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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-09-07 14:35:32 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-09-07 14:35:32 -0700
commitc7c4591db64dbd1e504bc4e2806d7ef290a3c81b (patch)
treea2fb124f9760eec668d20541383e762822d7cc7b /security
parent11c7b03d42a847db90862d0f9d8be6ce9b2f0553 (diff)
parentc7b96acf1456ef127fef461fcfedb54b81fecfbb (diff)
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Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug fixes. The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace infrastructure. Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on. pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code. proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c10
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe6648e..b9d613e0ef14 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -768,16 +768,16 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
*/
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
{
- int is_subset;
+ int is_subset, ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
current_cred()->cap_permitted);
+ if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ ret = -EPERM;
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (!is_subset && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
*/
static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;