diff options
63 files changed, 8818 insertions, 626 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6434f0df012e --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +What: security/ima/policy +Date: May 2008 +Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> +Description: + The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity + Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash + values of executables and other sensitive system files + loaded into the run-time of this system. At runtime, + the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data. + Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy + by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and + then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after + the file ima/policy is closed. + + rule format: action [condition ...] + + action: measure | dont_measure + condition:= base | lsm + base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]] + lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] + + base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION] + mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] + fsmagic:= hex value + uid:= decimal value + lsm: are LSM specific + + default policy: + # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 + # SYSFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 + # DEBUGFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 + # TMPFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 + # SECURITYFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 + + measure func=BPRM_CHECK + measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC + measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0 + + The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, + all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files + open for read by root in inode_permission. + + Examples of LSM specific definitions: + + SELinux: + # SELINUX_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C + + dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t + dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t + measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ + + Smack: + measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index 54f21a5c262b..224263e7711f 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ parameter is applicable: FB The frame buffer device is enabled. HW Appropriate hardware is enabled. IA-64 IA-64 architecture is enabled. + IMA Integrity measurement architecture is enabled. IOSCHED More than one I/O scheduler is enabled. IP_PNP IP DHCP, BOOTP, or RARP is enabled. ISAPNP ISA PnP code is enabled. @@ -902,6 +903,15 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file ihash_entries= [KNL] Set number of hash buckets for inode cache. + ima_audit= [IMA] + Format: { "0" | "1" } + 0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default) + 1 -- enable informational integrity auditing messages. + + ima_hash= [IMA] + Formt: { "sha1" | "md5" } + default: "sha1" + in2000= [HW,SCSI] See header of drivers/scsi/in2000.c. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 5d460c9d1c2c..e92ed4a79fa7 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -2216,6 +2216,11 @@ M: stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de L: linux1394-devel@lists.sourceforge.net S: Maintained +INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA) +P: Mimi Zohar +M: zohar@us.ibm.com +S: Supported + IMS TWINTURBO FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER L: linux-fbdev-devel@lists.sourceforge.net (moderated for non-subscribers) S: Orphan @@ -3844,6 +3849,7 @@ M: jmorris@namei.org L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (suggested Cc:) T: git kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6.git +W: http://security.wiki.kernel.org/ S: Supported SECURITY CONTACT @@ -4285,6 +4291,19 @@ L: tlan-devel@lists.sourceforge.net (subscribers-only) W: http://sourceforge.net/projects/tlan/ S: Maintained +TOMOYO SECURITY MODULE +P: Kentaro Takeda +M: takedakn@nttdata.co.jp +P: Tetsuo Handa +M: penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp +L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (kernel issues) +L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and users in English) +L: tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese) +L: tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese) +W: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ +T: quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.2.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/ +S: Maintained + TOSHIBA ACPI EXTRAS DRIVER P: John Belmonte M: toshiba_acpi@memebeam.org diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c index 9c47dc48c9fd..ccdd828adcef 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c @@ -429,134 +429,148 @@ out: #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 #define TPM_ERROR_SIZE 10 #define TPM_RET_CODE_IDX 6 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_SIZE_IDX 10 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX 14 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_2_IDX 18 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_3_IDX 22 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_4_IDX 26 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_PERM_DISABLE_IDX 16 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_PERM_INACTIVE_IDX 18 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_BOOL_1_IDX 14 -#define TPM_GET_CAP_TEMP_INACTIVE_IDX 16 - -#define TPM_CAP_IDX 13 -#define TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX 21 enum tpm_capabilities { - TPM_CAP_FLAG = 4, - TPM_CAP_PROP = 5, + TPM_CAP_FLAG = cpu_to_be32(4), + TPM_CAP_PROP = cpu_to_be32(5), + CAP_VERSION_1_1 = cpu_to_be32(0x06), + CAP_VERSION_1_2 = cpu_to_be32(0x1A) }; enum tpm_sub_capabilities { - TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = 0x1, - TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = 0x3, - TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = 0x8, - TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = 0x9, - TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = 0x11, - TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = 0x15, - TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = 0x20, -}; + TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = cpu_to_be32(0x101), + TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = cpu_to_be32(0x103), + TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = cpu_to_be32(0x108), + TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = cpu_to_be32(0x109), + TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = cpu_to_be32(0x111), + TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = cpu_to_be32(0x115), + TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = cpu_to_be32(0x120), -/* - * This is a semi generic GetCapability command for use - * with the capability type TPM_CAP_PROP or TPM_CAP_FLAG - * and their associated sub_capabilities. - */ - -static const u8 tpm_cap[] = { - 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */ - 0, 0, 0, 22, /* length */ - 0, 0, 0, 101, /* TPM_ORD_GetCapability */ - 0, 0, 0, 0, /* TPM_CAP_<TYPE> */ - 0, 0, 0, 4, /* TPM_CAP_SUB_<TYPE> size */ - 0, 0, 1, 0 /* TPM_CAP_SUB_<TYPE> */ }; -static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, int len, - char *desc) +static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_cmd_t *cmd, + int len, const char *desc) { int err; - len = tpm_transmit(chip, data, len); + len = tpm_transmit(chip,(u8 *) cmd, len); if (len < 0) return len; if (len == TPM_ERROR_SIZE) { - err = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_RET_CODE_IDX))); + err = be32_to_cpu(cmd->header.out.return_code); dev_dbg(chip->dev, "A TPM error (%d) occurred %s\n", err, desc); return err; } return 0; } +#define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200 +#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND cpu_to_be16(193) +#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP cpu_to_be32(101) + +static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = { + .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, + .length = cpu_to_be32(22), + .ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_CAP +}; + +ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct device *dev, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap, + const char *desc) +{ + struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd; + int rc; + struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + + tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; + if (subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_1 || subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_2) { + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = subcap_id; + /*subcap field not necessary */ + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(0); + tpm_cmd.header.in.length -= cpu_to_be32(sizeof(__be32)); + } else { + if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM || + subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL) + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_FLAG; + else + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = subcap_id; + } + rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, desc); + if (!rc) + *cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap; + return rc; +} + void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - u8 data[max_t(int, ARRAY_SIZE(tpm_cap), 30)]; + struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd; ssize_t rc; - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT; + tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT; - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, sizeof(data), + rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, "attempting to determine the timeouts"); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_gen_interrupt); void tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - u8 data[max_t(int, ARRAY_SIZE(tpm_cap), 30)]; + struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd; + struct timeout_t *timeout_cap; + struct duration_t *duration_cap; ssize_t rc; u32 timeout; - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT; + tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT; - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, sizeof(data), + rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, "attempting to determine the timeouts"); if (rc) goto duration; - if (be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_SIZE_IDX))) + if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length) != 4 * sizeof(u32)) goto duration; + timeout_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout; /* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */ - timeout = - be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX))); + timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->a); if (timeout) chip->vendor.timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout); - timeout = - be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_2_IDX))); + timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->b); if (timeout) chip->vendor.timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout); - timeout = - be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_3_IDX))); + timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->c); if (timeout) chip->vendor.timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout); - timeout = - be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_4_IDX))); + timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->d); if (timeout) chip->vendor.timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout); duration: - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION; + tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); + tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION; - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, sizeof(data), + rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, "attempting to determine the durations"); if (rc) return; - if (be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_SIZE_IDX))) + if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 3 * sizeof(u32)) return; - + duration_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.duration; chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = - usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu - (*((__be32 *) (data + - TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX)))); + usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_short)); /* The Broadcom BCM0102 chipset in a Dell Latitude D820 gets the above * value wrong and apparently reports msecs rather than usecs. So we * fix up the resulting too-small TPM_SHORT value to make things work. @@ -565,13 +579,9 @@ duration: chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = HZ; chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] = - usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu - (*((__be32 *) (data + - TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_2_IDX)))); + usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_medium)); chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] = - usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu - (*((__be32 *) (data + - TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_3_IDX)))); + usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_long)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts); @@ -587,36 +597,18 @@ void tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_continue_selftest); -#define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200 - ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf) { - u8 *data; + cap_t cap; ssize_t rc; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (chip == NULL) - return -ENODEV; - - data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) - return -ENOMEM; - - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM; - - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, - "attemtping to determine the permanent enabled state"); - if (rc) { - kfree(data); + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap, + "attempting to determine the permanent enabled state"); + if (rc) return 0; - } - - rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !data[TPM_GET_CAP_PERM_DISABLE_IDX]); - kfree(data); + rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.disable); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_enabled); @@ -624,31 +616,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_enabled); ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf) { - u8 *data; + cap_t cap; ssize_t rc; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (chip == NULL) - return -ENODEV; - - data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) - return -ENOMEM; - - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM; - - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, - "attemtping to determine the permanent active state"); - if (rc) { - kfree(data); + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap, + "attempting to determine the permanent active state"); + if (rc) return 0; - } - rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !data[TPM_GET_CAP_PERM_INACTIVE_IDX]); - - kfree(data); + rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.deactivated); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_active); @@ -656,31 +632,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_active); ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf) { - u8 *data; + cap_t cap; ssize_t rc; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (chip == NULL) - return -ENODEV; - - data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) - return -ENOMEM; - - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER; - - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, - "attempting to determine the owner state"); - if (rc) { - kfree(data); + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER, &cap, + "attempting to determine the owner state"); + if (rc) return 0; - } - - rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", data[TPM_GET_CAP_RET_BOOL_1_IDX]); - kfree(data); + rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.owned); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_owned); @@ -688,116 +648,180 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_owned); ssize_t tpm_show_temp_deactivated(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf) { - u8 *data; + cap_t cap; ssize_t rc; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (chip == NULL) - return -ENODEV; + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL, &cap, + "attempting to determine the temporary state"); + if (rc) + return 0; - data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) - return -ENOMEM; + rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.stclear_flags.deactivated); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_temp_deactivated); - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL; +/* + * tpm_chip_find_get - return tpm_chip for given chip number + */ +static struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num) +{ + struct tpm_chip *pos, *chip = NULL; - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, - "attempting to determine the temporary state"); - if (rc) { - kfree(data); - return 0; + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &tpm_chip_list, list) { + if (chip_num != TPM_ANY_NUM && chip_num != pos->dev_num) + continue; + + if (try_module_get(pos->dev->driver->owner)) { + chip = pos; + break; + } } + rcu_read_unlock(); + return chip; +} - rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", data[TPM_GET_CAP_TEMP_INACTIVE_IDX]); +#define TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD cpu_to_be32(21) +#define READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 30 +static struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = { + .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, + .length = cpu_to_be32(14), + .ordinal = TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD +}; - kfree(data); +int __tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) +{ + int rc; + struct tpm_cmd_t cmd; + + cmd.header.in = pcrread_header; + cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx); + BUILD_BUG_ON(cmd.header.in.length > READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE); + rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, cmd.header.in.length, + "attempting to read a pcr value"); + + if (rc == 0) + memcpy(res_buf, cmd.params.pcrread_out.pcr_result, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); return rc; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_temp_deactivated); -static const u8 pcrread[] = { - 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */ - 0, 0, 0, 14, /* length */ - 0, 0, 0, 21, /* TPM_ORD_PcrRead */ - 0, 0, 0, 0 /* PCR index */ +/** + * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value + * @chip_num: tpm idx # or ANY + * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to retrieve + * @res_buf: TPM_PCR value + * size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care) + * + * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it + * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing + * the module usage count. + */ +int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip; + int rc; + + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); + if (chip == NULL) + return -ENODEV; + rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, pcr_idx, res_buf); + module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read); + +/** + * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash + * @chip_num: tpm idx # or AN& + * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to extend + * @hash: hash value used to extend pcr value + * + * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it + * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing + * the module usage count. + */ +#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20) +#define EXTEND_PCR_SIZE 34 +static struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = { + .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, + .length = cpu_to_be32(34), + .ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND }; +int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) +{ + struct tpm_cmd_t cmd; + int rc; + struct tpm_chip *chip; + + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); + if (chip == NULL) + return -ENODEV; + + cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header; + BUILD_BUG_ON(be32_to_cpu(cmd.header.in.length) > EXTEND_PCR_SIZE); + cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx); + memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, cmd.header.in.length, + "attempting extend a PCR value"); + + module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend); + ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - u8 *data; + cap_t cap; + u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; ssize_t rc; int i, j, num_pcrs; - __be32 index; char *str = buf; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (chip == NULL) - return -ENODEV; - data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) - return -ENOMEM; - - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR; - - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR, &cap, "attempting to determine the number of PCRS"); - if (rc) { - kfree(data); + if (rc) return 0; - } - num_pcrs = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + 14))); + num_pcrs = be32_to_cpu(cap.num_pcrs); for (i = 0; i < num_pcrs; i++) { - memcpy(data, pcrread, sizeof(pcrread)); - index = cpu_to_be32(i); - memcpy(data + 10, &index, 4); - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, - "attempting to read a PCR"); + rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, i, digest); if (rc) - goto out; + break; str += sprintf(str, "PCR-%02d: ", i); for (j = 0; j < TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; j++) - str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", *(data + 10 + j)); + str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", digest[j]); str += sprintf(str, "\n"); } -out: - kfree(data); return str - buf; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pcrs); #define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314 -static const u8 readpubek[] = { - 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */ - 0, 0, 0, 30, /* length */ - 0, 0, 0, 124, /* TPM_ORD_ReadPubek */ +#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124) +struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = { + .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, + .length = cpu_to_be32(30), + .ordinal = TPM_ORD_READPUBEK }; ssize_t tpm_show_pubek(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { u8 *data; + struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd; ssize_t err; int i, rc; char *str = buf; struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (chip == NULL) - return -ENODEV; - data = kzalloc(READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) - return -ENOMEM; - - memcpy(data, readpubek, sizeof(readpubek)); - - err = transmit_cmd(chip, data, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE, + tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header; + err = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE, "attempting to read the PUBEK"); if (err) goto out; @@ -812,7 +836,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_show_pubek(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, 256 byte modulus ignore checksum 20 bytes */ - + data = tpm_cmd.params.readpubek_out_buffer; str += sprintf(str, "Algorithm: %02X %02X %02X %02X\nEncscheme: %02X %02X\n" @@ -832,65 +856,33 @@ ssize_t tpm_show_pubek(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, } out: rc = str - buf; - kfree(data); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pubek); -#define CAP_VERSION_1_1 6 -#define CAP_VERSION_1_2 0x1A -#define CAP_VERSION_IDX 13 -static const u8 cap_version[] = { - 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */ - 0, 0, 0, 18, /* length */ - 0, 0, 0, 101, /* TPM_ORD_GetCapability */ - 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0 -}; ssize_t tpm_show_caps(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - u8 *data; + cap_t cap; ssize_t rc; char *str = buf; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (chip == NULL) - return -ENODEV; - - data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) - return -ENOMEM; - - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER; - - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER, &cap, "attempting to determine the manufacturer"); - if (rc) { - kfree(data); + if (rc) return 0; - } - str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n", - be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX)))); + be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id)); - memcpy(data, cap_version, sizeof(cap_version)); - data[CAP_VERSION_IDX] = CAP_VERSION_1_1; - rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, - "attempting to determine the 1.1 version"); + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap, + "attempting to determine the 1.1 version"); if (rc) - goto out; - + return 0; str += sprintf(str, "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n", - (int) data[14], (int) data[15], (int) data[16], - (int) data[17]); - -out: - kfree(data); + cap.tpm_version.Major, cap.tpm_version.Minor, + cap.tpm_version.revMajor, cap.tpm_version.revMinor); return str - buf; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps); @@ -898,51 +890,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps); ssize_t tpm_show_caps_1_2(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf) { - u8 *data; - ssize_t len; + cap_t cap; + ssize_t rc; char *str = buf; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - if (chip == NULL) - return -ENODEV; - - data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) - return -ENOMEM; - - memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap)); - data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP; - data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER; - - len = tpm_transmit(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE); - if (len <= TPM_ERROR_SIZE) { - dev_dbg(chip->dev, "A TPM error (%d) occurred " - "attempting to determine the manufacturer\n", - be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_RET_CODE_IDX)))); - kfree(data); + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER, &cap, + "attempting to determine the manufacturer"); + if (rc) return 0; - } - str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n", - be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX)))); - - memcpy(data, cap_version, sizeof(cap_version)); - data[CAP_VERSION_IDX] = CAP_VERSION_1_2; - - len = tpm_transmit(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE); - if (len <= TPM_ERROR_SIZE) { - dev_err(chip->dev, "A TPM error (%d) occurred " - "attempting to determine the 1.2 version\n", - be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_RET_CODE_IDX)))); - goto out; - } + be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id)); + rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap, + "attempting to determine the 1.2 version"); + if (rc) + return 0; str += sprintf(str, "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n", - (int) data[16], (int) data[17], (int) data[18], - (int) data[19]); - -out: - kfree(data); + cap.tpm_version_1_2.Major, cap.tpm_version_1_2.Minor, + cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMajor, + cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMinor); return str - buf; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps_1_2); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 8e30df4a4388..8e00b4ddd083 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/platform_device.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/tpm.h> enum tpm_timeout { TPM_TIMEOUT = 5, /* msecs */ @@ -123,6 +124,147 @@ static inline void tpm_write_index(int base, int index, int value) outb(index, base); outb(value & 0xFF, base+1); } +struct tpm_input_header { + __be16 tag; + __be32 length; + __be32 ordinal; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct tpm_output_header { + __be16 tag; + __be32 length; + __be32 return_code; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct stclear_flags_t { + __be16 tag; + u8 deactivated; + u8 disableForceClear; + u8 physicalPresence; + u8 physicalPresenceLock; + u8 bGlobalLock; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct tpm_version_t { + u8 Major; + u8 Minor; + u8 revMajor; + u8 revMinor; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct tpm_version_1_2_t { + __be16 tag; + u8 Major; + u8 Minor; + u8 revMajor; + u8 revMinor; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct timeout_t { + __be32 a; + __be32 b; + __be32 c; + __be32 d; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct duration_t { + __be32 tpm_short; + __be32 tpm_medium; + __be32 tpm_long; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct permanent_flags_t { + __be16 tag; + u8 disable; + u8 ownership; + u8 deactivated; + u8 readPubek; + u8 disableOwnerClear; + u8 allowMaintenance; + u8 physicalPresenceLifetimeLock; + u8 physicalPresenceHWEnable; + u8 physicalPresenceCMDEnable; + u8 CEKPUsed; + u8 TPMpost; + u8 TPMpostLock; + u8 FIPS; + u8 operator; + u8 enableRevokeEK; + u8 nvLocked; + u8 readSRKPub; + u8 tpmEstablished; + u8 maintenanceDone; + u8 disableFullDALogicInfo; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +typedef union { + struct permanent_flags_t perm_flags; + struct stclear_flags_t stclear_flags; + bool owned; + __be32 num_pcrs; + struct tpm_version_t tpm_version; + struct tpm_version_1_2_t tpm_version_1_2; + __be32 manufacturer_id; + struct timeout_t timeout; + struct duration_t duration; +} cap_t; + +struct tpm_getcap_params_in { + __be32 cap; + __be32 subcap_size; + __be32 subcap; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct tpm_getcap_params_out { + __be32 cap_size; + cap_t cap; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct tpm_readpubek_params_out { + u8 algorithm[4]; + u8 encscheme[2]; + u8 sigscheme[2]; + u8 parameters[12]; /*assuming RSA*/ + __be32 keysize; + u8 modulus[256]; + u8 checksum[20]; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +typedef union { + struct tpm_input_header in; + struct tpm_output_header out; +} tpm_cmd_header; + +#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 +struct tpm_pcrread_out { + u8 pcr_result[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct tpm_pcrread_in { + __be32 pcr_idx; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +struct tpm_pcrextend_in { + __be32 pcr_idx; + u8 hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +typedef union { + struct tpm_getcap_params_out getcap_out; + struct tpm_readpubek_params_out readpubek_out; + u8 readpubek_out_buffer[sizeof(struct tpm_readpubek_params_out)]; + struct tpm_getcap_params_in getcap_in; + struct tpm_pcrread_in pcrread_in; + struct tpm_pcrread_out pcrread_out; + struct tpm_pcrextend_in pcrextend_in; +} tpm_cmd_params; + +struct tpm_cmd_t { + tpm_cmd_header header; + tpm_cmd_params params; +}__attribute__((packed)); + +ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct device *, __be32, cap_t *, const char *); extern void tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *); extern void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *); diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c index d0145ca27572..0949b43794a4 100644 --- a/fs/compat.c +++ b/fs/compat.c @@ -1402,6 +1402,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; + current->in_execve = 1; retval = -ENOMEM; bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds(); @@ -1454,6 +1455,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, goto out; /* execve succeeded */ + current->in_execve = 0; mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); acct_update_integrals(current); free_bprm(bprm); @@ -1470,6 +1472,7 @@ out_file: } out_unlock: + current->in_execve = 0; mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); out_free: diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 929b58004b7e..b9f1c144b7a1 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h> #include <linux/cn_proc.h> @@ -127,6 +128,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library) MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN); if (error) goto exit; + error = ima_path_check(&nd.path, MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN); + if (error) + goto exit; file = nameidata_to_filp(&nd, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE); error = PTR_ERR(file); @@ -674,6 +678,9 @@ struct file *open_exec(const char *name) err = inode_permission(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN); if (err) goto out_path_put; + err = ima_path_check(&nd.path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN); + if (err) + goto out_path_put; file = nameidata_to_filp(&nd, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE); if (IS_ERR(file)) @@ -1184,6 +1191,9 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs) retval = security_bprm_check(bprm); if (retval) return retval; + retval = ima_bprm_check(bprm); + if (retval) + return retval; /* kernel module loader fixup */ /* so we don't try to load run modprobe in kernel space. */ @@ -1284,6 +1294,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; + current->in_execve = 1; retval = -ENOMEM; bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds(); @@ -1337,6 +1348,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, goto out; /* execve succeeded */ + current->in_execve = 0; mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); acct_update_integrals(current); free_bprm(bprm); @@ -1355,6 +1367,7 @@ out_file: } out_unlock: + current->in_execve = 0; mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); out_free: diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index bbeeac6efa1a..da806aceae3f 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/eventpoll.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/mount.h> @@ -279,6 +280,7 @@ void __fput(struct file *file) if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); security_file_free(file); + ima_file_free(file); if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL)) cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); fops_put(file->f_op); diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index 6ac0cef6c5f5..643ac43e5a5c 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/hash.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/cdev.h> #include <linux/bootmem.h> @@ -147,13 +148,13 @@ struct inode *inode_init_always(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode) inode->i_cdev = NULL; inode->i_rdev = 0; inode->dirtied_when = 0; - if (security_inode_alloc(inode)) { - if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode) - inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode); - else - kmem_cache_free(inode_cachep, (inode)); - return NULL; - } + + if (security_inode_alloc(inode)) + goto out_free_inode; + + /* allocate and initialize an i_integrity */ + if (ima_inode_alloc(inode)) + goto out_free_security; spin_lock_init(&inode->i_lock); lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_lock, &sb->s_type->i_lock_key); @@ -189,6 +190,15 @@ struct inode *inode_init_always(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode) inode->i_mapping = mapping; return inode; + +out_free_security: + security_inode_free(inode); +out_free_inode: + if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode) + inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode); + else + kmem_cache_free(inode_cachep, (inode)); + return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_always); diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index bbc15c237558..199317642ad6 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -850,6 +851,8 @@ static int __link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd) if (err == -EAGAIN) err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC); + if (!err) + err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC); if (err) break; @@ -1509,6 +1512,11 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag) error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode); if (error) return error; + + error = ima_path_check(path, + acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + if (error) + return error; /* * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing. */ diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 67e5dbfc2961..4fa2810b675e 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events * 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records - * 1800 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events) + * 1800 - 1899 kernel integrity events + * 1900 - 1999 future kernel use * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy) * 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel) * 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records @@ -125,6 +126,12 @@ #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799 #define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS 1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */ #define AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND 1701 /* Process ended abnormally */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA 1800 /* Data integrity verification */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA 1801 /* Metadata integrity verification */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS 1802 /* Integrity enable status */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH 1803 /* Integrity HASH type */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */ #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */ diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0e2aa45cb0ce --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation + * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_IMA_H +#define _LINUX_IMA_H + +#include <linux/fs.h> +struct linux_binprm; + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); +extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode); +extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask); +extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); +extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); +extern void ima_shm_check(struct file *file); + +#else +static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) +{ + return; +} + +static inline int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file) +{ + return; +} + +static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void ima_shm_check(struct file *file) +{ + return; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */ +#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index 011db2f4c94c..2c36f62e7544 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1175,6 +1175,8 @@ struct task_struct { /* ??? */ unsigned int personality; unsigned did_exec:1; + unsigned in_execve:1; /* Tell the LSMs that the process is doing an + * execve */ pid_t pid; pid_t tgid; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3338b3f5c21a --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2004,2007,2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com> + * Dave Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> + * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com> + * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> + * Debora Velarde <dvelarde@us.ibm.com> + * + * Maintained by: <tpmdd_devel@lists.sourceforge.net> + * + * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module). + * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + */ +#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_H__ +#define __LINUX_TPM_H__ + +/* + * Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx + */ +#define TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF + +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) + +extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); +extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); +#endif +#endif diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c index 05d51d2a792c..f239d87e0d37 100644 --- a/ipc/shm.c +++ b/ipc/shm.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> @@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params) error = PTR_ERR(file); if (IS_ERR(file)) goto no_file; + ima_shm_check(file); id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni); if (id < 0) { @@ -887,6 +889,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr) file = alloc_file(path.mnt, path.dentry, f_mode, &shm_file_operations); if (!file) goto out_free; + ima_shm_check(file); file->private_data = sfd; file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping; diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c index fbb300e6191f..850e0ba41c1e 100644 --- a/kernel/user.c +++ b/kernel/user.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = { .kref = { - .refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(1), + .refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(2), }, .creator = &root_user, }; diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 00ced3ee49a8..1abb9185a686 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/profile.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -1049,6 +1050,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0); if (error) return error; + error = ima_file_mmap(file, prot); + if (error) + return error; return mmap_region(file, addr, len, flags, vm_flags, pgoff); } diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 4103a239ce84..7ec78e24a30d 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/swap.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt; @@ -2665,6 +2666,7 @@ int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (IS_ERR(file)) return PTR_ERR(file); + ima_shm_check(file); if (vma->vm_file) fput(vma->vm_file); vma->vm_file = file; diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 9438535d7fd0..bb244774e9d7 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ config SECURITYFS bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" help This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by - the TPM bios character driver. It is not used by SELinux or SMACK. + the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is + not used by SELinux or SMACK. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. @@ -134,6 +135,9 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig +source security/tomoyo/Kconfig + +source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig endmenu diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index c05c127fff9a..fa77021d9778 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -15,5 +16,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly. obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += root_plug.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o + +# Object integrity file lists +subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima/built-in.o diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index 007ef252dde7..f3b91bfbe4cb 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -202,12 +202,11 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode, * This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds. This * pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is * to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded, - * you are responsible here). If an error occurs, %NULL is returned. + * you are responsible here). If an error occurs, the function will return + * the erorr value (via ERR_PTR). * * If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is - * returned. It is not wise to check for this value, but rather, check for - * %NULL or !%NULL instead as to eliminate the need for #ifdef in the calling - * code. + * returned. */ struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode, struct dentry *parent, void *data, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..53d9764e8f09 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture +# +config IMA + bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)" + depends on ACPI + select SECURITYFS + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_MD5 + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select TCG_TPM + select TCG_TIS + help + The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity + Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash + values of executables and other sensitive system files, + as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages + to change the contents of an important system file + being measured, we can tell. + + If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains + an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the + TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party + whether or not critical system files have been modified. + Read <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html> + to learn more about IMA. + If unsure, say N. + +config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX + int + depends on IMA + range 8 14 + default 10 + help + IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index + that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the + measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10. + +config IMA_AUDIT + bool + depends on IMA + default y + help + This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which + allows informational auditing messages to be enabled + at boot. If this option is selected, informational integrity + auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on + the kernel command line. + +config IMA_LSM_RULES + bool + depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK) + default y + help + Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..787c4cb916cd --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +# +# Makefile for building Trusted Computing Group's(TCG) runtime Integrity +# Measurement Architecture(IMA). +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o + +ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ + ima_policy.o ima_iint.o ima_audit.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..165eb5397ea5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com> + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * File: ima.h + * internal Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) definitions + */ + +#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_H +#define __LINUX_IMA_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/hash.h> +#include <linux/tpm.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> + +enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_ASCII }; +enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; + +/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */ +#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE 20 +#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255 + +#define IMA_HASH_BITS 9 +#define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS) + +/* set during initialization */ +extern int ima_initialized; +extern int ima_used_chip; +extern char *ima_hash; + +/* IMA inode template definition */ +struct ima_template_data { + u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1/md5 measurement hash */ + char file_name[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1]; /* name + \0 */ +}; + +struct ima_template_entry { + u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */ + const char *template_name; + int template_len; + struct ima_template_data template; +}; + +struct ima_queue_entry { + struct hlist_node hnext; /* place in hash collision list */ + struct list_head later; /* place in ima_measurements list */ + struct ima_template_entry *entry; +}; +extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */ + +/* declarations */ +void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, + const char *cause, int result, int info); + +/* Internal IMA function definitions */ +void ima_iintcache_init(void); +int ima_init(void); +void ima_cleanup(void); +int ima_fs_init(void); +void ima_fs_cleanup(void); +int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, + const char *op, struct inode *inode); +int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest); +int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest); +int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest); +void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, + const char *op, const char *cause); + +/* + * used to protect h_table and sha_table + */ +extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock; + +struct ima_h_table { + atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */ + atomic_long_t violations; + struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE]; +}; +extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable; + +static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) +{ + return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS); +} + +/* iint cache flags */ +#define IMA_MEASURED 1 +#define IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK 512 + +/* integrity data associated with an inode */ +struct ima_iint_cache { + u64 version; /* track inode changes */ + unsigned long flags; + u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; + struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */ + long readcount; /* measured files readcount */ + long writecount; /* measured files writecount */ + long opencount; /* opens reference count */ + struct kref refcount; /* ima_iint_cache reference count */ + struct rcu_head rcu; +}; + +/* LIM API function definitions */ +int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, + int mask, int function); +int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); +void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename); +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, + struct inode *inode); +void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, + enum ima_show_type show); + +/* radix tree calls to lookup, insert, delete + * integrity data associated with an inode. + */ +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode); +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get(struct inode *inode); +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_insert_get(struct inode *inode); +void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode); +void iint_free(struct kref *kref); +void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu); + +/* IMA policy related functions */ +enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; + +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask); +void ima_init_policy(void); +void ima_update_policy(void); +int ima_parse_add_rule(char *); +void ima_delete_rules(void); + +/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES + +#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init +#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match + +#else + +static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3cd58b60afd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * File: ima_api.c + * Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement, + * and store_template. + */ +#include <linux/module.h> + +#include "ima.h" +static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima"; + +/* + * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements + * + * Calculate the hash of a template entry, add the template entry + * to an ordered list of measurement entries maintained inside the kernel, + * and also update the aggregate integrity value (maintained inside the + * configured TPM PCR) over the hashes of the current list of measurement + * entries. + * + * Applications retrieve the current kernel-held measurement list through + * the securityfs entries in /sys/kernel/security/ima. The signed aggregate + * TPM PCR (called quote) can be retrieved using a TPM user space library + * and is used to validate the measurement list. + * + * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise + */ +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, + int violation, struct inode *inode) +{ + const char *op = "add_template_measure"; + const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error"; + int result; + + memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest)); + entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME; + entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template); + + if (!violation) { + result = ima_calc_template_hash(entry->template_len, + &entry->template, + entry->digest); + if (result < 0) { + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, + entry->template_name, op, + audit_cause, result, 0); + return result; + } + } + result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode); + return result; +} + +/* + * ima_add_violation - add violation to measurement list. + * + * Violations are flagged in the measurement list with zero hash values. + * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR + * value is invalidated. + */ +void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, + const char *op, const char *cause) +{ + struct ima_template_entry *entry; + int violation = 1; + int result; + + /* can overflow, only indicator */ + atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations); + + entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!entry) { + result = -ENOMEM; + goto err_out; + } + memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); + strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX); + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode); + if (result < 0) + kfree(entry); +err_out: + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, + op, cause, result, 0); +} + +/** + * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy. + * @inode: pointer to inode to measure + * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) + * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) + * + * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: + * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= + * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. + * func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP + * mask: contains the permission mask + * fsmagic: hex value + * + * Must be called with iint->mutex held. + * + * Return 0 to measure. Return 1 if already measured. + * For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other + * error, return an error code. +*/ +int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, + int mask, int function) +{ + int must_measure; + + if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) + return 1; + + must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask); + return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES; +} + +/* + * ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement + * + * Calculate the file hash, if it doesn't already exist, + * storing the measurement and i_version in the iint. + * + * Must be called with iint->mutex held. + * + * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise + */ +int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) +{ + int result = -EEXIST; + + if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) { + u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version; + + memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest); + if (!result) + iint->version = i_version; + } + return result; +} + +/* + * ima_store_measurement - store file measurement + * + * Create an "ima" template and then store the template by calling + * ima_store_template. + * + * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured, + * but the measurement could already exist: + * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or + * different filesystems. + * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info, + * containing the hashing info. + * + * Must be called with iint->mutex held. + */ +void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename) +{ + const char *op = "add_template_measure"; + const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; + int result = -ENOMEM; + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; + struct ima_template_entry *entry; + int violation = 0; + + entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!entry) { + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, + op, audit_cause, result, 0); + return; + } + memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); + memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX); + + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode); + if (!result) + iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; + else + kfree(entry); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1e082bb987be --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation + * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * File: integrity_audit.c + * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem + */ + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include "ima.h" + +static int ima_audit; + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT + +/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */ +static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str) +{ + unsigned long audit; + int rc, result = 0; + char *op = "ima_audit"; + char *cause; + + rc = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit); + if (rc || audit > 1) + result = 1; + else + ima_audit = audit; + cause = ima_audit ? "enabled" : "not_enabled"; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + op, cause, result, 0); + return 1; +} +__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup); +#endif + +void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, + const char *cause, int result, int audit_info) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */ + return; + + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno); + audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", + current->pid, current->cred->uid, + audit_get_loginuid(current), + audit_get_sessionid(current)); + audit_log_task_context(ab); + switch (audit_msgno) { + case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA: + case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA: + case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR: + case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS: + audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s", op, cause); + break; + case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH: + audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s hash=%s", op, cause); + break; + default: + audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", op); + } + audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); + if (fname) { + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname); + } + if (inode) + audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu", + inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1); + audit_log_end(ab); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..50d572b74caf --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * File: ima_crypto.c + * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include "ima.h" + +static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc) +{ + int rc; + + desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ima_hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) { + pr_info("failed to load %s transform: %ld\n", + ima_hash, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm)); + rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm); + return rc; + } + desc->flags = 0; + rc = crypto_hash_init(desc); + if (rc) + crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest + */ +int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) +{ + struct hash_desc desc; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + loff_t i_size; + char *rbuf; + int rc, offset = 0; + + rc = init_desc(&desc); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rbuf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode); + while (offset < i_size) { + int rbuf_len; + + rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE); + if (rbuf_len < 0) { + rc = rbuf_len; + break; + } + offset += rbuf_len; + sg_init_one(sg, rbuf, rbuf_len); + + rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, rbuf_len); + if (rc) + break; + } + kfree(rbuf); + if (!rc) + rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest); +out: + crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Calculate the hash of a given template + */ +int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest) +{ + struct hash_desc desc; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + int rc; + + rc = init_desc(&desc); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + sg_init_one(sg, template, template_len); + rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, template_len); + if (!rc) + rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest); + crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); + return rc; +} + +static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) +{ + if (!ima_used_chip) + return; + + if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0) + pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); +} + +/* + * Calculate the boot aggregate hash + */ +int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest) +{ + struct hash_desc desc; + struct scatterlist sg; + u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int rc, i; + + rc = init_desc(&desc); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + /* cumulative sha1 over tpm registers 0-7 */ + for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) { + ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i); + /* now accumulate with current aggregate */ + sg_init_one(&sg, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + if (!rc) + crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest); + crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ffbe259700b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -0,0 +1,376 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com> + * Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com> + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * File: ima_fs.c + * implemenents security file system for reporting + * current measurement list and IMA statistics + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/rculist.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> + +#include "ima.h" + +static int valid_policy = 1; +#define TMPBUFLEN 12 +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, + loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val) +{ + char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; + ssize_t len; + + len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); +} + +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations); +} + +static struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = { + .read = ima_show_htable_violations +}; + +static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len); + +} + +static struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = { + .read = ima_show_measurements_count +}; + +/* returns pointer to hlist_node */ +static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) +{ + loff_t l = *pos; + struct ima_queue_entry *qe; + + /* we need a lock since pos could point beyond last element */ + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later) { + if (!l--) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return qe; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + return NULL; +} + +static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v; + + /* lock protects when reading beyond last element + * against concurrent list-extension + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + qe = list_entry(rcu_dereference(qe->later.next), + struct ima_queue_entry, later); + rcu_read_unlock(); + (*pos)++; + + return (&qe->later == &ima_measurements) ? NULL : qe; +} + +static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ +} + +static void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen) +{ + while (datalen--) + seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++); +} + +/* print format: + * 32bit-le=pcr# + * char[20]=template digest + * 32bit-le=template name size + * char[n]=template name + * eventdata[n]=template specific data + */ +static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + /* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */ + struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v; + struct ima_template_entry *e; + int namelen; + u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; + + /* get entry */ + e = qe->entry; + if (e == NULL) + return -1; + + /* + * 1st: PCRIndex + * PCR used is always the same (config option) in + * little-endian format + */ + ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr); + + /* 2nd: template digest */ + ima_putc(m, e->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + + /* 3rd: template name size */ + namelen = strlen(e->template_name); + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen); + + /* 4th: template name */ + ima_putc(m, (void *)e->template_name, namelen); + + /* 5th: template specific data */ + ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template, + IMA_SHOW_BINARY); + return 0; +} + +static struct seq_operations ima_measurments_seqops = { + .start = ima_measurements_start, + .next = ima_measurements_next, + .stop = ima_measurements_stop, + .show = ima_measurements_show +}; + +static int ima_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return seq_open(file, &ima_measurments_seqops); +} + +static struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = { + .open = ima_measurements_open, + .read = seq_read, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .release = seq_release, +}; + +static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) + seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i)); +} + +void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show) +{ + struct ima_template_data *entry = e; + int namelen; + + switch (show) { + case IMA_SHOW_ASCII: + ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest); + seq_printf(m, " %s\n", entry->file_name); + break; + case IMA_SHOW_BINARY: + ima_putc(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + + namelen = strlen(entry->file_name); + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen); + ima_putc(m, entry->file_name, namelen); + default: + break; + } +} + +/* print in ascii */ +static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + /* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */ + struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v; + struct ima_template_entry *e; + + /* get entry */ + e = qe->entry; + if (e == NULL) + return -1; + + /* 1st: PCR used (config option) */ + seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); + + /* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */ + ima_print_digest(m, e->digest); + + /* 3th: template name */ + seq_printf(m, " %s ", e->template_name); + + /* 4th: template specific data */ + ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template, + IMA_SHOW_ASCII); + return 0; +} + +static struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_seqops = { + .start = ima_measurements_start, + .next = ima_measurements_next, + .stop = ima_measurements_stop, + .show = ima_ascii_measurements_show +}; + +static int ima_ascii_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return seq_open(file, &ima_ascii_measurements_seqops); +} + +static struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { + .open = ima_ascii_measurements_open, + .read = seq_read, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .release = seq_release, +}; + +static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *data; + int rc; + + if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + if (*ppos != 0) { + /* No partial writes. */ + return -EINVAL; + } + data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen)) { + kfree(data); + return -EFAULT; + } + *(data + datalen) = '\0'; + rc = ima_parse_add_rule(data); + if (rc < 0) { + datalen = -EINVAL; + valid_policy = 0; + } + + kfree(data); + return datalen; +} + +static struct dentry *ima_dir; +static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; +static struct dentry *violations; +static struct dentry *ima_policy; + +static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1); +/* + * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file + */ +int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) +{ + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount)) + return 0; + return -EBUSY; +} + +/* + * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules. + * + * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now + * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file, + * assuming a valid policy. + */ +static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + if (!valid_policy) { + ima_delete_rules(); + valid_policy = 1; + atomic_set(&policy_opencount, 1); + return 0; + } + ima_update_policy(); + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); + ima_policy = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { + .open = ima_open_policy, + .write = ima_write_policy, + .release = ima_release_policy +}; + +int ima_fs_init(void) +{ + ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(ima_dir)) + return -1; + + binary_runtime_measurements = + securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measurements_ops); + if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements)) + goto out; + + ascii_runtime_measurements = + securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_ascii_measurements_ops); + if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) + goto out; + + runtime_measurements_count = + securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measurements_count_ops); + if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) + goto out; + + violations = + securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); + if (IS_ERR(violations)) + goto out; + + ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR, + ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measure_policy_ops); + if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) + goto out; + + return 0; +out: + securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); + securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); + securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); + securityfs_remove(ima_dir); + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); + return -1; +} + +void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void) +{ + securityfs_remove(violations); + securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); + securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); + securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); + securityfs_remove(ima_dir); + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ec79f1ee992c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * File: ima_iint.c + * - implements the IMA hooks: ima_inode_alloc, ima_inode_free + * - cache integrity information associated with an inode + * using a radix tree. + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/radix-tree.h> +#include "ima.h" + +#define ima_iint_delete ima_inode_free + +RADIX_TREE(ima_iint_store, GFP_ATOMIC); +DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_iint_lock); + +static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly; + +/* ima_iint_find_get - return the iint associated with an inode + * + * ima_iint_find_get gets a reference to the iint. Caller must + * remember to put the iint reference. + */ +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + + rcu_read_lock(); + iint = radix_tree_lookup(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode); + if (!iint) + goto out; + kref_get(&iint->refcount); +out: + rcu_read_unlock(); + return iint; +} + +/* Allocate memory for the iint associated with the inode + * from the iint_cache slab, initialize the iint, and + * insert it into the radix tree. + * + * On success return a pointer to the iint; on failure return NULL. + */ +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; + int rc = 0; + + if (!ima_initialized) + return iint; + iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!iint) + return iint; + + rc = radix_tree_preload(GFP_KERNEL); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); + rc = radix_tree_insert(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode, iint); + spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); +out: + if (rc < 0) { + kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); + if (rc == -EEXIST) { + spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); + iint = radix_tree_lookup(&ima_iint_store, + (unsigned long)inode); + spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); + } else + iint = NULL; + } + radix_tree_preload_end(); + return iint; +} + +/** + * ima_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode + * @inode: pointer to the inode + * + * Return 0 on success, 1 on failure. + */ +int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + + if (!ima_initialized) + return 0; + + iint = ima_iint_insert(inode); + if (!iint) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* ima_iint_find_insert_get - get the iint associated with an inode + * + * Most insertions are done at inode_alloc, except those allocated + * before late_initcall. When the iint does not exist, allocate it, + * initialize and insert it, and increment the iint refcount. + * + * (Can't initialize at security_initcall before any inodes are + * allocated, got to wait at least until proc_init.) + * + * Return the iint. + */ +struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_insert_get(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; + + iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); + if (iint) + return iint; + + iint = ima_iint_insert(inode); + if (iint) + kref_get(&iint->refcount); + + return iint; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_iint_find_insert_get); + +/* iint_free - called when the iint refcount goes to zero */ +void iint_free(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint = container_of(kref, struct ima_iint_cache, + refcount); + iint->version = 0; + iint->flags = 0UL; + if (iint->readcount != 0) { + printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__, + iint->readcount); + iint->readcount = 0; + } + if (iint->writecount != 0) { + printk(KERN_INFO "%s: writecount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__, + iint->writecount); + iint->writecount = 0; + } + if (iint->opencount != 0) { + printk(KERN_INFO "%s: opencount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__, + iint->opencount); + iint->opencount = 0; + } + kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1); + kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); +} + +void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint = container_of(rcu_head, + struct ima_iint_cache, rcu); + kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); +} + +/** + * ima_iint_delete - called on integrity_inode_free + * @inode: pointer to the inode + * + * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode. + */ +void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + + if (!ima_initialized) + return; + spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); + iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode); + spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); + if (iint) + call_rcu(&iint->rcu, iint_rcu_free); +} + +static void init_once(void *foo) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint = foo; + + memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); + iint->version = 0; + iint->flags = 0UL; + mutex_init(&iint->mutex); + iint->readcount = 0; + iint->writecount = 0; + iint->opencount = 0; + kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1); +} + +void ima_iintcache_init(void) +{ + iint_cache = + kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0, + SLAB_PANIC, init_once); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0b0bb8c978cc --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com> + * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com> + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * File: ima_init.c + * initialization and cleanup functions + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include "ima.h" + +/* name for boot aggregate entry */ +static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate"; +int ima_used_chip; + +/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend + * the PCR register. + * + * Calculate the boot aggregate, a SHA1 over tpm registers 0-7, + * assuming a TPM chip exists, and zeroes if the TPM chip does not + * exist. Add the boot aggregate measurement to the measurement + * list and extend the PCR register. + * + * If a tpm chip does not exist, indicate the core root of trust is + * not hardware based by invalidating the aggregate PCR value. + * (The aggregate PCR value is invalidated by adding one value to + * the measurement list and extending the aggregate PCR value with + * a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement + * list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's. + */ +static void ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) +{ + struct ima_template_entry *entry; + const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate"; + const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; + int result = -ENOMEM; + int violation = 1; + + entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!entry) + goto err_out; + + memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); + strncpy(entry->template.file_name, boot_aggregate_name, + IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX); + if (ima_used_chip) { + violation = 0; + result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(entry->template.digest); + if (result < 0) { + audit_cause = "hashing_error"; + kfree(entry); + goto err_out; + } + } + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL); + if (result < 0) + kfree(entry); + return; +err_out: + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op, + audit_cause, result, 0); +} + +int ima_init(void) +{ + u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int rc; + + ima_used_chip = 0; + rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i); + if (rc == 0) + ima_used_chip = 1; + + if (!ima_used_chip) + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); + + ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */ + ima_init_policy(); + + return ima_fs_init(); +} + +void __exit ima_cleanup(void) +{ + ima_fs_cleanup(); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f4e7266f5aee --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com> + * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> + * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com> + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * File: ima_main.c + * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap, + * and ima_path_check. + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/binfmts.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> + +#include "ima.h" + +int ima_initialized; + +char *ima_hash = "sha1"; +static int __init hash_setup(char *str) +{ + const char *op = "hash_setup"; + const char *hash = "sha1"; + int result = 0; + int audit_info = 0; + + if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) { + hash = "md5"; + ima_hash = str; + } else if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) != 0) { + hash = "invalid_hash_type"; + result = 1; + } + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH, NULL, NULL, op, hash, + result, audit_info); + return 1; +} +__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup); + +/** + * ima_file_free - called on __fput() + * @file: pointer to file structure being freed + * + * Flag files that changed, based on i_version; + * and decrement the iint readcount/writecount. + */ +void ima_file_free(struct file *file) +{ + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + + if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + if (iint->opencount <= 0) { + printk(KERN_INFO + "%s: %s open/free imbalance (r:%ld w:%ld o:%ld f:%ld)\n", + __FUNCTION__, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, + iint->readcount, iint->writecount, + iint->opencount, atomic_long_read(&file->f_count)); + if (!(iint->flags & IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK)) { + dump_stack(); + iint->flags |= IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK; + } + } + iint->opencount--; + + if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) + iint->readcount--; + + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { + iint->writecount--; + if (iint->writecount == 0) { + if (iint->version != inode->i_version) + iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED; + } + } + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); + kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); +} + +/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR. + * + * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write, + * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error. + * + * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results + * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. + * + * In either case invalidate the PCR. + */ +enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS }; +static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error, + struct ima_iint_cache *iint, + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename) +{ + switch (error) { + case TOMTOU: + if (iint->readcount > 0) + ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", + "ToMToU"); + break; + case OPEN_WRITERS: + if (iint->writecount > 0) + ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", + "open_writers"); + break; + } +} + +static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename) +{ + int rc = 0; + + if (IS_ERR(file)) { + pr_info("%s dentry_open failed\n", filename); + return rc; + } + iint->opencount++; + iint->readcount++; + + rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); + if (!rc) + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename); + return rc; +} + +/** + * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. + * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured + * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE + * + * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the + * ima_must_measure() policy decision. + * + * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only + * invalidate the PCR for measured files: + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, + * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. + * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, + * could result in a file measurement error. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().) + */ +int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask) +{ + struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + struct file *file = NULL; + int rc; + + if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return 0; + iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return 0; + + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + iint->opencount++; + if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0)) + iint->writecount++; + else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) + iint->readcount++; + + rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0)) + ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, + path->dentry->d_name.name); + + if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ) + goto out; + + ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, + path->dentry->d_name.name); + if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) { + struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry); + struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt); + + file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY, current->cred); + rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name); + } +out: + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); + if (file) + fput(file); + kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); + return 0; +} + +static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + int mask, int function) +{ + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + int rc; + + if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return 0; + iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return -ENOMEM; + + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function); + if (rc != 0) + goto out; + + rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); + if (!rc) + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename); +out: + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); + kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); + return rc; +} + +static void opencount_get(struct file *file) +{ + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + + if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + iint->opencount++; + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); +} + +/** + * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. + * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) + * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. + * + * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure() + * policy decision. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().) + */ +int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) +{ + int rc; + + if (!file) + return 0; + if (prot & PROT_EXEC) + rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, + MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP); + return 0; +} + +/* + * ima_shm_check - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file + * + * Maintain the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary + * imbalance messages. + */ +void ima_shm_check(struct file *file) +{ + opencount_get(file); + return; +} + +/** + * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. + * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure + * + * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write, + * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file, + * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access(). + * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually + * what is being executed. + * + * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. + * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().) + */ +int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + int rc; + + rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->filename, + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + return 0; +} + +static int __init init_ima(void) +{ + int error; + + ima_iintcache_init(); + error = ima_init(); + ima_initialized = 1; + return error; +} + +static void __exit cleanup_ima(void) +{ + ima_cleanup(); +} + +late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ + +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b5291ad5ef56 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation + * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + * ima_policy.c + * - initialize default measure policy rules + * + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/magic.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> + +#include "ima.h" + +/* flags definitions */ +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002 +#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 +#define IMA_UID 0x0008 + +enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE }; + +#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 +enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, + LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE +}; + +struct ima_measure_rule_entry { + struct list_head list; + enum ima_action action; + unsigned int flags; + enum ima_hooks func; + int mask; + unsigned long fsmagic; + uid_t uid; + struct { + void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ + int type; /* audit type */ + } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; +}; + +/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be + * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid + */ +static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, + .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, + .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, + .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID} +}; + +static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules); +static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules); +static struct list_head *ima_measure; + +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex); + +/** + * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule. + * @rule: a pointer to a rule + * @inode: a pointer to an inode + * @func: LIM hook identifier + * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) + * + * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. + */ +static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, + struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk = current; + int i; + + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func) + return false; + if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask) + return false; + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) + && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) + return false; + if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid) + return false; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { + int rc; + u32 osid, sid; + + if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) + continue; + + switch (i) { + case LSM_OBJ_USER: + case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: + case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, + rule->lsm[i].type, + AUDIT_EQUAL, + rule->lsm[i].rule, + NULL); + break; + case LSM_SUBJ_USER: + case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: + case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, + rule->lsm[i].type, + AUDIT_EQUAL, + rule->lsm[i].rule, + NULL); + default: + break; + } + if (!rc) + return false; + } + return true; +} + +/** + * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions + * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made + * @func: IMA hook identifier + * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) + * + * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) + * conditions. + * + * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list, + * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list + * change.) + */ +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) +{ + struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; + + list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) { + bool rc; + + rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask); + if (rc) + return entry->action; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. + * + * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the + * the new measure_policy_rules. + */ +void ima_init_policy(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++) + list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules); + ima_measure = &measure_default_rules; +} + +/** + * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules + * + * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new + * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be + * added to the policy. + */ +void ima_update_policy(void) +{ + const char *op = "policy_update"; + const char *cause = "already exists"; + int result = 1; + int audit_info = 0; + + if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) { + ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules; + cause = "complete"; + result = 0; + } + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, + NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info); +} + +enum { + Opt_err = -1, + Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure, + Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, + Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, + Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid +}; + +static match_table_t policy_tokens = { + {Opt_measure, "measure"}, + {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"}, + {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"}, + {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"}, + {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"}, + {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"}, + {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"}, + {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"}, + {Opt_func, "func=%s"}, + {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, + {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, + {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, + char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) +{ + int result; + + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; + result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, + AUDIT_EQUAL, args, + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + return result; +} + +static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + char *p; + int result = 0; + + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); + + entry->action = -1; + while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) { + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + int token; + unsigned long lnum; + + if (result < 0) + break; + if (!*p) + continue; + token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args); + switch (token) { + case Opt_measure: + audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure"); + entry->action = MEASURE; + break; + case Opt_dont_measure: + audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure"); + entry->action = DONT_MEASURE; + break; + case Opt_func: + audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); + if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = PATH_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_MMAP; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = BPRM_CHECK; + else + result = -EINVAL; + if (!result) + entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC; + break; + case Opt_mask: + audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from); + if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) + entry->mask = MAY_EXEC; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) + entry->mask = MAY_WRITE; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0) + entry->mask = MAY_READ; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) + entry->mask = MAY_APPEND; + else + result = -EINVAL; + if (!result) + entry->flags |= IMA_MASK; + break; + case Opt_fsmagic: + audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from); + result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, + &entry->fsmagic); + if (!result) + entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; + break; + case Opt_uid: + audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from); + result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + if (!result) { + entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum; + if (entry->uid != lnum) + result = -EINVAL; + else + entry->flags |= IMA_UID; + } + break; + case Opt_obj_user: + audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_OBJ_USER, + AUDIT_OBJ_USER); + break; + case Opt_obj_role: + audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_OBJ_ROLE, + AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE); + break; + case Opt_obj_type: + audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_OBJ_TYPE, + AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE); + break; + case Opt_subj_user: + audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_SUBJ_USER, + AUDIT_SUBJ_USER); + break; + case Opt_subj_role: + audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, + AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE); + break; + case Opt_subj_type: + audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, + AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); + break; + case Opt_err: + audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p); + break; + } + } + if (entry->action == UNKNOWN) + result = -EINVAL; + + audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1); + audit_log_end(ab); + return result; +} + +/** + * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules + * @rule - ima measurement policy rule + * + * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers. + * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) +{ + const char *op = "update_policy"; + struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; + int result = 0; + int audit_info = 0; + + /* Prevent installed policy from changing */ + if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) { + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, + NULL, op, "already exists", + -EACCES, audit_info); + return -EACCES; + } + + entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!entry) { + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, + NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); + + result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry); + if (!result) { + mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules); + mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); + } else { + kfree(entry); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, + NULL, op, "invalid policy", result, + audit_info); + } + return result; +} + +/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */ +void ima_delete_rules(void) +{ + struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; + + mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) { + list_del(&entry->list); + kfree(entry); + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7ec94314ac0c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> + * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com> + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * File: ima_queue.c + * Implements queues that store template measurements and + * maintains aggregate over the stored measurements + * in the pre-configured TPM PCR (if available). + * The measurement list is append-only. No entry is + * ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle. + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/rculist.h> +#include "ima.h" + +LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements); /* list of all measurements */ + +/* key: inode (before secure-hashing a file) */ +struct ima_h_table ima_htable = { + .len = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0), + .violations = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0), + .queue[0 ... IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE - 1] = HLIST_HEAD_INIT +}; + +/* mutex protects atomicity of extending measurement list + * and extending the TPM PCR aggregate. Since tpm_extend can take + * long (and the tpm driver uses a mutex), we can't use the spinlock. + */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex); + +/* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */ +static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value) +{ + struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *ret = NULL; + unsigned int key; + struct hlist_node *pos; + int rc; + + key = ima_hash_key(digest_value); + rcu_read_lock(); + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, pos, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) { + rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (rc == 0) { + ret = qe; + break; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + return ret; +} + +/* ima_add_template_entry helper function: + * - Add template entry to measurement list and hash table. + * + * (Called with ima_extend_list_mutex held.) + */ +static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry) +{ + struct ima_queue_entry *qe; + unsigned int key; + + qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL); + if (qe == NULL) { + pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + qe->entry = entry; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later); + list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements); + + atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len); + key = ima_hash_key(entry->digest); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &ima_htable.queue[key]); + return 0; +} + +static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash) +{ + int result = 0; + + if (!ima_used_chip) + return result; + + result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash); + if (result != 0) + pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); + return result; +} + +/* Add template entry to the measurement list and hash table, + * and extend the pcr. + */ +int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, + const char *op, struct inode *inode) +{ + u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; + const char *audit_cause = "hash_added"; + int audit_info = 1; + int result = 0; + + mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); + if (!violation) { + memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest); + if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) { + audit_cause = "hash_exists"; + goto out; + } + } + + result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry); + if (result < 0) { + audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; + audit_info = 0; + goto out; + } + + if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */ + memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest); + + result = ima_pcr_extend(digest); + if (result != 0) { + audit_cause = "TPM error"; + audit_info = 0; + } +out: + mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, entry->template_name, + op, audit_cause, result, audit_info); + return result; +} diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 81932abefe7b..9fb679c66b8a 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct key_user { atomic_t nkeys; /* number of keys */ atomic_t nikeys; /* number of instantiated keys */ uid_t uid; + struct user_namespace *user_ns; int qnkeys; /* number of keys allocated to this user */ int qnbytes; /* number of bytes allocated to this user */ }; @@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern struct rb_root key_user_tree; extern spinlock_t key_user_lock; extern struct key_user root_key_user; -extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid); +extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, + struct user_namespace *user_ns); extern void key_user_put(struct key_user *user); /* diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index f76c8a546fd3..4a1297d1ada4 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include "internal.h" static struct kmem_cache *key_jar; @@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ void __key_check(const struct key *key) * get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't * already exist */ -struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid) +struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, struct user_namespace *user_ns) { struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user; struct rb_node *parent = NULL; @@ -79,6 +80,10 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid) p = &(*p)->rb_left; else if (uid > user->uid) p = &(*p)->rb_right; + else if (user_ns < user->user_ns) + p = &(*p)->rb_left; + else if (user_ns > user->user_ns) + p = &(*p)->rb_right; else goto found; } @@ -106,6 +111,7 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid) atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0); atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0); candidate->uid = uid; + candidate->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); candidate->qnkeys = 0; candidate->qnbytes = 0; spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock); @@ -136,6 +142,7 @@ void key_user_put(struct key_user *user) if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) { rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree); spin_unlock(&key_user_lock); + put_user_ns(user->user_ns); kfree(user); } @@ -234,7 +241,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen; /* get hold of the key tracking for this user */ - user = key_user_lookup(uid); + user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user->user_ns); if (!user) goto no_memory_1; diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index b1ec3b4ee17d..7f09fb897d2b 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) /* change the UID */ if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) { ret = -ENOMEM; - newowner = key_user_lookup(uid); + newowner = key_user_lookup(uid, current_user_ns()); if (!newowner) goto error_put; diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index ed851574d073..3dba81c2eba3 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -539,6 +539,9 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) &keyring_name_hash[bucket], type_data.link ) { + if (keyring->user->user_ns != current_user_ns()) + continue; + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags)) continue; diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index 5d9fc7b93f2e..0ed802c9e698 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user->user_ns) + goto use_other_perms; + /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */ if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) { kperm = key->perm >> 16; @@ -56,6 +59,8 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, } } +use_other_perms: + /* otherwise use the least-significant 8-bits */ kperm = key->perm; diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 7f508def50e3..769f9bdfd2b3 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -91,6 +91,28 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init); */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS +static struct rb_node *__key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n) +{ + while (n) { + struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node); + if (key->user->user_ns == current_user_ns()) + break; + n = rb_next(n); + } + return n; +} + +static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n) +{ + return __key_serial_next(rb_next(n)); +} + +static struct rb_node *key_serial_first(struct rb_root *r) +{ + struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r); + return __key_serial_next(n); +} + static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops); @@ -104,10 +126,10 @@ static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos) spin_lock(&key_serial_lock); - _p = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); + _p = key_serial_first(&key_serial_tree); while (pos > 0 && _p) { pos--; - _p = rb_next(_p); + _p = key_serial_next(_p); } return _p; @@ -117,7 +139,7 @@ static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos) static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos) { (*_pos)++; - return rb_next((struct rb_node *) v); + return key_serial_next((struct rb_node *) v); } @@ -203,6 +225,27 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */ +static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct rb_node *n) +{ + while (n) { + struct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node); + if (user->user_ns == current_user_ns()) + break; + n = rb_next(n); + } + return n; +} + +static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct rb_node *n) +{ + return __key_user_next(rb_next(n)); +} + +static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r) +{ + struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r); + return __key_user_next(n); +} /*****************************************************************************/ /* * implement "/proc/key-users" to provides a list of the key users @@ -220,10 +263,10 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos) spin_lock(&key_user_lock); - _p = rb_first(&key_user_tree); + _p = key_user_first(&key_user_tree); while (pos > 0 && _p) { pos--; - _p = rb_next(_p); + _p = key_user_next(_p); } return _p; @@ -233,7 +276,7 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos) static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos) { (*_pos)++; - return rb_next((struct rb_node *) v); + return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v); } diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 2f5d89e92b85..276d27882ce8 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = { .nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2), .nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2), .uid = 0, + .user_ns = &init_user_ns, }; /*****************************************************************************/ diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 0e04f72ef2d4..22a31582bfaa 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, kenter(""); - user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid(), current_user_ns()); if (!user) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index eb41f43e2772..7f9b5fac8779 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -88,17 +88,16 @@ struct avc_entry { u32 tsid; u16 tclass; struct av_decision avd; - atomic_t used; /* used recently */ }; struct avc_node { struct avc_entry ae; - struct list_head list; + struct hlist_node list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */ struct rcu_head rhead; }; struct avc_cache { - struct list_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; + struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */ spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */ atomic_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */ atomic_t active_nodes; @@ -234,7 +233,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void) int i; for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]); + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]); spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]); } atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0); @@ -250,16 +249,20 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page) { int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used; struct avc_node *node; + struct hlist_head *head; rcu_read_lock(); slots_used = 0; max_chain_len = 0; for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { - if (!list_empty(&avc_cache.slots[i])) { + head = &avc_cache.slots[i]; + if (!hlist_empty(head)) { + struct hlist_node *next; + slots_used++; chain_len = 0; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list) + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) chain_len++; if (chain_len > max_chain_len) max_chain_len = chain_len; @@ -283,7 +286,7 @@ static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead) static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node) { - list_del_rcu(&node->list); + hlist_del_rcu(&node->list); call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free); atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes); } @@ -297,7 +300,7 @@ static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node) static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old) { - list_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list); + hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list); call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free); atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes); } @@ -307,29 +310,31 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void) struct avc_node *node; int hvalue, try, ecx; unsigned long flags; + struct hlist_head *head; + struct hlist_node *next; + spinlock_t *lock; for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) { hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); + head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; + lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue]; - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags)) + if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags)) continue; rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) { - if (atomic_dec_and_test(&node->ae.used)) { - /* Recently Unused */ - avc_node_delete(node); - avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims); - ecx++; - if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags); - goto out; - } + hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) { + avc_node_delete(node); + avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims); + ecx++; + if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags); + goto out; } } rcu_read_unlock(); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags); } out: return ecx; @@ -344,8 +349,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void) goto out; INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->list); - atomic_set(&node->ae.used, 1); + INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list); avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations); if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold) @@ -355,21 +359,24 @@ out: return node; } -static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae) +static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd) { node->ae.ssid = ssid; node->ae.tsid = tsid; node->ae.tclass = tclass; - memcpy(&node->ae.avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd)); + memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd)); } static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) { struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL; int hvalue; + struct hlist_head *head; + struct hlist_node *next; hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) { + head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) { if (ssid == node->ae.ssid && tclass == node->ae.tclass && tsid == node->ae.tsid) { @@ -378,15 +385,6 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) } } - if (ret == NULL) { - /* cache miss */ - goto out; - } - - /* cache hit */ - if (atomic_read(&ret->ae.used) != 1) - atomic_set(&ret->ae.used, 1); -out: return ret; } @@ -395,30 +393,25 @@ out: * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class - * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass * * Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the - * @requested permissions between the SID pair * (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions * based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists, * then this function return the avc_node. * Otherwise, this function returns NULL. */ -static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested) +static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) { struct avc_node *node; avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups); node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass); - if (node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) == requested)) { + if (node) avc_cache_stats_incr(hits); - goto out; - } + else + avc_cache_stats_incr(misses); - node = NULL; - avc_cache_stats_incr(misses); -out: return node; } @@ -449,34 +442,41 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert) * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class - * @ae: AVC entry + * @avd: resulting av decision * * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass. * The access vectors and the sequence number are * normally provided by the security server in * response to a security_compute_av() call. If the - * sequence number @ae->avd.seqno is not less than the latest + * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest * revocation notification, then the function copies * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL. */ -static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae) +static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd) { struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL; int hvalue; unsigned long flag; - if (avc_latest_notif_update(ae->avd.seqno, 1)) + if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1)) goto out; node = avc_alloc_node(); if (node) { + struct hlist_head *head; + struct hlist_node *next; + spinlock_t *lock; + hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); - avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, ae); + avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); + + head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; + lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue]; - spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag); - list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) { + spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag); + hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) { if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid && pos->ae.tsid == tsid && pos->ae.tclass == tclass) { @@ -484,9 +484,9 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_en goto found; } } - list_add_rcu(&node->list, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head); found: - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag); } out: return node; @@ -742,17 +742,22 @@ static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y) * @event : Updating event * @perms : Permission mask bits * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry + * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made * * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT. * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM. * otherwise, this function update the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object * will release later by RCU. */ -static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) +static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + u32 seqno) { int hvalue, rc = 0; unsigned long flag; struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL; + struct hlist_head *head; + struct hlist_node *next; + spinlock_t *lock; node = avc_alloc_node(); if (!node) { @@ -762,12 +767,17 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) /* Lock the target slot */ hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass); - spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag); - list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) { + head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; + lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue]; + + spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag); + + hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) { if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid && tsid == pos->ae.tsid && - tclass == pos->ae.tclass){ + tclass == pos->ae.tclass && + seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){ orig = pos; break; } @@ -783,7 +793,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) * Copy and replace original node. */ - avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae); + avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd); switch (event) { case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT: @@ -808,7 +818,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) } avc_node_replace(node, orig); out_unlock: - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag); out: return rc; } @@ -823,18 +833,24 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) int i, rc = 0, tmprc; unsigned long flag; struct avc_node *node; + struct hlist_head *head; + struct hlist_node *next; + spinlock_t *lock; for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag); + head = &avc_cache.slots[i]; + lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i]; + + spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag); /* * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not * prevent RCU grace periods from ending. */ rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list) + hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) avc_node_delete(node); rcu_read_unlock(); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag); } for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) { @@ -875,10 +891,10 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno) int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, unsigned flags, - struct av_decision *avd) + struct av_decision *in_avd) { struct avc_node *node; - struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae; + struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd; int rc = 0; u32 denied; @@ -886,29 +902,34 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, rcu_read_lock(); - node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested); + node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass); if (!node) { rcu_read_unlock(); - rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &entry.avd); + + if (in_avd) + avd = in_avd; + else + avd = &avd_entry; + + rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); if (rc) goto out; rcu_read_lock(); - node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry); + node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); + } else { + if (in_avd) + memcpy(in_avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*in_avd)); + avd = &node->ae.avd; } - p_ae = node ? &node->ae : &entry; - - if (avd) - memcpy(avd, &p_ae->avd, sizeof(*avd)); - - denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed); + denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed); if (denied) { if (flags & AVC_STRICT) rc = -EACCES; else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid)) avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid, - tsid, tclass); + tsid, tclass, avd->seqno); else rc = -EACCES; } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 00815973d412..7c52ba243c64 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX -#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4 +#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ enum { Opt_fscontext = 2, Opt_defcontext = 3, Opt_rootcontext = 4, + Opt_labelsupport = 5, }; static const match_table_t tokens = { @@ -360,6 +361,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = { {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, + {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR}, {Opt_error, NULL}, }; @@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) } } - sbsec->initialized = 1; + sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP); if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", @@ -441,6 +443,12 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); + if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE || + sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) + sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP; + /* Initialize the root inode. */ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); @@ -487,23 +495,22 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, security_init_mnt_opts(opts); - if (!sbsec->initialized) + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return -EINVAL; if (!ss_initialized) return -EINVAL; - /* - * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount - * settings this is going to need a mask - */ - tmp = sbsec->flags; + tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (tmp & 0x01) opts->num_mnt_opts++; tmp >>= 1; } + /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) + opts->num_mnt_opts++; opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!opts->mnt_opts) { @@ -549,6 +556,10 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; } + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) { + opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; + opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP; + } BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); @@ -562,8 +573,10 @@ out_free: static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) { + char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; + /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ - if (sbsec->initialized) + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || (old_sid != new_sid)) return 1; @@ -571,8 +584,8 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, /* check if we were passed the same options twice, * aka someone passed context=a,context=b */ - if (!sbsec->initialized) - if (sbsec->flags & flag) + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) + if (mnt_flags & flag) return 1; return 0; } @@ -626,7 +639,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options * will be used for both mounts) */ - if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) + if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) && (num_opts == 0)) goto out; @@ -637,6 +650,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, */ for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { u32 sid; + + if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) + continue; rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); if (rc) { @@ -690,19 +706,19 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, } } - if (sbsec->initialized) { + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ - if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts) + if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts) goto out_double_mount; rc = 0; goto out; } if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) - sbsec->proc = 1; + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC; /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ - rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); + rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); @@ -806,10 +822,10 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, } /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ - BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized); + BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */ - if (newsbsec->initialized) + if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) return; mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); @@ -917,7 +933,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, goto out_err; } break; - + case Opt_labelsupport: + break; default: rc = -EINVAL; printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); @@ -999,7 +1016,12 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, char *prefix; for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) { - char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); + char *has_comma; + + if (opts->mnt_opts[i]) + has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); + else + has_comma = NULL; switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { case CONTEXT_MNT: @@ -1014,6 +1036,10 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; break; + case SE_SBLABELSUPP: + seq_putc(m, ','); + seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); + continue; default: BUG(); }; @@ -1209,7 +1235,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out_unlock; sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; - if (!sbsec->initialized) { + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ @@ -1237,19 +1263,26 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent dentry = d_find_alias(inode); } if (!dentry) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s " - "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id, - inode->i_ino); + /* + * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed + * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we + * may find inodes that have no dentry on the + * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these + * will get fixed up the next time we go through + * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could + * be used again by userspace. + */ goto out_unlock; } len = INITCONTEXTLEN; - context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) { rc = -ENOMEM; dput(dentry); goto out_unlock; } + context[len] = '\0'; rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); if (rc == -ERANGE) { @@ -1262,12 +1295,13 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent } kfree(context); len = rc; - context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) { rc = -ENOMEM; dput(dentry); goto out_unlock; } + context[len] = '\0'; rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); @@ -1289,10 +1323,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent sbsec->def_sid, GFP_NOFS); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " - "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", - __func__, context, -rc, - inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); + char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; + unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; + + if (rc == -EINVAL) { + if (printk_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " + "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " + "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); + } else { + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " + "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", + __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); + } kfree(context); /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ rc = 0; @@ -1326,7 +1369,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; - if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { + if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); if (proci->pde) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); @@ -1587,7 +1630,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, if (rc) return rc; - if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { + if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1801,6 +1844,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN; else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) av |= DIR__OPEN; + else if (S_ISSOCK(mode)) + av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN; else printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with " "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode); @@ -1815,7 +1860,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode); + rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1832,7 +1877,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent); + rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1848,7 +1893,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, if (error) return error; - return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); + return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); } static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -1858,7 +1903,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, { int error; - error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old, + error = cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); if (error) return error; @@ -1866,12 +1911,22 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP); } +/* + * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, + * which was removed). + * + * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux + * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not + * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of + * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. + */ + static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit); + rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1997,7 +2052,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type); + rc = cap_syslog(type); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2028,10 +2083,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type) * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. * - * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0 - * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if - * the capability is granted. - * * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all * processes that allocate mappings. */ @@ -2058,7 +2109,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm); + rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2156,11 +2207,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return 0; } -static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm); -} - static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); @@ -2180,7 +2226,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); } - return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm)); + return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); } extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; @@ -2290,8 +2336,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; - secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm); - new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) return; @@ -2337,8 +2381,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int rc, i; unsigned long flags; - secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm); - osid = tsec->osid; sid = tsec->sid; @@ -2400,7 +2442,8 @@ static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || - match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len)); + match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || + match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len)); } static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) @@ -2513,11 +2556,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data); - if (rc) - return rc; if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb, @@ -2530,11 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags); - if (rc) - return rc; return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); @@ -2570,7 +2603,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, sid = tsec->sid; newsid = tsec->create_sid; - if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { + if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), &newsid); @@ -2585,14 +2618,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ - if (sbsec->initialized) { + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = 1; } - if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) + if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (name) { @@ -2622,21 +2655,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int ma static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); - if (rc) - return rc; return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); } static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry); - if (rc) - return rc; return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); } @@ -2657,12 +2680,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) { - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); - if (rc) - return rc; - return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); } @@ -2682,22 +2699,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata); - if (rc) - return rc; return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); } static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask); - if (rc) - return rc; if (!mask) { /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ @@ -2711,11 +2719,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr); - if (rc) - return rc; if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) return 0; @@ -2769,7 +2772,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; - if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode)) @@ -2931,16 +2934,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t return len; } -static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry); -} - -static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry); -} - static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; @@ -3078,18 +3071,13 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); - if (rc) - return rc; if (selinux_checkreqprot) prot = reqprot; #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { - rc = 0; + int rc = 0; if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP); @@ -3239,12 +3227,6 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) { - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags); - if (rc) - return rc; - return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK); } @@ -3278,14 +3260,6 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, } /* - * commit new credentials - */ -static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ - secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old); -} - -/* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled */ @@ -3329,29 +3303,6 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) return 0; } -static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) -{ - /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and - since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux - identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control - this operation. However, SELinux does control the use - of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the - capable hook. */ - return 0; -} - -static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, - int flags) -{ - return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags); -} - -static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) -{ - /* See the comment for setuid above. */ - return 0; -} - static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID); @@ -3372,17 +3323,11 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) *secid = task_sid(p); } -static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) -{ - /* See the comment for setuid above. */ - return 0; -} - static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice); + rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3393,7 +3338,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio); + rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3408,11 +3353,6 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim); - if (rc) - return rc; /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can @@ -3428,7 +3368,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); + rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3451,10 +3391,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, u32 perm; int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); - if (rc) - return rc; - if (!sig) perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else @@ -3467,18 +3403,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, return rc; } -static int selinux_task_prctl(int option, - unsigned long arg2, - unsigned long arg3, - unsigned long arg4, - unsigned long arg5) -{ - /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require - any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify - the state of the current process. */ - return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); -} - static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) { return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD); @@ -4047,10 +3971,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct avc_audit_data ad; int err; - err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk); - if (err) - return err; - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; @@ -4844,7 +4764,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err; - err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); + err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); if (err) return err; @@ -4859,7 +4779,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) int err; struct avc_audit_data ad; - err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability); + err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability); if (err) return err; @@ -5167,11 +5087,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) { u32 perms; - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg); - if (rc) - return rc; if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) perms = SHM__READ; @@ -5581,7 +5496,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv, .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds, - .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds, .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds, .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, @@ -5623,8 +5537,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, - .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv, - .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv, .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, @@ -5644,17 +5556,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_create = selinux_task_create, .cred_free = selinux_cred_free, .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare, - .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit, .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as, .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as, - .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid, - .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid, - .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid, .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, - .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups, .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio, .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio, @@ -5664,7 +5571,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory, .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, - .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl, .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h index c0c885427b91..31df1d7c1aee 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open") + S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, SOCK_FILE__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use") S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto") @@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY, "nlmsg_relay") S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV, "nlmsg_readpriv") + S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT, "nlmsg_tty_audit") S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h index 0ba79fe00e11..d645192ee950 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ #define SOCK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL #define SOCK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL #define SOCK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL +#define SOCK_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL #define FIFO_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define FIFO_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL #define FIFO_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL @@ -707,6 +708,7 @@ #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY 0x01000000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV 0x02000000UL +#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT 0x04000000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 3cc45168f674..c4e062336ef3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -60,9 +60,7 @@ struct superblock_security_struct { u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */ u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */ unsigned int behavior; /* labeling behavior */ - unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */ unsigned char flags; /* which mount options were specified */ - unsigned char proc; /* proc fs */ struct mutex lock; struct list_head isec_head; spinlock_t isec_lock; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 72447370bc95..5c3434f7626f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -37,15 +37,23 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY #endif +/* Mask for just the mount related flags */ +#define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f +/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */ #define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01 #define FSCONTEXT_MNT 0x02 #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04 #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT 0x08 +/* Non-mount related flags */ +#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x10 +#define SE_SBPROC 0x20 +#define SE_SBLABELSUPP 0x40 #define CONTEXT_STR "context=" #define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext=" #define ROOTCONTEXT_STR "rootcontext=" #define DEFCONTEXT_STR "defcontext=" +#define LABELSUPP_STR "seclabel" struct netlbl_lsm_secattr; @@ -80,7 +88,6 @@ int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap); #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32 struct av_decision { u32 allowed; - u32 decided; u32 auditallow; u32 auditdeny; u32 seqno; diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 4ed7bab89c59..c6875fd3b9d6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = { AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY }, { AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { AUDIT_TTY_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, - { AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT }, }; diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 01ec6d2c6b97..d3c8b982cfb0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT, "%x %x %x %x %u", - avd.allowed, avd.decided, + avd.allowed, 0xffffffff, avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny, avd.seqno); out2: diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index c65e4fe4a0f1..deeec6c013ae 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -407,7 +407,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, * Initialize the access vectors to the default values. */ avd->allowed = 0; - avd->decided = 0xffffffff; avd->auditallow = 0; avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; avd->seqno = latest_granting; @@ -743,7 +742,6 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, if (!ss_initialized) { avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; - avd->decided = 0xffffffff; avd->auditallow = 0; avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; avd->seqno = latest_granting; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 2e0b83e77ffe..cfa19ca125e3 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request) /** * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object - * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label - * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format + * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label + * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format * * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted, diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index e7ded1326b0f..84b62b5e9e2c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack) /** * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH * @ctp: child task pointer + * @mode: ptrace attachment mode * * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise * @@ -203,9 +204,8 @@ static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) /** * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing - * @type: file system type * @orig: where to start - * @smackopts + * @smackopts: mount options string * * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error. * @@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) /** * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting * @dev_name: unused - * @nd: mount point + * @path: mount point * @type: unused * @flags: unused * @data: unused @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) /** * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob - * @inode - the inode in need of a blob + * @inode: the inode in need of a blob * * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise */ @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) /** * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob - * @inode - the inode with a blob + * @inode: the inode with a blob * * Clears the blob pointer in inode */ @@ -538,7 +538,6 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission() * @inode: the inode in question * @mask: the access requested - * @nd: unused * * This is the important Smack hook. * @@ -701,8 +700,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) * @inode: the object * @name: attribute name * @buffer: where to put the result - * @size: size of the buffer - * @err: unused + * @alloc: unused * * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code */ @@ -864,7 +862,7 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, /** * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking * @file: the object - * @cmd unused + * @cmd: unused * * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise */ @@ -1003,8 +1001,8 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, return 0; } -/* - * commit new credentials +/** + * smack_cred_commit - commit new credentials * @new: the new credentials * @old: the original credentials */ @@ -1014,8 +1012,8 @@ static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) /** * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials - * @new points to the set of credentials to be modified. - * @secid specifies the security ID to be set + * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified. + * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set * * Set the security data for a kernel service. */ @@ -1032,8 +1030,8 @@ static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) /** * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds - * @new points to the set of credentials to be modified - * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference + * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified + * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference * * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same * as the objective context of the specified inode @@ -1242,7 +1240,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) /** * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob * @p: task to copy from - * inode: inode to copy to + * @inode: inode to copy to * * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob */ @@ -1260,7 +1258,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob * @sk: the socket * @family: unused - * @priority: memory allocation priority + * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags * * Assign Smack pointers to current * @@ -1974,7 +1972,7 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag) /** * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id - * @ipcp: the object permissions + * @ipp: the object permissions * @secid: where result will be saved */ static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid) @@ -2251,7 +2249,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) /** * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host * @sock: the socket - * @msghdr: the message + * @msg: the message * @size: the size of the message * * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination @@ -2292,8 +2290,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, /** - * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat - * pair to smack + * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack * @sap: netlabel secattr * @sip: where to put the result * @@ -2414,7 +2411,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) * @sock: the socket * @optval: user's destination * @optlen: size thereof - * @len: max thereoe + * @len: max thereof * * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise */ @@ -2749,7 +2746,7 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ -/* +/** * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid * @secid: incoming integer * @secdata: destination @@ -2766,7 +2763,7 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) return 0; } -/* +/** * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label * @secdata: smack label * @seclen: how long result is @@ -2780,11 +2777,10 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) return 0; } -/* +/** * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything. - * @key_ref: unused - * @context: unused - * @perm: unused + * @secdata: unused + * @seclen: unused * * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly */ diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 51f0efc50dab..a1b57e4dba3e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ out: /** * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent * @ppos: where to start - must be 0 @@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void) /** * smk_unlbl_ambient - initialize the unlabeled domain + * @oldambient: previous domain string */ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient) { @@ -513,7 +514,7 @@ static int smk_open_cipso(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) /** * smk_write_cipso - write() for /smack/cipso - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent * @ppos: where to start @@ -733,7 +734,7 @@ static void smk_netlbladdr_insert(struct smk_netlbladdr *new) /** * smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent * @ppos: where to start @@ -884,7 +885,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_doi(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, /** * smk_write_doi - write() for /smack/doi - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent * @ppos: where to start @@ -949,7 +950,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_direct(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, /** * smk_write_direct - write() for /smack/direct - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent * @ppos: where to start @@ -1024,7 +1025,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, /** * smk_write_ambient - write() for /smack/ambient - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent * @ppos: where to start @@ -1099,7 +1100,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, /** * smk_write_onlycap - write() for /smack/onlycap - * @filp: file pointer, not actually used + * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from * @count: bytes sent * @ppos: where to start diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c8f385793235 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +config SECURITY_TOMOYO + bool "TOMOYO Linux Support" + depends on SECURITY + select SECURITYFS + select SECURITY_PATH + default n + help + This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control. + Required userspace tools and further information may be + found at <http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/>. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..10ccd686b290 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..92cea656ad21 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,2206 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/common.c + * + * Common functions for TOMOYO. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION + * + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01 + * + */ + +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/hardirq.h> +#include "realpath.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "tomoyo.h" + +/* Has loading policy done? */ +bool tomoyo_policy_loaded; + +/* String table for functionality that takes 4 modes. */ +static const char *tomoyo_mode_4[4] = { + "disabled", "learning", "permissive", "enforcing" +}; +/* String table for functionality that takes 2 modes. */ +static const char *tomoyo_mode_2[4] = { + "disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled" +}; + +/* Table for profile. */ +static struct { + const char *keyword; + unsigned int current_value; + const unsigned int max_value; +} tomoyo_control_array[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX] = { + [TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE] = { "MAC_FOR_FILE", 0, 3 }, + [TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY] = { "MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY", 2048, INT_MAX }, + [TOMOYO_VERBOSE] = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE", 1, 1 }, +}; + +/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */ +static struct tomoyo_profile { + unsigned int value[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX]; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment; +} *tomoyo_profile_ptr[TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES]; + +/* Permit policy management by non-root user? */ +static bool tomoyo_manage_by_non_root; + +/* Utility functions. */ + +/* Open operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file); +/* Close /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file); +/* Read operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, + const int buffer_len); +/* Write operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, + const int buffer_len); + +/** + * tomoyo_is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value. + * + * @str: Pointer to the string. + * + * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise. + * + * TOMOYO uses \ooo style representation for 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF. + * This function verifies that \ooo is in valid range. + */ +static inline bool tomoyo_is_byte_range(const char *str) +{ + return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' && + *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' && + *str >= '0' && *str <= '7'; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet. + * + * @c: The character to check. + * + * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise. + */ +static inline bool tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(const char c) +{ + return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters. + * + * @c1: The first character. + * @c2: The second character. + * @c3: The third character. + * + * Returns byte value. + */ +static inline u8 tomoyo_make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3) +{ + return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0'); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword. + * + * @src: Pointer to pointer to the string. + * @find: Pointer to the keyword. + * + * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise. + * + * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find + * if @src starts with @find. + */ +static bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find) +{ + const int len = strlen(find); + char *tmp = *src; + + if (strncmp(tmp, find, len)) + return false; + tmp += len; + *src = tmp; + return true; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_normalize_line - Format string. + * + * @buffer: The line to normalize. + * + * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed. + * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +static void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer) +{ + unsigned char *sp = buffer; + unsigned char *dp = buffer; + bool first = true; + + while (tomoyo_is_invalid(*sp)) + sp++; + while (*sp) { + if (!first) + *dp++ = ' '; + first = false; + while (tomoyo_is_valid(*sp)) + *dp++ = *sp++; + while (tomoyo_is_invalid(*sp)) + sp++; + } + *dp = '\0'; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname. + * @filename: The pathname to check. + * @start_type: Should the pathname start with '/'? + * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care + * @pattern_type: Can the pathname contain a wildcard? + * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care + * @end_type: Should the pathname end with '/'? + * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care + * @function: The name of function calling me. + * + * Check whether the given filename follows the naming rules. + * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type, + const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type, + const char *function) +{ + bool contains_pattern = false; + unsigned char c; + unsigned char d; + unsigned char e; + const char *original_filename = filename; + + if (!filename) + goto out; + c = *filename; + if (start_type == 1) { /* Must start with '/' */ + if (c != '/') + goto out; + } else if (start_type == -1) { /* Must not start with '/' */ + if (c == '/') + goto out; + } + if (c) + c = *(filename + strlen(filename) - 1); + if (end_type == 1) { /* Must end with '/' */ + if (c != '/') + goto out; + } else if (end_type == -1) { /* Must not end with '/' */ + if (c == '/') + goto out; + } + while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') { + if (c == '\\') { + switch ((c = *filename++)) { + case '\\': /* "\\" */ + continue; + case '$': /* "\$" */ + case '+': /* "\+" */ + case '?': /* "\?" */ + case '*': /* "\*" */ + case '@': /* "\@" */ + case 'x': /* "\x" */ + case 'X': /* "\X" */ + case 'a': /* "\a" */ + case 'A': /* "\A" */ + case '-': /* "\-" */ + if (pattern_type == -1) + break; /* Must not contain pattern */ + contains_pattern = true; + continue; + case '0': /* "\ooo" */ + case '1': + case '2': + case '3': + d = *filename++; + if (d < '0' || d > '7') + break; + e = *filename++; + if (e < '0' || e > '7') + break; + c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e); + if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) + continue; /* pattern is not \000 */ + } + goto out; + } else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) { + goto out; + } + } + if (pattern_type == 1) { /* Must contain pattern */ + if (!contains_pattern) + goto out; + } + return true; + out: + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid pathname '%s'\n", function, + original_filename); + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules. + * @domainname: The domainname to check. + * @function: The name of function calling me. + * + * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname, + const char *function) +{ + unsigned char c; + unsigned char d; + unsigned char e; + const char *org_domainname = domainname; + + if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, + TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN)) + goto out; + domainname += TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN; + if (!*domainname) + return true; + do { + if (*domainname++ != ' ') + goto out; + if (*domainname++ != '/') + goto out; + while ((c = *domainname) != '\0' && c != ' ') { + domainname++; + if (c == '\\') { + c = *domainname++; + switch ((c)) { + case '\\': /* "\\" */ + continue; + case '0': /* "\ooo" */ + case '1': + case '2': + case '3': + d = *domainname++; + if (d < '0' || d > '7') + break; + e = *domainname++; + if (e < '0' || e > '7') + break; + c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e); + if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) + /* pattern is not \000 */ + continue; + } + goto out; + } else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) { + goto out; + } + } + } while (*domainname); + return true; + out: + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid domainname '%s'\n", function, + org_domainname); + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname. + * + * @buffer: The token to check. + * + * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer) +{ + return !strncmp(buffer, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name. + * + * @domainname: The domainname to find. + * + * Caller must call down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); or + * down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); . + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise. + */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + struct tomoyo_path_info name; + + name.name = domainname; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name); + list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + if (!domain->is_deleted && + !tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname)) + return domain; + } + return NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_path_depth - Evaluate the number of '/' in a string. + * + * @pathname: The string to evaluate. + * + * Returns path depth of the string. + * + * I score 2 for each of the '/' in the @pathname + * and score 1 if the @pathname ends with '/'. + */ +static int tomoyo_path_depth(const char *pathname) +{ + int i = 0; + + if (pathname) { + const char *ep = pathname + strlen(pathname); + if (pathname < ep--) { + if (*ep != '/') + i++; + while (pathname <= ep) + if (*ep-- == '/') + i += 2; + } + } + return i; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token. + * + * @filename: The string to evaluate. + * + * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename. + */ +static int tomoyo_const_part_length(const char *filename) +{ + char c; + int len = 0; + + if (!filename) + return 0; + while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') { + if (c != '\\') { + len++; + continue; + } + c = *filename++; + switch (c) { + case '\\': /* "\\" */ + len += 2; + continue; + case '0': /* "\ooo" */ + case '1': + case '2': + case '3': + c = *filename++; + if (c < '0' || c > '7') + break; + c = *filename++; + if (c < '0' || c > '7') + break; + len += 4; + continue; + } + break; + } + return len; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members. + * + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" to fill in. + * + * The caller sets "struct tomoyo_path_info"->name. + */ +void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr) +{ + const char *name = ptr->name; + const int len = strlen(name); + + ptr->total_len = len; + ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name); + ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/'); + ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len); + ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len); + ptr->depth = tomoyo_path_depth(name); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character + * and "\-" pattern. + * + * @filename: The start of string to check. + * @filename_end: The end of string to check. + * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare. + * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare. + * + * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename, + const char *filename_end, + const char *pattern, + const char *pattern_end) +{ + while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) { + char c; + if (*pattern != '\\') { + if (*filename++ != *pattern++) + return false; + continue; + } + c = *filename; + pattern++; + switch (*pattern) { + int i; + int j; + case '?': + if (c == '/') { + return false; + } else if (c == '\\') { + if (filename[1] == '\\') + filename++; + else if (tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + 1)) + filename += 3; + else + return false; + } + break; + case '\\': + if (c != '\\') + return false; + if (*++filename != '\\') + return false; + break; + case '+': + if (!isdigit(c)) + return false; + break; + case 'x': + if (!isxdigit(c)) + return false; + break; + case 'a': + if (!tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(c)) + return false; + break; + case '0': + case '1': + case '2': + case '3': + if (c == '\\' && tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + 1) + && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) { + filename += 3; + pattern += 2; + break; + } + return false; /* Not matched. */ + case '*': + case '@': + for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) { + if (tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2( + filename + i, filename_end, + pattern + 1, pattern_end)) + return true; + c = filename[i]; + if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@') + break; + if (c != '\\') + continue; + if (filename[i + 1] == '\\') + i++; + else if (tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + i + 1)) + i += 3; + else + break; /* Bad pattern. */ + } + return false; /* Not matched. */ + default: + j = 0; + c = *pattern; + if (c == '$') { + while (isdigit(filename[j])) + j++; + } else if (c == 'X') { + while (isxdigit(filename[j])) + j++; + } else if (c == 'A') { + while (tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(filename[j])) + j++; + } + for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) { + if (tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2( + filename + i, filename_end, + pattern + 1, pattern_end)) + return true; + } + return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */ + } + filename++; + pattern++; + } + while (*pattern == '\\' && + (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@')) + pattern += 2; + return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern - Pattern matching without without '/' character. + * + * @filename: The start of string to check. + * @filename_end: The end of string to check. + * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare. + * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare. + * + * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename, + const char *filename_end, + const char *pattern, + const char *pattern_end) +{ + const char *pattern_start = pattern; + bool first = true; + bool result; + + while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) { + /* Split at "\-" pattern. */ + if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-') + continue; + result = tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, + filename_end, + pattern_start, + pattern - 2); + if (first) + result = !result; + if (result) + return false; + first = false; + pattern_start = pattern; + } + result = tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, filename_end, + pattern_start, pattern_end); + return first ? result : !result; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. + * @filename: The filename to check. + * @pattern: The pattern to compare. + * + * Returns true if matches, false otherwise. + * + * The following patterns are available. + * \\ \ itself. + * \ooo Octal representation of a byte. + * \* More than or equals to 0 character other than '/'. + * \@ More than or equals to 0 character other than '/' or '.'. + * \? 1 byte character other than '/'. + * \$ More than or equals to 1 decimal digit. + * \+ 1 decimal digit. + * \X More than or equals to 1 hexadecimal digit. + * \x 1 hexadecimal digit. + * \A More than or equals to 1 alphabet character. + * \a 1 alphabet character. + * \- Subtraction operator. + */ +bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern) +{ + /* + if (!filename || !pattern) + return false; + */ + const char *f = filename->name; + const char *p = pattern->name; + const int len = pattern->const_len; + + /* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */ + if (!pattern->is_patterned) + return !tomoyo_pathcmp(filename, pattern); + /* Dont compare if the number of '/' differs. */ + if (filename->depth != pattern->depth) + return false; + /* Compare the initial length without patterns. */ + if (strncmp(f, p, len)) + return false; + f += len; + p += len; + /* Main loop. Compare each directory component. */ + while (*f && *p) { + const char *f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/'); + const char *p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/'); + if (!f_delimiter) + f_delimiter = f + strlen(f); + if (!p_delimiter) + p_delimiter = p + strlen(p); + if (!tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(f, f_delimiter, + p, p_delimiter)) + return false; + f = f_delimiter; + if (*f) + f++; + p = p_delimiter; + if (*p) + p++; + } + /* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */ + while (*p == '\\' && + (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@')) + p += 2; + return !*f && !*p; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_io_printf - Transactional printf() to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters. + * + * Returns true if output was written, false otherwise. + * + * The snprintf() will truncate, but tomoyo_io_printf() won't. + */ +bool tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int len; + int pos = head->read_avail; + int size = head->readbuf_size - pos; + + if (size <= 0) + return false; + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size) + return false; + head->read_avail += len; + return true; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_get_exe - Get tomoyo_realpath() of current process. + * + * Returns the tomoyo_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise. + * + * This function uses tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free() + * if this function didn't return NULL. + */ +static const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + const char *cp = NULL; + + if (!mm) + return NULL; + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) { + cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path); + break; + } + } + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + return cp; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_get_msg - Get warning message. + * + * @is_enforce: Is it enforcing mode? + * + * Returns "ERROR" or "WARNING". + */ +const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce) +{ + if (is_enforce) + return "ERROR"; + else + return "WARNING"; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_flags - Check mode for specified functionality. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @index: The functionality to check mode. + * + * TOMOYO checks only process context. + * This code disables TOMOYO's enforcement in case the function is called from + * interrupt context. + */ +unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const u8 index) +{ + const u8 profile = domain->profile; + + if (WARN_ON(in_interrupt())) + return 0; + return tomoyo_policy_loaded && index < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX +#if TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES != 256 + && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES +#endif + && tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] ? + tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]->value[index] : 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_verbose_mode - Check whether TOMOYO is verbose mode. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * + * Returns true if domain policy violation warning should be printed to + * console. + */ +bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) +{ + return tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_VERBOSE) != 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok - Check for domain's quota. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * + * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain) +{ + unsigned int count = 0; + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; + + if (!domain) + return true; + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED) + continue; + switch (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr)) { + struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl1; + struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl2; + u16 perm; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL: + acl1 = container_of(ptr, + struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record, + head); + perm = acl1->perm; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & + ((1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL) | + (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL))) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL)) + count++; + break; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL: + acl2 = container_of(ptr, + struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record, + head); + perm = acl2->perm; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL)) + count++; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + if (count < tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY)) + return true; + if (!domain->quota_warned) { + domain->quota_warned = true; + printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: " + "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. " + "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name); + } + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile - Create a new profile. + * + * @profile: Profile number to create. + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile" on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned + int profile) +{ + static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock); + struct tomoyo_profile *ptr = NULL; + int i; + + if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) + return NULL; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + mutex_lock(&lock); + ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]; + if (ptr) + goto ok; + ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr)); + if (!ptr) + goto ok; + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) + ptr->value[i] = tomoyo_control_array[i].current_value; + mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */ + tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr; + ok: + mutex_unlock(&lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return ptr; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_profile - Write to profile table. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_write_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + char *data = head->write_buf; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int value; + char *cp; + struct tomoyo_profile *profile; + unsigned long num; + + cp = strchr(data, '-'); + if (cp) + *cp = '\0'; + if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &num)) + return -EINVAL; + if (cp) + data = cp + 1; + profile = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(num); + if (!profile) + return -EINVAL; + cp = strchr(data, '='); + if (!cp) + return -EINVAL; + *cp = '\0'; + if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) { + profile->comment = tomoyo_save_name(cp + 1); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) { + if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_control_array[i].keyword)) + continue; + if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &value) != 1) { + int j; + const char **modes; + switch (i) { + case TOMOYO_VERBOSE: + modes = tomoyo_mode_2; + break; + default: + modes = tomoyo_mode_4; + break; + } + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + if (strcmp(cp + 1, modes[j])) + continue; + value = j; + break; + } + if (j == 4) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (value > tomoyo_control_array[i].max_value) { + value = tomoyo_control_array[i].max_value; + } + profile->value[i] = value; + return 0; + } + return -EINVAL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_profile - Read from profile table. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0. + */ +static int tomoyo_read_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + static const int total = TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX + 1; + int step; + + if (head->read_eof) + return 0; + for (step = head->read_step; step < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES * total; + step++) { + const u8 index = step / total; + u8 type = step % total; + const struct tomoyo_profile *profile + = tomoyo_profile_ptr[index]; + head->read_step = step; + if (!profile) + continue; + if (!type) { /* Print profile' comment tag. */ + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=%s\n", + index, profile->comment ? + profile->comment->name : "")) + break; + continue; + } + type--; + if (type < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX) { + const unsigned int value = profile->value[type]; + const char **modes = NULL; + const char *keyword + = tomoyo_control_array[type].keyword; + switch (tomoyo_control_array[type].max_value) { + case 3: + modes = tomoyo_mode_4; + break; + case 1: + modes = tomoyo_mode_2; + break; + } + if (modes) { + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%s\n", index, + keyword, modes[value])) + break; + } else { + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%u\n", index, + keyword, value)) + break; + } + } + } + if (step == TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES * total) + head->read_eof = true; + return 0; +} + +/* Structure for policy manager. */ +struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry { + struct list_head list; + /* A path to program or a domainname. */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *manager; + bool is_domain; /* True if manager is a domainname. */ + bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */ +}; + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry". */ +static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_policy_manager_list); +static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + +/** + * tomoyo_update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry. + * + * @manager: The path to manager or the domainnamme. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *new_entry; + struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_manager; + int error = -ENOMEM; + bool is_domain = false; + + if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(manager)) { + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(manager, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + is_domain = true; + } else { + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + } + saved_manager = tomoyo_save_name(manager); + if (!saved_manager) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) { + if (ptr->manager != saved_manager) + continue; + ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + if (is_delete) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry)); + if (!new_entry) + goto out; + new_entry->manager = saved_manager; + new_entry->is_domain = is_domain; + list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list); + error = 0; + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_manager_policy - Write manager policy. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_write_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + char *data = head->write_buf; + bool is_delete = tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE); + + if (!strcmp(data, "manage_by_non_root")) { + tomoyo_manage_by_non_root = !is_delete; + return 0; + } + return tomoyo_update_manager_entry(data, is_delete); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_manager_policy - Read manager policy. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0. + */ +static int tomoyo_read_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *pos; + bool done = true; + + if (head->read_eof) + return 0; + down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, + &tomoyo_policy_manager_list) { + struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr; + ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry, + list); + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + head->read_eof = done; + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_policy_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager. + * + * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy + * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + */ +static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void) +{ + struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr; + const char *exe; + const struct task_struct *task = current; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname = tomoyo_domain()->domainname; + bool found = false; + + if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) + return true; + if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid)) + return false; + down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) { + if (!ptr->is_deleted && ptr->is_domain + && !tomoyo_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager)) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + if (found) + return true; + exe = tomoyo_get_exe(); + if (!exe) + return false; + down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) { + if (!ptr->is_deleted && !ptr->is_domain + && !strcmp(exe, ptr->manager->name)) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock); + if (!found) { /* Reduce error messages. */ + static pid_t last_pid; + const pid_t pid = current->pid; + if (last_pid != pid) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s ( %s ) is not permitted to " + "update policies.\n", domainname->name, exe); + last_pid = pid; + } + } + tomoyo_free(exe); + return found; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_select_one - Parse select command. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @data: String to parse. + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + const char *data) +{ + unsigned int pid; + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; + + if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) { + struct task_struct *p; + /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/ + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); + if (p) + domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/ + } else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) { + if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data + 7)) { + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data + 7); + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + } + } else + return false; + head->write_var1 = domain; + /* Accessing read_buf is safe because head->io_sem is held. */ + if (!head->read_buf) + return true; /* Do nothing if open(O_WRONLY). */ + head->read_avail = 0; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data); + head->read_single_domain = true; + head->read_eof = !domain; + if (domain) { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *d; + head->read_var1 = NULL; + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(d, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + if (d == domain) + break; + head->read_var1 = &d->list; + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_bit = 0; + head->read_step = 0; + if (domain->is_deleted) + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n"); + } + return true; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_domain_policy - Write domain policy. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_write_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + char *data = head->write_buf; + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = head->write_var1; + bool is_delete = false; + bool is_select = false; + bool is_undelete = false; + unsigned int profile; + + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE)) + is_delete = true; + else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT)) + is_select = true; + else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_UNDELETE)) + is_undelete = true; + if (is_select && tomoyo_is_select_one(head, data)) + return 0; + /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */ + if (!tomoyo_is_policy_manager()) + return -EPERM; + if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data)) { + domain = NULL; + if (is_delete) + tomoyo_delete_domain(data); + else if (is_select) { + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data); + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + } else if (is_undelete) + domain = tomoyo_undelete_domain(data); + else + domain = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(data, 0); + head->write_var1 = domain; + return 0; + } + if (!domain) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sscanf(data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u", &profile) == 1 + && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) { + if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] || !tomoyo_policy_loaded) + domain->profile = (u8) profile; + return 0; + } + if (!strcmp(data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)) { + tomoyo_set_domain_flag(domain, is_delete, + TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ); + return 0; + } + return tomoyo_write_file_policy(data, domain, is_delete); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_print_single_path_acl - Print a single path ACL entry. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_print_single_path_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record * + ptr) +{ + int pos; + u8 bit; + const char *atmark = ""; + const char *filename; + const u16 perm = ptr->perm; + + filename = ptr->filename->name; + for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION; + bit++) { + const char *msg; + if (!(perm & (1 << bit))) + continue; + /* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */ + if ((bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL || + bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL) + && (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL))) + continue; + msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(bit); + pos = head->read_avail; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s\n", msg, + atmark, filename)) + goto out; + } + head->read_bit = 0; + return true; + out: + head->read_bit = bit; + head->read_avail = pos; + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_print_double_path_acl - Print a double path ACL entry. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_print_double_path_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record * + ptr) +{ + int pos; + const char *atmark1 = ""; + const char *atmark2 = ""; + const char *filename1; + const char *filename2; + const u8 perm = ptr->perm; + u8 bit; + + filename1 = ptr->filename1->name; + filename2 = ptr->filename2->name; + for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION; + bit++) { + const char *msg; + if (!(perm & (1 << bit))) + continue; + msg = tomoyo_dp2keyword(bit); + pos = head->read_avail; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s %s%s\n", msg, + atmark1, filename1, atmark2, filename2)) + goto out; + } + head->read_bit = 0; + return true; + out: + head->read_bit = bit; + head->read_avail = pos; + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_print_entry - Print an ACL entry. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @ptr: Pointer to an ACL entry. + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_print_entry(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) +{ + const u8 acl_type = tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr); + + if (acl_type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED) + return true; + if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) { + struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl + = container_of(ptr, + struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record, + head); + return tomoyo_print_single_path_acl(head, acl); + } + if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) { + struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl + = container_of(ptr, + struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record, + head); + return tomoyo_print_double_path_acl(head, acl); + } + BUG(); /* This must not happen. */ + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_domain_policy - Read domain policy. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0. + */ +static int tomoyo_read_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *dpos; + struct list_head *apos; + bool done = true; + + if (head->read_eof) + return 0; + if (head->read_step == 0) + head->read_step = 1; + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(dpos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_domain_list) { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + const char *quota_exceeded = ""; + const char *transition_failed = ""; + const char *ignore_global_allow_read = ""; + domain = list_entry(dpos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list); + if (head->read_step != 1) + goto acl_loop; + if (domain->is_deleted && !head->read_single_domain) + continue; + /* Print domainname and flags. */ + if (domain->quota_warned) + quota_exceeded = "quota_exceeded\n"; + if (domain->flags & TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED) + transition_failed = "transition_failed\n"; + if (domain->flags & + TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ) + ignore_global_allow_read + = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n"; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, + "%s\n" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n" + "%s%s%s\n", domain->domainname->name, + domain->profile, quota_exceeded, + transition_failed, + ignore_global_allow_read)) { + done = false; + break; + } + head->read_step = 2; +acl_loop: + if (head->read_step == 3) + goto tail_mark; + /* Print ACL entries in the domain. */ + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2, + &domain->acl_info_list) { + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr + = list_entry(apos, struct tomoyo_acl_info, + list); + if (!tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + if (!done) + break; + head->read_step = 3; +tail_mark: + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n")) { + done = false; + break; + } + head->read_step = 1; + if (head->read_single_domain) + break; + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + head->read_eof = done; + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_domain_profile - Assign profile for specified domain. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise. + * + * This is equivalent to doing + * + * ( echo "select " $domainname; echo "use_profile " $profile ) | + * /usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy -d + */ +static int tomoyo_write_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + char *data = head->write_buf; + char *cp = strchr(data, ' '); + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + unsigned long profile; + + if (!cp) + return -EINVAL; + *cp = '\0'; + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + domain = tomoyo_find_domain(cp + 1); + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &profile)) + return -EINVAL; + if (domain && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES + && (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] || !tomoyo_policy_loaded)) + domain->profile = (u8) profile; + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_domain_profile - Read only domainname and profile. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns list of profile number and domainname pairs. + * + * This is equivalent to doing + * + * grep -A 1 '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy | + * awk ' { if ( domainname == "" ) { if ( $1 == "<kernel>" ) + * domainname = $0; } else if ( $1 == "use_profile" ) { + * print $2 " " domainname; domainname = ""; } } ; ' + */ +static int tomoyo_read_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *pos; + bool done = true; + + if (head->read_eof) + return 0; + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_domain_list) { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + domain = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list); + if (domain->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile, + domain->domainname->name)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + head->read_eof = done; + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_pid: Specify PID to obtain domainname. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0. + */ +static int tomoyo_write_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + unsigned long pid; + /* No error check. */ + strict_strtoul(head->write_buf, 10, &pid); + head->read_step = (int) pid; + head->read_eof = false; + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_pid - Get domainname of the specified PID. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns the domainname which the specified PID is in on success, + * empty string otherwise. + * The PID is specified by tomoyo_write_pid() so that the user can obtain + * using read()/write() interface rather than sysctl() interface. + */ +static int tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + if (head->read_avail == 0 && !head->read_eof) { + const int pid = head->read_step; + struct task_struct *p; + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; + /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/ + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); + if (p) + domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/ + if (domain) + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile, + domain->domainname->name); + head->read_eof = true; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_exception_policy - Write exception policy. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_write_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + char *data = head->write_buf; + bool is_delete = tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE); + + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN)) + return tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, false, + is_delete); + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN)) + return tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, true, is_delete); + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN)) + return tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, false, + is_delete); + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN)) + return tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, true, + is_delete); + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS)) + return tomoyo_write_alias_policy(data, is_delete); + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ)) + return tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(data, is_delete); + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN)) + return tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete); + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE)) + return tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete); + return -EINVAL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_exception_policy - Read exception policy. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_read_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + if (!head->read_eof) { + switch (head->read_step) { + case 0: + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 1; + case 1: + if (!tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(head)) + break; + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 2; + case 2: + if (!tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(head)) + break; + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 3; + case 3: + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 4; + case 4: + if (!tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(head)) + break; + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 5; + case 5: + if (!tomoyo_read_alias_policy(head)) + break; + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 6; + case 6: + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 7; + case 7: + if (!tomoyo_read_file_pattern(head)) + break; + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 8; + case 8: + if (!tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(head)) + break; + head->read_var2 = NULL; + head->read_step = 9; + case 9: + head->read_eof = true; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* path to policy loader */ +static const char *tomoyo_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init"; + +/** + * tomoyo_policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists. + * + * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void) +{ + /* + * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist. + * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not + * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since + * policies are not loaded yet. + * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime. + */ + struct nameidata nd; + + if (path_lookup(tomoyo_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd)) { + printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now " + "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tomoyo_loader); + return false; + } + path_put(&nd.path); + return true; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy. + * + * @filename: The program about to start. + * + * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so + * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init + * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init. + * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and + * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename) +{ + char *argv[2]; + char *envp[3]; + + if (tomoyo_policy_loaded) + return; + /* + * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start. + * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't + * be passed. + * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by + * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start". + */ + if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") && + strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start")) + return; + if (!tomoyo_policy_loader_exists()) + return; + + printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n", + tomoyo_loader); + argv[0] = (char *) tomoyo_loader; + argv[1] = NULL; + envp[0] = "HOME=/"; + envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin"; + envp[2] = NULL; + call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1); + + printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01\n"); + printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n"); + tomoyo_policy_loaded = true; + { /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */ + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + const u8 profile = domain->profile; + if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]) + continue; + panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n", + profile, domain->domainname->name); + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + } +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_version: Get version. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns version information. + */ +static int tomoyo_read_version(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + if (!head->read_eof) { + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "2.2.0-pre"); + head->read_eof = true; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_self_domain - Get the current process's domainname. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns the current process's domainname. + */ +static int tomoyo_read_self_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + if (!head->read_eof) { + /* + * tomoyo_domain()->domainname != NULL + * because every process belongs to a domain and + * the domain's name cannot be NULL. + */ + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s", tomoyo_domain()->domainname->name); + head->read_eof = true; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_open_control - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @type: Type of interface. + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * + * Associates policy handler and returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) +{ + struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*head)); + + if (!head) + return -ENOMEM; + mutex_init(&head->io_sem); + switch (type) { + case TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy */ + head->write = tomoyo_write_domain_policy; + head->read = tomoyo_read_domain_policy; + break; + case TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy */ + head->write = tomoyo_write_exception_policy; + head->read = tomoyo_read_exception_policy; + break; + case TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain */ + head->read = tomoyo_read_self_domain; + break; + case TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status */ + head->write = tomoyo_write_domain_profile; + head->read = tomoyo_read_domain_profile; + break; + case TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status */ + head->write = tomoyo_write_pid; + head->read = tomoyo_read_pid; + break; + case TOMOYO_VERSION: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version */ + head->read = tomoyo_read_version; + head->readbuf_size = 128; + break; + case TOMOYO_MEMINFO: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo */ + head->write = tomoyo_write_memory_quota; + head->read = tomoyo_read_memory_counter; + head->readbuf_size = 512; + break; + case TOMOYO_PROFILE: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */ + head->write = tomoyo_write_profile; + head->read = tomoyo_read_profile; + break; + case TOMOYO_MANAGER: + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager */ + head->write = tomoyo_write_manager_policy; + head->read = tomoyo_read_manager_policy; + break; + } + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { + /* + * No need to allocate read_buf since it is not opened + * for reading. + */ + head->read = NULL; + } else { + if (!head->readbuf_size) + head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2; + head->read_buf = tomoyo_alloc(head->readbuf_size); + if (!head->read_buf) { + tomoyo_free(head); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) { + /* + * No need to allocate write_buf since it is not opened + * for writing. + */ + head->write = NULL; + } else if (head->write) { + head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2; + head->write_buf = tomoyo_alloc(head->writebuf_size); + if (!head->write_buf) { + tomoyo_free(head->read_buf); + tomoyo_free(head); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + file->private_data = head; + /* + * Call the handler now if the file is + * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain + * so that the user can use + * cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain" + * to know the current process's domainname. + */ + if (type == TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN) + tomoyo_read_control(file, NULL, 0); + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_control - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @buffer: Poiner to buffer to write to. + * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer. + * + * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, + const int buffer_len) +{ + int len = 0; + struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; + char *cp; + + if (!head->read) + return -ENOSYS; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem)) + return -EINTR; + /* Call the policy handler. */ + len = head->read(head); + if (len < 0) + goto out; + /* Write to buffer. */ + len = head->read_avail; + if (len > buffer_len) + len = buffer_len; + if (!len) + goto out; + /* head->read_buf changes by some functions. */ + cp = head->read_buf; + if (copy_to_user(buffer, cp, len)) { + len = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + head->read_avail -= len; + memmove(cp, cp + len, head->read_avail); + out: + mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem); + return len; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_control - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to read from. + * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer. + * + * Returns @buffer_len on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, + const int buffer_len) +{ + struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; + int error = buffer_len; + int avail_len = buffer_len; + char *cp0 = head->write_buf; + + if (!head->write) + return -ENOSYS; + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buffer, buffer_len)) + return -EFAULT; + /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */ + if (head->write != tomoyo_write_pid && + head->write != tomoyo_write_domain_policy && + !tomoyo_is_policy_manager()) + return -EPERM; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem)) + return -EINTR; + /* Read a line and dispatch it to the policy handler. */ + while (avail_len > 0) { + char c; + if (head->write_avail >= head->writebuf_size - 1) { + error = -ENOMEM; + break; + } else if (get_user(c, buffer)) { + error = -EFAULT; + break; + } + buffer++; + avail_len--; + cp0[head->write_avail++] = c; + if (c != '\n') + continue; + cp0[head->write_avail - 1] = '\0'; + head->write_avail = 0; + tomoyo_normalize_line(cp0); + head->write(head); + } + mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem); + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_close_control - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * + * Releases memory and returns 0. + */ +static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file) +{ + struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; + + /* Release memory used for policy I/O. */ + tomoyo_free(head->read_buf); + head->read_buf = NULL; + tomoyo_free(head->write_buf); + head->write_buf = NULL; + tomoyo_free(head); + head = NULL; + file->private_data = NULL; + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_alloc_acl_element - Allocate permanent memory for ACL entry. + * + * @acl_type: Type of ACL entry. + * + * Returns pointer to the ACL entry on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +void *tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type) +{ + int len; + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; + + switch (acl_type) { + case TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL: + len = sizeof(struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record); + break; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL: + len = sizeof(struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record); + break; + default: + return NULL; + } + ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(len); + if (!ptr) + return NULL; + ptr->type = acl_type; + return ptr; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode". + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + const int key = ((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private) + - ((u8 *) NULL); + return tomoyo_open_control(key, file); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode". + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return tomoyo_close_control(file); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @buf: Pointer to buffer. + * @count: Size of @buf. + * @ppos: Unused. + * + * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static ssize_t tomoyo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + return tomoyo_read_control(file, buf, count); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @buf: Pointer to buffer. + * @count: Size of @buf. + * @ppos: Unused. + * + * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return tomoyo_write_control(file, buf, count); +} + +/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = { + .open = tomoyo_open, + .release = tomoyo_release, + .read = tomoyo_read, + .write = tomoyo_write, +}; + +/** + * tomoyo_create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory. + * + * @name: The name of the interface file. + * @mode: The permission of the interface file. + * @parent: The parent directory. + * @key: Type of interface. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode, + struct dentry *parent, const u8 key) +{ + securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key, + &tomoyo_operations); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * Returns 0. + */ +static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void) +{ + struct dentry *tomoyo_dir; + + /* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */ + if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain) + return 0; + + tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL); + tomoyo_create_entry("domain_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY); + tomoyo_create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY); + tomoyo_create_entry("self_domain", 0400, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN); + tomoyo_create_entry(".domain_status", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS); + tomoyo_create_entry(".process_status", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS); + tomoyo_create_entry("meminfo", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_MEMINFO); + tomoyo_create_entry("profile", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_PROFILE); + tomoyo_create_entry("manager", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_MANAGER); + tomoyo_create_entry("version", 0400, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_VERSION); + return 0; +} + +fs_initcall(tomoyo_initerface_init); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6dcb7cc0ed1d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,359 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/common.h + * + * Common functions for TOMOYO. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION + * + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01 + * + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H +#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H + +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/kmod.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/list.h> + +struct dentry; +struct vfsmount; + +/* Temporary buffer for holding pathnames. */ +struct tomoyo_page_buffer { + char buffer[4096]; +}; + +/* Structure for holding a token. */ +struct tomoyo_path_info { + const char *name; + u32 hash; /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */ + u16 total_len; /* = strlen(name) */ + u16 const_len; /* = tomoyo_const_part_length(name) */ + bool is_dir; /* = tomoyo_strendswith(name, "/") */ + bool is_patterned; /* = tomoyo_path_contains_pattern(name) */ + u16 depth; /* = tomoyo_path_depth(name) */ +}; + +/* + * This is the max length of a token. + * + * A token consists of only ASCII printable characters. + * Non printable characters in a token is represented in \ooo style + * octal string. Thus, \ itself is represented as \\. + */ +#define TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000 + +/* Structure for holding requested pathname. */ +struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data { + /* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to tomoyo_free(). */ + struct tomoyo_path_info head; + char bariier1[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */ + char body[TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN]; + char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */ +}; + +/* + * Common header for holding ACL entries. + * + * Packing "struct tomoyo_acl_info" allows + * "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" to embed "u16" and + * "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record" to embed "u8" + * without enlarging their structure size. + */ +struct tomoyo_acl_info { + struct list_head list; + /* + * Type of this ACL entry. + * + * MSB is is_deleted flag. + */ + u8 type; +} __packed; + +/* This ACL entry is deleted. */ +#define TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED 0x80 + +/* Structure for domain information. */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info { + struct list_head list; + struct list_head acl_info_list; + /* Name of this domain. Never NULL. */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; + u8 profile; /* Profile number to use. */ + u8 is_deleted; /* Delete flag. + 0 = active. + 1 = deleted but undeletable. + 255 = deleted and no longer undeletable. */ + bool quota_warned; /* Quota warnning flag. */ + /* DOMAIN_FLAGS_*. Use tomoyo_set_domain_flag() to modify. */ + u8 flags; +}; + +/* Profile number is an integer between 0 and 255. */ +#define TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES 256 + +/* Ignore "allow_read" directive in exception policy. */ +#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ 1 +/* + * This domain was unable to create a new domain at tomoyo_find_next_domain() + * because the name of the domain to be created was too long or + * it could not allocate memory. + * More than one process continued execve() without domain transition. + */ +#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED 2 + +/* + * Structure for "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read", + * "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", + * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", + * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite" directive. + */ +struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record { + struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL */ + u16 perm; + /* Pointer to single pathname. */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename; +}; + +/* Structure for "allow_rename" and "allow_link" directive. */ +struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record { + struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL */ + u8 perm; + /* Pointer to single pathname. */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1; + /* Pointer to single pathname. */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2; +}; + +/* Keywords for ACLs. */ +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "alias " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "allow_read " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE "delete " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "deny_rewrite " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "file_pattern " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "initialize_domain " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN "keep_domain " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "no_initialize_domain " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN "no_keep_domain " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT "select " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_UNDELETE "undelete " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "use_profile " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "ignore_global_allow_read" +/* A domain definition starts with <kernel>. */ +#define TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME "<kernel>" +#define TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN (sizeof(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) - 1) + +/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */ +#define TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE 0 /* domain_policy.conf */ +#define TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY 1 +#define TOMOYO_VERBOSE 2 +#define TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX 3 + +/* Structure for reading/writing policy via securityfs interfaces. */ +struct tomoyo_io_buffer { + int (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); + int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); + /* Exclusive lock for this structure. */ + struct mutex io_sem; + /* The position currently reading from. */ + struct list_head *read_var1; + /* Extra variables for reading. */ + struct list_head *read_var2; + /* The position currently writing to. */ + struct tomoyo_domain_info *write_var1; + /* The step for reading. */ + int read_step; + /* Buffer for reading. */ + char *read_buf; + /* EOF flag for reading. */ + bool read_eof; + /* Read domain ACL of specified PID? */ + bool read_single_domain; + /* Extra variable for reading. */ + u8 read_bit; + /* Bytes available for reading. */ + int read_avail; + /* Size of read buffer. */ + int readbuf_size; + /* Buffer for writing. */ + char *write_buf; + /* Bytes available for writing. */ + int write_avail; + /* Size of write buffer. */ + int writebuf_size; +}; + +/* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */ +bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain); +/* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */ +bool tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))); +/* Check whether the domainname is correct. */ +bool tomoyo_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname, + const char *function); +/* Check whether the token is correct. */ +bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type, + const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type, + const char *function); +/* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */ +bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer); +/* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */ +bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern); +/* Read "alias" entry in exception policy. */ +bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); +/* + * Read "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry + * in exception policy. + */ +bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); +/* Read "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */ +bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); +/* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */ +bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); +/* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */ +bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); +/* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */ +bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); +/* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */ +bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain); +/* Convert double path operation to operation name. */ +const char *tomoyo_dp2keyword(const u8 operation); +/* Get the last component of the given domainname. */ +const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain); +/* Get warning message. */ +const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce); +/* Convert single path operation to operation name. */ +const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation); +/* Delete a domain. */ +int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *data); +/* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */ +int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); +/* + * Create "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry + * in exception policy. + */ +int tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, + const bool is_delete); +/* Create "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */ +int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, + const bool is_delete); +/* + * Create "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read", "allow_write", + * "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", + * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar", + * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_rename" and + * "allow_link" entry in domain policy. + */ +int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete); +/* Create "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */ +int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); +/* Create "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */ +int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); +/* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */ +int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); +/* Find a domain by the given name. */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname); +/* Find or create a domain by the given name. */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char * + domainname, + const u8 profile); +/* Undelete a domain. */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_undelete_domain(const char *domainname); +/* Check mode for specified functionality. */ +unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const u8 index); +/* Allocate memory for structures. */ +void *tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type); +/* Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members. */ +void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr); +/* Run policy loader when /sbin/init starts. */ +void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename); +/* Change "struct tomoyo_domain_info"->flags. */ +void tomoyo_set_domain_flag(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete, const u8 flags); + +/* strcmp() for "struct tomoyo_path_info" structure. */ +static inline bool tomoyo_pathcmp(const struct tomoyo_path_info *a, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *b) +{ + return a->hash != b->hash || strcmp(a->name, b->name); +} + +/* Get type of an ACL entry. */ +static inline u8 tomoyo_acl_type1(struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) +{ + return ptr->type & ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED; +} + +/* Get type of an ACL entry. */ +static inline u8 tomoyo_acl_type2(struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) +{ + return ptr->type; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_valid - Check whether the character is a valid char. + * + * @c: The character to check. + * + * Returns true if @c is a valid character, false otherwise. + */ +static inline bool tomoyo_is_valid(const unsigned char c) +{ + return c > ' ' && c < 127; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_invalid - Check whether the character is an invalid char. + * + * @c: The character to check. + * + * Returns true if @c is an invalid character, false otherwise. + */ +static inline bool tomoyo_is_invalid(const unsigned char c) +{ + return c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127); +} + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */ +extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_list; +extern struct rw_semaphore tomoyo_domain_list_lock; + +/* Lock for domain->acl_info_list. */ +extern struct rw_semaphore tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock; + +/* Has /sbin/init started? */ +extern bool tomoyo_policy_loaded; + +/* The kernel's domain. */ +extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain; + +/** + * list_for_each_cookie - iterate over a list with cookie. + * @pos: the &struct list_head to use as a loop cursor. + * @cookie: the &struct list_head to use as a cookie. + * @head: the head for your list. + * + * Same with list_for_each() except that this primitive uses @cookie + * so that we can continue iteration. + * @cookie must be NULL when iteration starts, and @cookie will become + * NULL when iteration finishes. + */ +#define list_for_each_cookie(pos, cookie, head) \ + for (({ if (!cookie) \ + cookie = head; }), \ + pos = (cookie)->next; \ + prefetch(pos->next), pos != (head) || ((cookie) = NULL); \ + (cookie) = pos, pos = pos->next) + +#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H) */ diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..093a756030bd --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c @@ -0,0 +1,878 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/domain.c + * + * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION + * + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "tomoyo.h" +#include "realpath.h" +#include <linux/binfmts.h> + +/* Variables definitions.*/ + +/* The initial domain. */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain; + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */ +LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_list); +DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + +/* Structure for "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" keyword. */ +struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry { + struct list_head list; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; /* This may be NULL */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *program; + bool is_deleted; + bool is_not; /* True if this entry is "no_initialize_domain". */ + /* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */ + bool is_last_name; +}; + +/* Structure for "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" keyword. */ +struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry { + struct list_head list; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *program; /* This may be NULL */ + bool is_deleted; + bool is_not; /* True if this entry is "no_keep_domain". */ + /* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */ + bool is_last_name; +}; + +/* Structure for "alias" keyword. */ +struct tomoyo_alias_entry { + struct list_head list; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *original_name; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *aliased_name; + bool is_deleted; +}; + +/** + * tomoyo_set_domain_flag - Set or clear domain's attribute flags. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * @flags: Flags to set or clear. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +void tomoyo_set_domain_flag(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete, const u8 flags) +{ + /* We need to serialize because this is bitfield operation. */ + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/ + spin_lock(&lock); + if (!is_delete) + domain->flags |= flags; + else + domain->flags &= ~flags; + spin_unlock(&lock); + /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/ +} + +/** + * tomoyo_get_last_name - Get last component of a domainname. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * + * Returns the last component of the domainname. + */ +const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) +{ + const char *cp0 = domain->domainname->name; + const char *cp1 = strrchr(cp0, ' '); + + if (cp1) + return cp1 + 1; + return cp0; +} + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry". */ +static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list); +static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock); + +/** + * tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list. + * + * @domainname: The name of domain. May be NULL. + * @program: The name of program. + * @is_not: True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname, + const char *program, + const bool is_not, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *new_entry; + struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname = NULL; + int error = -ENOMEM; + bool is_last_name = false; + + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */ + if (domainname) { + if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) && + tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1, __func__)) + is_last_name = true; + else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname); + if (!saved_domainname) + return -ENOMEM; + } + saved_program = tomoyo_save_name(program); + if (!saved_program) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_not != is_not || + ptr->domainname != saved_domainname || + ptr->program != saved_program) + continue; + ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + if (is_delete) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry)); + if (!new_entry) + goto out; + new_entry->domainname = saved_domainname; + new_entry->program = saved_program; + new_entry->is_not = is_not; + new_entry->is_last_name = is_last_name; + list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list); + error = 0; + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *pos; + bool done = true; + + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, + &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list) { + const char *no; + const char *from = ""; + const char *domain = ""; + struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr; + ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry, + list); + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : ""; + if (ptr->domainname) { + from = " from "; + domain = ptr->domainname->name; + } + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, + "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN + "%s%s%s\n", no, ptr->program->name, from, + domain)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock); + return done; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @is_not: True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, + const bool is_delete) +{ + char *cp = strstr(data, " from "); + + if (cp) { + *cp = '\0'; + return tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(cp + 6, data, + is_not, + is_delete); + } + return tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, data, is_not, + is_delete); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_domain_initializer - Check whether the given program causes domainname reinitialization. + * + * @domainname: The name of domain. + * @program: The name of program. + * @last_name: The last component of @domainname. + * + * Returns true if executing @program reinitializes domain transition, + * false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(const struct tomoyo_path_info * + domainname, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *program, + const struct tomoyo_path_info * + last_name) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr; + bool flag = false; + + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (ptr->domainname) { + if (!ptr->is_last_name) { + if (ptr->domainname != domainname) + continue; + } else { + if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name)) + continue; + } + } + if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program)) + continue; + if (ptr->is_not) { + flag = false; + break; + } + flag = true; + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock); + return flag; +} + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry". */ +static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list); +static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock); + +/** + * tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list. + * + * @domainname: The name of domain. + * @program: The name of program. May be NULL. + * @is_not: True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname, + const char *program, + const bool is_not, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *new_entry; + struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL; + static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock); + int error = -ENOMEM; + bool is_last_name = false; + + if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) && + tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1, __func__)) + is_last_name = true; + else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + if (program) { + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + saved_program = tomoyo_save_name(program); + if (!saved_program) + return -ENOMEM; + } + saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname); + if (!saved_domainname) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_not != is_not || + ptr->domainname != saved_domainname || + ptr->program != saved_program) + continue; + ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + if (is_delete) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry)); + if (!new_entry) + goto out; + new_entry->domainname = saved_domainname; + new_entry->program = saved_program; + new_entry->is_not = is_not; + new_entry->is_last_name = is_last_name; + list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list); + error = 0; + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @is_not: True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + */ +int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, + const bool is_delete) +{ + char *cp = strstr(data, " from "); + + if (cp) { + *cp = '\0'; + return tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(cp + 6, data, is_not, + is_delete); + } + return tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(data, NULL, is_not, is_delete); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *pos; + bool done = true; + + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, + &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list) { + struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr; + const char *no; + const char *from = ""; + const char *program = ""; + + ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry, list); + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : ""; + if (ptr->program) { + from = " from "; + program = ptr->program->name; + } + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, + "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN + "%s%s%s\n", no, program, from, + ptr->domainname->name)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock); + return done; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_domain_keeper - Check whether the given program causes domain transition suppression. + * + * @domainname: The name of domain. + * @program: The name of program. + * @last_name: The last component of @domainname. + * + * Returns true if executing @program supresses domain transition, + * false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *program, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *last_name) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr; + bool flag = false; + + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!ptr->is_last_name) { + if (ptr->domainname != domainname) + continue; + } else { + if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name)) + continue; + } + if (ptr->program && tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program)) + continue; + if (ptr->is_not) { + flag = false; + break; + } + flag = true; + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock); + return flag; +} + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_alias_entry". */ +static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_alias_list); +static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_alias_list_lock); + +/** + * tomoyo_update_alias_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list. + * + * @original_name: The original program's real name. + * @aliased_name: The symbolic program's symbolic link's name. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name, + const char *aliased_name, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_alias_entry *new_entry; + struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_original_name; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_aliased_name; + int error = -ENOMEM; + + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(original_name, 1, -1, -1, __func__) || + !tomoyo_is_correct_path(aliased_name, 1, -1, -1, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */ + saved_original_name = tomoyo_save_name(original_name); + saved_aliased_name = tomoyo_save_name(aliased_name); + if (!saved_original_name || !saved_aliased_name) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) { + if (ptr->original_name != saved_original_name || + ptr->aliased_name != saved_aliased_name) + continue; + ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + if (is_delete) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry)); + if (!new_entry) + goto out; + new_entry->original_name = saved_original_name; + new_entry->aliased_name = saved_aliased_name; + list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_alias_list); + error = 0; + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_alias_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *pos; + bool done = true; + + down_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_alias_list) { + struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr; + + ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_alias_entry, list); + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n", + ptr->original_name->name, + ptr->aliased_name->name)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock); + return done; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_alias_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) +{ + char *cp = strchr(data, ' '); + + if (!cp) + return -EINVAL; + *cp++ = '\0'; + return tomoyo_update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete); +} + +/* Domain create/delete/undelete handler. */ + +/* #define TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE */ + +/** + * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain. + * + * @domainname: The name of domain. + * + * Returns 0. + */ +int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + struct tomoyo_path_info name; + + name.name = domainname; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); +#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE + printk(KERN_DEBUG "tomoyo_delete_domain %s\n", domainname); + list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + if (tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name)) + continue; + printk(KERN_DEBUG "List: %p %u\n", domain, domain->is_deleted); + } +#endif + /* Is there an active domain? */ + list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain2; + /* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */ + if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain) + continue; + if (domain->is_deleted || + tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name)) + continue; + /* Mark already deleted domains as non undeletable. */ + list_for_each_entry(domain2, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + if (!domain2->is_deleted || + tomoyo_pathcmp(domain2->domainname, &name)) + continue; +#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE + if (domain2->is_deleted != 255) + printk(KERN_DEBUG + "Marked %p as non undeletable\n", + domain2); +#endif + domain2->is_deleted = 255; + } + /* Delete and mark active domain as undeletable. */ + domain->is_deleted = 1; +#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE + printk(KERN_DEBUG "Marked %p as undeletable\n", domain); +#endif + break; + } + up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_undelete_domain - Undelete a domain. + * + * @domainname: The name of domain. + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_undelete_domain(const char *domainname) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + struct tomoyo_domain_info *candidate_domain = NULL; + struct tomoyo_path_info name; + + name.name = domainname; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); +#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE + printk(KERN_DEBUG "tomoyo_undelete_domain %s\n", domainname); + list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + if (tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name)) + continue; + printk(KERN_DEBUG "List: %p %u\n", domain, domain->is_deleted); + } +#endif + list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + if (tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname)) + continue; + if (!domain->is_deleted) { + /* This domain is active. I can't undelete. */ + candidate_domain = NULL; +#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%p is active. I can't undelete.\n", + domain); +#endif + break; + } + /* Is this domain undeletable? */ + if (domain->is_deleted == 1) + candidate_domain = domain; + } + if (candidate_domain) { + candidate_domain->is_deleted = 0; +#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%p was undeleted.\n", candidate_domain); +#endif + } + up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return candidate_domain; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain. + * + * @domainname: The name of domain. + * @profile: Profile number to assign if the domain was newly created. + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char * + domainname, + const u8 profile) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname; + + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + domain = tomoyo_find_domain(domainname); + if (domain) + goto out; + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__)) + goto out; + saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname); + if (!saved_domainname) + goto out; + /* Can I reuse memory of deleted domain? */ + list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + struct task_struct *p; + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; + bool flag; + if (!domain->is_deleted || + domain->domainname != saved_domainname) + continue; + flag = false; + /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/ + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_process(p) { + if (tomoyo_real_domain(p) != domain) + continue; + flag = true; + break; + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/ + if (flag) + continue; +#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE + printk(KERN_DEBUG "Reusing %p %s\n", domain, + domain->domainname->name); +#endif + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED; + } + tomoyo_set_domain_flag(domain, true, domain->flags); + domain->profile = profile; + domain->quota_warned = false; + mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */ + domain->is_deleted = 0; + goto out; + } + /* No memory reusable. Create using new memory. */ + domain = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*domain)); + if (domain) { + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&domain->acl_info_list); + domain->domainname = saved_domainname; + domain->profile = profile; + list_add_tail(&domain->list, &tomoyo_domain_list); + } + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return domain; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_find_next_domain - Find a domain. + * + * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm". + * @next_domain: Pointer to pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm, + struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain) +{ + /* + * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by + * tomoyo_realpath() = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN. + */ + struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*tmp)); + struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain(); + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; + const char *old_domain_name = old_domain->domainname->name; + const char *original_name = bprm->filename; + char *new_domain_name = NULL; + char *real_program_name = NULL; + char *symlink_program_name = NULL; + const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(old_domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); + const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + int retval = -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_path_info r; /* real name */ + struct tomoyo_path_info s; /* symlink name */ + struct tomoyo_path_info l; /* last name */ + static bool initialized; + + if (!tmp) + goto out; + + if (!initialized) { + /* + * Built-in initializers. This is needed because policies are + * not loaded until starting /sbin/init. + */ + tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/hotplug", + false, false); + tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/modprobe", + false, false); + initialized = true; + } + + /* Get tomoyo_realpath of program. */ + retval = -ENOENT; + /* I hope tomoyo_realpath() won't fail with -ENOMEM. */ + real_program_name = tomoyo_realpath(original_name); + if (!real_program_name) + goto out; + /* Get tomoyo_realpath of symbolic link. */ + symlink_program_name = tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(original_name); + if (!symlink_program_name) + goto out; + + r.name = real_program_name; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&r); + s.name = symlink_program_name; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&s); + l.name = tomoyo_get_last_name(old_domain); + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&l); + + /* Check 'alias' directive. */ + if (tomoyo_pathcmp(&r, &s)) { + struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr; + /* Is this program allowed to be called via symbolic links? */ + down_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_deleted || + tomoyo_pathcmp(&r, ptr->original_name) || + tomoyo_pathcmp(&s, ptr->aliased_name)) + continue; + memset(real_program_name, 0, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN); + strncpy(real_program_name, ptr->aliased_name->name, + TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1); + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&r); + break; + } + up_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock); + } + + /* Check execute permission. */ + retval = tomoyo_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r, tmp); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + + new_domain_name = tmp->buffer; + if (tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) { + /* Transit to the child of tomoyo_kernel_domain domain. */ + snprintf(new_domain_name, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1, + TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME " " "%s", real_program_name); + } else if (old_domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain && + !tomoyo_policy_loaded) { + /* + * Needn't to transit from kernel domain before starting + * /sbin/init. But transit from kernel domain if executing + * initializers because they might start before /sbin/init. + */ + domain = old_domain; + } else if (tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) { + /* Keep current domain. */ + domain = old_domain; + } else { + /* Normal domain transition. */ + snprintf(new_domain_name, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1, + "%s %s", old_domain_name, real_program_name); + } + if (domain || strlen(new_domain_name) >= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN) + goto done; + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + domain = tomoyo_find_domain(new_domain_name); + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + if (domain) + goto done; + if (is_enforce) + goto done; + domain = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(new_domain_name, + old_domain->profile); + done: + if (domain) + goto out; + printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-ERROR: Domain '%s' not defined.\n", + new_domain_name); + if (is_enforce) + retval = -EPERM; + else + tomoyo_set_domain_flag(old_domain, false, + TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED); + out: + tomoyo_free(real_program_name); + tomoyo_free(symlink_program_name); + *next_domain = domain ? domain : old_domain; + tomoyo_free(tmp); + return retval; +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..65f50c1c5ee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c @@ -0,0 +1,1241 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/file.c + * + * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION + * + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "tomoyo.h" +#include "realpath.h" +#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) + +/* Structure for "allow_read" keyword. */ +struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry { + struct list_head list; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename; + bool is_deleted; +}; + +/* Structure for "file_pattern" keyword. */ +struct tomoyo_pattern_entry { + struct list_head list; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern; + bool is_deleted; +}; + +/* Structure for "deny_rewrite" keyword. */ +struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry { + struct list_head list; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern; + bool is_deleted; +}; + +/* Keyword array for single path operations. */ +static const char *tomoyo_sp_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL] = "read/write", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL] = "execute", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL] = "read", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL] = "write", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL] = "create", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL] = "unlink", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL] = "mkdir", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL] = "rmdir", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL] = "mkfifo", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL] = "mksock", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL] = "mkblock", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL] = "mkchar", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL] = "truncate", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL] = "symlink", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL] = "rewrite", +}; + +/* Keyword array for double path operations. */ +static const char *tomoyo_dp_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL] = "link", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL] = "rename", +}; + +/** + * tomoyo_sp2keyword - Get the name of single path operation. + * + * @operation: Type of operation. + * + * Returns the name of single path operation. + */ +const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation) +{ + return (operation < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION) + ? tomoyo_sp_keyword[operation] : NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_dp2keyword - Get the name of double path operation. + * + * @operation: Type of operation. + * + * Returns the name of double path operation. + */ +const char *tomoyo_dp2keyword(const u8 operation) +{ + return (operation < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION) + ? tomoyo_dp_keyword[operation] : NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_strendswith - Check whether the token ends with the given token. + * + * @name: The token to check. + * @tail: The token to find. + * + * Returns true if @name ends with @tail, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_strendswith(const char *name, const char *tail) +{ + int len; + + if (!name || !tail) + return false; + len = strlen(name) - strlen(tail); + return len >= 0 && !strcmp(name + len, tail); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_get_path - Get realpath. + * + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +static struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_path(struct path *path) +{ + int error; + struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data *buf = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*buf)); + + if (!buf) + return NULL; + /* Reserve one byte for appending "/". */ + error = tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf->body, + sizeof(buf->body) - 2); + if (!error) { + buf->head.name = buf->body; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&buf->head); + return &buf->head; + } + tomoyo_free(buf); + return NULL; +} + +/* Lock for domain->acl_info_list. */ +DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + +static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1, + const char *filename2, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * + const domain, const bool is_delete); +static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * + const domain, const bool is_delete); + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry". */ +static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_globally_readable_list); +static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock); + +/** + * tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list. + * + * @filename: Filename unconditionally permitted to open() for reading. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *new_entry; + struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename; + int error = -ENOMEM; + + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 1, 0, -1, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename); + if (!saved_filename) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) { + if (ptr->filename != saved_filename) + continue; + ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + if (is_delete) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry)); + if (!new_entry) + goto out; + new_entry->filename = saved_filename; + list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list); + error = 0; + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file - Check if the file is unconditionnaly permitted to be open()ed for reading. + * + * @filename: The filename to check. + * + * Returns true if any domain can open @filename for reading, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info * + filename) +{ + struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr; + bool found = false; + down_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) { + if (!ptr->is_deleted && + tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->filename)) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock); + return found; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) +{ + return tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(data, is_delete); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *pos; + bool done = true; + + down_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, + &tomoyo_globally_readable_list) { + struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr; + ptr = list_entry(pos, + struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry, + list); + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n", + ptr->filename->name)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock); + return done; +} + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry". */ +static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_pattern_list); +static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_pattern_list_lock); + +/** + * tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list. + * + * @pattern: Pathname pattern. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *new_entry; + struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern; + int error = -ENOMEM; + + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 1, 0, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern); + if (!saved_pattern) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) { + if (saved_pattern != ptr->pattern) + continue; + ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + if (is_delete) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry)); + if (!new_entry) + goto out; + new_entry->pattern = saved_pattern; + list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_pattern_list); + error = 0; + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_get_file_pattern - Get patterned pathname. + * + * @filename: The filename to find patterned pathname. + * + * Returns pointer to pathname pattern if matched, @filename otherwise. + */ +static const struct tomoyo_path_info * +tomoyo_get_file_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) +{ + struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern = NULL; + + down_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern)) + continue; + pattern = ptr->pattern; + if (tomoyo_strendswith(pattern->name, "/\\*")) { + /* Do nothing. Try to find the better match. */ + } else { + /* This would be the better match. Use this. */ + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock); + if (pattern) + filename = pattern; + return filename; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_pattern_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) +{ + return tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(data, is_delete); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_file_pattern - Read "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *pos; + bool done = true; + + down_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_pattern_list) { + struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr; + ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_pattern_entry, list); + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "%s\n", + ptr->pattern->name)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock); + return done; +} + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry". */ +static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list); +static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock); + +/** + * tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list. + * + * @pattern: Pathname pattern that are not rewritable by default. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *new_entry, *ptr; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern; + int error = -ENOMEM; + + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 0, 0, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern); + if (!saved_pattern) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) { + if (ptr->pattern != saved_pattern) + continue; + ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + if (is_delete) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry)); + if (!new_entry) + goto out; + new_entry->pattern = saved_pattern; + list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list); + error = 0; + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file - Check if the given pathname is not permitted to be rewrited. + * + * @filename: Filename to check. + * + * Returns true if @filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" directive, + * false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) +{ + struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr; + bool found = false; + + down_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern)) + continue; + found = true; + break; + } + up_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock); + return found; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) +{ + return tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(data, is_delete); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *pos; + bool done = true; + + down_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock); + list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list) { + struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr; + ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry, list); + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "%s\n", + ptr->pattern->name)) { + done = false; + break; + } + } + up_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock); + return done; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_update_file_acl - Update file's read/write/execute ACL. + * + * @filename: Filename. + * @perm: Permission (between 1 to 7). + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + * + * This is legacy support interface for older policy syntax. + * Current policy syntax uses "allow_read/write" instead of "6", + * "allow_read" instead of "4", "allow_write" instead of "2", + * "allow_execute" instead of "1". + */ +static int tomoyo_update_file_acl(const char *filename, u8 perm, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain, + const bool is_delete) +{ + if (perm > 7 || !perm) { + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid permission '%d %s'\n", + __func__, perm, filename); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (filename[0] != '@' && tomoyo_strendswith(filename, "/")) + /* + * Only 'allow_mkdir' and 'allow_rmdir' are valid for + * directory permissions. + */ + return 0; + if (perm & 4) + tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL, filename, + domain, is_delete); + if (perm & 2) + tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL, filename, + domain, is_delete); + if (perm & 1) + tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL, + filename, domain, is_delete); + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2 - Check permission for single path operation. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @filename: Filename to check. + * @perm: Permission. + * @may_use_pattern: True if patterned ACL is permitted. + * + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(const struct tomoyo_domain_info * + domain, + const struct tomoyo_path_info * + filename, + const u16 perm, + const bool may_use_pattern) +{ + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; + int error = -EPERM; + + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl; + if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) + continue; + acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record, + head); + if (!(acl->perm & perm)) + continue; + if (may_use_pattern || !acl->filename->is_patterned) { + if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, + acl->filename)) + continue; + } else { + continue; + } + error = 0; + break; + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_file_acl - Check permission for opening files. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @filename: Filename to check. + * @operation: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute"). + * + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_check_file_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, + const u8 operation) +{ + u16 perm = 0; + + if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE)) + return 0; + if (operation == 6) + perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL; + else if (operation == 4) + perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL; + else if (operation == 2) + perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL; + else if (operation == 1) + perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL; + else + BUG(); + return tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(domain, filename, perm, + operation != 1); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_file_perm2 - Check permission for opening files. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @filename: Filename to check. + * @perm: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute"). + * @operation: Operation name passed used for verbose mode. + * @mode: Access control mode. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_check_file_perm2(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, + const u8 perm, const char *operation, + const u8 mode) +{ + const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + const char *msg = "<unknown>"; + int error = 0; + + if (!filename) + return 0; + error = tomoyo_check_file_acl(domain, filename, perm); + if (error && perm == 4 && + (domain->flags & TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ) == 0 + && tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(filename)) + error = 0; + if (perm == 6) + msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL); + else if (perm == 4) + msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL); + else if (perm == 2) + msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL); + else if (perm == 1) + msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL); + else + BUG(); + if (!error) + return 0; + if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain)) + printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s(%s) %s' denied " + "for %s\n", tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, operation, + filename->name, tomoyo_get_last_name(domain)); + if (is_enforce) + return error; + if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) { + /* Don't use patterns for execute permission. */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *patterned_file = (perm != 1) ? + tomoyo_get_file_pattern(filename) : filename; + tomoyo_update_file_acl(patterned_file->name, perm, + domain, false); + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_file_policy - Update file related list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete) +{ + char *filename = strchr(data, ' '); + char *filename2; + unsigned int perm; + u8 type; + + if (!filename) + return -EINVAL; + *filename++ = '\0'; + if (sscanf(data, "%u", &perm) == 1) + return tomoyo_update_file_acl(filename, (u8) perm, domain, + is_delete); + if (strncmp(data, "allow_", 6)) + goto out; + data += 6; + for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION; type++) { + if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_sp_keyword[type])) + continue; + return tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(type, filename, + domain, is_delete); + } + filename2 = strchr(filename, ' '); + if (!filename2) + goto out; + *filename2++ = '\0'; + for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION; type++) { + if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_dp_keyword[type])) + continue; + return tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(type, filename, filename2, + domain, is_delete); + } + out: + return -EINVAL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_update_single_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" list. + * + * @type: Type of operation. + * @filename: Filename. + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * + const domain, const bool is_delete) +{ + static const u16 rw_mask = + (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL) | (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL); + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename; + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; + struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl; + int error = -ENOMEM; + const u16 perm = 1 << type; + + if (!domain) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename); + if (!saved_filename) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + if (is_delete) + goto delete; + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (tomoyo_acl_type1(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) + continue; + acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record, + head); + if (acl->filename != saved_filename) + continue; + /* Special case. Clear all bits if marked as deleted. */ + if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED) + acl->perm = 0; + acl->perm |= perm; + if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) == rw_mask) + acl->perm |= 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL; + else if (acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)) + acl->perm |= rw_mask; + ptr->type &= ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + /* Not found. Append it to the tail. */ + acl = tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL); + if (!acl) + goto out; + acl->perm = perm; + if (perm == (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)) + acl->perm |= rw_mask; + acl->filename = saved_filename; + list_add_tail(&acl->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list); + error = 0; + goto out; + delete: + error = -ENOENT; + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) + continue; + acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record, + head); + if (acl->filename != saved_filename) + continue; + acl->perm &= ~perm; + if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) != rw_mask) + acl->perm &= ~(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL); + else if (!(acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL))) + acl->perm &= ~rw_mask; + if (!acl->perm) + ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED; + error = 0; + break; + } + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_update_double_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record" list. + * + * @type: Type of operation. + * @filename1: First filename. + * @filename2: Second filename. + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1, + const char *filename2, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * + const domain, const bool is_delete) +{ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename1; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename2; + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; + struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl; + int error = -ENOMEM; + const u8 perm = 1 << type; + + if (!domain) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename1, 0, 0, 0, __func__) || + !tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename2, 0, 0, 0, __func__)) + return -EINVAL; + saved_filename1 = tomoyo_save_name(filename1); + saved_filename2 = tomoyo_save_name(filename2); + if (!saved_filename1 || !saved_filename2) + return -ENOMEM; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + if (is_delete) + goto delete; + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (tomoyo_acl_type1(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) + continue; + acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record, + head); + if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 || + acl->filename2 != saved_filename2) + continue; + /* Special case. Clear all bits if marked as deleted. */ + if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED) + acl->perm = 0; + acl->perm |= perm; + ptr->type &= ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED; + error = 0; + goto out; + } + /* Not found. Append it to the tail. */ + acl = tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL); + if (!acl) + goto out; + acl->perm = perm; + acl->filename1 = saved_filename1; + acl->filename2 = saved_filename2; + list_add_tail(&acl->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list); + error = 0; + goto out; + delete: + error = -ENOENT; + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) + continue; + acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record, + head); + if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 || + acl->filename2 != saved_filename2) + continue; + acl->perm &= ~perm; + if (!acl->perm) + ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED; + error = 0; + break; + } + out: + up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_single_path_acl - Check permission for single path operation. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @type: Type of operation. + * @filename: Filename to check. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_check_single_path_acl(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const u8 type, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) +{ + if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE)) + return 0; + return tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(domain, filename, 1 << type, 1); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_double_path_acl - Check permission for double path operation. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @type: Type of operation. + * @filename1: First filename to check. + * @filename2: Second filename to check. + * + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_check_double_path_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const u8 type, + const struct tomoyo_path_info * + filename1, + const struct tomoyo_path_info * + filename2) +{ + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; + const u8 perm = 1 << type; + int error = -EPERM; + + if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE)) + return 0; + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl; + if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) + continue; + acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record, + head); + if (!(acl->perm & perm)) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename1, acl->filename1)) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename2, acl->filename2)) + continue; + error = 0; + break; + } + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock); + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2 - Check permission for single path operation. + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @operation: Type of operation. + * @filename: Filename to check. + * @mode: Access control mode. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(struct tomoyo_domain_info * + const domain, u8 operation, + const struct tomoyo_path_info * + filename, const u8 mode) +{ + const char *msg; + int error; + const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + + if (!mode) + return 0; + next: + error = tomoyo_check_single_path_acl(domain, operation, filename); + msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(operation); + if (!error) + goto ok; + if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain)) + printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s' denied for %s\n", + tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, filename->name, + tomoyo_get_last_name(domain)); + if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) { + const char *name = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(filename)->name; + tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(operation, name, domain, false); + } + if (!is_enforce) + error = 0; + ok: + /* + * Since "allow_truncate" doesn't imply "allow_rewrite" permission, + * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission if the filename is + * specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword. + */ + if (!error && operation == TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL && + tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(filename)) { + operation = TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL; + goto next; + } + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_file_perm - Check permission for sysctl()'s "read" and "write". + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @filename: Filename to check. + * @perm: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write"). + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const char *filename, const u8 perm) +{ + struct tomoyo_path_info name; + const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); + + if (!mode) + return 0; + name.name = filename; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name); + return tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, &name, perm, "sysctl", mode); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_exec_perm - Check permission for "execute". + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @filename: Check permission for "execute". + * @tmp: Buffer for temporary use. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negativevalue otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, + struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp) +{ + const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); + + if (!mode) + return 0; + return tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, filename, 1, "do_execve", mode); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_open_permission - Check permission for "read" and "write". + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". + * @flag: Flags for open(). + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + struct path *path, const int flag) +{ + const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag); + int error = -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_path_info *buf; + const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); + const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + + if (!mode || !path->mnt) + return 0; + if (acc_mode == 0) + return 0; + if (path->dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) + /* + * I don't check directories here because mkdir() and rmdir() + * don't call me. + */ + return 0; + buf = tomoyo_get_path(path); + if (!buf) + goto out; + error = 0; + /* + * If the filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword, + * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not + * opened for append mode or the filename is truncated at open time. + */ + if ((acc_mode & MAY_WRITE) && + ((flag & O_TRUNC) || !(flag & O_APPEND)) && + (tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(buf))) { + error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain, + TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL, + buf, mode); + } + if (!error) + error = tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, buf, acc_mode, "open", + mode); + if (!error && (flag & O_TRUNC)) + error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain, + TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL, + buf, mode); + out: + tomoyo_free(buf); + if (!is_enforce) + error = 0; + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_1path_perm - Check permission for "create", "unlink", "mkdir", "rmdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "mkblock", "mkchar", "truncate" and "symlink". + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @operation: Type of operation. + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const u8 operation, struct path *path) +{ + int error = -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_path_info *buf; + const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); + const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + + if (!mode || !path->mnt) + return 0; + buf = tomoyo_get_path(path); + if (!buf) + goto out; + switch (operation) { + case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL: + case TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL: + if (!buf->is_dir) { + /* + * tomoyo_get_path() reserves space for appending "/." + */ + strcat((char *) buf->name, "/"); + tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf); + } + } + error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain, operation, buf, + mode); + out: + tomoyo_free(buf); + if (!is_enforce) + error = 0; + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission - Check permission for "rewrite". + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @filp: Pointer to "struct file". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + struct file *filp) +{ + int error = -ENOMEM; + const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); + const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + struct tomoyo_path_info *buf; + + if (!mode || !filp->f_path.mnt) + return 0; + buf = tomoyo_get_path(&filp->f_path); + if (!buf) + goto out; + if (!tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(buf)) { + error = 0; + goto out; + } + error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain, + TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL, + buf, mode); + out: + tomoyo_free(buf); + if (!is_enforce) + error = 0; + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_check_2path_perm - Check permission for "rename" and "link". + * + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @operation: Type of operation. + * @path1: Pointer to "struct path". + * @path2: Pointer to "struct path". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain, + const u8 operation, struct path *path1, + struct path *path2) +{ + int error = -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_path_info *buf1, *buf2; + const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); + const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + const char *msg; + + if (!mode || !path1->mnt || !path2->mnt) + return 0; + buf1 = tomoyo_get_path(path1); + buf2 = tomoyo_get_path(path2); + if (!buf1 || !buf2) + goto out; + { + struct dentry *dentry = path1->dentry; + if (dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) { + /* + * tomoyo_get_path() reserves space for appending "/." + */ + if (!buf1->is_dir) { + strcat((char *) buf1->name, "/"); + tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf1); + } + if (!buf2->is_dir) { + strcat((char *) buf2->name, "/"); + tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf2); + } + } + } + error = tomoyo_check_double_path_acl(domain, operation, buf1, buf2); + msg = tomoyo_dp2keyword(operation); + if (!error) + goto out; + if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain)) + printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s %s' " + "denied for %s\n", tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), + msg, buf1->name, buf2->name, + tomoyo_get_last_name(domain)); + if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) { + const char *name1 = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(buf1)->name; + const char *name2 = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(buf2)->name; + tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(operation, name1, name2, domain, + false); + } + out: + tomoyo_free(buf1); + tomoyo_free(buf2); + if (!is_enforce) + error = 0; + return error; +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d47f16b844b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c @@ -0,0 +1,482 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/realpath.c + * + * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION + * + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01 + * + */ + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h> +#include "common.h" +#include "realpath.h" + +/** + * tomoyo_encode: Convert binary string to ascii string. + * + * @buffer: Buffer for ASCII string. + * @buflen: Size of @buffer. + * @str: Binary string. + * + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str) +{ + while (1) { + const unsigned char c = *(unsigned char *) str++; + + if (tomoyo_is_valid(c)) { + if (--buflen <= 0) + break; + *buffer++ = (char) c; + if (c != '\\') + continue; + if (--buflen <= 0) + break; + *buffer++ = (char) c; + continue; + } + if (!c) { + if (--buflen <= 0) + break; + *buffer = '\0'; + return 0; + } + buflen -= 4; + if (buflen <= 0) + break; + *buffer++ = '\\'; + *buffer++ = (c >> 6) + '0'; + *buffer++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0'; + *buffer++ = (c & 7) + '0'; + } + return -ENOMEM; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_realpath_from_path2 - Returns realpath(3) of the given dentry but ignores chroot'ed root. + * + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". + * @newname: Pointer to buffer to return value in. + * @newname_len: Size of @newname. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + * + * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended. + * Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to + * \ooo style octal string. + * Character \ is converted to \\ string. + */ +int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname, + int newname_len) +{ + int error = -ENOMEM; + struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; + char *sp; + + if (!dentry || !path->mnt || !newname || newname_len <= 2048) + return -EINVAL; + if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) { + /* For "socket:[\$]" and "pipe:[\$]". */ + static const int offset = 1536; + sp = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, newname + offset, + newname_len - offset); + } else { + /* Taken from d_namespace_path(). */ + struct path root; + struct path ns_root = { }; + struct path tmp; + + read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); + root = current->fs->root; + path_get(&root); + read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); + spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock); + if (root.mnt && root.mnt->mnt_ns) + ns_root.mnt = mntget(root.mnt->mnt_ns->root); + if (ns_root.mnt) + ns_root.dentry = dget(ns_root.mnt->mnt_root); + spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock); + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + tmp = ns_root; + sp = __d_path(path, &tmp, newname, newname_len); + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + path_put(&root); + path_put(&ns_root); + } + if (IS_ERR(sp)) + error = PTR_ERR(sp); + else + error = tomoyo_encode(newname, sp - newname, sp); + /* Append trailing '/' if dentry is a directory. */ + if (!error && dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) + && *newname) { + sp = newname + strlen(newname); + if (*(sp - 1) != '/') { + if (sp < newname + newname_len - 4) { + *sp++ = '/'; + *sp = '\0'; + } else { + error = -ENOMEM; + } + } + } + if (error) + printk(KERN_WARNING "tomoyo_realpath: Pathname too long.\n"); + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. + * + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". + * + * Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise. + * + * These functions use tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free() + * if these functions didn't return NULL. + */ +char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path) +{ + char *buf = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer)); + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer) + <= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1); + if (!buf) + return NULL; + if (tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf, + TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1) == 0) + return buf; + tomoyo_free(buf); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_realpath - Get realpath of a pathname. + * + * @pathname: The pathname to solve. + * + * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname) +{ + struct nameidata nd; + + if (pathname && path_lookup(pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd) == 0) { + char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&nd.path); + path_put(&nd.path); + return buf; + } + return NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_realpath_nofollow - Get realpath of a pathname. + * + * @pathname: The pathname to solve. + * + * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname) +{ + struct nameidata nd; + + if (pathname && path_lookup(pathname, 0, &nd) == 0) { + char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&nd.path); + path_put(&nd.path); + return buf; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* Memory allocated for non-string data. */ +static unsigned int tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements; +/* Quota for holding non-string data. */ +static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_elements; + +/** + * tomoyo_alloc_element - Allocate permanent memory for structures. + * + * @size: Size in bytes. + * + * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise. + * + * Memory has to be zeroed. + * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer. + */ +void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size) +{ + static char *buf; + static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock); + static unsigned int buf_used_len = PATH_MAX; + char *ptr = NULL; + /*Assumes sizeof(void *) >= sizeof(long) is true. */ + const unsigned int word_aligned_size + = roundup(size, max(sizeof(void *), sizeof(long))); + if (word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX) + return NULL; + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + mutex_lock(&lock); + if (buf_used_len + word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX) { + if (!tomoyo_quota_for_elements || + tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements + + PATH_MAX <= tomoyo_quota_for_elements) + ptr = kzalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ptr) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory " + "for tomoyo_alloc_element().\n"); + if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) + panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n"); + } else { + buf = ptr; + tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements += PATH_MAX; + buf_used_len = word_aligned_size; + ptr = buf; + } + } else if (word_aligned_size) { + int i; + ptr = buf + buf_used_len; + buf_used_len += word_aligned_size; + for (i = 0; i < word_aligned_size; i++) { + if (!ptr[i]) + continue; + printk(KERN_ERR "WARNING: Reserved memory was tainted! " + "The system might go wrong.\n"); + ptr[i] = '\0'; + } + } + mutex_unlock(&lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return ptr; +} + +/* Memory allocated for string data in bytes. */ +static unsigned int tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename; +/* Quota for holding string data in bytes. */ +static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_savename; + +/* + * TOMOYO uses this hash only when appending a string into the string + * table. Frequency of appending strings is very low. So we don't need + * large (e.g. 64k) hash size. 256 will be sufficient. + */ +#define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH 256 + +/* Structure for string data. */ +struct tomoyo_name_entry { + struct list_head list; + struct tomoyo_path_info entry; +}; + +/* Structure for available memory region. */ +struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list { + struct list_head list; + char *ptr; /* Pointer to a free area. */ + int len; /* Length of the area. */ +}; + +/* + * The list for "struct tomoyo_name_entry". + * + * This list is updated only inside tomoyo_save_name(), thus + * no global mutex exists. + */ +static struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH]; + +/** + * tomoyo_save_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data. + * + * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory. + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise. + * + * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name. + */ +const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name) +{ + static LIST_HEAD(fmb_list); + static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock); + struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr; + unsigned int hash; + /* fmb contains available size in bytes. + fmb is removed from the fmb_list when fmb->len becomes 0. */ + struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list *fmb; + int len; + char *cp; + + if (!name) + return NULL; + len = strlen(name) + 1; + if (len > TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Name too long " + "for tomoyo_save_name().\n"); + return NULL; + } + hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/ + mutex_lock(&lock); + list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH], + list) { + if (hash == ptr->entry.hash && !strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name)) + goto out; + } + list_for_each_entry(fmb, &fmb_list, list) { + if (len <= fmb->len) + goto ready; + } + if (!tomoyo_quota_for_savename || + tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename + PATH_MAX + <= tomoyo_quota_for_savename) + cp = kzalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); + else + cp = NULL; + fmb = kzalloc(sizeof(*fmb), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cp || !fmb) { + kfree(cp); + kfree(fmb); + printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory " + "for tomoyo_save_name().\n"); + if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) + panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n"); + ptr = NULL; + goto out; + } + tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename += PATH_MAX; + list_add(&fmb->list, &fmb_list); + fmb->ptr = cp; + fmb->len = PATH_MAX; + ready: + ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr)); + if (!ptr) + goto out; + ptr->entry.name = fmb->ptr; + memmove(fmb->ptr, name, len); + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry); + fmb->ptr += len; + fmb->len -= len; + list_add_tail(&ptr->list, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH]); + if (fmb->len == 0) { + list_del(&fmb->list); + kfree(fmb); + } + out: + mutex_unlock(&lock); + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/ + return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_realpath_init - Initialize realpath related code. + */ +void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void) +{ + int i; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN > PATH_MAX); + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_name_list[i]); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.acl_info_list); + tomoyo_kernel_domain.domainname = tomoyo_save_name(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME); + list_add_tail(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.list, &tomoyo_domain_list); + down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); + if (tomoyo_find_domain(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) != &tomoyo_kernel_domain) + panic("Can't register tomoyo_kernel_domain"); + up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); +} + +/* Memory allocated for temporary purpose. */ +static atomic_t tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size; + +/** + * tomoyo_alloc - Allocate memory for temporary purpose. + * + * @size: Size in bytes. + * + * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +void *tomoyo_alloc(const size_t size) +{ + void *p = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (p) + atomic_add(ksize(p), &tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size); + return p; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_free - Release memory allocated by tomoyo_alloc(). + * + * @p: Pointer returned by tomoyo_alloc(). May be NULL. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +void tomoyo_free(const void *p) +{ + if (p) { + atomic_sub(ksize(p), &tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size); + kfree(p); + } +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_memory_counter - Check for memory usage in bytes. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns memory usage. + */ +int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + if (!head->read_eof) { + const unsigned int shared + = tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename; + const unsigned int private + = tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements; + const unsigned int dynamic + = atomic_read(&tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size); + char buffer[64]; + + memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); + if (tomoyo_quota_for_savename) + snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, + " (Quota: %10u)", + tomoyo_quota_for_savename); + else + buffer[0] = '\0'; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Shared: %10u%s\n", shared, buffer); + if (tomoyo_quota_for_elements) + snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, + " (Quota: %10u)", + tomoyo_quota_for_elements); + else + buffer[0] = '\0'; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Private: %10u%s\n", private, buffer); + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Dynamic: %10u\n", dynamic); + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Total: %10u\n", + shared + private + dynamic); + head->read_eof = true; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_memory_quota - Set memory quota. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0. + */ +int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + char *data = head->write_buf; + unsigned int size; + + if (sscanf(data, "Shared: %u", &size) == 1) + tomoyo_quota_for_savename = size; + else if (sscanf(data, "Private: %u", &size) == 1) + tomoyo_quota_for_elements = size; + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.h b/security/tomoyo/realpath.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7ec9fc9cbc07 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/realpath.h + * + * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION + * + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01 + * + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H +#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H + +struct path; +struct tomoyo_path_info; +struct tomoyo_io_buffer; + +/* Convert binary string to ascii string. */ +int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str); + +/* Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. */ +int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname, + int newname_len); + +/* + * Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. + * These functions use tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free() + * if these functions didn't return NULL. + */ +char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname); +/* + * Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that it doesn't follow the final symlink. + */ +char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname); +/* Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that the pathname is already solved. */ +char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path); + +/* + * Allocate memory for ACL entry. + * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer. + */ +void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size); + +/* + * Keep the given name on the RAM. + * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name. + */ +const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name); + +/* Allocate memory for temporary use (e.g. permission checks). */ +void *tomoyo_alloc(const size_t size); + +/* Free memory allocated by tomoyo_alloc(). */ +void tomoyo_free(const void *p); + +/* Check for memory usage. */ +int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); + +/* Set memory quota. */ +int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); + +/* Initialize realpath related code. */ +void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void); + +#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H) */ diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3eeeae12c4dc --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c + * + * LSM hooks for TOMOYO Linux. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION + * + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01 + * + */ + +#include <linux/security.h> +#include "common.h" +#include "tomoyo.h" +#include "realpath.h" + +static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + /* + * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer, + * we don't need to duplicate. + */ + new->security = old->security; + return 0; +} + +static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + /* + * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve + * operation. + */ + if (bprm->cred_prepared) + return 0; + /* + * Load policy if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists and /sbin/init is requested + * for the first time. + */ + if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) + tomoyo_load_policy(bprm->filename); + /* + * Tell tomoyo_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an + * execve operation. + */ + bprm->cred->security = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security; + + /* + * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve() + * using current domain. + */ + if (!domain) { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *next_domain = NULL; + int retval = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain); + + if (!retval) + bprm->cred->security = next_domain; + return retval; + } + /* + * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain. + * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY). + */ + return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL + +static int tomoyo_prepend(char **buffer, int *buflen, const char *str) +{ + int namelen = strlen(str); + + if (*buflen < namelen) + return -ENOMEM; + *buflen -= namelen; + *buffer -= namelen; + memcpy(*buffer, str, namelen); + return 0; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_sysctl_path - return the realpath of a ctl_table. + * @table: pointer to "struct ctl_table". + * + * Returns realpath(3) of the @table on success. + * Returns NULL on failure. + * + * This function uses tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free() + * if this function didn't return NULL. + */ +static char *tomoyo_sysctl_path(struct ctl_table *table) +{ + int buflen = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN; + char *buf = tomoyo_alloc(buflen); + char *end = buf + buflen; + int error = -ENOMEM; + + if (!buf) + return NULL; + + *--end = '\0'; + buflen--; + while (table) { + char num[32]; + const char *sp = table->procname; + + if (!sp) { + memset(num, 0, sizeof(num)); + snprintf(num, sizeof(num) - 1, "=%d=", table->ctl_name); + sp = num; + } + if (tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, sp) || + tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, "/")) + goto out; + table = table->parent; + } + if (tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, "/proc/sys")) + goto out; + error = tomoyo_encode(buf, end - buf, end); + out: + if (!error) + return buf; + tomoyo_free(buf); + return NULL; +} + +static int tomoyo_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op) +{ + int error; + char *name; + + op &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE; + if (!op) + return 0; + name = tomoyo_sysctl_path(table); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + error = tomoyo_check_file_perm(tomoyo_domain(), name, op); + tomoyo_free(name); + return error; +} +#endif + +static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, + unsigned int time_attrs) +{ + return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(), + TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL, + path); +} + +static int tomoyo_path_unlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry }; + return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(), + TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL, + &path); +} + +static int tomoyo_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, + int mode) +{ + struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry }; + return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(), + TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL, + &path); +} + +static int tomoyo_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry }; + return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(), + TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL, + &path); +} + +static int tomoyo_path_symlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry }; + return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(), + TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL, + &path); +} + +static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, + int mode, unsigned int dev) +{ + struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry }; + int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL; + + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFCHR: + type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL; + break; + case S_IFBLK: + type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL; + break; + case S_IFIFO: + type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL; + break; + case S_IFSOCK: + type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL; + break; + } + return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(), + type, &path); +} + +static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + struct path path1 = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; + struct path path2 = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry }; + return tomoyo_check_2path_perm(tomoyo_domain(), + TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL, + &path1, &path2); +} + +static int tomoyo_path_rename(struct path *old_parent, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_parent, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry }; + struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry }; + return tomoyo_check_2path_perm(tomoyo_domain(), + TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL, + &path1, &path2); +} + +static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND)) + return tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(tomoyo_domain(), file); + return 0; +} + +static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) +{ + int flags = f->f_flags; + + if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE) + flags++; + flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC); + /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */ + if (current->in_execve) + return 0; + return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, flags); +} + +static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = { + .name = "tomoyo", + .cred_prepare = tomoyo_cred_prepare, + .bprm_set_creds = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds, + .bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security, +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL + .sysctl = tomoyo_sysctl, +#endif + .file_fcntl = tomoyo_file_fcntl, + .dentry_open = tomoyo_dentry_open, + .path_truncate = tomoyo_path_truncate, + .path_unlink = tomoyo_path_unlink, + .path_mkdir = tomoyo_path_mkdir, + .path_rmdir = tomoyo_path_rmdir, + .path_symlink = tomoyo_path_symlink, + .path_mknod = tomoyo_path_mknod, + .path_link = tomoyo_path_link, + .path_rename = tomoyo_path_rename, +}; + +static int __init tomoyo_init(void) +{ + struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred(); + + if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops)) + return 0; + /* register ourselves with the security framework */ + if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops)) + panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux"); + printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n"); + cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain; + tomoyo_realpath_init(); + return 0; +} + +security_initcall(tomoyo_init); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a0c8f6e0bea4 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h + * + * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION + * + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01 + * + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H +#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H + +struct tomoyo_path_info; +struct path; +struct inode; +struct linux_binprm; +struct pt_regs; +struct tomoyo_page_buffer; + +int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const char *filename, const u8 perm); +int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, + struct tomoyo_page_buffer *buf); +int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + struct path *path, const int flag); +int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const u8 operation, struct path *path); +int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const u8 operation, struct path *path1, + struct path *path2); +int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + struct file *filp); +int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm, + struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain); + +/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */ + +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL 0 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL 1 + +/* Index numbers for File Controls. */ + +/* + * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is special. TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically set + * if both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are set. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and + * TYPE_WRITE_ACL are automatically set if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is set. + * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically cleared if either TYPE_READ_ACL or + * TYPE_WRITE_ACL is cleared. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are + * automatically cleared if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is cleared. + */ + +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL 0 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL 1 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL 2 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL 3 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL 4 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL 5 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL 6 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL 7 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL 8 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL 9 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL 10 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL 11 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL 12 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL 13 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL 14 +#define TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION 15 + +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL 0 +#define TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL 1 +#define TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION 2 + +#define TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY 0 +#define TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY 1 +#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS 2 +#define TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS 3 +#define TOMOYO_MEMINFO 4 +#define TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN 5 +#define TOMOYO_VERSION 6 +#define TOMOYO_PROFILE 7 +#define TOMOYO_MANAGER 8 + +extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain; + +static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void) +{ + return current_cred()->security; +} + +/* Caller holds tasklist_lock spinlock. */ +static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct + *task) +{ + /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/ + const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security; + + put_cred(cred); + return domain; + /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/ +} + +#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H) */ |