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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-05-01 18:50:44 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-05-01 18:50:44 -0700 |
commit | 17ae69aba89dbfa2139b7f8024b757ab3cc42f59 (patch) | |
tree | d0d13c06cf9bb3024563036a9ba5213b06b454e0 /samples | |
parent | e6f0bf09f0669b3c2cd77fa906830123279a0a21 (diff) | |
parent | 3532b0b4352ce79400b0aa68414f1a0fc422b920 (diff) | |
download | linux-17ae69aba89dbfa2139b7f8024b757ab3cc42f59.tar.gz linux-17ae69aba89dbfa2139b7f8024b757ab3cc42f59.tar.bz2 linux-17ae69aba89dbfa2139b7f8024b757ab3cc42f59.zip |
Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
Diffstat (limited to 'samples')
-rw-r--r-- | samples/Kconfig | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | samples/Makefile | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | samples/landlock/.gitignore | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | samples/landlock/Makefile | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 238 |
5 files changed, 260 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/samples/Kconfig b/samples/Kconfig index e76cdfc50e25..b5a1a7aa7e23 100644 --- a/samples/Kconfig +++ b/samples/Kconfig @@ -124,6 +124,13 @@ config SAMPLE_HIDRAW bool "hidraw sample" depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL +config SAMPLE_LANDLOCK + bool "Landlock example" + depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL + help + Build a simple Landlock sandbox manager able to start a process + restricted by a user-defined filesystem access control policy. + config SAMPLE_PIDFD bool "pidfd sample" depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL diff --git a/samples/Makefile b/samples/Makefile index c3392a595e4b..087e0988ccc5 100644 --- a/samples/Makefile +++ b/samples/Makefile @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KDB) += kdb/ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KFIFO) += kfifo/ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KOBJECT) += kobject/ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KPROBES) += kprobes/ +subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_LANDLOCK) += landlock obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_LIVEPATCH) += livepatch/ subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_PIDFD) += pidfd obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_QMI_CLIENT) += qmi/ diff --git a/samples/landlock/.gitignore b/samples/landlock/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f43668b2d318 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/landlock/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +/sandboxer diff --git a/samples/landlock/Makefile b/samples/landlock/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5d601e51c2eb --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/landlock/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + +userprogs-always-y := sandboxer + +userccflags += -I usr/include + +.PHONY: all clean + +all: + $(MAKE) -C ../.. samples/landlock/ + +clean: + $(MAKE) -C ../.. M=samples/landlock/ clean diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7a15910d2171 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +/* + * Simple Landlock sandbox manager able to launch a process restricted by a + * user-defined filesystem access control policy. + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> + * Copyright © 2020 ANSSI + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <linux/landlock.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/prctl.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#ifndef landlock_create_ruleset +static inline int landlock_create_ruleset( + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const attr, + const size_t size, const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, attr, size, flags); +} +#endif + +#ifndef landlock_add_rule +static inline int landlock_add_rule(const int ruleset_fd, + const enum landlock_rule_type rule_type, + const void *const rule_attr, const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule, ruleset_fd, rule_type, + rule_attr, flags); +} +#endif + +#ifndef landlock_restrict_self +static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd, + const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, flags); +} +#endif + +#define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO" +#define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW" +#define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":" + +static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list) +{ + int i, num_paths = 0; + + if (env_path) { + num_paths++; + for (i = 0; env_path[i]; i++) { + if (env_path[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0]) + num_paths++; + } + } + *path_list = malloc(num_paths * sizeof(**path_list)); + for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) + (*path_list)[i] = strsep(&env_path, ENV_PATH_TOKEN); + + return num_paths; +} + +#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + +static int populate_ruleset( + const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd, + const __u64 allowed_access) +{ + int num_paths, i, ret = 1; + char *env_path_name; + const char **path_list = NULL; + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = { + .parent_fd = -1, + }; + + env_path_name = getenv(env_var); + if (!env_path_name) { + /* Prevents users to forget a setting. */ + fprintf(stderr, "Missing environment variable %s\n", env_var); + return 1; + } + env_path_name = strdup(env_path_name); + unsetenv(env_var); + num_paths = parse_path(env_path_name, &path_list); + if (num_paths == 1 && path_list[0][0] == '\0') { + /* + * Allows to not use all possible restrictions (e.g. use + * LL_FS_RO without LL_FS_RW). + */ + ret = 0; + goto out_free_name; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { + struct stat statbuf; + + path_beneath.parent_fd = open(path_list[i], O_PATH | + O_CLOEXEC); + if (path_beneath.parent_fd < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n", + path_list[i], + strerror(errno)); + goto out_free_name; + } + if (fstat(path_beneath.parent_fd, &statbuf)) { + close(path_beneath.parent_fd); + goto out_free_name; + } + path_beneath.allowed_access = allowed_access; + if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) + path_beneath.allowed_access &= ACCESS_FILE; + if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to update the ruleset with \"%s\": %s\n", + path_list[i], strerror(errno)); + close(path_beneath.parent_fd); + goto out_free_name; + } + close(path_beneath.parent_fd); + } + ret = 0; + +out_free_name: + free(env_path_name); + return ret; +} + +#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR) + +#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM) + +int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) +{ + const char *cmd_path; + char *const *cmd_argv; + int ruleset_fd; + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | + ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE, + }; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s <cmd> [args]...\n\n", + ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]); + fprintf(stderr, "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, " + "each separated by a colon:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only way.\n", + ENV_FS_RO_NAME); + fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n", + ENV_FS_RW_NAME); + fprintf(stderr, "\nexample:\n" + "%s=\"/bin:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" " + "%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" " + "%s bash -i\n", + ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]); + return 1; + } + + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + if (ruleset_fd < 0) { + const int err = errno; + + perror("Failed to create a ruleset"); + switch (err) { + case ENOSYS: + fprintf(stderr, "Hint: Landlock is not supported by the current kernel. " + "To support it, build the kernel with " + "CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y and prepend " + "\"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM.\n"); + break; + case EOPNOTSUPP: + fprintf(stderr, "Hint: Landlock is currently disabled. " + "It can be enabled in the kernel configuration by " + "prepending \"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM, " + "or at boot time by setting the same content to the " + "\"lsm\" kernel parameter.\n"); + break; + } + return 1; + } + if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, + ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ)) { + goto err_close_ruleset; + } + if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, + ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE)) { + goto err_close_ruleset; + } + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { + perror("Failed to restrict privileges"); + goto err_close_ruleset; + } + if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) { + perror("Failed to enforce ruleset"); + goto err_close_ruleset; + } + close(ruleset_fd); + + cmd_path = argv[1]; + cmd_argv = argv + 1; + execvpe(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp); + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute \"%s\": %s\n", cmd_path, + strerror(errno)); + fprintf(stderr, "Hint: access to the binary, the interpreter or " + "shared libraries may be denied.\n"); + return 1; + +err_close_ruleset: + close(ruleset_fd); + return 1; +} |