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author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2016-02-29 19:52:05 -0500 |
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committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2016-05-01 09:23:52 -0400 |
commit | 05d1a717ec0430c916a749b94eb90ab74bbfa356 (patch) | |
tree | d5283278e18669da5c76e41d1d33d58787dc61bc /security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | |
parent | 42a4c603198f0d45b7aa936d3ac6ba1b8bd14a1b (diff) | |
download | linux-05d1a717ec0430c916a749b94eb90ab74bbfa356.tar.gz linux-05d1a717ec0430c916a749b94eb90ab74bbfa356.tar.bz2 linux-05d1a717ec0430c916a749b94eb90ab74bbfa356.zip |
ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
Commit 3034a14 "ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files"
stopped identifying empty files as new files. However new empty files
can be created using the mknodat syscall. On systems with IMA-appraisal
enabled, these empty files are not labeled with security.ima extended
attributes properly, preventing them from subsequently being opened in
order to write the file data contents. This patch defines a new hook
named ima_post_path_mknod() to mark these empty files, created using
mknodat, as new in order to allow the file data contents to be written.
In addition, files with security.ima xattrs containing a file signature
are considered "immutable" and can not be modified. The file contents
need to be written, before signing the file. This patch relaxes this
requirement for new files, allowing the file signature to be written
before the file contents.
Changelog:
- defer identifying files with signatures stored as security.ima
(based on Dmitry Rozhkov's comments)
- removing tests (eg. dentry, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_size == 0)
(based on Al's review)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index d2f28a0c8614..1bcbc12e03d9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -275,6 +275,11 @@ out: xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint)) status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + } else if ((inode->i_size == 0) && + (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) && + (xattr_value && + xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { + status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); |