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Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/wpa.c')
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wpa.c32
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index b758350919ff..bdb53aba888e 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
data = skb->data + hdrlen;
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
@@ -179,7 +183,8 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
u8 *pos;
if (info->control.hw_key &&
- !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
+ !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
+ !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
return 0;
}
@@ -198,8 +203,14 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
+ skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + TKIP_IV_LEN);
pos += hdrlen;
+ /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
+ if (info->control.hw_key &&
+ (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
+ return 0;
+
/* Increase IV for the frame */
spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
@@ -253,6 +264,11 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
+ if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
/*
* Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
* In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
@@ -413,6 +429,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
+ skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + CCMP_HDR_LEN);
/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
if (info->control.hw_key &&
@@ -484,6 +501,14 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ } else {
+ if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ }
+
ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
queue = rx->security_idx;
@@ -509,7 +534,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
- skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN);
+ if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
@@ -609,6 +635,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
+ /* management frames are already linear */
+
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;