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| author | Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> | 2017-10-11 20:57:07 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 2017-10-20 15:22:44 +1100 |
| commit | fc7eadf768a3e2c062e52eea89b52a0076d53b0c (patch) | |
| tree | 1e8fc73f8d0ab14eda333285b40ee657e498eb7e /security/commoncap.c | |
| parent | 4c7e715fc87b6f8b652363b3515b48b3822c5b5f (diff) | |
| download | linux-fc7eadf768a3e2c062e52eea89b52a0076d53b0c.tar.gz linux-fc7eadf768a3e2c062e52eea89b52a0076d53b0c.tar.bz2 linux-fc7eadf768a3e2c062e52eea89b52a0076d53b0c.zip | |
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 20 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 4c9af6ef24b6..13661d34f842 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size) static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, - bool *has_cap) + bool *has_fcap) { struct cred *new = bprm->cred; unsigned i; @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, *effective = true; if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) - *has_cap = true; + *has_fcap = true; CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i]; @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being * constructed by execve(). */ -static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap) +static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap) { int rc = 0; struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; @@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c goto out; } - rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap); + rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap); if (rc == -EINVAL) printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", __func__, rc, bprm->filename); @@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ out: * set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is * updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set. */ -static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, +static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. */ - if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { + if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); return; } @@ -759,20 +759,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid; + bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid; int ret; kuid_t root_uid; if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old))) return -EPERM; - ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); + ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap); if (ret < 0) return ret; root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); - handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid); + handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) @@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; /* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */ - if (has_cap || is_setid) + if (has_fcap || is_setid) cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); /* |