diff options
author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2020-05-03 01:00:02 -0400 |
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committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2020-05-22 14:41:04 -0400 |
commit | 8eb613c0b8f19627ba1846dcf78bb2c85edbe8dd (patch) | |
tree | 7cd7a2a48ae7c51b0d1db9b2aa71ede32f76812d /security | |
parent | 0c4395fb2aa77341269ea619c5419ea48171883f (diff) | |
download | linux-8eb613c0b8f19627ba1846dcf78bb2c85edbe8dd.tar.gz linux-8eb613c0b8f19627ba1846dcf78bb2c85edbe8dd.tar.bz2 linux-8eb613c0b8f19627ba1846dcf78bb2c85edbe8dd.zip |
ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy
Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
IMA's mmap appraise policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
would be taken prior to i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
this point. Eliminate this integrity gap, by denying the mprotect
PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.
On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 7 |
2 files changed, 57 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index f96f151294e6..800fb3bba418 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -394,6 +394,57 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) } /** + * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change + * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * + * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent + * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore + * would be taken before i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at + * this point. Eliminate this integrity gap by denying the mprotect + * PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists. + * + * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS. + */ +int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) +{ + struct ima_template_desc *template; + struct file *file = vma->vm_file; + char filename[NAME_MAX]; + char *pathbuf = NULL; + const char *pathname = NULL; + struct inode *inode; + int result = 0; + int action; + u32 secid; + int pcr; + + /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ + if (!vma->vm_file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + return 0; + + security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); + action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, + MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0); + + /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ + if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))) + return 0; + + if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) + result = -EPERM; + + file = vma->vm_file; + pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, pathname, + "collect_data", "failed-mprotect", result, 0); + if (pathbuf) + __putname(pathbuf); + + return result; +} + +/** * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure * diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 7fed24b9d57e..dd0917c5bfe9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1512,7 +1512,12 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) { - return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); } int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |