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| author | Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> | 2011-04-21 17:23:19 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2011-04-25 10:20:32 -0400 |
| commit | 1c9904297451f558191e211a48d8838b4bf792b0 (patch) | |
| tree | 9c7cabec6ce3d6604147de73953cfaca672f1c0d /security | |
| parent | 6b697323a78bed254ee372f71b1a6a2901bb4b7a (diff) | |
| download | linux-1c9904297451f558191e211a48d8838b4bf792b0.tar.gz linux-1c9904297451f558191e211a48d8838b4bf792b0.tar.bz2 linux-1c9904297451f558191e211a48d8838b4bf792b0.zip | |
SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modules
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 |
4 files changed, 13 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index ab3d807accc3..56bb1605fd79 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } -static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 47b8a447118f..7e34f98bf433 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -514,16 +514,14 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; - return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask); + return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, 0); } int security_inode_exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; - if (flags) - return -ECHILD; - return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); + return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, flags); } int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 7a630a8a5cef..9a220be17a3f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2635,7 +2635,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); } -static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -2649,6 +2649,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (!mask) return 0; + /* May be droppable after audit */ + if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU) + return -ECHILD; + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); ad.u.fs.inode = inode; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 23c7a6d0c80c..42fcb47747a3 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, * * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise */ -static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags) { struct smk_audit_info ad; @@ -696,6 +696,10 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) */ if (mask == 0) return 0; + + /* May be droppable after audit */ + if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU) + return -ECHILD; smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode); return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad); |