diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-03-16 09:15:43 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-03-16 09:15:43 -0700 |
| commit | 0f6e0e8448a16d8d22119ce91d8dd24b44865b51 (patch) | |
| tree | 7c295c02db035fc6a0b867465911a2bc9dc6b1ef /security | |
| parent | 0d2ecee2bdb2a19d04bc5cefac0f86e790f1aad4 (diff) | |
| parent | a002951c97ff8da49938c982a4c236bf2fafdc9f (diff) | |
| download | linux-0f6e0e8448a16d8d22119ce91d8dd24b44865b51.tar.gz linux-0f6e0e8448a16d8d22119ce91d8dd24b44865b51.tar.bz2 linux-0f6e0e8448a16d8d22119ce91d8dd24b44865b51.zip | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits)
AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c
AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly
KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE
KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code
KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted
KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro
AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read
SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM
SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket
SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute
SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class
TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.
Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"
selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions
selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting
selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer
selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm
ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure
IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
33 files changed, 1243 insertions, 578 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index f204869399ea..2dafe50a2e25 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -6,19 +6,47 @@ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ resource.o sid.o file.o -clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h + +# Build a lower case string table of capability names +# Transforms lines from +# #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1 +# to +# [1] = "dac_override", quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN $@ -cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ +cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ + sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \ + -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ + +# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names. +# Transforms lines from +# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */ +# to +# [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack", +# +# and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps +# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h Thi is +# required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal +# ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT. +# Transforms lines from +# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */ +# to +# RLIMIT_STACK, quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN $@ -cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n --e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+RLIMIT_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ ; echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+\\(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/\\1,/p" $< >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ +cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ + sed $< >> $@ -r -n \ + -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ ;\ + echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\ + sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\ + echo "};" >> $@ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h $(call cmd,make-caps) -$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h - $(call cmd,make-af) $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h $(call cmd,make-rlim) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index b7106f192b75..d21a427a35ae 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -693,11 +693,9 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); -#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); -#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 2a5df2b7da83..ab3d807accc3 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -12,11 +12,6 @@ #include <linux/security.h> -static int cap_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) -{ - return 0; -} - static int cap_syslog(int type) { return 0; @@ -59,6 +54,11 @@ static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) return 0; } +static int cap_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +{ + return 0; +} + static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) { return 0; @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static void cap_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) } static int cap_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - char **name, void **value, size_t *len) + const struct qstr *qstr, char **name, + void **value, size_t *len) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -880,7 +881,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sysctl); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory); @@ -892,6 +892,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_free_security); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_remount); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index ac79032bdf23..08408bd71462 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -110,8 +110,7 @@ struct ima_iint_cache { }; /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, - int mask, int function); +int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index d3963de6003d..da36d2c085a4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -105,20 +105,13 @@ err_out: * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * - * Must be called with iint->mutex held. - * - * Return 0 to measure. Return 1 if already measured. - * For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other - * error, return an error code. + * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, + * or other error, return an error code. */ -int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, - int mask, int function) +int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function) { int must_measure; - if (iint && iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) - return 1; - must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask); return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c index c442e47b6785..4ae73040ab7b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c @@ -137,11 +137,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - if (inode->i_readcount) - printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %u\n", __func__, inode->i_readcount); - - inode->i_readcount = 0; - if (!IS_IMA(inode)) return; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 203de979d305..39d66dc2b8e9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -36,67 +36,17 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str) } __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); -struct ima_imbalance { - struct hlist_node node; - unsigned long fsmagic; -}; - -/* - * ima_limit_imbalance - emit one imbalance message per filesystem type - * - * Maintain list of filesystem types that do not measure files properly. - * Return false if unknown, true if known. - */ -static bool ima_limit_imbalance(struct file *file) -{ - static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_imbalance_lock); - static HLIST_HEAD(ima_imbalance_list); - - struct super_block *sb = file->f_dentry->d_sb; - struct ima_imbalance *entry; - struct hlist_node *node; - bool found = false; - - rcu_read_lock(); - hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, node, &ima_imbalance_list, node) { - if (entry->fsmagic == sb->s_magic) { - found = true; - break; - } - } - rcu_read_unlock(); - if (found) - goto out; - - entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS); - if (!entry) - goto out; - entry->fsmagic = sb->s_magic; - spin_lock(&ima_imbalance_lock); - /* - * we could have raced and something else might have added this fs - * to the list, but we don't really care - */ - hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->node, &ima_imbalance_list); - spin_unlock(&ima_imbalance_lock); - printk(KERN_INFO "IMA: unmeasured files on fsmagic: %lX\n", - entry->fsmagic); -out: - return found; -} - /* - * ima_counts_get - increment file counts + * ima_rdwr_violation_check * - * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only - * invalidate the PCR for measured files: + * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files: * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, * could result in a file measurement error. * */ -void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) +static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) { struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; @@ -104,32 +54,25 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) int rc; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; - if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized) return; - spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); - - if (!ima_initialized) - goto out; + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */ if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { - if (inode->i_readcount && IS_IMA(inode)) + if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) send_tomtou = true; goto out; } - rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); + rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); if (rc < 0) goto out; if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) send_writers = true; out: - /* remember the vfs deals with i_writecount */ - if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) - inode->i_readcount++; - - spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); if (send_tomtou) ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr", @@ -139,71 +82,25 @@ out: "open_writers"); } -/* - * Decrement ima counts - */ -static void ima_dec_counts(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - mode_t mode = file->f_mode; - - assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock); - - if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) { - if (unlikely(inode->i_readcount == 0)) { - if (!ima_limit_imbalance(file)) { - printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%u)\n", - __func__, inode->i_readcount); - dump_stack(); - } - return; - } - inode->i_readcount--; - } -} - static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { mode_t mode = file->f_mode; - BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex)); - assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock); - + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); if (mode & FMODE_WRITE && atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 && iint->version != inode->i_version) iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED; -} - -static void ima_file_free_iint(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, - struct file *file) -{ - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); - - ima_dec_counts(inode, file); - ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); - - spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); } -static void ima_file_free_noiint(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); - - ima_dec_counts(inode, file); - - spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); -} - /** * ima_file_free - called on __fput() * @file: pointer to file structure being freed * - * Flag files that changed, based on i_version; - * and decrement the i_readcount. + * Flag files that changed, based on i_version */ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { @@ -214,12 +111,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) return; iint = ima_iint_find(inode); + if (!iint) + return; - if (iint) - ima_file_free_iint(iint, inode, file); - else - ima_file_free_noiint(inode, file); - + ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, @@ -232,7 +127,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return 0; - rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, mask, function); + rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function); if (rc != 0) return rc; retry: @@ -246,7 +141,7 @@ retry: mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function); + rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0; if (rc != 0) goto out; @@ -317,6 +212,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { int rc; + ima_rdwr_violation_check(file); rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), FILE_CHECK); diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c index 07a5f35e3970..338b510e9027 100644 --- a/security/keys/compat.c +++ b/security/keys/compat.c @@ -12,9 +12,52 @@ #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/keyctl.h> #include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> #include "internal.h" /* + * Instantiate a key with the specified compatibility multipart payload and + * link the key into the destination keyring if one is given. + * + * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to + * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. + * + * If successful, 0 will be returned. + */ +long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( + key_serial_t id, + const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov, + unsigned ioc, + key_serial_t ringid) +{ + struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack; + long ret; + + if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0) + goto no_payload; + + ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, + ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), + iovstack, &iov); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret == 0) + goto no_payload_free; + + ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid); + + if (iov != iovstack) + kfree(iov); + return ret; + +no_payload_free: + if (iov != iovstack) + kfree(iov); +no_payload: + return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid); +} + +/* * The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs * * This should only be called if the 64-bit arch uses weird pointers in 32-bit @@ -85,6 +128,13 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option, case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT: return keyctl_session_to_parent(); + case KEYCTL_REJECT: + return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); + + case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV: + return compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( + arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4, arg5); + default: return -EOPNOTSUPP; } diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted.c index 9e7e4ce3fae8..69907a58a683 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted.c @@ -765,8 +765,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t asciiblob_len; int ret; - epayload = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data, - rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem)); + epayload = rcu_dereference_key(key); /* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */ asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1 diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index a52aa7c88b41..07a025f81902 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -214,6 +214,14 @@ extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t); extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void); +extern long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, unsigned, key_serial_t); +extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t, + const struct iovec __user *, + unsigned, key_serial_t); + +extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t, + const struct iovec __user *, + unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t); /* * Debugging key validation diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 1c2d43dc5107..f7f9d93f08d9 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -249,6 +249,14 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, if (!desc || !*desc) goto error; + if (type->vet_description) { + ret = type->vet_description(desc); + if (ret < 0) { + key = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error; + } + } + desclen = strlen(desc) + 1; quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen; @@ -503,26 +511,29 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link); /** - * key_negate_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring. + * key_reject_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring. * @key: The key to instantiate. * @timeout: The timeout on the negative key. + * @error: The error to return when the key is hit. * @keyring: Keyring to create a link in on success (or NULL). * @authkey: The authorisation token permitting instantiation. * * Negatively instantiate a key that's in the uninstantiated state and, if - * successful, set its timeout and link it in to the destination keyring if one - * is supplied. The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage - * collected after the timeout expires. + * successful, set its timeout and stored error and link it in to the + * destination keyring if one is supplied. The key and any links to the key + * will be automatically garbage collected after the timeout expires. * * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing - * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires. + * them to return the stored error code (typically ENOKEY) until the negative + * key expires. * * If successful, 0 is returned, the authorisation token is revoked and anyone * waiting for the key is woken up. If the key was already instantiated, * -EBUSY will be returned. */ -int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key, +int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, unsigned timeout, + unsigned error, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey) { @@ -548,6 +559,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key, atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); + key->type_data.reject_error = -error; now = current_kernel_time(); key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); @@ -577,8 +589,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key, return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret; } - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_negate_and_link); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_reject_and_link); /* * Garbage collect keys in process context so that we don't have to disable diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 31a0fd8189f1..427fddcaeb19 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -913,6 +913,21 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key) } /* + * Copy the iovec data from userspace + */ +static long copy_from_user_iovec(void *buffer, const struct iovec *iov, + unsigned ioc) +{ + for (; ioc > 0; ioc--) { + if (copy_from_user(buffer, iov->iov_base, iov->iov_len) != 0) + return -EFAULT; + buffer += iov->iov_len; + iov++; + } + return 0; +} + +/* * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the * destination keyring if one is given. * @@ -921,10 +936,11 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key) * * If successful, 0 will be returned. */ -long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id, - const void __user *_payload, - size_t plen, - key_serial_t ringid) +long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id, + const struct iovec *payload_iov, + unsigned ioc, + size_t plen, + key_serial_t ringid) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct request_key_auth *rka; @@ -953,7 +969,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id, /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ payload = NULL; - if (_payload) { + if (payload_iov) { ret = -ENOMEM; payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!payload) { @@ -965,8 +981,8 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id, goto error; } - ret = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0) + ret = copy_from_user_iovec(payload, payload_iov, ioc); + if (ret < 0) goto error2; } @@ -997,6 +1013,72 @@ error: } /* + * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the + * destination keyring if one is given. + * + * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to + * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. + * + * If successful, 0 will be returned. + */ +long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id, + const void __user *_payload, + size_t plen, + key_serial_t ringid) +{ + if (_payload && plen) { + struct iovec iov[1] = { + [0].iov_base = (void __user *)_payload, + [0].iov_len = plen + }; + + return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, 1, plen, ringid); + } + + return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid); +} + +/* + * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into + * the destination keyring if one is given. + * + * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to + * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. + * + * If successful, 0 will be returned. + */ +long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id, + const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov, + unsigned ioc, + key_serial_t ringid) +{ + struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack; + long ret; + + if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0) + goto no_payload; + + ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, + ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret == 0) + goto no_payload_free; + + ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid); + + if (iov != iovstack) + kfree(iov); + return ret; + +no_payload_free: + if (iov != iovstack) + kfree(iov); +no_payload: + return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid); +} + +/* * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link * the key into the destination keyring if one is given. * @@ -1013,12 +1095,42 @@ error: */ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid) { + return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid); +} + +/* + * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error + * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given. + * + * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to + * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. + * + * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected + * after the timeout expires. + * + * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing + * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires. + * + * If successful, 0 will be returned. + */ +long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error, + key_serial_t ringid) +{ const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct request_key_auth *rka; struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring; long ret; - kenter("%d,%u,%d", id, timeout, ringid); + kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid); + + /* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */ + if (error <= 0 || + error >= MAX_ERRNO || + error == ERESTARTSYS || + error == ERESTARTNOINTR || + error == ERESTARTNOHAND || + error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) + return -EINVAL; /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been * assumed before calling this */ @@ -1038,7 +1150,7 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid) goto error; /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */ - ret = key_negate_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, + ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error, dest_keyring, instkey); key_put(dest_keyring); @@ -1492,6 +1604,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT: return keyctl_session_to_parent(); + case KEYCTL_REJECT: + return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2, + (unsigned) arg3, + (unsigned) arg4, + (key_serial_t) arg5); + + case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV: + return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( + (key_serial_t) arg2, + (const struct iovec __user *) arg3, + (unsigned) arg4, + (key_serial_t) arg5); + default: return -EOPNOTSUPP; } diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 5620f084dede..cdd2f3f88c88 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, goto error_2; if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) goto error_2; - key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error); if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) goto error_2; goto found; @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ descend: /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { - err = -ENOKEY; + err = key->type_data.reject_error; continue; } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index a3dc0d460def..df3c0417ee40 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr) if (ret < 0) return ret; if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) - return -ENOKEY; + return key->type_data.reject_error; return key_validate(key); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 83fc92e297cd..c99b9368368c 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1076,8 +1076,7 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, char *bufp; int i; - p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data, - rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem)); + p = rcu_dereference_key(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 02807fb16340..c6ca8662a468 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -184,8 +184,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) struct user_key_payload *upayload; long ret; - upayload = rcu_dereference_protected( - key->payload.data, rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem)); + upayload = rcu_dereference_key(key); ret = upayload->datalen; /* we can return the data as is */ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index bb33ecadcf95..bab9b23c3ff4 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -181,11 +181,6 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) return ret; } -int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op) -{ - return security_ops->sysctl(table, op); -} - int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) { return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb); @@ -271,6 +266,11 @@ int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data); +int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +{ + return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data); +} + int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) { return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data); @@ -335,11 +335,13 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) } int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - char **name, void **value, size_t *len) + const struct qstr *qstr, char **name, + void **value, size_t *len) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, name, value, len); + return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value, + len); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); @@ -359,6 +361,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) return 0; return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { @@ -373,6 +376,7 @@ int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) return 0; return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name) @@ -399,6 +403,7 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); int security_path_truncate(struct path *path) { diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index c8d699270687..d52a92507412 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -24,9 +24,11 @@ */ #include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kd.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/ext2_fs.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> @@ -36,14 +38,15 @@ #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fdtable.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/mount.h> -#include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> #include <linux/tty.h> @@ -70,7 +73,6 @@ #include <net/ipv6.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/personality.h> -#include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/selinux.h> @@ -1120,39 +1122,35 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc } #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS -static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, +static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass, u32 *sid) { - int buflen, rc; - char *buffer, *path, *end; + int rc; + char *buffer, *path; buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!buffer) return -ENOMEM; - buflen = PAGE_SIZE; - end = buffer+buflen; - *--end = '\0'; - buflen--; - path = end-1; - *path = '/'; - while (de && de != de->parent) { - buflen -= de->namelen + 1; - if (buflen < 0) - break; - end -= de->namelen; - memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen); - *--end = '/'; - path = end; - de = de->parent; + path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE); + if (IS_ERR(path)) + rc = PTR_ERR(path); + else { + /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the + * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. + * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ + while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { + path[1] = '/'; + path++; + } + rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); } - rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); free_page((unsigned long)buffer); return rc; } #else -static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de, +static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass, u32 *sid) { @@ -1300,10 +1298,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, - sbsec->sid, - isec->sclass, - &sid); + rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid, + isec->sclass, NULL, &sid); if (rc) goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; @@ -1316,10 +1312,9 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { - struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); - if (proci->pde) { + if (opt_dentry) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde, + rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) @@ -1578,7 +1573,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, return rc; if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { - rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid); + rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, NULL, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; } @@ -1862,82 +1857,6 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit); } -static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid) -{ - int buflen, rc; - char *buffer, *path, *end; - - rc = -ENOMEM; - buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buffer) - goto out; - - buflen = PAGE_SIZE; - end = buffer+buflen; - *--end = '\0'; - buflen--; - path = end-1; - *path = '/'; - while (table) { - const char *name = table->procname; - size_t namelen = strlen(name); - buflen -= namelen + 1; - if (buflen < 0) - goto out_free; - end -= namelen; - memcpy(end, name, namelen); - *--end = '/'; - path = end; - table = table->parent; - } - buflen -= 4; - if (buflen < 0) - goto out_free; - end -= 4; - memcpy(end, "/sys", 4); - path = end; - rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid); -out_free: - free_page((unsigned long)buffer); -out: - return rc; -} - -static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op) -{ - int error = 0; - u32 av; - u32 tsid, sid; - int rc; - - sid = current_sid(); - - rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ? - SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid); - if (rc) { - /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */ - tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL; - } - - /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating - * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */ - if (op == 001) { - error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, - SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL); - } else { - av = 0; - if (op & 004) - av |= FILE__READ; - if (op & 002) - av |= FILE__WRITE; - if (av) - error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, - SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL); - } - - return error; -} - static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); @@ -2060,7 +1979,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, - SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid); + SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, + &new_tsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } @@ -2443,6 +2363,91 @@ out: return rc; } +static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +{ + int rc, i, *flags; + struct security_mnt_opts opts; + char *secdata, **mount_options; + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) + return 0; + + if (!data) + return 0; + + if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) + return 0; + + security_init_mnt_opts(&opts); + secdata = alloc_secdata(); + if (!secdata) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata); + if (rc) + goto out_free_secdata; + + rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts); + if (rc) + goto out_free_secdata; + + mount_options = opts.mnt_opts; + flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags; + + for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) { + u32 sid; + size_t len; + + if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) + continue; + len = strlen(mount_options[i]); + rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" + "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", + mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); + goto out_free_opts; + } + rc = -EINVAL; + switch (flags[i]) { + case FSCONTEXT_MNT: + if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) + goto out_bad_option; + break; + case CONTEXT_MNT: + if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) + goto out_bad_option; + break; + case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: { + struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; + root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security; + + if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) + goto out_bad_option; + break; + } + case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: + if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) + goto out_bad_option; + break; + default: + goto out_free_opts; + } + } + + rc = 0; +out_free_opts: + security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); +out_free_secdata: + free_secdata(secdata); + return rc; +out_bad_option: + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options " + "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, + sb->s_type->name); + goto out_free_opts; +} + static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); @@ -2509,8 +2514,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) } static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - char **name, void **value, - size_t *len) + const struct qstr *qstr, char **name, + void **value, size_t *len) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; @@ -2531,7 +2536,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), - &newsid); + qstr, &newsid); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " @@ -2932,16 +2937,47 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - u32 av = 0; + int error = 0; - if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) - av |= FILE__WRITE; - if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ) - av |= FILE__READ; - if (!av) - av = FILE__IOCTL; + switch (cmd) { + case FIONREAD: + /* fall through */ + case FIBMAP: + /* fall through */ + case FIGETBSZ: + /* fall through */ + case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS: + /* fall through */ + case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION: + error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR); + break; + + case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS: + /* fall through */ + case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION: + error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR); + break; + + /* sys_ioctl() checks */ + case FIONBIO: + /* fall through */ + case FIOASYNC: + error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); + break; - return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); + case KDSKBENT: + case KDSKBSENT: + error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, + SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + break; + + /* default case assumes that the command will go + * to the file's ioctl() function. + */ + default: + error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL); + } + return error; } static int default_noexec; @@ -3644,9 +3680,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) /* socket security operations */ -static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec) +static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, + u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) { - return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; + if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { + *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; + return 0; + } + + return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, + socksid); } static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) @@ -3670,12 +3713,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); u32 newsid; u16 secclass; + int rc; if (kern) return 0; - newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec); secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); + rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid); + if (rc) + return rc; + return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } @@ -3687,12 +3734,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, struct sk_security_struct *sksec; int err = 0; + isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); + if (kern) isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; - else - isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec); + else { + err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid)); + if (err) + return err; + } - isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); isec->initialized = 1; if (sock->sk) { @@ -4002,7 +4053,6 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, { int err = 0; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - u32 peer_sid; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; char *addrp; @@ -4021,20 +4071,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return err; } - if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) { - err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); - if (err) - return err; - err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, - SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); - if (err) - selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); - } else { - err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); - if (err) - return err; - err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); - } + err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); + if (err) + return err; + err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); return err; } @@ -4529,9 +4569,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); - if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) - if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) - return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); + if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) + return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); return NF_ACCEPT; } @@ -4574,27 +4613,14 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */ sk = skb->sk; if (sk == NULL) { - switch (family) { - case PF_INET: - if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED) - secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; - else - secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; - break; - case PF_INET6: - if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED) - secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; - else - secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; - break; - default: - return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); - } - if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) { + if (skb->skb_iif) { + secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) return NF_DROP; - } else + } else { + secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; + } } else { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; peer_sid = sksec->sid; @@ -4848,7 +4874,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, * message queue this message will be stored in */ rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, - &msec->sid); + NULL, &msec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } @@ -5402,7 +5428,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme, .capget = selinux_capget, .capset = selinux_capset, - .sysctl = selinux_sysctl, .capable = selinux_capable, .quotactl = selinux_quotactl, .quota_on = selinux_quota_on, @@ -5420,6 +5445,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security, .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security, .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data, + .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount, .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount, .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options, .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 7ed3663332ec..b8c53723e09b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ #define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \ "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write" +/* + * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket", + * and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket". + */ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "security", { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member", @@ -132,8 +136,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "appletalk_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "packet", - { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "flow_in", "flow_out", - "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } }, + { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } }, { "key", { "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create", NULL } }, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 671273eb1115..348eb00cb668 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ #define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ +#include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include "flask.h" @@ -28,13 +29,14 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP 22 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE 23 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS 25 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE #else -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS #endif /* Mask for just the mount related flags */ @@ -106,8 +108,8 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd); -int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); +int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid); int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h index dff0c75345c1..63ce2f9e441d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ * * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation, version 2. * * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> @@ -27,16 +27,16 @@ struct avtab_key { u16 source_type; /* source type */ u16 target_type; /* target type */ u16 target_class; /* target object class */ -#define AVTAB_ALLOWED 1 -#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 2 -#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY 4 -#define AVTAB_AV (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY) -#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 16 -#define AVTAB_MEMBER 32 -#define AVTAB_CHANGE 64 -#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE) -#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */ -#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */ +#define AVTAB_ALLOWED 0x0001 +#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 0x0002 +#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY 0x0004 +#define AVTAB_AV (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY) +#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 0x0010 +#define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020 +#define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040 +#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE) +#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */ +#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */ u16 specified; /* what field is specified */ }; @@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ void avtab_cache_destroy(void); #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 11 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS) -#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK (MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1) #endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index 1f4e93c2ae86..922f8afa89dd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct ebitmap { }; #define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit) -#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0) static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(struct ebitmap *e, struct ebitmap_node **n) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index 1ef8e4e89880..e96174216bc9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -512,7 +512,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified, - struct context *newcontext) + struct context *newcontext, + bool sock) { struct range_trans rtr; struct mls_range *r; @@ -531,7 +532,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, return mls_range_set(newcontext, r); /* Fallthrough */ case AVTAB_CHANGE: - if (tclass == policydb.process_class) + if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) /* Use the process MLS attributes. */ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext); else diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index cd9152632e54..037bf9d82d41 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified, - struct context *newcontext); + struct context *newcontext, + bool sock); int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, struct context *usercon); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 57363562f0f8..e7b850ad57ee 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { .sym_num = SYM_NUM, .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, }; static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) @@ -704,6 +709,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) int i; struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL; struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL; + struct filename_trans *ft, *nft; for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) { cond_resched(); @@ -781,6 +787,15 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) } flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array); } + + ft = p->filename_trans; + while (ft) { + nft = ft->next; + kfree(ft->name); + kfree(ft); + ft = nft; + } + ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps); ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map); @@ -1788,6 +1803,76 @@ out: return rc; } +static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) +{ + struct filename_trans *ft, *last; + u32 nel, len; + char *name; + __le32 buf[4]; + int rc, i; + + if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS) + return 0; + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + printk(KERN_ERR "%s: nel=%d\n", __func__, nel); + + last = p->filename_trans; + while (last && last->next) + last = last->next; + + for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ft) + goto out; + + /* add it to the tail of the list */ + if (!last) + p->filename_trans = ft; + else + last->next = ft; + last = ft; + + /* length of the path component string */ + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + rc = -ENOMEM; + name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + goto out; + + ft->name = name; + + /* path component string */ + rc = next_entry(name, fp, len); + if (rc) + goto out; + name[len] = 0; + + printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ft=%p ft->name=%p ft->name=%s\n", __func__, ft, ft->name, ft->name); + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4); + if (rc) + goto out; + + ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); + ft->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]); + } + rc = 0; +out: + return rc; +} + static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) { int i, j, rc; @@ -2251,6 +2336,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) lra = ra; } + rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp); + if (rc) + goto bad; + rc = policydb_index(p); if (rc) goto bad; @@ -3025,6 +3114,43 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) return 0; } +static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) +{ + struct filename_trans *ft; + u32 len, nel = 0; + __le32 buf[4]; + int rc; + + for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) + nel++; + + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel); + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + + for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) { + len = strlen(ft->name); + buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len); + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + + buf[0] = ft->stype; + buf[1] = ft->ttype; + buf[2] = ft->tclass; + buf[3] = ft->otype; + + rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + return 0; +} /* * Write the configuration data in a policy database * structure to a policy database binary representation @@ -3135,6 +3261,10 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) if (rc) return rc; + rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp); if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index 4e3ab9d0b315..732ea4a68682 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -77,6 +77,15 @@ struct role_trans { struct role_trans *next; }; +struct filename_trans { + struct filename_trans *next; + u32 stype; /* current process */ + u32 ttype; /* parent dir context */ + u16 tclass; /* class of new object */ + const char *name; /* last path component */ + u32 otype; /* expected of new object */ +}; + struct role_allow { u32 role; /* current role */ u32 new_role; /* new role */ @@ -217,6 +226,9 @@ struct policydb { /* role transitions */ struct role_trans *role_tr; + /* file transitions with the last path component */ + struct filename_trans *filename_trans; + /* bools indexed by (value - 1) */ struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct; /* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */ @@ -302,7 +314,7 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes) return 0; } -static inline int put_entry(void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp) +static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp) { size_t len = bytes * num; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index a03cfaf0ee07..3e7544d2a07b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -201,6 +201,21 @@ static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass) return tclass; } +/* + * Get kernel value for class from its policy value + */ +static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value) +{ + u16 i; + + for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) { + if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value) + return i; + } + + return pol_value; +} + static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, int allow_unknown) { @@ -1343,10 +1358,27 @@ out: return -EACCES; } +static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext, + u32 scon, u32 tcon, u16 tclass, + const struct qstr *qstr) +{ + struct filename_trans *ft; + for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) { + if (ft->stype == scon && + ft->ttype == tcon && + ft->tclass == tclass && + !strcmp(ft->name, qstr->name)) { + newcontext->type = ft->otype; + return; + } + } +} + static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 orig_tclass, u32 specified, + const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid, bool kern) { @@ -1357,6 +1389,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, struct avtab_node *node; u16 tclass; int rc = 0; + bool sock; if (!ss_initialized) { switch (orig_tclass) { @@ -1374,10 +1407,13 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - if (kern) + if (kern) { tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); - else + sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass); + } else { tclass = orig_tclass; + sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass)); + } scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { @@ -1408,7 +1444,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, } /* Set the role and type to default values. */ - if (tclass == policydb.process_class) { + if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) { /* Use the current role and type of process. */ newcontext.role = scontext->role; newcontext.type = scontext->type; @@ -1442,6 +1478,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, newcontext.type = avdatum->data; } + /* if we have a qstr this is a file trans check so check those rules */ + if (qstr) + filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type, + tcontext->type, tclass, qstr); + /* Check for class-specific changes. */ if (tclass == policydb.process_class) { if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) { @@ -1460,7 +1501,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, /* Set the MLS attributes. This is done last because it may allocate memory. */ - rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext); + rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, + &newcontext, sock); if (rc) goto out_unlock; @@ -1495,22 +1537,17 @@ out: * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was * computed successfully. */ -int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, - u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, - u32 *out_sid) +int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid) { return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, - out_sid, true); + qstr, out_sid, true); } -int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, - u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, - u32 *out_sid) +int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, - out_sid, false); + NULL, out_sid, false); } /** @@ -1531,8 +1568,8 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid, - false); + return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL, + out_sid, false); } /** @@ -1553,8 +1590,8 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid, - false); + return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL, + out_sid, false); } /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */ diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index fff78d3b51a2..728c57e3d65d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, if (!uctx) goto not_from_user; - if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX) + if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX) return -EINVAL; str_len = uctx->ctx_len; diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 129c4eb8ffb1..b449cfdad21c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -52,13 +52,16 @@ struct socket_smack { struct inode_smack { char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */ char *smk_task; /* label of the task */ + char *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */ struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */ int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */ }; struct task_smack { - char *smk_task; /* label used for access control */ - char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */ + char *smk_task; /* label for access control */ + char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */ + struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */ + struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */ }; #define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */ @@ -152,12 +155,6 @@ struct smack_known { #define SMACK_MAGIC 0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */ /* - * A limit on the number of entries in the lists - * makes some of the list administration easier. - */ -#define SMACK_LIST_MAX 10000 - -/* * CIPSO defaults. */ #define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT 3 /* Historical */ @@ -174,9 +171,7 @@ struct smack_known { /* * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with */ -#define MAY_ANY (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) #define MAY_ANYREAD (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC) -#define MAY_ANYWRITE (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND) #define MAY_READWRITE (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE) #define MAY_NOT 0 @@ -202,7 +197,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *); /* * These functions are in smack_access.c */ -int smk_access_entry(char *, char *); +int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *); int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *); int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *); int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 7ba8478f599e..86453db4333d 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -70,10 +70,11 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED; * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label + * @rule_list: the list of rules to search * * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the - * access rule list and returns pointer to the matching rule if found, - * NULL otherwise. + * access rule list and returns the access mode. If no + * entry is found returns -ENOENT. * * NOTE: * Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list @@ -85,13 +86,13 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED; * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile * optimization. */ -int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label) +int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label, + struct list_head *rule_list) { - u32 may = MAY_NOT; + int may = -ENOENT; struct smack_rule *srp; - rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) { if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label || strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) { if (srp->smk_object == object_label || @@ -101,7 +102,6 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label) } } } - rcu_read_unlock(); return may; } @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label) int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, struct smk_audit_info *a) { - u32 may = MAY_NOT; + int may = MAY_NOT; int rc = 0; /* @@ -181,13 +181,14 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required. * If the requested access is contained in the available * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's - * good. - */ - may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label); - /* - * This is a bit map operation. + * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry() + * indicates there is no entry for this pair. */ - if ((request & may) == request) + rcu_read_lock(); + may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &smack_rule_list); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request) goto out_audit; rc = -EACCES; @@ -212,12 +213,27 @@ out_audit: */ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) { + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp); + int may; int rc; - char *sp = smk_of_current(); + /* + * Check the global rule list + */ rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL); - if (rc == 0) - goto out_audit; + if (rc == 0) { + /* + * If there is an entry in the task's rule list + * it can further restrict access. + */ + may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules); + if (may < 0) + goto out_audit; + if ((mode & may) == mode) + goto out_audit; + rc = -EACCES; + } /* * Return if a specific label has been designated as the @@ -228,7 +244,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) goto out_audit; if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - return 0; + rc = 0; out_audit: #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 533bf3255d7f..23c7a6d0c80c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/magic.h> +#include <linux/dcache.h> #include "smack.h" #define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security)) @@ -84,6 +85,56 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack) return isp; } +/** + * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob + * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob + * + * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available + */ +static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp; + + tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp); + if (tsp == NULL) + return NULL; + + tsp->smk_task = task; + tsp->smk_forked = forked; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules); + mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock); + + return tsp; +} + +/** + * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set + * @nhead - new rules header pointer + * @ohead - old rules header pointer + * + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error + */ +static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct smack_rule *nrp; + struct smack_rule *orp; + int rc = 0; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) { + nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp); + if (nrp == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + break; + } + *nrp = *orp; + list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead); + } + return rc; +} + /* * LSM hooks. * We he, that is fun! @@ -102,23 +153,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) { int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; - char *sp, *tsp; + char *tsp; rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode); if (rc != 0) return rc; - sp = smk_of_current(); tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp)); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp); - /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */ - rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL); - if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - rc = 0; - - smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); return rc; } @@ -134,23 +179,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) { int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; - char *sp, *tsp; + char *tsp; rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp); if (rc != 0) return rc; + tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp)); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp); - sp = smk_of_current(); - tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp)); - /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */ - rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL); - if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - rc = 0; - - smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); return rc; } @@ -463,6 +502,7 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode * @inode: the inode * @dir: unused + * @qstr: unused * @name: where to put the attribute name * @value: where to put the attribute value * @len: where to put the length of the attribute @@ -470,11 +510,12 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory */ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - char **name, void **value, size_t *len) + const struct qstr *qstr, char **name, + void **value, size_t *len) { char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode); char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir); - u32 may; + int may; if (name) { *name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -483,14 +524,17 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } if (value) { - may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp); + rcu_read_lock(); + may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp, &smack_rule_list); + rcu_read_unlock(); /* * If the access rule allows transmutation and * the directory requests transmutation then * by all means transmute. */ - if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) + if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && + smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) isp = dsp; *value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -716,7 +760,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) { + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; /* @@ -773,6 +818,12 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, isp->smk_task = nsp; else isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; + } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { + nsp = smk_import(value, size); + if (nsp != NULL) + isp->smk_mmap = nsp; + else + isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE; @@ -815,7 +866,8 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) { if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; } else @@ -829,6 +881,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) if (rc == 0) { isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security; isp->smk_task = NULL; + isp->smk_mmap = NULL; } return rc; @@ -1060,6 +1113,126 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, } /** + * smack_file_mmap : + * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. + * if mapping anonymous memory. + * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL). + * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. + * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * @flags contains the operational flags. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. + */ +static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file, + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long addr_only) +{ + struct smack_rule *srp; + struct task_smack *tsp; + char *sp; + char *msmack; + char *osmack; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct dentry *dp; + int may; + int mmay; + int tmay; + int rc; + + /* do DAC check on address space usage */ + rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + if (rc || addr_only) + return rc; + + if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL) + return 0; + + dp = file->f_dentry; + + if (dp->d_inode == NULL) + return 0; + + isp = dp->d_inode->i_security; + if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL) + return 0; + msmack = isp->smk_mmap; + + tsp = current_security(); + sp = smk_of_current(); + rc = 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + /* + * For each Smack rule associated with the subject + * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access + * to that rule's object label. + * + * Because neither of the labels comes + * from the networking code it is sufficient + * to compare pointers. + */ + list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) { + if (srp->smk_subject != sp) + continue; + + osmack = srp->smk_object; + /* + * Matching labels always allows access. + */ + if (msmack == osmack) + continue; + /* + * If there is a matching local rule take + * that into account as well. + */ + may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack, + &tsp->smk_rules); + if (may == -ENOENT) + may = srp->smk_access; + else + may &= srp->smk_access; + /* + * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't + * possibly have less access. + */ + if (may == 0) + continue; + + /* + * Fetch the global list entry. + * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject + * can't have as much access as current. + */ + mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &smack_rule_list); + if (mmay == -ENOENT) { + rc = -EACCES; + break; + } + /* + * If there is a local entry it modifies the + * potential access, too. + */ + tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules); + if (tmay != -ENOENT) + mmay &= tmay; + + /* + * If there is any access available to current that is + * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject + * deny access. + */ + if ((may | mmay) != mmay) { + rc = -EACCES; + break; + } + } + + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return rc; +} + +/** * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value * @file: object in question * @@ -1095,6 +1268,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); + /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */ rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) @@ -1145,9 +1319,14 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) */ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { - cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp); - if (cred->security == NULL) + struct task_smack *tsp; + + tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp); + if (tsp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + + cred->security = tsp; + return 0; } @@ -1156,13 +1335,24 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials * @cred: the credentials in question * - * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone - * points to an immutable list. The blobs never go away. - * There is no leak here. */ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { - kfree(cred->security); + struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; + struct smack_rule *rp; + struct list_head *l; + struct list_head *n; + + if (tsp == NULL) + return; + cred->security = NULL; + + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) { + rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list); + list_del(&rp->list); + kfree(rp); + } + kfree(tsp); } /** @@ -1178,13 +1368,16 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, { struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security; struct task_smack *new_tsp; + int rc; - new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp); + new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp); if (new_tsp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task; - new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task; + rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + new->security = new_tsp; return 0; } @@ -1203,6 +1396,11 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task; new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task; + mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules); + + + /* cbs copy rule list */ } /** @@ -2419,6 +2617,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) } } isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp); + isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp); dput(dp); break; @@ -2478,6 +2677,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { + int rc; struct task_smack *tsp; struct task_smack *oldtsp; struct cred *new; @@ -2513,13 +2713,16 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, new = prepare_creds(); if (new == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL); + + tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL); if (tsp == NULL) { kfree(new); return -ENOMEM; } - tsp->smk_task = newsmack; - tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked; + rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + new->security = tsp; commit_creds(new); return size; @@ -3221,6 +3424,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl, .file_lock = smack_file_lock, .file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl, + .file_mmap = smack_file_mmap, .file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner, .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask, .file_receive = smack_file_receive, @@ -3334,23 +3538,20 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) struct cred *cred; struct task_smack *tsp; - tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + return 0; + + tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known, + smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); if (tsp == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) { - kfree(tsp); - return 0; - } - printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n"); /* * Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred = (struct cred *) current->cred; - tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known; - tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known; cred->security = tsp; /* initialize the smack_know_list */ diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 362d5eda948b..90d1bbaaa6f3 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ enum smk_inos { SMK_NETLBLADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */ SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */ SMK_LOGGING = 10, /* logging */ + SMK_LOAD_SELF = 11, /* task specific rules */ }; /* @@ -135,104 +136,30 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap) #define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN 9 #define SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX 42 -/* - * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load - */ - -static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos) -{ - if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED) - return NULL; - if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list)) - return NULL; - return smack_rule_list.next; -} - -static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos) -{ - struct list_head *list = v; - - if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) { - *pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED; - return NULL; - } - return list->next; -} - -static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) -{ - struct list_head *list = v; - struct smack_rule *srp = - list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list); - - seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject, - (char *)srp->smk_object); - - seq_putc(s, ' '); - - if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ) - seq_putc(s, 'r'); - if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE) - seq_putc(s, 'w'); - if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC) - seq_putc(s, 'x'); - if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND) - seq_putc(s, 'a'); - if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE) - seq_putc(s, 't'); - if (srp->smk_access == 0) - seq_putc(s, '-'); - - seq_putc(s, '\n'); - - return 0; -} - -static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v) -{ - /* No-op */ -} - -static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = { - .start = load_seq_start, - .next = load_seq_next, - .show = load_seq_show, - .stop = load_seq_stop, -}; - -/** - * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load - * @inode: inode structure representing file - * @file: "load" file pointer - * - * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations. - */ -static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops); -} - /** * smk_set_access - add a rule to the rule list * @srp: the new rule to add + * @rule_list: the list of rules + * @rule_lock: the rule list lock * * Looks through the current subject/object/access list for * the subject/object pair and replaces the access that was * there. If the pair isn't found add it with the specified * access. * + * Returns 1 if a rule was found to exist already, 0 if it is new * Returns 0 if nothing goes wrong or -ENOMEM if it fails * during the allocation of the new pair to add. */ -static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp) +static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list, + struct mutex *rule_lock) { struct smack_rule *sp; - int ret = 0; - int found; - mutex_lock(&smack_list_lock); + int found = 0; - found = 0; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, &smack_rule_list, list) { + mutex_lock(rule_lock); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list) { if (sp->smk_subject == srp->smk_subject && sp->smk_object == srp->smk_object) { found = 1; @@ -241,19 +168,21 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp) } } if (found == 0) - list_add_rcu(&srp->list, &smack_rule_list); + list_add_rcu(&srp->list, rule_list); - mutex_unlock(&smack_list_lock); + mutex_unlock(rule_lock); - return ret; + return found; } /** - * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load + * smk_write_load_list - write() for any /smack/load * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent * @ppos: where to start - must be 0 + * @rule_list: the list of rules to write to + * @rule_lock: lock for the rule list * * Get one smack access rule from above. * The format is exactly: @@ -263,21 +192,19 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp) * * writes must be SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_ACCESSLEN bytes. */ -static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos, + struct list_head *rule_list, + struct mutex *rule_lock) { struct smack_rule *rule; char *data; int rc = -EINVAL; /* - * Must have privilege. * No partial writes. * Enough data must be present. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - if (*ppos != 0) return -EINVAL; /* @@ -372,11 +299,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out_free_rule; } - rc = smk_set_access(rule); - - if (!rc) - rc = count; - goto out; + rc = count; + /* + * smk_set_access returns true if there was already a rule + * for the subject/object pair, and false if it was new. + */ + if (!smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock)) + goto out; out_free_rule: kfree(rule); @@ -385,6 +314,108 @@ out: return rc; } + +/* + * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load + */ + +static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos) +{ + if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED) + return NULL; + if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list)) + return NULL; + return smack_rule_list.next; +} + +static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct list_head *list = v; + + if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) { + *pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED; + return NULL; + } + return list->next; +} + +static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) +{ + struct list_head *list = v; + struct smack_rule *srp = + list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list); + + seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject, + (char *)srp->smk_object); + + seq_putc(s, ' '); + + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ) + seq_putc(s, 'r'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE) + seq_putc(s, 'w'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC) + seq_putc(s, 'x'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND) + seq_putc(s, 'a'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE) + seq_putc(s, 't'); + if (srp->smk_access == 0) + seq_putc(s, '-'); + + seq_putc(s, '\n'); + + return 0; +} + +static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v) +{ + /* No-op */ +} + +static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = { + .start = load_seq_start, + .next = load_seq_next, + .show = load_seq_show, + .stop = load_seq_stop, +}; + +/** + * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load + * @inode: inode structure representing file + * @file: "load" file pointer + * + * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations. + */ +static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops); +} + +/** + * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load + * @file: file pointer, not actually used + * @buf: where to get the data from + * @count: bytes sent + * @ppos: where to start - must be 0 + * + */ +static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + + /* + * Must have privilege. + * No partial writes. + * Enough data must be present. + */ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &smack_rule_list, + &smack_list_lock); +} + static const struct file_operations smk_load_ops = { .open = smk_open_load, .read = seq_read, @@ -1288,6 +1319,112 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = { .write = smk_write_logging, .llseek = default_llseek, }; + +/* + * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self + */ + +static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + + if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED) + return NULL; + if (list_empty(&tsp->smk_rules)) + return NULL; + return tsp->smk_rules.next; +} + +static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + struct list_head *list = v; + + if (list_is_last(list, &tsp->smk_rules)) { + *pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED; + return NULL; + } + return list->next; +} + +static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) +{ + struct list_head *list = v; + struct smack_rule *srp = + list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list); + + seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject, + (char *)srp->smk_object); + + seq_putc(s, ' '); + + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ) + seq_putc(s, 'r'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE) + seq_putc(s, 'w'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC) + seq_putc(s, 'x'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND) + seq_putc(s, 'a'); + if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE) + seq_putc(s, 't'); + if (srp->smk_access == 0) + seq_putc(s, '-'); + + seq_putc(s, '\n'); + + return 0; +} + +static void load_self_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v) +{ + /* No-op */ +} + +static const struct seq_operations load_self_seq_ops = { + .start = load_self_seq_start, + .next = load_self_seq_next, + .show = load_self_seq_show, + .stop = load_self_seq_stop, +}; + + +/** + * smk_open_load_self - open() for /smack/load-self + * @inode: inode structure representing file + * @file: "load" file pointer + * + * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations. + */ +static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return seq_open(file, &load_self_seq_ops); +} + +/** + * smk_write_load_self - write() for /smack/load-self + * @file: file pointer, not actually used + * @buf: where to get the data from + * @count: bytes sent + * @ppos: where to start - must be 0 + * + */ +static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + + return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules, + &tsp->smk_rules_lock); +} + +static const struct file_operations smk_load_self_ops = { + .open = smk_open_load_self, + .read = seq_read, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .write = smk_write_load_self, + .release = seq_release, +}; /** * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock * @sb: the empty superblock @@ -1304,23 +1441,26 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) struct inode *root_inode; static struct tree_descr smack_files[] = { - [SMK_LOAD] = - {"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SMK_CIPSO] = - {"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SMK_DOI] = - {"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SMK_DIRECT] = - {"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SMK_AMBIENT] = - {"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SMK_NETLBLADDR] = - {"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SMK_ONLYCAP] = - {"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SMK_LOGGING] = - {"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - /* last one */ {""} + [SMK_LOAD] = { + "load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_CIPSO] = { + "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_DOI] = { + "doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_DIRECT] = { + "direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_AMBIENT] = { + "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_NETLBLADDR] = { + "netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_ONLYCAP] = { + "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_LOGGING] = { + "logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_LOAD_SELF] = { + "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, + /* last one */ + {""} }; rc = simple_fill_super(sb, SMACK_MAGIC, smack_files); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c index 9d32f182301e..cb09f1fce910 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/file.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c @@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, struct path *path, const int flag) { const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag); - int error = -ENOMEM; + int error = 0; struct tomoyo_path_info buf; struct tomoyo_request_info r; int idx; @@ -938,9 +938,6 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, buf.name = NULL; r.mode = TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED; idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); - if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) - goto out; - error = 0; /* * If the filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword, * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not |