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| * | | | x86/microcode, cpuhotplug: Add a microcode loader CPU hotplug callbackBorislav Petkov2019-06-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adric Blake reported the following warning during suspend-resume: Enabling non-boot CPUs ... x86: Booting SMP configuration: smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x2 unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x10f (tried to write 0x0000000000000000) \ at rIP: 0xffffffff8d267924 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20) Call Trace: intel_set_tfa intel_pmu_cpu_starting ? x86_pmu_dead_cpu x86_pmu_starting_cpu cpuhp_invoke_callback ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave notify_cpu_starting start_secondary secondary_startup_64 microcode: sig=0x806ea, pf=0x80, revision=0x96 microcode: updated to revision 0xb4, date = 2019-04-01 CPU1 is up The MSR in question is MSR_TFA_RTM_FORCE_ABORT and that MSR is emulated by microcode. The log above shows that the microcode loader callback happens after the PMU restoration, leading to the conjecture that because the microcode hasn't been updated yet, that MSR is not present yet, leading to the #GP. Add a microcode loader-specific hotplug vector which comes before the PERF vectors and thus executes earlier and makes sure the MSR is present. Fixes: 400816f60c54 ("perf/x86/intel: Implement support for TSX Force Abort") Reported-by: Adric Blake <promarbler14@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203637
| * | | | x86/resctrl: Prevent NULL pointer dereference when local MBM is disabledPrarit Bhargava2019-06-121-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Booting with kernel parameter "rdt=cmt,mbmtotal,memlocal,l3cat,mba" and executing "mount -t resctrl resctrl -o mba_MBps /sys/fs/resctrl" results in a NULL pointer dereference on systems which do not have local MBM support enabled.. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 722 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.2.0-0.rc3.git0.1.el7_UNSUPPORTED.x86_64 #2 Workqueue: events mbm_handle_overflow RIP: 0010:mbm_handle_overflow+0x150/0x2b0 Only enter the bandwith update loop if the system has local MBM enabled. Fixes: de73f38f7680 ("x86/intel_rdt/mba_sc: Feedback loop to dynamically update mem bandwidth") Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190610171544.13474-1-prarit@redhat.com
| * | | | x86/resctrl: Don't stop walking closids when a locksetup group is foundJames Morse2019-06-121-1/+6
| | |/ / | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a new control group is created __init_one_rdt_domain() walks all the other closids to calculate the sets of used and unused bits. If it discovers a pseudo_locksetup group, it breaks out of the loop. This means any later closid doesn't get its used bits added to used_b. These bits will then get set in unused_b, and added to the new control group's configuration, even if they were marked as exclusive for a later closid. When encountering a pseudo_locksetup group, we should continue. This is because "a resource group enters 'pseudo-locked' mode after the schemata is written while the resource group is in 'pseudo-locksetup' mode." When we find a pseudo_locksetup group, its configuration is expected to be overwritten, we can skip it. Fixes: dfe9674b04ff6 ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable entering of pseudo-locksetup mode") Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H Peter Avin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190603172531.178830-1-james.morse@arm.com
* | | | Merge tag 'spdx-5.2-rc4' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-06-0812-83/+12
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core Pull yet more SPDX updates from Greg KH: "Another round of SPDX header file fixes for 5.2-rc4 These are all more "GPL-2.0-or-later" or "GPL-2.0-only" tags being added, based on the text in the files. We are slowly chipping away at the 700+ different ways people tried to write the license text. All of these were reviewed on the spdx mailing list by a number of different people. We now have over 60% of the kernel files covered with SPDX tags: $ ./scripts/spdxcheck.py -v 2>&1 | grep Files Files checked: 64533 Files with SPDX: 40392 Files with errors: 0 I think the majority of the "easy" fixups are now done, it's now the start of the longer-tail of crazy variants to wade through" * tag 'spdx-5.2-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (159 commits) treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 450 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 449 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 448 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 446 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 445 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 444 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 443 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 442 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 440 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 438 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 437 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 436 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 435 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 434 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 433 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 432 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 431 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 430 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 429 ...
| * | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441Thomas Gleixner2019-06-052-10/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation version 2 of the license extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 437Thomas Gleixner2019-06-052-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this file is licensed under gplv2 extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 22 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.129548190@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 353Thomas Gleixner2019-06-051-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): licensed under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 see file copying for details extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531081035.403801661@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 347Thomas Gleixner2019-06-051-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): your use of this code is subject to the terms and conditions of the gnu general public license version 2 see copying or http www gnu org licenses gpl html extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530000437.701946635@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 335Thomas Gleixner2019-06-051-14/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms and conditions of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is distributed in the hope it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc 51 franklin st fifth floor boston ma 02110 1301 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 111 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530000436.567572064@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 333Thomas Gleixner2019-06-051-13/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc 59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 136 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530000436.384967451@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 288Thomas Gleixner2019-06-054-36/+4
| |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms and conditions of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is distributed in the hope it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 263 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.208660670@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | | | Merge branch 'pm-x86'Rafael J. Wysocki2019-06-072-22/+5
|\ \ \ \ | |/ / / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * pm-x86: x86/power: Fix 'nosmt' vs hibernation triple fault during resume x86: intel_epb: Do not build when CONFIG_PM is unset
| * | | x86: intel_epb: Do not build when CONFIG_PM is unsetRafael J. Wysocki2019-05-302-22/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 9ed0985332a6 ("x86: intel_epb: Take CONFIG_PM into account") prevented the majority of the Performance and Energy Bias Hint (EPB) handling code from being built when CONFIG_PM is unset to fix a regression introduced by commit b9c273babce7 ("PM / arch: x86: MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS sysfs interface"). In hindsight, however, it would be better to skip all of the EPB handling code for CONFIG_PM unset as there really is no reason for it to be there in that case. Namely, if the EPB is not touched by the kernel at all with CONFIG_PM unset, there is no need to worry about modifying the EPB inadvertently on CPU online and since the system will not suspend or hibernate then, there is no need to worry about possible modifications of the EPB by the platform firmware during system-wide PM transitions. For this reason, revert the changes made by commit 9ed0985332a6 and only allow intel_epb.o to be built when CONFIG_PM is set. Note that this changes the behavior of the kernels built with CONFIG_PM unset as they will not modify the EPB on boot if it is zero initially any more, so it is not a fix strictly speaking, but users building their kernels with CONFIG_PM unset really should not expect them to take energy efficiency into account. Moreover, if CONFIG_PM is unset for performance reasons, leaving EPB as set initially by the platform firmware will actually be consistent with the user's expectations. Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | | | Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-06-021-2/+5
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Two fixes: a quirk for KVM guests running on certain AMD CPUs, and a KASAN related build fix" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/CPU/AMD: Don't force the CPB cap when running under a hypervisor x86/boot: Provide KASAN compatible aliases for string routines
| * | | | x86/CPU/AMD: Don't force the CPB cap when running under a hypervisorFrank van der Linden2019-05-241-2/+5
| |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For F17h AMD CPUs, the CPB capability ('Core Performance Boost') is forcibly set, because some versions of that chip incorrectly report that they do not have it. However, a hypervisor may filter out the CPB capability, for good reasons. For example, KVM currently does not emulate setting the CPB bit in MSR_K7_HWCR, and unchecked MSR access errors will be thrown when trying to set it as a guest: unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010015 (tried to write 0x0000000001000011) at rIP: 0xffffffff890638f4 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20) Call Trace: boost_set_msr+0x50/0x80 [acpi_cpufreq] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x86/0x560 sort_range+0x20/0x20 cpuhp_thread_fun+0xb0/0x110 smpboot_thread_fn+0xef/0x160 kthread+0x113/0x130 kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 To avoid this issue, don't forcibly set the CPB capability for a CPU when running under a hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com Fixes: 0237199186e7 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Set the CPB bit unconditionally on F17h") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522221745.GA15789@dev-dsk-fllinden-2c-c1893d73.us-west-2.amazon.com [ Minor edits to the changelog. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 172Thomas Gleixner2019-05-301-8/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this file may be distributed under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 9 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070034.395589349@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | | | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152Thomas Gleixner2019-05-302-10/+2
|/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | | treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner2019-05-212-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | | treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed filesThomas Gleixner2019-05-216-0/+6
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which: - Have no license information of any form - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the initial scan/conversion to ignore the file These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | Merge tag 'pm-5.2-rc1-2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-05-151-1/+21
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm Pull more power management updates from Rafael Wysocki: "These fix a recent regression causing kernels built with CONFIG_PM unset to crash on systems that support the Performance and Energy Bias Hint (EPB), clean up the cpufreq core and some users of transition notifiers and introduce a new power domain flag into the generic power domains framework (genpd). Specifics: - Fix recent regression causing kernels built with CONFIG_PM unset to crash on systems that support the Performance and Energy Bias Hint (EPB) by avoiding to compile the EPB-related code depending on CONFIG_PM when it is unset (Rafael Wysocki). - Clean up the transition notifier invocation code in the cpufreq core and change some users of cpufreq transition notifiers accordingly (Viresh Kumar). - Change MAINTAINERS to cover the schedutil governor as part of cpufreq (Viresh Kumar). - Simplify cpufreq_init_policy() to avoid redundant computations (Yue Hu). - Add explanatory comment to the cpufreq core (Rafael Wysocki). - Introduce a new flag, GENPD_FLAG_RPM_ALWAYS_ON, to the generic power domains (genpd) framework along with the first user of it (Leonard Crestez)" * tag 'pm-5.2-rc1-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: soc: imx: gpc: Use GENPD_FLAG_RPM_ALWAYS_ON for ERR009619 PM / Domains: Add GENPD_FLAG_RPM_ALWAYS_ON flag cpufreq: Update MAINTAINERS to include schedutil governor cpufreq: Don't find governor for setpolicy drivers in cpufreq_init_policy() cpufreq: Explain the kobject_put() in cpufreq_policy_alloc() cpufreq: Call transition notifier only once for each policy x86: intel_epb: Take CONFIG_PM into account
| * | x86: intel_epb: Take CONFIG_PM into accountRafael J. Wysocki2019-05-101-1/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit b9c273babce7 ("PM / arch: x86: MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS sysfs interface") caused kernels built with CONFIG_PM unset to crash on systems supporting the Performance and Energy Bias Hint (EPB), because it attempts to add files to sysfs directories that don't exist on those systems. Prevent that from happening by taking CONFIG_PM into account so that the code depending on it is not compiled at all when it is not set. Fixes: b9c273babce7 ("PM / arch: x86: MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS sysfs interface") Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | | Merge branch 'x86-mds-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-05-142-54/+202
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner: "Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures has the following CVEs assigned: CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose this data via cache side channels. Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully. The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by default to avoid breaking unattended updates. The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a deeper technical view" * 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits) x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers() x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY ...
| * | | x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDSJosh Poimboeuf2019-04-181-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add MDS to the new 'mitigations=' cmdline option. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
| * | | Merge branch 'core/speculation' of ↵Thomas Gleixner2019-04-171-2/+9
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git Pull in the command line updates from the tip tree so the MDS parts can be added.
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations offKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2019-04-171-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not* affected by the other two MDS issues. For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to mitigate SMT. However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should not report that SMT is mitigated: $cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds Vulnerable; SMT mitigated But rather: Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Fix commentBoris Ostrovsky2019-04-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | s/L1TF/MDS/ Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning messageJosh Poimboeuf2019-04-021-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | MDS is vulnerable with SMT. Make that clear with a one-time printk whenever SMT first gets enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
| * | | | x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisionsJosh Poimboeuf2019-04-021-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | arch_smt_update() now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS mitigations. Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions have been made. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline optionJosh Poimboeuf2019-04-021-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add the mds=full,nosmt cmdline option. This is like mds=full, but with SMT disabled if the CPU is vulnerable. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
| * | | | Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directoryThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level entry. Should have done that right away. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERVThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-6/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests. Introduce an internal mitigation mode VMWERV which enables the invocation of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated, but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared. That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDSThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-0/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative hardware vulnerabilities. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDSThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-0/+70
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update mechanism. This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is: mds=[full|off] This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative hardware vulnerabilities. The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT enabled systems. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entryThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear mechanism on idle entry. This is independent of other MDS mitigations because the idle entry invocation to mitigate the potential leakage due to store buffer repartitioning is only necessary on SMT systems. Add the actual invocations to the different halt/mwait variants which covers all usage sites. mwaitx is not patched as it's not available on Intel CPUs. The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent that stale data from the idling CPU is spilled to the Hyper-Thread sibling after the Store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are available to the non idle sibling. When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each sibling has half of it available. Now CPU which returned from idle could be speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling, but the buffers are flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER. When later on conditional buffer clearing is implemented on top of this, then there is no action required either because before returning to user space the context switch will set the condition flag which causes a flush on the return to user path. Note, that the buffer clearing on idle is only sensible on CPUs which are solely affected by MSBDS and not any other variant of MDS because the other MDS variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so the buffer clearing on idle would be a window dressing exercise. This intentionally does not handle the case in the acpi/processor_idle driver which uses the legacy IO port interface for C-State transitions for two reasons: - The acpi/processor_idle driver was replaced by the intel_idle driver almost a decade ago. Anything Nehalem upwards supports it and defaults to that new driver. - The legacy IO port interface is likely to be used on older and therefore unaffected CPUs or on systems which do not receive microcode updates anymore, so there is no point in adding that. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not activeThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CPUs which are affected by L1TF and MDS mitigate MDS with the L1D Flush on VMENTER when updated microcode is installed. If a CPU is not affected by L1TF or if the L1D Flush is not in use, then MDS mitigation needs to be invoked explicitly. For these cases, follow the host mitigation state and invoke the MDS mitigation before VMENTER. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to userThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning. Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and explain why some corner cases are not mitigated. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLYThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-8/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant. This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated. That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities, e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category. Also the Silvermont/Airmont ATOMs, but for them it's not really relevant as they do not support SMT, but mark them for completeness sake. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDSAndi Kleen2019-03-061-9/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are: - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126) - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130) - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127) MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other. MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible. MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible. All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off), so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue. Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by MDS. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
| * | | | x86/speculation: Consolidate CPU whitelistsThomas Gleixner2019-03-061-50/+60
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The CPU vulnerability whitelists have some overlap and there are more whitelists coming along. Use the driver_data field in the x86_cpu_id struct to denote the whitelisted vulnerabilities and combine all whitelists into one. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
* | | | | Merge tag 'stream_open-5.2' of https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/linuxLinus Torvalds2019-05-071-1/+1
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull stream_open conversion from Kirill Smelkov: - remove unnecessary double nonseekable_open from drivers/char/dtlk.c as noticed by Pavel Machek while reviewing nonseekable_open -> stream_open mass conversion. - the mass conversion patch promised in commit 10dce8af3422 ("fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock") and is automatically generated by running $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci I've verified each generated change manually - that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations. More details on this in the patch. - finally, change VFS to pass ppos=NULL into .read/.write for files that declare themselves streams. It was suggested by Rasmus Villemoes and makes sure that if ppos starts to be erroneously used in a stream file, such bug won't go unnoticed and will produce an oops instead of creating illusion of position change being taken into account. Note: this patch does not conflict with "fuse: Add FOPEN_STREAM to use stream_open()" that will be hopefully coming via FUSE tree, because fs/fuse/ uses new-style .read_iter/.write_iter, and for these accessors position is still passed as non-pointer kiocb.ki_pos . * tag 'stream_open-5.2' of https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/linux: vfs: pass ppos=NULL to .read()/.write() of FMODE_STREAM files *: convert stream-like files from nonseekable_open -> stream_open dtlk: remove double call to nonseekable_open
| * | | | | *: convert stream-like files from nonseekable_open -> stream_openKirill Smelkov2019-05-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Using scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci added in 10dce8af3422 ("fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock"), search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations which assume @offset access. I've verified each generated change manually - that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations. The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert, but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g. drivers/input/mousedev.c) Among cases converted 14 were potentially vulnerable to read vs write deadlock (see details in 10dce8af3422): drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:988:1-17: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:401:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. and the rest were just safe to convert to stream_open because their read and write do not use ppos at all and corresponding file_operations do not have methods that assume @offset file access(*): arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c:631:8-24: WARNING: mpc52xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/um/drivers/harddog_kern.c:88:8-24: WARNING: harddog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c:430:33-49: WARNING: microcode_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ds1620.c:215:8-24: WARNING: ds1620_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/dtlk.c:301:1-17: WARNING: dtlk_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c:840:9-25: WARNING: ipmi_wdog_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c:95:8-24: WARNING: scr24x_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/tb0219.c:246:9-25: WARNING: tb0219_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/firewire/nosy.c:306:8-24: WARNING: nosy_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/fschmd.c:840:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/w83793.c:1344:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1747:8-24: WARNING: ucma_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1178:8-24: WARNING: ucm_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:1086:8-24: WARNING: uverbs_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/input/joydev.c:282:1-17: WARNING: joydev_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c:393:1-17: WARNING: switchtec_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_debugfs.c:135:8-24: WARNING: cros_ec_console_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1374.c:470:9-25: WARNING: ds1374_wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-m41t80.c:805:9-25: WARNING: wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/tape_char.c:293:2-18: WARNING: tape_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/zcore.c:194:8-24: WARNING: zcore_reipl_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c:528:8-24: WARNING: zcrypt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/spi/spidev.c:594:1-17: WARNING: spidev_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/staging/pi433/pi433_if.c:974:1-17: WARNING: pi433_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/acquirewdt.c:203:8-24: WARNING: acq_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/advantechwdt.c:202:8-24: WARNING: advwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim1535_wdt.c:252:8-24: WARNING: ali_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim7101_wdt.c:217:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ar7_wdt.c:166:8-24: WARNING: ar7_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/at91rm9200_wdt.c:113:8-24: WARNING: at91wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ath79_wdt.c:135:8-24: WARNING: ath79_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/bcm63xx_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: bcm63xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c:143:8-24: WARNING: cpu5wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpwd.c:397:8-24: WARNING: cpwd_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/eurotechwdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: eurwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c:528:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/gef_wdt.c:232:8-24: WARNING: gef_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/geodewdt.c:95:8-24: WARNING: geodewdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ib700wdt.c:241:8-24: WARNING: ibwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ibmasr.c:326:8-24: WARNING: asr_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/indydog.c:80:8-24: WARNING: indydog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/intel_scu_watchdog.c:307:8-24: WARNING: intel_scu_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/iop_wdt.c:104:8-24: WARNING: iop_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/it8712f_wdt.c:330:8-24: WARNING: it8712f_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ixp4xx_wdt.c:68:8-24: WARNING: ixp4xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ks8695_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: ks8695wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/m54xx_wdt.c:88:8-24: WARNING: m54xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/machzwd.c:336:8-24: WARNING: zf_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mixcomwd.c:153:8-24: WARNING: mixcomwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mtx-1_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: mtx1_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mv64x60_wdt.c:136:8-24: WARNING: mv64x60_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nuc900_wdt.c:134:8-24: WARNING: nuc900wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nv_tco.c:164:8-24: WARNING: nv_tco_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pc87413_wdt.c:289:8-24: WARNING: pc87413_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:698:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:737:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:581:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:623:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:488:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:527:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_temperature_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pika_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: pikawdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pnx833x_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: pnx833x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rc32434_wdt.c:153:8-24: WARNING: rc32434_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rdc321x_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: rdc321x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/riowd.c:79:1-17: WARNING: riowd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sa1100_wdt.c:62:8-24: WARNING: sa1100dog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc60xxwdt.c:211:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc7240_wdt.c:139:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc8360.c:274:8-24: WARNING: sbc8360_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_epx_c3.c:81:8-24: WARNING: epx_c3_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_fitpc2_wdt.c:78:8-24: WARNING: fitpc2_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sb_wdog.c:108:1-17: WARNING: sbwdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc1200wdt.c:181:8-24: WARNING: sc1200wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc520_wdt.c:261:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sch311x_wdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: sch311x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/scx200_wdt.c:105:8-24: WARNING: scx200_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/smsc37b787_wdt.c:369:8-24: WARNING: wb_smsc_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83877f_wdt.c:227:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83977f_wdt.c:301:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wafer5823wdt.c:200:8-24: WARNING: wafwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/watchdog_dev.c:828:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:379:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:445:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt285.c:104:1-17: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt977.c:276:8-24: WARNING: wdt977_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:424:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:484:8-24: WARNING: wdt_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:464:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:527:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. net/batman-adv/log.c:105:1-17: WARNING: batadv_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/control.c:57:7-23: WARNING: snd_ctl_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/rawmidi.c:385:7-23: WARNING: snd_rawmidi_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:310:7-23: WARNING: snd_seq_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/timer.c:1428:7-23: WARNING: snd_timer_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. One can also recheck/review the patch via generating it with explanation comments included via $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci SPFLAGS="-D explain" (*) This second group also contains cases with read/write deadlocks that stream_open.cocci don't yet detect, but which are still valid to convert to stream_open since ppos is not used. For example drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c calls wait_for_completion_interruptible() in its .read, but stream_open.cocci currently detects only "wait_event*" as blocking. Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Cc: Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org> Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Cc: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James R. Van Zandt" <jrv@vanzandt.mv.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Acked-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> [scr24x_cs] Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@googlemail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.com> Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> [watchdog/* hwmon/*] Cc: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> Cc: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Kurt Schwemmer <kurt.schwemmer@microsemi.com> Acked-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Cc: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org> Acked-by: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com> [platform/chrome] Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> [rtc/*] Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Cc: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com Cc: Wan ZongShun <mcuos.com@gmail.com> Cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com> Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
* | | | | | Merge branch 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-05-071-0/+5
|\ \ \ \ \ \ | |_|_|_|_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 FPU state handling updates from Borislav Petkov: "This contains work started by Rik van Riel and brought to fruition by Sebastian Andrzej Siewior with the main goal to optimize when to load FPU registers: only when returning to userspace and not on every context switch (while the task remains in the kernel). In addition, this optimization makes kernel_fpu_begin() cheaper by requiring registers saving only on the first invocation and skipping that in following ones. What is more, this series cleans up and streamlines many aspects of the already complex FPU code, hopefully making it more palatable for future improvements and simplifications. Finally, there's a __user annotations fix from Jann Horn" * 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (29 commits) x86/fpu: Fault-in user stack if copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() fails x86/pkeys: Add PKRU value to init_fpstate x86/fpu: Restore regs in copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() in order to use the fastpath x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace x86/fpu: Merge the two code paths in __fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Restore from kernel memory on the 64-bit path too x86/fpu: Inline copy_user_to_fpregs_zeroing() x86/fpu: Update xstate's PKRU value on write_pkru() x86/fpu: Prepare copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD x86/fpu: Always store the registers in copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() x86/entry: Add TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD x86/fpu: Eager switch PKRU state x86/pkeys: Don't check if PKRU is zero before writing it x86/fpu: Only write PKRU if it is different from current x86/pkeys: Provide *pkru() helpers x86/fpu: Use a feature number instead of mask in two more helpers x86/fpu: Make __raw_xsave_addr() use a feature number instead of mask x86/fpu: Add an __fpregs_load_activate() internal helper ...
| * | | | | x86/pkeys: Add PKRU value to init_fpstateSebastian Andrzej Siewior2019-04-121-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The task's initial PKRU value is set partly for fpu__clear()/ copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(). It is not part of init_fpstate.xsave and instead it is set explicitly. If the user removes the PKRU state from XSAVE in the signal handler then __fpu__restore_sig() will restore the missing bits from `init_fpstate' and initialize the PKRU value to 0. Add the `init_pkru_value' to `init_fpstate' so it is set to the init value in such a case. In theory copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs() could be removed because restoring the PKRU at return-to-userland should be enough. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403164156.19645-28-bigeasy@linutronix.de
* | | | | | Merge branch 'ras-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-05-065-64/+116
|\ \ \ \ \ \ | |_|_|_|_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull RAS updates from Borislav Petkov: - Support for varying MCA bank numbers per CPU: this is in preparation for future CPU enablement (Yazen Ghannam) - MCA banks read race fix (Tony Luck) - Facility to filter MCEs which should not be logged (Yazen Ghannam) - The usual round of cleanups and fixes * 'ras-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/MCE/AMD: Don't report L1 BTB MCA errors on some family 17h models x86/MCE: Add an MCE-record filtering function RAS/CEC: Increment cec_entered under the mutex lock x86/mce: Fix debugfs_simple_attr.cocci warnings x86/mce: Remove mce_report_event() x86/mce: Handle varying MCA bank counts x86/mce: Fix machine_check_poll() tests for error types MAINTAINERS: Fix file pattern for X86 MCE INFRASTRUCTURE x86/MCE: Group AMD function prototypes in <asm/mce.h>
| * | | | | x86/MCE/AMD: Don't report L1 BTB MCA errors on some family 17h modelsYazen Ghannam2019-04-233-13/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AMD family 17h Models 10h-2Fh may report a high number of L1 BTB MCA errors under certain conditions. The errors are benign and can safely be ignored. However, the high error rate may cause the MCA threshold counter to overflow causing a high rate of thresholding interrupts. In addition, users may see the errors reported through the AMD MCE decoder module, even with the interrupt disabled, due to MCA polling. Clear the "Counter Present" bit in the Instruction Fetch bank's MCA_MISC0 register. This will prevent enabling MCA thresholding on this bank which will prevent the high interrupt rate due to this error. Define an AMD-specific function to filter these errors from the MCE event pool so that they don't get reported during early boot. Rename filter function in EDAC/mce_amd to avoid a naming conflict, while at it. [ bp: Move function prototype to the internal header and massage/cleanup, fix typos. ] Reported-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl> Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "clemej@gmail.com" <clemej@gmail.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Shirish S <Shirish.S@amd.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: c95b323dcd35: x86/MCE/AMD: Turn off MC4_MISC thresholding on all family 0x15 models Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: 30aa3d26edb0: x86/MCE/AMD: Carve out the MC4_MISC thresholding quirk Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x: 9308fd407455: x86/MCE: Group AMD function prototypes in <asm/mce.h> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325163410.171021-2-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
| * | | | | x86/MCE: Add an MCE-record filtering functionYazen Ghannam2019-04-233-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some systems may report spurious MCA errors. In general, spurious MCA errors may be disabled by clearing a particular bit in MCA_CTL. However, clearing a bit in MCA_CTL may not be recommended for some errors, so the only option is to ignore them. An MCA error is printed and handled after it has been added to the MCE event pool. So an MCA error can be ignored by not adding it to that pool in the first place. Add such a filtering function. [ bp: Move function prototype to the internal header and massage. ] Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: "clemej@gmail.com" <clemej@gmail.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: "rafal@milecki.pl" <rafal@milecki.pl> Cc: Shirish S <Shirish.S@amd.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.0.x Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325163410.171021-1-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
| * | | | | x86/mce: Fix debugfs_simple_attr.cocci warningsYueHaibing2019-04-191-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() rather than DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE() for debugfs files. Semantic patch information: Rationale: DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE + debugfs_create_file() imposes some significant overhead as compared to DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE + debugfs_create_file_unsafe(). Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/debugfs/debugfs_simple_attr.cocci Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545981853-70877-1-git-send-email-yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * | | | | x86/mce: Remove mce_report_event()Borislav Petkov2019-03-291-18/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Calling this function has been wrong for a while now: * Can't call schedule_work() in #MC context. * mce_notify_irq() either. * None of that noodling is needed anymore - all it needs to do is kick the IRQ work which would self-IPI so that once the #MC handler is done, the work queue will run and process queued MCE records. So remove it. Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325172121.7926-1-bp@alien8.de
| * | | | | x86/mce: Handle varying MCA bank countsYazen Ghannam2019-03-272-22/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Linux reads MCG_CAP[Count] to find the number of MCA banks visible to a CPU. Currently, this number is the same for all CPUs and a warning is shown if there is a difference. The number of banks is overwritten with the MCG_CAP[Count] value of each following CPU that boots. According to the Intel SDM and AMD APM, the MCG_CAP[Count] value gives the number of banks that are available to a "processor implementation". The AMD BKDGs/PPRs further clarify that this value is per core. This value has historically been the same for every core in the system, but that is not an architectural requirement. Future AMD systems may have different MCG_CAP[Count] values per core, so the assumption that all CPUs will have the same MCG_CAP[Count] value will no longer be valid. Also, the first CPU to boot will allocate the struct mce_banks[] array using the number of banks based on its MCG_CAP[Count] value. The machine check handler and other functions use the global number of banks to iterate and index into the mce_banks[] array. So it's possible to use an out-of-bounds index on an asymmetric system where a following CPU sees a MCG_CAP[Count] value greater than its predecessors. Thus, allocate the mce_banks[] array to the maximum number of banks. This will avoid the potential out-of-bounds index since the value of mca_cfg.banks is capped to MAX_NR_BANKS. Set the value of mca_cfg.banks equal to the max of the previous value and the value for the current CPU. This way mca_cfg.banks will always represent the max number of banks detected on any CPU in the system. This will ensure that all CPUs will access all the banks that are visible to them. A CPU that can access fewer than the max number of banks will find the registers of the extra banks to be read-as-zero. Furthermore, print the resulting number of MCA banks in use. Do this in mcheck_late_init() so that the final value is printed after all CPUs have been initialized. Finally, get bank count from target CPU when doing injection with mce-inject module. [ bp: Remove out-of-bounds example, passify and cleanup commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180727214009.78289-1-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
| * | | | | x86/mce: Fix machine_check_poll() tests for error typesTony Luck2019-03-271-7/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There has been a lurking "TBD" in the machine check poll routine ever since it was first split out from the machine check handler. The potential issue is that the poll routine may have just begun a read from the STATUS register in a machine check bank when the hardware logs an error in that bank and signals a machine check. That race used to be pretty small back when machine checks were broadcast, but the addition of local machine check means that the poll code could continue running and clear the error from the bank before the local machine check handler on another CPU gets around to reading it. Fix the code to be sure to only process errors that need to be processed in the poll code, leaving other logged errors alone for the machine check handler to find and process. [ bp: Massage a bit and flip the "== 0" check to the usual !(..) test. ] Fixes: b79109c3bbcf ("x86, mce: separate correct machine check poller and fatal exception handler") Fixes: ed7290d0ee8f ("x86, mce: implement new status bits") Reported-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190312170938.GA23035@agluck-desk
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