diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
25 files changed, 658 insertions, 222 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 0fe5a026aef8..579775088967 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -709,16 +709,31 @@ static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, { } +static int cap_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void cap_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) +{ +} + static int cap_tun_dev_create(void) { return 0; } -static void cap_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) +static int cap_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { + return 0; } -static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) +static int cap_tun_dev_open(void *security) { return 0; } @@ -1050,8 +1065,11 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_inc); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_dec); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_alloc_security); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_free_security); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create); - set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_post_create); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_open); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach_queue); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 19ecc8de9e6b..1c69e38e3a2c 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -159,6 +159,16 @@ static void dev_exception_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, } } +static void __dev_exception_clean(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup) +{ + struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + list_del_rcu(&ex->list); + kfree_rcu(ex, rcu); + } +} + /** * dev_exception_clean - frees all entries of the exception list * @dev_cgroup: dev_cgroup with the exception list to be cleaned @@ -167,14 +177,9 @@ static void dev_exception_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, */ static void dev_exception_clean(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup) { - struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp; - lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex); - list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { - list_del_rcu(&ex->list); - kfree_rcu(ex, rcu); - } + __dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup); } /* @@ -215,7 +220,7 @@ static void devcgroup_css_free(struct cgroup *cgroup) struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); - dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup); + __dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup); kfree(dev_cgroup); } diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 5bd1cc1b4a54..4bb3a775a996 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -17,5 +17,17 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only added from initramfs. +config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support" + depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE + default n + select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE + select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA + select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + help + This option enables digital signature verification using + asymmetric keys. + source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index d43799cc14f6..ebb6409b3fcb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-y := iint.o diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 2dc167d7cde9..0b759e17a131 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -44,5 +44,14 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, } } - return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, digest, digestlen); + switch (sig[0]) { + case 1: + return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, + digest, digestlen); + case 2: + return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, + digest, digestlen); + } + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b4754667659d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013 Intel Corporation + * + * Author: + * Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + * + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> + +#include "integrity.h" + +/* + * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys + */ +struct signature_v2_hdr { + uint8_t version; /* signature format version */ + uint8_t hash_algo; /* Digest algorithm [enum pkey_hash_algo] */ + uint32_t keyid; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific*/ + uint16_t sig_size; /* signature size */ + uint8_t sig[0]; /* signature payload */ +} __packed; + +/* + * Request an asymmetric key. + */ +static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) +{ + struct key *key; + char name[12]; + + sprintf(name, "id:%x", keyid); + + pr_debug("key search: \"%s\"\n", name); + + if (keyring) { + /* search in specific keyring */ + key_ref_t kref; + kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, name); + if (IS_ERR(kref)) + key = ERR_CAST(kref); + else + key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref); + } else { + key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL); + } + + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + pr_warn("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n", + name, PTR_ERR(key)); + switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { + /* Hide some search errors */ + case -EACCES: + case -ENOTDIR: + case -EAGAIN: + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + default: + return key; + } + } + + pr_debug("%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key)); + + return key; +} + +int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) +{ + struct public_key_signature pks; + struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig; + struct key *key; + int ret = -ENOMEM; + + if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr)) + return -EBADMSG; + + siglen -= sizeof(*hdr); + + if (siglen != __be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size)) + return -EBADMSG; + + if (hdr->hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST) + return -ENOPKG; + + key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, __be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid)); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return PTR_ERR(key); + + memset(&pks, 0, sizeof(pks)); + + pks.pkey_hash_algo = hdr->hash_algo; + pks.digest = (u8 *)data; + pks.digest_size = datalen; + pks.nr_mpi = 1; + pks.rsa.s = mpi_read_raw_data(hdr->sig, siglen); + + if (pks.rsa.s) + ret = verify_signature(key, &pks); + + mpi_free(pks.rsa.s); + key_put(key); + pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index afbb59dd262d..fea9749c3756 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -11,3 +11,16 @@ config EVM integrity attacks. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config EVM_HMAC_VERSION + int "EVM HMAC version" + depends on EVM + default 2 + help + This options adds EVM HMAC version support. + 1 - original version + 2 - add per filesystem unique identifier (UUID) (default) + + WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding + additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM + labeled file systems to be relabeled. diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index c885247ebcf7..30bd1ec0232e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ extern int evm_initialized; extern char *evm_hmac; extern char *evm_hash; +extern int evm_hmac_version; extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; @@ -45,6 +46,5 @@ extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, char *hmac_val); extern int evm_init_secfs(void); -extern void evm_cleanup_secfs(void); #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index dfb26918699c..3bab89eb21d6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc); + if (evm_hmac_version > 1) + crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, + sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid)); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); } @@ -205,9 +208,9 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, &xattr_data, sizeof(xattr_data), 0); - } - else if (rc == -ENODATA) + } else if (rc == -ENODATA && inode->i_op->removexattr) { rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); + } return rc; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index eb5484504f50..cdbde1762189 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ int evm_initialized; char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; char *evm_hash = "sha1"; +int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION; char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX @@ -427,15 +428,6 @@ err: return error; } -static void __exit cleanup_evm(void) -{ - evm_cleanup_secfs(); - if (hmac_tfm) - crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm); - if (hash_tfm) - crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm); -} - /* * evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes */ diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index ac7629950578..30f670ad6ac3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -100,9 +100,3 @@ int __init evm_init_secfs(void) error = -EFAULT; return error; } - -void __exit evm_cleanup_secfs(void) -{ - if (evm_init_tpm) - securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm); -} diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index d82a5a13d855..74522dbd10a6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -72,7 +72,10 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { iint->version = 0; iint->flags = 0UL; - iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); } @@ -149,7 +152,10 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); iint->version = 0; iint->flags = 0UL; - iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + iint->ima_module_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 079a85dc37b2..a41c9c18e5e0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -84,11 +84,12 @@ void ima_fs_cleanup(void); int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode); int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, const char *op, struct inode *inode); -int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest); -int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest); +int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest); +int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest); int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest); void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, const char *op, const char *cause); +int ima_init_crypto(void); /* * used to protect h_table and sha_table @@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode); void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show); +const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf); /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete * integrity data associated with an inode. @@ -127,7 +129,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode); struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); /* IMA policy related functions */ -enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR }; +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, MMAP_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK, POST_SETATTR }; int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags); @@ -142,13 +144,16 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void); #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x04 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE -int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename); int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); +enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + int func); #else -static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename) { @@ -165,6 +170,12 @@ static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) { } + +static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache + *iint, int func) +{ + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +} #endif /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 27cb9eb42cc8..1c03e8f1e0e1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template); if (!violation) { - result = ima_calc_template_hash(entry->template_len, - &entry->template, + result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(&entry->template, + entry->template_len, entry->digest); if (result < 0) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, @@ -100,12 +100,12 @@ err_out: * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) - * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP, MODULE_CHECK) + * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK) * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP | MODULE_CHECK + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST; - result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest); + result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest); if (!result) { iint->version = i_version; iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; @@ -237,3 +237,20 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED; } + +const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf) +{ + char *pathname = NULL; + + /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ + *pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*pathbuf) { + pathname = d_path(path, *pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11); + if (IS_ERR(pathname)) { + kfree(*pathbuf); + *pathbuf = NULL; + pathname = NULL; + } + } + return pathname; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index bdc8ba1d1d27..2d4becab8918 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -42,12 +42,69 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE); } -static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, +static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST; - __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr, - sizeof iint->ima_xattr, 0); + return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, + (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr, + sizeof(iint->ima_xattr), 0); +} + +/* Return specific func appraised cached result */ +enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + int func) +{ + switch(func) { + case MMAP_CHECK: + return iint->ima_mmap_status; + case BPRM_CHECK: + return iint->ima_bprm_status; + case MODULE_CHECK: + return iint->ima_module_status; + case FILE_CHECK: + default: + return iint->ima_file_status; + } +} + +static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + int func, enum integrity_status status) +{ + switch(func) { + case MMAP_CHECK: + iint->ima_mmap_status = status; + break; + case BPRM_CHECK: + iint->ima_bprm_status = status; + break; + case MODULE_CHECK: + iint->ima_module_status = status; + break; + case FILE_CHECK: + default: + iint->ima_file_status = status; + break; + } +} + +static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int func) +{ + switch(func) { + case MMAP_CHECK: + iint->flags |= (IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); + break; + case BPRM_CHECK: + iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); + break; + case MODULE_CHECK: + iint->flags |= (IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); + break; + case FILE_CHECK: + default: + iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED); + break; + } } /* @@ -58,7 +115,7 @@ static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ -int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename) { struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; @@ -74,9 +131,6 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED) - return iint->ima_status; - rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value, 0, GFP_NOFS); if (rc <= 0) { @@ -98,19 +152,18 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, cause = "invalid-HMAC"; goto out; } - switch (xattr_value->type) { case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: + if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { + cause = "IMA signature required"; + status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + break; + } rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); if (rc) { cause = "invalid-hash"; status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; - print_hex_dump_bytes("security.ima: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - xattr_value, sizeof(*xattr_value)); - print_hex_dump_bytes("collected: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr, - sizeof iint->ima_xattr); break; } status = INTEGRITY_PASS; @@ -141,15 +194,15 @@ out: if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { - ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint); - status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint)) + status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); } else { - iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED; + ima_cache_flags(iint, func); } - iint->ima_status = status; + ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status); kfree(xattr_value); return status; } @@ -195,10 +248,11 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry) must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) { + iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | + IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | + IMA_ACTION_FLAGS); if (must_appraise) iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE; - else - iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED); } if (!must_appraise) rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 81dcaa26401e..a02e0791cf15 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -19,38 +19,41 @@ #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> #include "ima.h" -static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc) +static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm; + +int ima_init_crypto(void) { - int rc; + long rc; - desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ima_hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); - if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) { - pr_info("IMA: failed to load %s transform: %ld\n", - ima_hash, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm)); - rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm); + ima_shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(ima_hash, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(ima_shash_tfm)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(ima_shash_tfm); + pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", ima_hash, rc); return rc; } - desc->flags = 0; - rc = crypto_hash_init(desc); - if (rc) - crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm); - return rc; + return 0; } /* * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest */ -int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) +int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) { - struct hash_desc desc; - struct scatterlist sg[1]; loff_t i_size, offset = 0; char *rbuf; int rc, read = 0; + struct { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)]; + } desc; - rc = init_desc(&desc); + desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm; + desc.shash.flags = 0; + + rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash); if (rc != 0) return rc; @@ -75,41 +78,34 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) if (rbuf_len == 0) break; offset += rbuf_len; - sg_init_one(sg, rbuf, rbuf_len); - rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, rbuf_len); + rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, rbuf, rbuf_len); if (rc) break; } kfree(rbuf); if (!rc) - rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest); + rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest); if (read) file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; out: - crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); return rc; } /* - * Calculate the hash of a given template + * Calculate the hash of a given buffer */ -int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest) +int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *data, int len, char *digest) { - struct hash_desc desc; - struct scatterlist sg[1]; - int rc; + struct { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)]; + } desc; - rc = init_desc(&desc); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; + desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm; + desc.shash.flags = 0; - sg_init_one(sg, template, template_len); - rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, template_len); - if (!rc) - rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest); - crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); - return rc; + return crypto_shash_digest(&desc.shash, data, len, digest); } static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) @@ -126,12 +122,17 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) */ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest) { - struct hash_desc desc; - struct scatterlist sg; u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; int rc, i; + struct { + struct shash_desc shash; + char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(ima_shash_tfm)]; + } desc; + + desc.shash.tfm = ima_shash_tfm; + desc.shash.flags = 0; - rc = init_desc(&desc); + rc = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash); if (rc != 0) return rc; @@ -139,11 +140,9 @@ int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest) for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) { ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i); /* now accumulate with current aggregate */ - sg_init_one(&sg, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); - rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); } if (!rc) - crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest); - crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); + crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, digest); return rc; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index b5dfd534f13d..162ea723db3d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void) if (!ima_used_chip) pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); + rc = ima_init_crypto(); + if (rc) + return rc; ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */ ima_init_policy(); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index e7a147f7d371..3b3b7e6bf8da 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; int must_measure; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; - unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; + char *pathbuf = NULL; + const char *pathname; if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized) return; @@ -86,22 +87,15 @@ out: if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers) return; - /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ - pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL); - if (pathbuf) { - pathname = d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11); - if (IS_ERR(pathname)) - pathname = NULL; - else if (strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) - pathname = NULL; - } + pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf); + if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) + pathname = dentry->d_name.name; + if (send_tomtou) - ima_add_violation(inode, - !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname, + ima_add_violation(inode, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); if (send_writers) - ima_add_violation(inode, - !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname, + ima_add_violation(inode, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); kfree(pathbuf); } @@ -145,25 +139,31 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); } -static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, +static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, int mask, int function) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; - int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise; + char *pathbuf = NULL; + const char *pathname = NULL; + int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func; if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return 0; - /* Determine if in appraise/audit/measurement policy, - * returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT bitmask. */ + /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action + * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. + * Included is the appraise submask. + */ action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function); if (!action) return 0; must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE; + /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */ + _func = (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) ? FILE_CHECK : function; + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); @@ -171,44 +171,45 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, goto out; /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask - * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED, - * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) */ + * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED, + * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) + */ iint->flags |= action; + action &= IMA_DO_MASK; action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1); /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ if (!action) { - if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED) - rc = iint->ima_status; - goto out; + if (must_appraise) + rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, _func); + goto out_digsig; } rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); if (rc != 0) - goto out; + goto out_digsig; + + if (function != BPRM_CHECK) + pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf); + + if (!pathname) + pathname = filename; - if (function != BPRM_CHECK) { - /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ - pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL); - if (pathbuf) { - pathname = - d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11); - if (IS_ERR(pathname)) - pathname = NULL; - } - } if (action & IMA_MEASURE) - ima_store_measurement(iint, file, - !pathname ? filename : pathname); - if (action & IMA_APPRAISE) - rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file, - !pathname ? filename : pathname); + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname); + if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) + rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname); if (action & IMA_AUDIT) - ima_audit_measurement(iint, !pathname ? filename : pathname); + ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); kfree(pathbuf); +out_digsig: + if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)) + rc = -EACCES; out: mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); - return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0; + if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + return -EACCES; + return 0; } /** @@ -219,19 +220,15 @@ out: * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure() * policy decision. * - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().) + * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file + * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - int rc = 0; - - if (!file) - return 0; - if (prot & PROT_EXEC) - rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, - MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP); - return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0; + if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) + return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, + MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + return 0; } /** @@ -244,18 +241,15 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually * what is being executed. * - * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure. - * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().) + * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file + * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - int rc; - - rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, + return process_measurement(bprm->file, (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ? bprm->filename : bprm->interp, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); - return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0; } /** @@ -265,18 +259,15 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision. * - * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. - * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.) + * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file + * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - int rc; - ima_rdwr_violation_check(file); - rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, + return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), FILE_CHECK); - return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -286,23 +277,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); * * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy. * - * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. - * Return code is based upon measurement appraisal. + * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file + * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ int ima_module_check(struct file *file) { - int rc = 0; - if (!file) { - if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) { #ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - rc = -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ #endif - } - } else - rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, - MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK); - return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0; + return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ + } + return process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, + MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK); } static int __init init_ima(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 479fca940bb5..399433ad614e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/genhd.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 #define IMA_UID 0x0008 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 +#define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -45,10 +47,12 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { enum ima_hooks func; int mask; unsigned long fsmagic; + u8 fsuuid[16]; kuid_t uid; kuid_t fowner; struct { void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ + void *args_p; /* audit value */ int type; /* audit type */ } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; }; @@ -74,7 +78,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, @@ -119,6 +123,35 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); +/* + * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be + * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old, + * stale LSM policy. + * + * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. + * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't. + */ +static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) +{ + struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; + int result; + int i; + + mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) { + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { + if (!entry->lsm[i].rule) + continue; + result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type, + Audit_equal, + entry->lsm[i].args_p, + &entry->lsm[i].rule); + BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule); + } + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); +} + /** * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule. * @rule: a pointer to a rule @@ -142,6 +175,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) return false; + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) && + memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid))) + return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid)) @@ -149,10 +185,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid, sid; + int retried = 0; if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) continue; - +retry: switch (i) { case LSM_OBJ_USER: case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: @@ -176,12 +213,39 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, default: break; } + if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) { + retried = 1; + ima_lsm_update_rules(); + goto retry; + } if (!rc) return false; } return true; } +/* + * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general, + * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules. + */ +static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func) +{ + if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC)) + return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; + + switch(func) { + case MMAP_CHECK: + return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE; + case BPRM_CHECK: + return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE; + case MODULE_CHECK: + return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE; + case FILE_CHECK: + default: + return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE; + } +} + /** * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made @@ -209,7 +273,12 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask)) continue; + action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; + action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK; + if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) + action |= get_subaction(entry, func); + if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1); else @@ -282,7 +351,8 @@ enum { Opt_audit, Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, - Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner + Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner, + Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -300,25 +370,35 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_func, "func=%s"}, {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, + {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"}, {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, + {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, - char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) + substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) { int result; if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) return -EINVAL; + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args); + if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p) + return -ENOMEM; + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, - Audit_equal, args, + Audit_equal, + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); - if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) + if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { + kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); return -EINVAL; + } + return result; } @@ -404,8 +484,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = FILE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = MODULE_CHECK; - else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) - entry->func = FILE_MMAP; + else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) + || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0)) + entry->func = MMAP_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = BPRM_CHECK; else @@ -445,6 +526,20 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (!result) entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; break; + case Opt_fsuuid: + ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from); + + if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00, + sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + result = blk_part_pack_uuid(args[0].from, + entry->fsuuid); + if (!result) + entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID; + break; case Opt_uid: ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from); @@ -481,40 +576,52 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; case Opt_obj_user: ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, LSM_OBJ_USER, AUDIT_OBJ_USER); break; case Opt_obj_role: ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE); break; case Opt_obj_type: ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE); break; case Opt_subj_user: ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, LSM_SUBJ_USER, AUDIT_SUBJ_USER); break; case Opt_subj_role: ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE); break; case Opt_subj_type: ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from); - result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); break; + case Opt_appraise_type: + if (entry->action != APPRAISE) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from); + if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) + entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; + else + result = -EINVAL; + break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); result = -EINVAL; @@ -590,9 +697,13 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) void ima_delete_rules(void) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; + int i; mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) { + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) + kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); + list_del(&entry->list); kfree(entry); } diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index e9db763a875e..84c37c4db914 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -14,23 +14,41 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <linux/key.h> /* iint action cache flags */ -#define IMA_MEASURE 0x0001 -#define IMA_MEASURED 0x0002 -#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x0004 -#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x0008 -/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x0010 do not use this flag */ -#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x0020 -#define IMA_AUDIT 0x0040 -#define IMA_AUDITED 0x0080 +#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 +#define IMA_MEASURED 0x00000002 +#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x00000004 +#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x00000008 +/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x00000010 do not use this flag */ +#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020 +#define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040 +#define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080 /* iint cache flags */ -#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x0100 +#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 +#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000 +#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000 -#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT) -#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED \ - | IMA_COLLECTED) +#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ + IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) +#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \ + IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK) + +/* iint subaction appraise cache flags */ +#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00000100 +#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00000200 +#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00000400 +#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00000800 +#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00001000 +#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000 +#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE 0x00004000 +#define IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED 0x00008000 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE) +#define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \ + IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_MODULE_APPRAISED) enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -48,10 +66,13 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ u64 version; /* track inode changes */ - unsigned short flags; + unsigned long flags; struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr; - enum integrity_status ima_status; - enum integrity_status evm_status; + enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; + enum integrity_status ima_module_status:4; + enum integrity_status evm_status:4; }; /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete @@ -81,5 +102,16 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */ +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS +int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen, const char *data, int datalen); +#else +static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif + /* set during initialization */ extern int iint_initialized; diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 20e4bf57aec8..58dfe0890947 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -367,6 +367,8 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) { case -EAGAIN: /* no key */ + if (ret) + break; case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */ ret = key_ref; break; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index daa97f4ac9d1..7b88c6aeaed4 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1254,24 +1254,42 @@ void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); +int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) +{ + return security_ops->tun_dev_alloc_security(security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); + +void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) +{ + security_ops->tun_dev_free_security(security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); + int security_tun_dev_create(void) { return security_ops->tun_dev_create(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); -void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) +int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { - return security_ops->tun_dev_post_create(sk); + return security_ops->tun_dev_attach_queue(security); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_post_create); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); -int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) +int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { - return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk); + return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); +int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) +{ + return security_ops->tun_dev_open(security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); + #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2963c689f9c0..84b591711eec 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4399,6 +4399,24 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; } +static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) +{ + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; + + tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tunsec) + return -ENOMEM; + tunsec->sid = current_sid(); + + *security = tunsec; + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) +{ + kfree(security); +} + static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) { u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -4414,8 +4432,17 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) NULL); } -static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) +static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; + + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, + TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); +} + +static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) +{ + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it @@ -4425,20 +4452,19 @@ static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk) * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling * protocols were being used */ - /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use - * the sockcreate SID here */ - - sksec->sid = current_sid(); + sksec->sid = tunsec->sid; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; + + return 0; } -static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) +static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; - err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, + err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -4446,8 +4472,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk) TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); if (err) return err; - - sksec->sid = sid; + tunsec->sid = sid; return 0; } @@ -5642,9 +5667,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc, .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec, .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow, + .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security, + .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security, .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create, - .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create, + .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue, .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach, + .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index df2de54a958d..14d04e63b1f0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -150,6 +150,6 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { NULL } }, { "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } }, { "tun_socket", - { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, + { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } }, { NULL } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 26c7eee1c309..aa47bcabb5f6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -110,6 +110,10 @@ struct sk_security_struct { u16 sclass; /* sock security class */ }; +struct tun_security_struct { + u32 sid; /* SID for the tun device sockets */ +}; + struct key_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of key */ }; |