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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2010-08-18 09:35:08 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2010-08-18 09:35:08 -0700
commit145c3ae46b37993b0debb0b3da6256daea4a6ec5 (patch)
tree0dbff382ce36b23b3d2dbff87d3eaab73a07a2a4 /security
parent81ca03a0e2ea0207b2df80e0edcf4c775c07a505 (diff)
parent99b7db7b8ffd6bb755eb0a175596421a0b581cb2 (diff)
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Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: fs: brlock vfsmount_lock fs: scale files_lock lglock: introduce special lglock and brlock spin locks tty: fix fu_list abuse fs: cleanup files_lock locking fs: remove extra lookup in __lookup_hash fs: fs_struct rwlock to spinlock apparmor: use task path helpers fs: dentry allocation consolidation fs: fix do_lookup false negative mbcache: Limit the maximum number of cache entries hostfs ->follow_link() braino hostfs: dumb (and usually harmless) tpyo - strncpy instead of strlcpy remove SWRITE* I/O types kill BH_Ordered flag vfs: update ctime when changing the file's permission by setfacl cramfs: only unlock new inodes fix reiserfs_evict_inode end_writeback second call
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/path.c9
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c9
2 files changed, 8 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index 96bab9469d48..19358dc14605 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -62,19 +62,14 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
int deleted, connected;
int error = 0;
- /* Get the root we want to resolve too */
+ /* Get the root we want to resolve too, released below */
if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) {
/* resolve paths relative to chroot */
- read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
- root = current->fs->root;
- /* released below */
- path_get(&root);
- read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
+ get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
} else {
/* resolve paths relative to namespace */
root.mnt = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root;
root.dentry = root.mnt->mnt_root;
- /* released below */
path_get(&root);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 42043f96e54f..4796ddd4e721 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2170,8 +2170,9 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
tty = get_current_tty();
if (tty) {
- file_list_lock();
+ spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
+ struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
struct inode *inode;
/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
@@ -2179,14 +2180,16 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
file may belong to another process and we are only
interested in the inode-based check here. */
- file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
+ file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
+ struct tty_file_private, list);
+ file = file_priv->file;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
drop_tty = 1;
}
}
- file_list_unlock();
+ spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
/* Reset controlling tty. */