Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
     of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
     is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
     cryptographically via dm-verity).

     This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
     default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).

   - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
     Lots of general fixes and updates.

   - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
     finit_module().  Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
     checks.  Apply execstack check on thread stacks"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
  LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
  Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
  seccomp: Fix comment typo
  ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
  ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
  vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
  fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
  selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
  selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
  LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
  fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
  Yama: consolidate error reporting
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
  string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
  selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
  selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
  selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
  selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
  ...

5 files changed, 127 insertions, 60 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3140efa76a75..a86d537eb79b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
 
 	might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
 
-	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INVALID) {
+	if (ss_initialized && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
 		if (!may_sleep)
 			return -ECHILD;
 
@@ -297,6 +297,13 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
 	return inode->i_security;
 }
 
+static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	return inode->i_security;
+}
+
 /*
  * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
  */
@@ -687,7 +694,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 	const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 	struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
-	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = backing_inode_security(root);
+	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
 	u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 	u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 	char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
@@ -730,6 +737,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	    && (num_opts == 0))
 		goto out;
 
+	root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
+
 	/*
 	 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 	 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
@@ -1623,7 +1632,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
-			       int cap, int audit)
+			       int cap, int audit, bool initns)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct av_decision avd;
@@ -1637,10 +1646,10 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
 	case 0:
-		sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
+		sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
 		break;
 	case 1:
-		sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
+		sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
 		break;
 	default:
 		printk(KERN_ERR
@@ -1782,7 +1791,6 @@ static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
 					 u32 *_new_isid)
 {
 	const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
-	const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 
 	if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
@@ -1792,6 +1800,7 @@ static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
 		   tsec->create_sid) {
 		*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
 	} else {
+		const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
 		return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
 					       name, _new_isid);
 	}
@@ -2076,7 +2085,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 	u32 sid = task_sid(to);
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -2095,6 +2104,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
 
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
 			    &ad);
 }
@@ -2143,7 +2153,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 			   int cap, int audit)
 {
-	return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
+	return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
 }
 
 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -2221,7 +2231,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
 	rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
-					SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+				 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
 
@@ -2230,6 +2240,20 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 
 /* binprm security operations */
 
+static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	u32 sid = 0;
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
+	if (tracer)
+		sid = task_sid(tracer);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return sid;
+}
+
 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 			    const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
 			    const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
@@ -2351,18 +2375,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
 		if (bprm->unsafe &
 		    (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
-			struct task_struct *tracer;
-			struct task_security_struct *sec;
-			u32 ptsid = 0;
-
-			rcu_read_lock();
-			tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
-			if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
-				sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
-				ptsid = sec->sid;
-			}
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-
+			u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(current);
 			if (ptsid != 0) {
 				rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
 						  SECCLASS_PROCESS,
@@ -3046,7 +3059,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				  const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
@@ -3065,6 +3078,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
 			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
 	if (rc)
@@ -3123,7 +3137,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 					int flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	u32 newsid;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -3140,6 +3154,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
 	isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 	isec->sid = newsid;
 	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
@@ -3181,7 +3196,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
 	u32 size;
 	int error;
 	char *context = NULL;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -3199,7 +3214,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
 			    SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 	if (!error)
 		error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
-					    SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+					    SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
 						      &size);
@@ -3220,7 +3236,7 @@ out_nofree:
 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 				     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
 	u32 newsid;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -3309,7 +3325,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
 	u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
@@ -3333,6 +3349,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
 
+	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
 			requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
 out:
@@ -3374,7 +3391,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	case KDSKBENT:
 	case KDSKBSENT:
 		error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
-					    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+					    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
 		break;
 
 	/* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -3463,8 +3480,9 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
 			rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
 		} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
-			   vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
-			   vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
+			   ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
+			     vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
+			    vma_is_stack_for_task(vma, current))) {
 			rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
 		} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
 			/*
@@ -3720,6 +3738,52 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
 }
 
+static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	/* init_module */
+	if (file == NULL)
+		return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+					SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
+
+	/* finit_module */
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+	fsec = file->f_security;
+	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+				SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+				    enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case READING_MODULE:
+		rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
 	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -4599,6 +4663,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 {
 	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
 	u16 family;
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
 	if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
 		family = PF_INET;
@@ -4609,9 +4674,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 	else
 		goto out;
 
-	if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
-		selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
-	else if (skb)
+	if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
+		isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+		peer_secid = isec->sid;
+	} else if (skb)
 		selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
 
 out:
@@ -5676,7 +5742,6 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 			       char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-	struct task_struct *tracer;
 	struct cred *new;
 	u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
 	int error;
@@ -5783,14 +5848,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 
 		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
 		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
-		ptsid = 0;
-		rcu_read_lock();
-		tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
-		if (tracer)
-			ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
-		rcu_read_unlock();
-
-		if (tracer) {
+		ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(p);
+		if (ptsid != 0) {
 			error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					     PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 			if (error)
@@ -6021,6 +6080,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index ef83c4b85a33..1f1f4b2f6018 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -12,6 +12,18 @@
 #define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
 	    "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
 
+#define COMMON_CAP_PERMS  "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search", \
+	    "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap", \
+	    "linux_immutable", "net_bind_service", "net_broadcast", \
+	    "net_admin", "net_raw", "ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module", \
+	    "sys_rawio", "sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin", \
+	    "sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time", \
+	    "sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write", \
+	    "audit_control", "setfcap"
+
+#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS  "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
+		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+
 /*
  * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
  *	 and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
@@ -32,16 +44,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "setsockcreate", NULL } },
 	{ "system",
 	  { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
-	    "syslog_console", "module_request", NULL } },
+	    "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
 	{ "capability",
-	  { "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search",
-	    "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap",
-	    "linux_immutable", "net_bind_service", "net_broadcast",
-	    "net_admin", "net_raw", "ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module",
-	    "sys_rawio", "sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin",
-	    "sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time",
-	    "sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write",
-	    "audit_control", "setfcap", NULL } },
+	  { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "filesystem",
 	  { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
 	    "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod",
@@ -150,12 +155,15 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
 	{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
 	{ "capability2",
-	  { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
-	    "audit_read", NULL } },
+	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
 	{ "tun_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
 	{ "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer",
 		      NULL } },
+	{ "cap_userns",
+	  { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "cap2_userns",
+	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ NULL }
   };
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
index 67ce7a8d8301..ff4fddca9050 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
 
 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
 
-int security_get_bool_value(int bool);
+int security_get_bool_value(int index);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index a2ae05414ba1..c21e135460a5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ struct task_security_struct {
 };
 
 enum label_initialized {
-	LABEL_MISSING,		/* not initialized */
-	LABEL_INITIALIZED,	/* inizialized */
-	LABEL_INVALID		/* invalid */
+	LABEL_INVALID,		/* invalid or not initialized */
+	LABEL_INITIALIZED	/* initialized */
 };
 
 struct inode_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ebda97333f1b..89df64672b89 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2696,7 +2696,7 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
+int security_get_bool_value(int index)
 {
 	int rc;
 	int len;
@@ -2705,10 +2705,10 @@ int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
 
 	rc = -EFAULT;
 	len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
-	if (bool >= len)
+	if (index >= len)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
+	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
 out:
 	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;