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| author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2018-11-14 12:21:11 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2018-11-20 14:26:55 +0800 |
| commit | 3d234b3313cd12157946522fe35f5a4574f31169 (patch) | |
| tree | 7d7f105aaa99a8d2c21d9e1d996330dcf95c40c6 /security | |
| parent | 1ad0f1603a6b2afb62a1c065409aaa4e43ca7627 (diff) | |
| download | linux-3d234b3313cd12157946522fe35f5a4574f31169.tar.gz linux-3d234b3313cd12157946522fe35f5a4574f31169.tar.bz2 linux-3d234b3313cd12157946522fe35f5a4574f31169.zip | |
crypto: drop mask=CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC from 'shash' tfm allocations
'shash' algorithms are always synchronous, so passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC
in the mask to crypto_alloc_shash() has no effect. Many users therefore
already don't pass it, but some still do. This inconsistency can cause
confusion, especially since the way the 'mask' argument works is
somewhat counterintuitive.
Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/crypto.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted.c | 4 |
4 files changed, 6 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c index 136f2a047836..af03d98c7552 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/crypto.c +++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int __init init_profile_hash(void) if (!apparmor_initialized) return 0; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha1", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha1", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { int error = PTR_ERR(tfm); AA_ERROR("failed to setup profile sha1 hashing: %d\n", error); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 8c25f949ebdb..1820099dc74b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) mutex_lock(&mutex); if (*tfm) goto out; - *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_NOLOAD); + *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index d92cbf9687c3..a3891ae9fa0f 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, struct crypto_shash *tfm; int err; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { pr_err("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s transform: %ld\n", hmac_alg, PTR_ERR(tfm)); @@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void) { int ret; - hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) { pr_err("encrypted_key: can't allocate %s transform: %ld\n", hash_alg, PTR_ERR(hash_tfm)); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index ff6789365a12..2d4f16b2a7c5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1199,14 +1199,14 @@ static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) { int ret; - hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", hmac_alg); return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); } - hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", hash_alg); |