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| author | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2012-06-05 15:28:30 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2012-07-13 15:49:23 -0700 |
| commit | 1880eff77e7a7cb46c68fae7cfa33f72f0a6e70e (patch) | |
| tree | fc4b9a2ca7c643a30cbe2260886fdbd969bf2b50 /security/smack/smack_lsm.c | |
| parent | eb982cb4cf6405b97ea1f9e1d10864981f269d46 (diff) | |
| download | linux-1880eff77e7a7cb46c68fae7cfa33f72f0a6e70e.tar.gz linux-1880eff77e7a7cb46c68fae7cfa33f72f0a6e70e.tar.bz2 linux-1880eff77e7a7cb46c68fae7cfa33f72f0a6e70e.zip | |
Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN
Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme,
using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to
determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or
change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an
additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set
by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack
label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE.
This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected
by the onlycap mechanism.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/smack/smack_lsm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 29bb4e7fa5e8..8221514cc997 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) int rc = 0; char *sp = smk_of_current(); - if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known) @@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; /* * check label validity here so import wont fail on @@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, smk_import(value, size) == NULL) rc = -EINVAL; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; } else rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); @@ -1716,7 +1716,8 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) * state into account in the decision as well as * the smack value. */ - if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || + has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = 0; /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */ out_log: @@ -2717,7 +2718,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (p != current) return -EPERM; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) @@ -2780,7 +2781,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); #endif - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); /* @@ -2816,7 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk); #endif - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); return rc; |