| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux
Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
"Regular fixes pull, some amdkfd, amdgpu, etnaviv, sun4i, qxl, tegra
fixes.
I've got an outstanding pull for i915 but it wasn't on an rc2 base so
I wanted to ship these out first, I might get to it before rc3 or I
might not"
* tag 'drm-fixes-for-v4.14-rc3' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~airlied/linux:
drm/tegra: trace: Fix path to include
qxl: fix framebuffer unpinning
drm/sun4i: cec: Enable back CEC-pin framework
drm/amdkfd: Print event limit messages only once per process
drm/amdkfd: Fix kernel-queue wrapping bugs
drm/amdkfd: Fix incorrect destroy_mqd parameter
drm/radeon: disable hard reset in hibernate for APUs
drm/amdgpu: revert tile table update for oland
etnaviv: fix gem object list corruption
etnaviv: fix submit error path
qxl: fix primary surface handling
drm/amdkfd: check for null dev to avoid a null pointer dereference
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git://anongit.freedesktop.org/git/drm-misc into drm-fixes
Driver Changes:
- qxl: fix primary surface and fb unpinning (Gerd)
- sun41: fix CEC_PIN config gate now that media has been merged (Hans)
- tegra: fix TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH (Thierry)
Cc: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Cc: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
* tag 'drm-misc-fixes-2017-09-28-1' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/git/drm-misc:
drm/tegra: trace: Fix path to include
qxl: fix framebuffer unpinning
drm/sun4i: cec: Enable back CEC-pin framework
qxl: fix primary surface handling
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The TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE macro needs to specify the path relative to the
define_trace.h header rather than relative to the file defining it.
Reported-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170823171326.23620-1-thierry.reding@gmail.com
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qxl_plane_cleanup_fb() unpins the just activated framebuffer
instead of the old one. Oops. Fix it.
Cc: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.co.uk>
Fixes: 1277eed5fecb8830c8cc414ad70c1ef640464bc0
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.co.uk>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170918074145.2257-1-kraxel@redhat.com
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Now that the cec-pin framework has been merged, we can remove the safeguard
that were preventing the CEC part of the sun4i HDMI driver and actually
start to use it.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com>
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Pick up 4.14-rc1
Signed-off-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org>
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The atomic conversion of the qxl driver didn't got the primary surface
handling completely right. It works in the common simple cases, but
fails for example when changing the display resolution using xrandr or
in multihead setups.
The rules are simple: There is one primary surface. Before defining a
new one you have to destroy the old one.
This patch makes qxl_primary_atomic_update() destroy the primary surface
before defining a new one. It fixes is_primary flag updates. It adds
is_primary checks so we don't try to update the primary surface in case
it already has the state we want it being in.
Fixes: 3538e80a869b ("drm: qxl: Atomic phase 1: Implement mode_set_nofb")
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102338
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196777
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.co.uk>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170911093950.22401-1-kraxel@redhat.com
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into drm-fixes
A few fixes for 4.14. Nothing too major.
* 'drm-fixes-4.14' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~agd5f/linux:
drm/radeon: disable hard reset in hibernate for APUs
drm/amdgpu: revert tile table update for oland
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Fixes a hibernation regression on APUs.
Bug: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191571
Fixes: 274ad65c9d02bdc (drm/radeon: hard reset r600 and newer GPU when hibernating.)
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Several users have complained that the tile table update broke Oland
support. Despite several attempts to fix it, the root cause is still
unknown at this point and no solution is available. As it is not
acceptable to leave a known regression breaking a major functionality
in the kernel for several releases, let's just reverse this
optimization for now. It can be implemented again later if and only
if the breakage is understood and fixed.
As there were no complaints for Hainan so far, only the Oland part of
the offending commit is reverted. Optimization is preserved on
Hainan, so this commit isn't an actual revert of the original.
This fixes bug #194761:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=194761
Reviewed-by: Marek Olšák <marek.olsak@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Fixes: f8d9422ef80c ("drm/amdgpu: update tile table for oland/hainan")
Cc: Flora Cui <Flora.Cui@amd.com>
Cc: Junwei Zhang <Jerry.Zhang@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Marek Olšák <maraeo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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into drm-fixes
Just two small etnaviv fixes, one fixing a list corruption, the other
fixing a NULL ptr deref in an error path.
* 'etnaviv/fixes' of https://git.pengutronix.de/git/lst/linux:
etnaviv: fix gem object list corruption
etnaviv: fix submit error path
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All manipulations of the gem_object list need to be protected by
the list mutex, as GEM objects can be created and freed in parallel.
This fixes a kernel memory corruption.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
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If the gpu submit fails, bail out to avoid accessing a potentially
unititalized fence.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org #4.12+
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
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git://people.freedesktop.org/~gabbayo/linux into drm-fixes
It contains the following fixes:
- correct checking of return value
- send correct parameter to function (According to the parameter type)
- avoid spamming of dmesg log
- fix queue wrapping calculations
* tag 'drm-amdkfd-fixes-2017-09-24' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~gabbayo/linux:
drm/amdkfd: Print event limit messages only once per process
drm/amdkfd: Fix kernel-queue wrapping bugs
drm/amdkfd: Fix incorrect destroy_mqd parameter
drm/amdkfd: check for null dev to avoid a null pointer dereference
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To avoid spamming the log.
Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
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Avoid intermediate negative numbers when doing calculations with a mix
of signed and unsigned variables where implicit conversions can lead
to unexpected results.
When kernel queue buffer wraps around to 0, we need to check that rptr
won't be overwritten by the new packet.
Signed-off-by: Yong Zhao <yong.zhao@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
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When uninitializing a kernel queue.
Signed-off-by: Yong Zhao <yong.zhao@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
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The call to kfd_device_by_id can potentially return null, so check that
dev is null and return with -EINVAL to avoid a null pointer dereference.
Detected by CoverityScan CID#1454629 ("Dereference null return value")
Fixes: 5d71dbc3a588 ("drm/amdkfd: Implement image tiling mode support v2")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Oded Gabbay <oded.gabbay@gmail.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu
Pull IOMMU fixes from Joerg Roedel:
- A comment fix for 'struct iommu_ops'
- Format string fixes for AMD IOMMU, unfortunatly I missed that during
review.
- Limit mediatek physical addresses to 32 bit for v7s to fix a warning
triggered in io-page-table code.
- Fix dma-sync in io-pgtable-arm-v7s code
* tag 'iommu-fixes-v4.14-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu:
iommu: Fix comment for iommu_ops.map_sg
iommu/amd: pr_err() strings should end with newlines
iommu/mediatek: Limit the physical address in 32bit for v7s
iommu/io-pgtable-arm-v7s: Need dma-sync while there is no QUIRK_NO_DMA
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The definition of map_sg was split during a recent addition to iommu_ops.
Put it back together.
Fixes: add02cfdc9bc ("iommu: Introduce Interface for IOMMU TLB Flushing")
Signed-off-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe.brucker@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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pr_err() messages should end with a new-line to avoid other messages
being concatenated. So replace '/n' with '\n'.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Fixes: 45a01c42933b ('iommu/amd: Add function copy_dev_tables()')
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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The ARM short descriptor has already limited the physical address
to 32bit after the commit <76557391433c> ("iommu/io-pgtable: Sanitise
map/unmap addresses"). But in MediaTek 4GB mode, the physical address
is from 0x1_0000_0000 to 0x1_ffff_ffff. this will cause:
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 3900 at
xxx/drivers/iommu/io-pgtable-arm-v7s.c:482 arm_v7s_map+0x40/0xf8
Modules linked in:
CPU: 4 PID: 3900 Comm: weston Tainted: G S W 4.9.44 #1
Hardware name: MediaTek MT2712m1v1 board (DT)
task: ffffffc0eaa5b280 task.stack: ffffffc0e9858000
PC is at arm_v7s_map+0x40/0xf8
LR is at mtk_iommu_map+0x64/0x90
pc : [<ffffff80085b09e8>] lr : [<ffffff80085b29fc>] pstate: 000001c5
sp : ffffffc0e985b920
x29: ffffffc0e985b920 x28: 0000000127d00000
x27: 0000000000100000 x26: ffffff8008f9e000
x25: 0000000000000003 x24: 0000000000100000
x23: 0000000127d00000 x22: 00000000ff800000
x21: ffffffc0f7ec8ce0 x20: 0000000000000003
x19: 0000000000000003 x18: 0000000000000002
x17: 0000007f7e5d72c0 x16: ffffff80082b0f08
x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 000000000000003f
x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000028
x11: 0088000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
x9 : ffffff80092fa000 x8 : ffffffc0e9858000
x7 : ffffff80085b29d8 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffffff80085b09a8 x4 : 0000000000000003
x3 : 0000000000100000 x2 : 0000000127d00000
x1 : 00000000ff800000 x0 : 0000000000000001
...
Call trace:
[<ffffff80085b09e8>] arm_v7s_map+0x40/0xf8
[<ffffff80085b29fc>] mtk_iommu_map+0x64/0x90
[<ffffff80085ab5f8>] iommu_map+0x100/0x3a0
[<ffffff80085ab99c>] default_iommu_map_sg+0x104/0x168
[<ffffff80085aead8>] iommu_dma_alloc+0x238/0x3f8
[<ffffff8008098b30>] __iommu_alloc_attrs+0xa8/0x260
[<ffffff80085f364c>] mtk_drm_gem_create+0xac/0x180
[<ffffff80085f3894>] mtk_drm_gem_dumb_create+0x54/0xc8
[<ffffff80085d576c>] drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0xa4/0xd8
[<ffffff80085cb2a0>] drm_ioctl+0x1c0/0x490
In order to satify this, Limit the physical address to 32bit.
Signed-off-by: Yong Wu <yong.wu@mediatek.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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Fix the commit 81b3c2521844 ("iommu/io-pgtable: Introduce explicit
coherency"). If there is no IO_PGTABLE_QUIRK_NO_DMA, we should call
dma_sync_single_for_device for cache synchronization.
Signed-off-by: Yong Wu <yong.wu@mediatek.com>
Fixes: 81b3c2521844 ('iommu/io-pgtable: Introduce explicit coherency')
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 fixes from Catalin Marinas:
- SPsel register initialisation on reset as the architecture defines
its state as unknown
- Use READ_ONCE when dereferencing pmd_t pointers to avoid race
conditions in page_vma_mapped_walk() (or fast GUP) with concurrent
modifications of the page table
- Avoid invoking the mm fault handling code for kernel addresses (check
against TASK_SIZE) which would otherwise result in calling
might_sleep() in atomic context
* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
arm64: fault: Route pte translation faults via do_translation_fault
arm64: mm: Use READ_ONCE when dereferencing pointer to pte table
arm64: Make sure SPsel is always set
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We currently route pte translation faults via do_page_fault, which elides
the address check against TASK_SIZE before invoking the mm fault handling
code. However, this can cause issues with the path walking code in
conjunction with our word-at-a-time implementation because
load_unaligned_zeropad can end up faulting in kernel space if it reads
across a page boundary and runs into a page fault (e.g. by attempting to
read from a guard region).
In the case of such a fault, load_unaligned_zeropad has registered a
fixup to shift the valid data and pad with zeroes, however the abort is
reported as a level 3 translation fault and we dispatch it straight to
do_page_fault, despite it being a kernel address. This results in calling
a sleeping function from atomic context:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:313
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 10290
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[...]
[<ffffff8e016cd0cc>] ___might_sleep+0x134/0x144
[<ffffff8e016cd158>] __might_sleep+0x7c/0x8c
[<ffffff8e016977f0>] do_page_fault+0x140/0x330
[<ffffff8e01681328>] do_mem_abort+0x54/0xb0
Exception stack(0xfffffffb20247a70 to 0xfffffffb20247ba0)
[...]
[<ffffff8e016844fc>] el1_da+0x18/0x78
[<ffffff8e017f399c>] path_parentat+0x44/0x88
[<ffffff8e017f4c9c>] filename_parentat+0x5c/0xd8
[<ffffff8e017f5044>] filename_create+0x4c/0x128
[<ffffff8e017f59e4>] SyS_mkdirat+0x50/0xc8
[<ffffff8e01684e30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 36380080 d5384100 f9400800 9402566d (d4210000)
---[ end trace 2d01889f2bca9b9f ]---
Fix this by dispatching all translation faults to do_translation_faults,
which avoids invoking the page fault logic for faults on kernel addresses.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Ankit Jain <ankijain@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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On kernels built with support for transparent huge pages, different CPUs
can access the PMD concurrently due to e.g. fast GUP or page_vma_mapped_walk
and they must take care to use READ_ONCE to avoid value tearing or caching
of stale values by the compiler. Unfortunately, these functions call into
our pgtable macros, which don't use READ_ONCE, and compiler caching has
been observed to cause the following crash during ext4 writeback:
PC is at check_pte+0x20/0x170
LR is at page_vma_mapped_walk+0x2e0/0x540
[...]
Process doio (pid: 2463, stack limit = 0xffff00000f2e8000)
Call trace:
[<ffff000008233328>] check_pte+0x20/0x170
[<ffff000008233758>] page_vma_mapped_walk+0x2e0/0x540
[<ffff000008234adc>] page_mkclean_one+0xac/0x278
[<ffff000008234d98>] rmap_walk_file+0xf0/0x238
[<ffff000008236e74>] rmap_walk+0x64/0xa0
[<ffff0000082370c8>] page_mkclean+0x90/0xa8
[<ffff0000081f3c64>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x84/0x2a8
[<ffff00000832f984>] mpage_submit_page+0x34/0x98
[<ffff00000832fb4c>] mpage_process_page_bufs+0x164/0x170
[<ffff00000832fc8c>] mpage_prepare_extent_to_map+0x134/0x2b8
[<ffff00000833530c>] ext4_writepages+0x484/0xe30
[<ffff0000081f6ab4>] do_writepages+0x44/0xe8
[<ffff0000081e5bd4>] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xbc/0x110
[<ffff0000081e5e68>] file_write_and_wait_range+0x48/0xd8
[<ffff000008324310>] ext4_sync_file+0x80/0x4b8
[<ffff0000082bd434>] vfs_fsync_range+0x64/0xc0
[<ffff0000082332b4>] SyS_msync+0x194/0x1e8
This is because page_vma_mapped_walk loads the PMD twice before calling
pte_offset_map: the first time without READ_ONCE (where it gets all zeroes
due to a concurrent pmdp_invalidate) and the second time with READ_ONCE
(where it sees a valid table pointer due to a concurrent pmd_populate).
However, the compiler inlines everything and caches the first value in
a register, which is subsequently used in pte_offset_phys which returns
a junk pointer that is later dereferenced when attempting to access the
relevant pte.
This patch fixes the issue by using READ_ONCE in pte_offset_phys to ensure
that a stale value is not used. Whilst this is a point fix for a known
failure (and simple to backport), a full fix moving all of our page table
accessors over to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE and consistently using READ_ONCE in
page_vma_mapped_walk is in the works for a future kernel release.
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: f27176cfc363 ("mm: convert page_mkclean_one() to use page_vma_mapped_walk()")
Tested-by: Richard Ruigrok <rruigrok@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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When the kernel is entered at EL2 on an ARMv8.0 system, we construct
the EL1 pstate and make sure this uses the the EL1 stack pointer
(we perform an exception return to EL1h).
But if the kernel is either entered at EL1 or stays at EL2 (because
we're on a VHE-capable system), we fail to set SPsel, and use whatever
stack selection the higher exception level has choosen for us.
Let's not take any chance, and make sure that SPsel is set to one
before we decide the mode we're going to run in.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:
- avoid a warning when compiling with clang
- consider read-only bits in xen-pciback when writing to a BAR
- fix a boot crash of pv-domains
* tag 'for-linus-4.14c-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
xen/mmu: Call xen_cleanhighmap() with 4MB aligned for page tables mapping
xen-pciback: relax BAR sizing write value check
x86/xen: clean up clang build warning
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When bootup a PVM guest with large memory(Ex.240GB), XEN provided initial
mapping overlaps with kernel module virtual space. When mapping in this space
is cleared by xen_cleanhighmap(), in certain case there could be an 2MB mapping
left. This is due to XEN initialize 4MB aligned mapping but xen_cleanhighmap()
finish at 2MB boundary.
When module loading is just on top of the 2MB space, got below warning:
WARNING: at mm/vmalloc.c:106 vmap_pte_range+0x14e/0x190()
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81117083>] warn_alloc_failed+0xf3/0x160
[<ffffffff81146022>] __vmalloc_area_node+0x182/0x1c0
[<ffffffff810ac91e>] ? module_alloc_update_bounds+0x1e/0x80
[<ffffffff81145df7>] __vmalloc_node_range+0xa7/0x110
[<ffffffff810ac91e>] ? module_alloc_update_bounds+0x1e/0x80
[<ffffffff8103ca54>] module_alloc+0x64/0x70
[<ffffffff810ac91e>] ? module_alloc_update_bounds+0x1e/0x80
[<ffffffff810ac91e>] module_alloc_update_bounds+0x1e/0x80
[<ffffffff810ac9a7>] move_module+0x27/0x150
[<ffffffff810aefa0>] layout_and_allocate+0x120/0x1b0
[<ffffffff810af0a8>] load_module+0x78/0x640
[<ffffffff811ff90b>] ? security_file_permission+0x8b/0x90
[<ffffffff810af6d2>] sys_init_module+0x62/0x1e0
[<ffffffff815154c2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Then the mapping of 2MB is cleared, finally oops when the page in that space is
accessed.
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880022600000
IP: [<ffffffff81260877>] clear_page_c_e+0x7/0x10
PGD 1788067 PUD 178c067 PMD 22434067 PTE 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81116ef7>] ? prep_new_page+0x127/0x1c0
[<ffffffff81117d42>] get_page_from_freelist+0x1e2/0x550
[<ffffffff81133010>] ? ii_iovec_copy_to_user+0x90/0x140
[<ffffffff81119c9d>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x12d/0x230
[<ffffffff81155516>] alloc_pages_vma+0xc6/0x1a0
[<ffffffff81006ffd>] ? pte_mfn_to_pfn+0x7d/0x100
[<ffffffff81134cfb>] do_anonymous_page+0x16b/0x350
[<ffffffff81139c34>] handle_pte_fault+0x1e4/0x200
[<ffffffff8100712e>] ? xen_pmd_val+0xe/0x10
[<ffffffff810052c9>] ? __raw_callee_save_xen_pmd_val+0x11/0x1e
[<ffffffff81139dab>] handle_mm_fault+0x15b/0x270
[<ffffffff81510c10>] do_page_fault+0x140/0x470
[<ffffffff8150d7d5>] page_fault+0x25/0x30
Call xen_cleanhighmap() with 4MB aligned for page tables mapping to fix it.
The unnecessory call of xen_cleanhighmap() in DEBUG mode is also removed.
-v2: add comment about XEN alignment from Juergen.
References: https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2012-07/msg01562.html
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
[boris: added 'xen/mmu' tag to commit subject]
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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Just like done in d2bd05d88d ("xen-pciback: return proper values during
BAR sizing") for the ROM BAR, ordinary ones also shouldn't compare the
written value directly against ~0, but consider the r/o bits at the
bottom (if any).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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In the case where sizeof(maddr) != sizeof(long) p is initialized and
never read and clang throws a warning on this. Move declaration of
p to clean up the clang build warning:
warning: Value stored to 'p' during its initialization is never read
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"Mixed bugfixes. Perhaps the most interesting one is a latent bug that
was finally triggered by PCID support"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
kvm/x86: Handle async PF in RCU read-side critical sections
KVM: nVMX: Fix nested #PF intends to break L1's vmlauch/vmresume
KVM: VMX: use cmpxchg64
KVM: VMX: simplify and fix vmx_vcpu_pi_load
KVM: VMX: avoid double list add with VT-d posted interrupts
KVM: VMX: extract __pi_post_block
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Check for updated HDSISR on P9 HDSI exception
KVM: nVMX: fix HOST_CR3/HOST_CR4 cache
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Sasha Levin reported a WARNING:
| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6974 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:329
| rcu_preempt_note_context_switch kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:329 [inline]
| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6974 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:329
| rcu_note_context_switch+0x16c/0x2210 kernel/rcu/tree.c:458
...
| CPU: 0 PID: 6974 Comm: syz-fuzzer Not tainted 4.13.0-next-20170908+ #246
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
| 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
| Call Trace:
...
| RIP: 0010:rcu_preempt_note_context_switch kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:329 [inline]
| RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x16c/0x2210 kernel/rcu/tree.c:458
| RSP: 0018:ffff88003b2debc8 EFLAGS: 00010002
| RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 1ffff1000765bd85 RCX: 0000000000000000
| RDX: 1ffff100075d7882 RSI: ffffffffb5c7da20 RDI: ffff88003aebc410
| RBP: ffff88003b2def30 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
| R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003b2def08
| R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003aebc040 R15: ffff88003aebc040
| __schedule+0x201/0x2240 kernel/sched/core.c:3292
| schedule+0x113/0x460 kernel/sched/core.c:3421
| kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x43f/0x940 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c:158
| do_async_page_fault+0x72/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c:271
| async_page_fault+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1069
| RIP: 0010:format_decode+0x240/0x830 lib/vsprintf.c:1996
| RSP: 0018:ffff88003b2df520 EFLAGS: 00010283
| RAX: 000000000000003f RBX: ffffffffb5d1e141 RCX: ffff88003b2df670
| RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffffffb5d1e140
| RBP: ffff88003b2df560 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
| R10: ffff88003b2df718 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003b2df5d8
| R13: 0000000000000064 R14: ffffffffb5d1e140 R15: 0000000000000000
| vsnprintf+0x173/0x1700 lib/vsprintf.c:2136
| sprintf+0xbe/0xf0 lib/vsprintf.c:2386
| proc_self_get_link+0xfb/0x1c0 fs/proc/self.c:23
| get_link fs/namei.c:1047 [inline]
| link_path_walk+0x1041/0x1490 fs/namei.c:2127
...
This happened when the host hit a page fault, and delivered it as in an
async page fault, while the guest was in an RCU read-side critical
section. The guest then tries to reschedule in kvm_async_pf_task_wait(),
but rcu_preempt_note_context_switch() would treat the reschedule as a
sleep in RCU read-side critical section, which is not allowed (even in
preemptible RCU). Thus the WARN.
To cure this, make kvm_async_pf_task_wait() go to the halt path if the
PF happens in a RCU read-side critical section.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 5280 at /home/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kvm//vmx.c:11394 nested_vmx_vmexit+0xc2b/0xd70 [kvm_intel]
CPU: 4 PID: 5280 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G W OE 4.13.0+ #17
RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0xc2b/0xd70 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
? emulator_read_emulated+0x15/0x20 [kvm]
? segmented_read+0xae/0xf0 [kvm]
vmx_inject_page_fault_nested+0x60/0x70 [kvm_intel]
? vmx_inject_page_fault_nested+0x60/0x70 [kvm_intel]
x86_emulate_instruction+0x733/0x810 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x2f4/0xda0 [kvm_intel]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xd2f/0x1c60 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xdab/0x1c60 [kvm]
? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x62/0x230 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x340/0x700 [kvm]
? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x340/0x700 [kvm]
? __fget+0xfc/0x210
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x6a0
? __fget+0x11d/0x210
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2
A nested #PF is triggered during L0 emulating instruction for L2. However, it
doesn't consider we should not break L1's vmlauch/vmresme. This patch fixes
it by queuing the #PF exception instead ,requesting an immediate VM exit from
L2 and keeping the exception for L1 pending for a subsequent nested VM exit.
This should actually work all the time, making vmx_inject_page_fault_nested
totally unnecessary. However, that's not working yet, so this patch can work
around the issue in the meanwhile.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This fixes a compilation failure on 32-bit systems.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The simplify part: do not touch pi_desc.nv, we can set it when the
VCPU is first created. Likewise, pi_desc.sn is only handled by
vmx_vcpu_pi_load, do not touch it in __pi_post_block.
The fix part: do not check kvm_arch_has_assigned_device, instead
check the SN bit to figure out whether vmx_vcpu_pi_put ran before.
This matches what the previous patch did in pi_post_block.
Cc: Huangweidong <weidong.huang@huawei.com>
Cc: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Cc: wangxin <wangxinxin.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Longpeng (Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In some cases, for example involving hot-unplug of assigned
devices, pi_post_block can forget to remove the vCPU from the
blocked_vcpu_list. When this happens, the next call to
pi_pre_block corrupts the list.
Fix this in two ways. First, check vcpu->pre_pcpu in pi_pre_block
and WARN instead of adding the element twice in the list. Second,
always do the list removal in pi_post_block if vcpu->pre_pcpu is
set (not -1).
The new code keeps interrupts disabled for the whole duration of
pi_pre_block/pi_post_block. This is not strictly necessary, but
easier to follow. For the same reason, PI.ON is checked only
after the cmpxchg, and to handle it we just call the post-block
code. This removes duplication of the list removal code.
Cc: Huangweidong <weidong.huang@huawei.com>
Cc: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Cc: wangxin <wangxinxin.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Longpeng (Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Simple code movement patch, preparing for the next one.
Cc: Huangweidong <weidong.huang@huawei.com>
Cc: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Cc: wangxin <wangxinxin.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Longpeng (Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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On POWER9 DD2.1 and below, sometimes on a Hypervisor Data Storage
Interrupt (HDSI) the HDSISR is not be updated at all.
To work around this we put a canary value into the HDSISR before
returning to a guest and then check for this canary when we take a
HDSI. If we find the canary on a HDSI, we know the hardware didn't
update the HDSISR. In this case we return to the guest to retake the
HDSI which should correctly update the HDSISR the second time HDSI
entry.
After talking to Paulus we've applied this workaround to all POWER9
CPUs. The workaround of returning to the guest shouldn't ever be
triggered on well behaving CPU. The extra instructions should have
negligible performance impact.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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For nested virt we maintain multiple VMCS that can run on a vCPU. So it is
incorrect to keep vmcs_host_cr3 and vmcs_host_cr4, whose purpose is caching
the value of the rarely changing HOST_CR3 and HOST_CR4 VMCS fields, in
vCPU-wide data structures.
Hyper-V nested on KVM runs into this consistently for me with PCID enabled.
CR3 is updated with a new value, unlikely(cr3 != vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr3)
fires, and the currently loaded VMCS is updated. Then we switch from L2 to
L1 and the next exit reverts CR3 to its old value.
Fixes: d6e41f1151fe ("x86/mm, KVM: Teach KVM's VMX code that CR3 isn't a constant")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull keys fixes from James Morris:
"Notable here is a rewrite of big_key crypto by Jason Donenfeld to
address some issues in the original code.
From Jason's commit log:
"This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at
boot time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were
even deeper underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems
to have been committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote
the whole thing, trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the
previous author, to fix these cryptographic flaws."
There has been positive review of the new code by Eric Biggers and
Herbert Xu, and it passes basic testing via the keyutils test suite.
Eric also manually tested it.
Generally speaking, we likely need to improve the amount of crypto
review for kernel crypto users including keys (I'll post a note
separately to ksummit-discuss)"
* 'fixes-v4.14-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key
KEYS: use kmemdup() in request_key_auth_new()
KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open time
KEYS: reset parent each time before searching key_user_tree
KEYS: prevent KEYCTL_READ on negative key
KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()
KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_read_key()
KEYS: fix key refcount leak in keyctl_assume_authority()
KEYS: don't revoke uninstantiated key in request_key_auth_new()
KEYS: fix cred refcount leak in request_key_auth_new()
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From David Howells:
"There are two sets of patches here:
(1) A bunch of core keyrings bug fixes from Eric Biggers.
(2) Fixing big_key to use safe crypto from Jason A. Donenfeld."
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This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot
time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper
underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been
committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing,
trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to
fix these cryptographic flaws.
It makes no sense to seed crypto/rng at boot time and then keep
using it like this, when in fact there's already get_random_bytes_wait,
which can ensure there's enough entropy and be a much more standard way
of generating keys. Since this sensitive material is being stored
untrusted, using ECB and no authentication is simply not okay at all. I
find it surprising and a bit horrifying that this code even made it past
basic crypto review, which perhaps points to some larger issues. This
patch moves from using AES-ECB to using AES-GCM. Since keys are uniquely
generated each time, we can set the nonce to zero. There was also a race
condition in which the same key would be reused at the same time in
different threads. A mutex fixes this issue now.
So, to summarize, this commit fixes the following vulnerabilities:
* Low entropy key generation, allowing an attacker to potentially
guess or predict keys.
* Unauthenticated encryption, allowing an attacker to modify the
cipher text in particular ways in order to manipulate the plaintext,
which is is even more frightening considering the next point.
* Use of ECB mode, allowing an attacker to trivially swap blocks or
compare identical plaintext blocks.
* Key re-use.
* Faulty memory zeroing.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so this patch changes
some kfrees into a kzfrees.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.
Following commit 34dbbcdbf633 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In key_user_lookup(), if there is no key_user for the given uid, we drop
key_user_lock, allocate a new key_user, and search the tree again. But
we failed to set 'parent' to NULL at the beginning of the second search.
If the tree were to be empty for the second search, the insertion would
be done with an invalid 'parent', scribbling over freed memory.
Fortunately this can't actually happen currently because the tree always
contains at least the root_key_user. But it still should be fixed to
make the code more robust.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Because keyctl_read_key() looks up the key with no permissions
requested, it may find a negatively instantiated key. If the key is
also possessed, we went ahead and called ->read() on the key. But the
key payload will actually contain the ->reject_error rather than the
normal payload. Thus, the kernel oopses trying to read the
user_key_payload from memory address (int)-ENOKEY = 0x00000000ffffff82.
Fortunately the payload data is stored inline, so it shouldn't be
possible to abuse this as an arbitrary memory read primitive...
Reproducer:
keyctl new_session
keyctl request2 user desc '' @s
keyctl read $(keyctl show | awk '/user: desc/ {print $1}')
It causes a crash like the following:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff92
IP: user_read+0x33/0xa0
PGD 36a54067 P4D 36a54067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 211 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #337
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff90aa3b74c3c0 task.stack: ffff9878c0478000
RIP: 0010:user_read+0x33/0xa0
RSP: 0018:ffff9878c047bee8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff90aa3d7da340 RCX: 0000000000000017
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff82 RDI: ffff90aa3d7da340
RBP: ffff9878c047bf00 R08: 00000024f95da94f R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f58ece69740(0000) GS:ffff90aa3e200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000ffffff92 CR3: 0000000036adc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
Call Trace:
keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xe0
SyS_keyctl+0x99/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f58ec787bb9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc8d401678 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc8d402800 RCX: 00007f58ec787bb9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000174a63ac RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffc8d402809 R09: 0000000000000020
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffc8d402800
R13: 00007ffc8d4016e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: e5 41 55 49 89 f5 41 54 49 89 d4 53 48 89 fb e8 a4 b4 ad ff 85 c0 74 09 80 3d b9 4c 96 00 00 74 43 48 8b b3 20 01 00 00 4d 85 ed <0f> b7 5e 10 74 29 4d 85 e4 74 24 4c 39 e3 4c 89 e2 4c 89 ef 48
RIP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 RSP: ffff9878c047bee8
CR2: 00000000ffffff92
Fixes: 61ea0c0ba904 ("KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Userspace can call keyctl_read() on a keyring to get the list of IDs of
keys in the keyring. But if the user-supplied buffer is too small, the
kernel would write the full list anyway --- which will corrupt whatever
userspace memory happened to be past the end of the buffer. Fix it by
only filling the space that is available.
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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