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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2014-03-14 17:44:49 +0000
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2014-03-14 17:44:49 +0000
commitf5895943d91b41b0368830cdb6eaffb8eda0f4c8 (patch)
tree7f2306521dae27b9beb0be25942d27ee6d9a328a /security/keys
parentc60f7d5a8e7c639de5d9dfe07e1e91d302d506e4 (diff)
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KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the permissions mask flags used in key->perm. Whilst we're at it: (1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h. (2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related directly to that. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h11
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c44
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/persistent.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c2
7 files changed, 35 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 80b2aac4f50c..5f20da01fd8d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -176,20 +176,11 @@ extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
/*
* Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way.
*/
-static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key_perm_t perm)
+static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, unsigned perm)
{
return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
}
-/* required permissions */
-#define KEY_VIEW 0x01 /* require permission to view attributes */
-#define KEY_READ 0x02 /* require permission to read content */
-#define KEY_WRITE 0x04 /* require permission to update / modify */
-#define KEY_SEARCH 0x08 /* require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
-#define KEY_LINK 0x10 /* require permission to link */
-#define KEY_SETATTR 0x20 /* require permission to change attributes */
-#define KEY_ALL 0x3f /* all the above permissions */
-
/*
* Authorisation record for request_key().
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 6e21c11e48bc..2048a110e7f1 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
int ret;
/* need write permission on the key to update it */
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
* to modify the keyring */
- ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+ ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error_link_end;
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
key_check(key);
/* the key must be writable */
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index cee72ce64222..cd5bd0cef25d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
}
/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
- KEY_WRITE);
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
long ret;
lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
}
/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -365,12 +365,12 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
if (ret != -EACCES)
goto error;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
kenter("%d", id);
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
@@ -470,13 +470,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
}
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
long ret;
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error;
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
char *tmpbuf;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
* authorisation token handy */
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
}
/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
- keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+ keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
goto error2;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
- KEY_WRITE);
+ KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
/* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
if (dest_ref) {
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (ret < 0)
goto error6;
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* see if we can read it directly */
- ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
+ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
if (ret == 0)
goto can_read_key;
if (ret != -EACCES)
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
if (ringid > 0) {
- dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dkref))
return PTR_ERR(dkref);
*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
long ret;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
- KEY_SETATTR);
+ KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
/* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
* if we have the authorisation token handy */
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
char *context;
long ret;
- key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
struct cred *cred;
int ret;
- keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+ keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 2fb2576dc644..9cf2575f0d97 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
/* key must have search permissions */
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
- ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) {
+ ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) {
ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
goto skipped;
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ ascend_to_node:
/* Search a nested keyring */
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
- ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+ ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* stack the current position */
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
- err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+ err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
if (!skip_perm_check &&
key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
- KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+ KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
continue;
/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index efcc0c855a0d..732cc0beffdf 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
* permissions bits or the LSM check.
*/
int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm)
+ unsigned perm)
{
struct key *key;
key_perm_t kperm;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ use_these_perms:
if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
kperm |= key->perm >> 24;
- kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_ALL;
+ kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_NEED_ALL;
if (kperm != perm)
return -EACCES;
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
index 0ad3ee283781..c9fae5ea89fe 100644
--- a/security/keys/persistent.c
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref);
found:
- ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_LINK);
+ ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_NEED_LINK);
if (ret == 0) {
persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref);
ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid)
}
/* There must be a destination keyring */
- dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+ dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref))
return PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) {
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 88e9a466940f..d3f6f2fd21db 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
* - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
* access to __current_cred() safe
*/
- rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW);
+ rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;