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* dm: support key eviction from keyslot managers of underlying devicesSatya Tangirala2021-02-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Now that device mapper supports inline encryption, add the ability to evict keys from all underlying devices. When an upper layer requests a key eviction, we simply iterate through all underlying devices and evict that key from each device. Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
* block: store a block_device pointer in struct bioChristoph Hellwig2021-01-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Replace the gendisk pointer in struct bio with a pointer to the newly improved struct block device. From that the gendisk can be trivially accessed with an extra indirection, but it also allows to directly look up all information related to partition remapping. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* block: warn if !__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM in bio_crypt_set_ctx()Eric Biggers2020-10-051-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | bio_crypt_set_ctx() assumes its gfp_mask argument always includes __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, so that the mempool_alloc() will always succeed. For now this assumption is still fine, since no callers violate it. Making bio_crypt_set_ctx() able to fail would add unneeded complexity. However, if a caller didn't use __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, it would be very hard to notice the bug. Make it easier by adding a WARN_ON_ONCE(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* block: make blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep() able to failEric Biggers2020-10-051-11/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep() assumes its gfp_mask argument always includes __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, so that the mempool_alloc() will always succeed. However, blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep() might be called with GFP_ATOMIC via setup_clone() in drivers/md/dm-rq.c. This case isn't currently reachable with a bio that actually has an encryption context. However, it's fragile to rely on this. Just make blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep() able to fail. Suggested-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* block: make bio_crypt_clone() able to failEric Biggers2020-10-051-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | bio_crypt_clone() assumes its gfp_mask argument always includes __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, so that the mempool_alloc() will always succeed. However, bio_crypt_clone() might be called with GFP_ATOMIC via setup_clone() in drivers/md/dm-rq.c, or with GFP_NOWAIT via kcryptd_io_read() in drivers/md/dm-crypt.c. Neither case is currently reachable with a bio that actually has an encryption context. However, it's fragile to rely on this. Just make bio_crypt_clone() able to fail, analogous to bio_integrity_clone(). Reported-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* block: rename generic_make_request to submit_bio_noacctChristoph Hellwig2020-07-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | generic_make_request has always been very confusingly misnamed, so rename it to submit_bio_noacct to make it clear that it is submit_bio minus accounting and a few checks. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* block: blk-crypto-fallback for Inline EncryptionSatya Tangirala2020-05-141-20/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Blk-crypto delegates crypto operations to inline encryption hardware when available. The separately configurable blk-crypto-fallback contains a software fallback to the kernel crypto API - when enabled, blk-crypto will use this fallback for en/decryption when inline encryption hardware is not available. This lets upper layers not have to worry about whether or not the underlying device has support for inline encryption before deciding to specify an encryption context for a bio. It also allows for testing without actual inline encryption hardware - in particular, it makes it possible to test the inline encryption code in ext4 and f2fs simply by running xfstests with the inlinecrypt mount option, which in turn allows for things like the regular upstream regression testing of ext4 to cover the inline encryption code paths. For more details, refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* block: Inline encryption support for blk-mqSatya Tangirala2020-05-141-0/+376
We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However, it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been told the encryption context for that bio. We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx. We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c. Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key, algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that. Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when necessary. Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>