Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Nothing groundbreaking for this kernel, just cleanups and fixes, and a
  couple of Smack enhancements."

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (21 commits)
  Smack: Maintainer Record
  Smack: don't show empty rules when /smack/load or /smack/load2 is read
  Smack: user access check bounds
  Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN
  Smack: fix smack_new_inode bogosities
  ima: audit is compiled only when enabled
  ima: ima_initialized is set only if successful
  ima: add policy for pseudo fs
  ima: remove unused cleanup functions
  ima: free securityfs violations file
  ima: use full pathnames in measurement list
  security: Fix nommu build.
  samples: seccomp: add .gitignore for untracked executables
  tpm: check the chip reference before using it
  TPM: fix memleak when register hardware fails
  TPM: chip disabled state erronously being reported as error
  MAINTAINERS: TPM maintainers' contacts update
  Merge branches 'next-queue' and 'next' into next
  Remove unused code from MPI library
  Revert "crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - additional sources (part 4)"
  ...

4 files changed, 51 insertions, 50 deletions

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index cc361b8f3d13..99b36124f712 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct superblock_smack {
 	char		*smk_hat;
 	char		*smk_default;
 	int		smk_initialized;
-	spinlock_t	smk_sblock;	/* for initialization */
 };
 
 struct socket_smack {
@@ -284,6 +283,19 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ */
+static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+	if (!capable(cap))
+		return 0;
+	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * logging functions
  */
 #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 9f3705e92712..db14689a21e0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -220,14 +220,9 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Return if a specific label has been designated as the
-	 * only one that gets privilege and current does not
-	 * have that label.
+	 * Allow for priviliged to override policy.
 	 */
-	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
-		goto out_audit;
-
-	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
 
 out_audit:
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ee0bb5735f35..8221514cc997 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
 	int rc = 0;
 	char *sp = smk_of_current();
 
-	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		return 0;
 
 	 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
@@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 	sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
 	sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
-	spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
 
 	sb->s_security = sbsp;
 
@@ -332,13 +331,10 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	char *commap;
 	char *nsp;
 
-	spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
-	if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
-		spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
+	if (sp->smk_initialized != 0)
 		return 0;
-	}
+
 	sp->smk_initialized = 1;
-	spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
 
 	for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
 		commap = strchr(op, ',');
@@ -825,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		/*
 		 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
@@ -835,7 +831,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		    smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 		if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
 		    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
@@ -931,7 +927,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
@@ -1720,7 +1716,8 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 	 * state into account in the decision as well as
 	 * the smack value.
 	 */
-	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) ||
+	    has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
 	/* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
  out_log:
@@ -2721,7 +2718,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 	if (p != current)
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
@@ -2784,7 +2781,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
 #endif
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
 	/*
@@ -2820,7 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
 #endif
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 1810c9a4ed48..d31e6d957c21 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -215,28 +215,27 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list,
  * @access: access string
  * @rule: Smack rule
  * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ * @len: label length limit
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure
  */
 static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 				const char *access, struct smack_rule *rule,
-				int import)
+				int import, int len)
 {
-	int rc = -1;
-	int done;
 	const char *cp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	if (import) {
-		rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, 0);
+		rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len);
 		if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
 			return -1;
 
-		rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, 0);
+		rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, len);
 		if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
 			return -1;
 	} else {
-		cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, 0);
+		cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
 		if (cp == NULL)
 			return -1;
 		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
@@ -245,7 +244,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 			return -1;
 		rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
 
-		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, 0);
+		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
 		if (cp == NULL)
 			return -1;
 		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
@@ -257,7 +256,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 
 	rule->smk_access = 0;
 
-	for (cp = access, done = 0; *cp && !done; cp++) {
+	for (cp = access; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
 		switch (*cp) {
 		case '-':
 			break;
@@ -282,13 +281,11 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 			rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
 			break;
 		default:
-			done = 1;
-			break;
+			return 0;
 		}
 	}
-	rc = 0;
 
-	return rc;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -304,7 +301,8 @@ static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule, int import)
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = smk_fill_rule(data, data + SMK_LABELLEN,
-			   data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import);
+			   data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import,
+			   SMK_LABELLEN);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -340,7 +338,7 @@ static int smk_parse_long_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule,
 		goto free_out_o;
 
 	if (sscanf(data, "%s %s %s", subject, object, access) == 3)
-		rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import);
+		rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import, 0);
 
 	kfree(access);
 free_out_o:
@@ -520,6 +518,9 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 	if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
 		return;
 
+	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+		return;
+
 	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object);
 
 	seq_putc(s, ' ');
@@ -534,8 +535,6 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 		seq_putc(s, 'a');
 	if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
 		seq_putc(s, 't');
-	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
-		seq_putc(s, '-');
 
 	seq_putc(s, '\n');
 }
@@ -595,13 +594,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-
 	/*
 	 * Must have privilege.
 	 * No partial writes.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -787,7 +785,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * No partial writes.
 	 * Enough data must be present.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1090,7 +1088,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
 	 * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (*ppos != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1267,7 +1265,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[80];
 	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1334,7 +1332,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[80];
 	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1412,7 +1410,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[80];
 	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1503,7 +1501,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *data;
 	int rc = count;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1586,7 +1584,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
 	int rc = count;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
@@ -1664,7 +1662,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char temp[32];
 	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -1885,7 +1883,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	/*
 	 * Must have privilege.
 	 */
-	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
@@ -2051,7 +2049,6 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	}
 
 	root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
-	root_inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known);
 
 	return 0;
 }