diff options
author | John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | 2012-04-12 16:47:51 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 2012-04-14 11:13:18 +1000 |
commit | c29bceb3967398cf2ac8bf8edf9634fdb722df7d (patch) | |
tree | 9feaa5a8b78812e48fa9b4e9b8b939f06390bee8 /security/apparmor | |
parent | 259e5e6c75a910f3b5e656151dc602f53f9d7548 (diff) | |
download | linux-c29bceb3967398cf2ac8bf8edf9634fdb722df7d.tar.gz linux-c29bceb3967398cf2ac8bf8edf9634fdb722df7d.tar.bz2 linux-c29bceb3967398cf2ac8bf8edf9634fdb722df7d.zip |
Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS
Add support for AppArmor to explicitly fail requested domain transitions
if NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and the task is not unconfined.
Transitions from unconfined are still allowed because this always results
in a reduction of privileges.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
v18: new acked-by, new description
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/domain.c | 39 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 18c88d06e881..b81ea10a17a3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -360,10 +360,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->cred_prepared) return 0; - /* XXX: no_new_privs is not usable with AppArmor yet */ - if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) - return -EPERM; - cxt = bprm->cred->security; BUG_ON(!cxt); @@ -398,6 +394,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name); if (!new_profile) goto cleanup; + /* + * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed + * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results + * in a further reduction of permissions. + */ goto apply; } @@ -459,6 +460,16 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* fail exec */ error = -EACCES; + /* + * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then + * fail the exec. + */ + if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) { + aa_put_profile(new_profile); + error = -EPERM; + goto cleanup; + } + if (!new_profile) goto audit; @@ -613,6 +624,14 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest) const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL; int error = 0; + /* + * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs. + * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not + * available. + */ + if (current->no_new_privs) + return -EPERM; + /* released below */ cred = get_current_cred(); cxt = cred->security; @@ -754,6 +773,18 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec, cxt = cred->security; profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + /* + * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs + * and not unconfined. + * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when + * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction + * of permissions. + */ + if (current->no_new_privs && !unconfined(profile)) { + put_cred(cred); + return -EPERM; + } + if (ns_name) { /* released below */ ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name); |