1 files changed, 152 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d5380a48e8fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c
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+/*
+ * This file implements KASLR memory randomization for x86_64. It randomizes
+ * the virtual address space of kernel memory regions (physical memory
+ * mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap) for x86_64. This security feature mitigates
+ * exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses.
+ *
+ * Entropy is generated using the KASLR early boot functions now shared in
+ * the lib directory (originally written by Kees Cook). Randomization is
+ * done on PGD & PUD page table levels to increase possible addresses. The
+ * physical memory mapping code was adapted to support PUD level virtual
+ * addresses. This implementation on the best configuration provides 30,000
+ * possible virtual addresses in average for each memory region. An additional
+ * low memory page is used to ensure each CPU can start with a PGD aligned
+ * virtual address (for realmode).
+ *
+ * The order of each memory region is not changed. The feature looks at
+ * the available space for the regions based on different configuration
+ * options and randomizes the base and space between each. The size of the
+ * physical memory mapping is the available physical memory.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+
+#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/kaslr.h>
+
+#include "mm_internal.h"
+
+#define TB_SHIFT 40
+
+/*
+ * Virtual address start and end range for randomization. The end changes base
+ * on configuration to have the highest amount of space for randomization.
+ * It increases the possible random position for each randomized region.
+ *
+ * You need to add an if/def entry if you introduce a new memory region
+ * compatible with KASLR. Your entry must be in logical order with memory
+ * layout. For example, ESPFIX is before EFI because its virtual address is
+ * before. You also need to add a BUILD_BUG_ON in kernel_randomize_memory to
+ * ensure that this order is correct and won't be changed.
+ */
+static const unsigned long vaddr_start;
+static const unsigned long vaddr_end;
+
+/*
+ * Memory regions randomized by KASLR (except modules that use a separate logic
+ * earlier during boot). The list is ordered based on virtual addresses. This
+ * order is kept after randomization.
+ */
+static __initdata struct kaslr_memory_region {
+	unsigned long *base;
+	unsigned long size_tb;
+} kaslr_regions[] = {
+};
+
+/* Get size in bytes used by the memory region */
+static inline unsigned long get_padding(struct kaslr_memory_region *region)
+{
+	return (region->size_tb << TB_SHIFT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply no randomization if KASLR was disabled at boot or if KASAN
+ * is enabled. KASAN shadow mappings rely on regions being PGD aligned.
+ */
+static inline bool kaslr_memory_enabled(void)
+{
+	return kaslr_enabled() && !config_enabled(CONFIG_KASAN);
+}
+
+/* Initialize base and padding for each memory region randomized with KASLR */
+void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	unsigned long vaddr = vaddr_start;
+	unsigned long rand;
+	struct rnd_state rand_state;
+	unsigned long remain_entropy;
+
+	if (!kaslr_memory_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	/* Calculate entropy available between regions */
+	remain_entropy = vaddr_end - vaddr_start;
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++)
+		remain_entropy -= get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]);
+
+	prandom_seed_state(&rand_state, kaslr_get_random_long("Memory"));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions); i++) {
+		unsigned long entropy;
+
+		/*
+		 * Select a random virtual address using the extra entropy
+		 * available.
+		 */
+		entropy = remain_entropy / (ARRAY_SIZE(kaslr_regions) - i);
+		prandom_bytes_state(&rand_state, &rand, sizeof(rand));
+		entropy = (rand % (entropy + 1)) & PUD_MASK;
+		vaddr += entropy;
+		*kaslr_regions[i].base = vaddr;
+
+		/*
+		 * Jump the region and add a minimum padding based on
+		 * randomization alignment.
+		 */
+		vaddr += get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]);
+		vaddr = round_up(vaddr + 1, PUD_SIZE);
+		remain_entropy -= entropy;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create PGD aligned trampoline table to allow real mode initialization
+ * of additional CPUs. Consume only 1 low memory page.
+ */
+void __meminit init_trampoline(void)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr, paddr_next;
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pud_t *pud_page, *pud_page_tramp;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!kaslr_memory_enabled()) {
+		init_trampoline_default();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pud_page_tramp = alloc_low_page();
+
+	paddr = 0;
+	pgd = pgd_offset_k((unsigned long)__va(paddr));
+	pud_page = (pud_t *) pgd_page_vaddr(*pgd);
+
+	for (i = pud_index(paddr); i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++, paddr = paddr_next) {
+		pud_t *pud, *pud_tramp;
+		unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
+
+		pud_tramp = pud_page_tramp + pud_index(paddr);
+		pud = pud_page + pud_index(vaddr);
+		paddr_next = (paddr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE;
+
+		*pud_tramp = *pud;
+	}
+
+	set_pgd(&trampoline_pgd_entry,
+		__pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pud_page_tramp)));
+}