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| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2020-10-02 10:38:13 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-10-05 13:34:18 +0200 |
| commit | c307459b9d1fcb8bbf3ea5a4162979532322ef77 (patch) | |
| tree | 2bf173bdc7277abfa8f4c604f8e9646baab278df /security | |
| parent | 6925478cad2721432e4cecf11174d64b22ed3b94 (diff) | |
| download | linux-c307459b9d1fcb8bbf3ea5a4162979532322ef77.tar.gz linux-c307459b9d1fcb8bbf3ea5a4162979532322ef77.tar.bz2 linux-c307459b9d1fcb8bbf3ea5a4162979532322ef77.zip | |
fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum
FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 |
3 files changed, 4 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index e9cbadade74b..ac02b7632353 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data, int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) { - void *data; + void *data = NULL; loff_t size; int rc; key_perm_t perm; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index e3fcad871861..15a44c5022f7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) { - void *data; + void *data = NULL; char *datap; loff_t size; int rc, pathlen = strlen(path); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 8a91711ca79b..2f187784c5bc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -611,19 +611,17 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { /* - * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER - * * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two - * buffers? + * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address + * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check. */ return 0; } const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, - [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, |