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* docs: ReSTify table of contents in core.rstJosh Holland2017-08-301-11/+1
| | | | | | | | Sphinx will now generate the table of contents automatically, which avoids having the ToC getting out of sync with the rest of the document. Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* docs: Fix paths in security/keysJosh Holland2017-08-243-4/+4
| | | | | | | Several paths in the security/keys documentation were incorrect. Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* KEYS: Add documentation for asymmetric keyring restrictionsMat Martineau2017-07-141-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to X.509 signature chain verification. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rstJonathan Corbet2017-05-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | The white space in the big enumerated list was inconsistent, leading to some strange formatting artifacts. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txtKees Cook2017-05-184-24/+21
| | | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txtKees Cook2017-05-183-38/+34
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-ecryptfs.txtKees Cook2017-05-183-9/+13
| | | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys.txtKees Cook2017-05-184-165/+160
| | | | | | | | | This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel keys, and adjusts for ReST markup. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify Smack.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-754/+0
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify LoadPin.txtKees Cook2017-05-181-17/+0
| | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify Yama.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-73/+0
| | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify tomoyo.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-57/+0
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify apparmor.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-41/+0
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify SELinux.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-29/+0
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify and split LSM.txtKees Cook2017-05-184-43/+15
| | | | | | | | | | The existing LSM.txt file covered both usage and development, so split this into two files, one under admin-guide and one under kernel development. Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify self-protection.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-36/+64
| | | | | | | | This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify credentials.txtKees Cook2017-05-183-153/+125
| | | | | | | | | This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify IMA-templates.txtKees Cook2017-05-183-23/+29
| | | | | | | | | Adjust IMA-templates.txt for ReST markup and add to the index for security/, under the Kernel API Documentation. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DHStephan Mueller2017-04-041-8/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by the caller. The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API. The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API. As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size. The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with SP800-56A. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRINGMat Martineau2017-04-041-0/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality was only available using internal kernel APIs. With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring. To restrict a keyring, call: keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type, const char *restriction) where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction option syntax is specific to each key type. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_typeMat Martineau2017-04-041-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | The restrict_link functions used to validate keys as they are linked to a keyring can be associated with specific key types. Each key type may be loaded (or not) at runtime, so lookup of restrict_link functions needs to be part of the key type implementation to ensure that the requested keys can be examined. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and dataMat Martineau2017-04-041-9/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the restriction. The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by unregistering key types. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functionsMat Martineau2017-04-031-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring. Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Use a typedef for restrict_link function pointersMat Martineau2017-04-031-4/+1
| | | | | | | This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()David Howells2017-03-021-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-02-211-2/+8
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull rodata updates from Kees Cook: "This renames the (now inaccurate) DEBUG_RODATA and related SET_MODULE_RONX configs to the more sensible STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and STRICT_MODULE_RWX" * tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common
| * arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONXLaura Abbott2017-02-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Both of these options are poorly named. The features they provide are necessary for system security and should not be considered debug only. Change the names to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to better describe what these options do. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be commonLaura Abbott2017-02-071-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are multiple architectures that support CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX. These options also now have the ability to be turned off at runtime. Move these to an architecture independent location and make these options def_bool y for almost all of those arches. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsmCasey Schaufler2017-01-191-0/+7
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-12-141-2/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Generally pretty quiet for this release. Highlights: Yama: - allow ptrace access for original parent after re-parenting TPM: - add documentation - many bugfixes & cleanups - define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements Integrity: - Harden against malformed xattrs SELinux: - bugfixes & cleanups Smack: - Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalid label - Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hook - parse mnt opts after privileges check (fixes unpriv DoS vuln)" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (56 commits) Yama: allow access for the current ptrace parent tpm: adjust return value of tpm_read_log tpm: vtpm_proxy: conditionally call tpm_chip_unregister tpm: Fix handling of missing event log tpm: Check the bios_dir entry for NULL before accessing it tpm: return -ENODEV if np is not set tpm: cleanup of printk error messages tpm: replace of_find_node_by_name() with dev of_node property tpm: redefine read_log() to handle ACPI/OF at runtime tpm: fix the missing .owner in tpm_bios_measurements_ops tpm: have event log use the tpm_chip tpm: drop tpm1_chip_register(/unregister) tpm: replace dynamically allocated bios_dir with a static array tpm: replace symbolic permission with octal for securityfs files char: tpm: fix kerneldoc tpm2_unseal_trusted name typo tpm_tis: Allow tpm_tis to be bound using DT tpm, tpm_vtpm_proxy: add kdoc comments for VTPM_PROXY_IOC_NEW_DEV tpm: Only call pm_runtime_get_sync if device has a parent tpm: define a generic open() method for ascii & bios measurements Documentation: tpm: add the Physical TPM device tree binding documentation ...
| * Doc: security: keys-trusted: drop duplicate blobauth entryBaruch Siach2016-11-131-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* | docs: Add more manuals to the PDF buildJonathan Corbet2016-11-161-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | There were a few manuals that weren't being built in PDF format, but there's no reason not to... Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* | tpm: move documentation under Documentation/securityJarkko Sakkinen2016-11-074-0/+177
|/ | | | | | | | In order too make Documentation root directory cleaner move the tpm directory under Documentation/security. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* Merge tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds2016-07-261-10/+18
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet: "Some big changes this month, headlined by the addition of a new formatted documentation mechanism based on the Sphinx system. The objectives here are to make it easier to create better-integrated (and more attractive) documents while (eventually) dumping our one-of-a-kind, cobbled-together system for something that is widely used and maintained by others. There's a fair amount of information what's being done, why, and how to use it in: https://lwn.net/Articles/692704/ https://lwn.net/Articles/692705/ Closer to home, Documentation/kernel-documentation.rst describes how it works. For now, the new system exists alongside the old one; you should soon see the GPU documentation converted over in the DRM pull and some significant media conversion work as well. Once all the docs have been moved over and we're convinced that the rough edges (of which are are a few) have been smoothed over, the DocBook-based stuff should go away. Primary credit is to Jani Nikula for doing the heavy lifting to make this stuff actually work; there has also been notable effort from Markus Heiser, Daniel Vetter, and Mauro Carvalho Chehab. Expect a couple of conflicts on the new index.rst file over the course of the merge window; they are trivially resolvable. That file may be a bit of a conflict magnet in the short term, but I don't expect that situation to last for any real length of time. Beyond that, of course, we have the usual collection of tweaks, updates, and typo fixes" * tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (77 commits) doc-rst: kernel-doc: fix handling of address_space tags Revert "doc/sphinx: Enable keep_warnings" doc-rst: kernel-doc directive, fix state machine reporter docs: deprecate kernel-doc-nano-HOWTO.txt doc/sphinx: Enable keep_warnings Documentation: add watermark_scale_factor to the list of vm systcl file kernel-doc: Fix up warning output docs: Get rid of some kernel-documentation warnings doc-rst: add an option to ignore DocBooks when generating docs workqueue: Fix a typo in workqueue.txt Doc: ocfs: Fix typo in filesystems/ocfs2-online-filecheck.txt Documentation/sphinx: skip build if user requested specific DOCBOOKS Documentation: add cleanmediadocs to the documentation targets Add .pyc files to .gitignore Doc: PM: Fix a typo in intel_powerclamp.txt doc-rst: flat-table directive - initial implementation Documentation: add meta-documentation for Sphinx and kernel-doc Documentation: tiny typo fix in usb/gadget_multi.txt Documentation: fix wrong value in md.txt bcache: documentation formatting, edited for clarity, stripe alignment notes ...
| * docs: self-protection: rename "leak" to "exposure"Kees Cook2016-06-091-10/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The meaning of "leak" can be both "untracked resource allocation" and "memory content disclosure". This document's use was entirely of the latter meaning, so avoid the confusion by using the Common Weakness Enumeration name for this: Information Exposure (CWE-200). Additionally adds a section on structure randomization. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* | KEYS: Add placeholder for KDF usage with DHStephan Mueller2016-06-031-1/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The values computed during Diffie-Hellman key exchange are often used in combination with key derivation functions to create cryptographic keys. Add a placeholder for a later implementation to configure a key derivation function that will transform the Diffie-Hellman result returned by the KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command. [This patch was stripped down from a patch produced by Mat Martineau that had a bug in the compat code - so for the moment Stephan's patch simply requires that the placeholder argument must be NULL] Original-signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds2016-05-191-0/+261
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull Documentation updates from Jon Corbet: "A bit busier this time around. The most interesting thing (IMO) this time around is some beginning infrastructural work to allow documents to be written using restructured text. Maybe someday, in a galaxy far far away, we'll be able to eliminate the DocBook dependency and have a much better integrated set of kernel docs. Someday. Beyond that, there's a new document on security hardening from Kees, the movement of some sample code over to samples/, a number of improvements to the serial docs from Geert, and the usual collection of corrections, typo fixes, etc" * tag 'docs-for-linus' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (55 commits) doc: self-protection: provide initial details serial: doc: Use port->state instead of info serial: doc: Always refer to tty_port->mutex Documentation: vm: Spelling s/paltform/platform/g Documentation/memcg: update kmem limit doc as codes behavior docproc: print a comment about autogeneration for rst output docproc: add support for reStructuredText format via --rst option docproc: abstract terminating lines at first space docproc: abstract docproc directive detection docproc: reduce unnecessary indentation docproc: add variables for subcommand and filename kernel-doc: use rst C domain directives and references for types kernel-doc: produce RestructuredText output kernel-doc: rewrite usage description, remove duplicated comments Doc: correct the location of sysrq.c Documentation: fix common spelling mistakes samples: v4l: from Documentation to samples directory samples: connector: from Documentation to samples directory Documentation: xillybus: fix spelling mistake Documentation: x86: fix spelling mistakes ...
| * doc: self-protection: provide initial detailsKees Cook2016-05-171-0/+261
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This document attempts to codify the intent around kernel self-protection along with discussion of both existing and desired technologies, with attention given to the rationale behind them, and the expectations of their usage. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> [jc: applied fixes suggested by Randy] Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* | Merge tag 'keys-next-20160505' of ↵James Morris2016-05-061-0/+52
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
| * \ Merge branch 'keys-trust' into keys-nextDavid Howells2016-05-041-0/+22
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined to be trusted. That's currently a two-step process: (1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring, assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set upon them. This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring, if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be consulted for whatever process is being undertaken. If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one), no matter what the key is going to be loaded for. (2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it. This was meant to be the system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings. A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks permit it. These patches change that: (1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied when the trust is evaluated only. (2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to restrict what may be added to that keyring. This is called whenever a key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being created in one keyring and then linked across. This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation. It is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other keyrings such as the system keyrings. [*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation. (3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the contents of the system keyring. A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM. (4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the root of the trust relationship. (5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with key_preparsed_payload::trusted. This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust relationships. Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings and making them generally global: (*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read only. It carries only keys built in to the kernel. It may be where UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring. (*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys) is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring. (*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can be vouched for by either ring of system keys. (*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use the new secondary keyring. (*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings. (*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY, is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the system keyrings. If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in the builtin system keyring only. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyringDavid Howells2016-04-111-0/+22
| | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide blacklisting. This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE. To this end: (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to the vetting function. This is called as: int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *key_type, unsigned long key_flags, const union key_payload *key_payload), where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED. [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed. The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the link. The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set through keyring_alloc(). Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function is called. (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the restriction check. (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted. (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL. (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for authoritative keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * / KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE commandMat Martineau2016-04-121-0/+30
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds userspace access to Diffie-Hellman computations through a new keyctl() syscall command to calculate shared secrets or public keys using input parameters stored in the keyring. Input key ids are provided in a struct due to the current 5-arg limit for the keyctl syscall. Only user keys are supported in order to avoid exposing the content of logon or encrypted keys. The output is written to the provided buffer, based on the assumption that the values are only needed in userspace. Future support for other types of key derivation would involve a new command, like KEYCTL_ECDH_COMPUTE. Once Diffie-Hellman support is included in the crypto API, this code can be converted to use the crypto API to take advantage of possible hardware acceleration and reduce redundant code. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* / LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictionsKees Cook2016-04-211-0/+17
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policyJarkko Sakkinen2015-12-201-14/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use authorization policies to seal trusted keys. Two following new options have been added for trusted keys: * 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing. * 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing. If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this will result an error because the state of the option would become mixed. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chipsJarkko Sakkinen2015-12-201-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key() syscall and documentation for it. Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support TPM_ALG_SM3_256: * hash_algo_name * hash_digest_size Includes support for the following hash algorithms: * sha1 * sha256 * sha384 * sha512 * sm3-256 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells2015-10-211-16/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
* Smack: limited capability for changing process labelZbigniew Jasinski2015-10-191-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This feature introduces new kernel interface: - <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism. List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset. Changes in v2: * use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write * added missing description in security/Smack.txt Changes in v3: * squashed into one commit Changes in v4: * switch from global list to per-task list * since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it Changes in v5: * change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which replace the previous list upon write Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Merge branch 'smack-for-4.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris2015-08-111-1/+26
|\ | | | | | | into next
| * Smack: IPv6 host labelingCasey Schaufler2015-07-281-1/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses. This patch also cleans up some of the conditional compilation associated with the introduction of secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit of code goes with which feature. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | Yama: remove needless CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKEDKees Cook2015-07-281-6/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively a no-op change. Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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