| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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There are 2 common cases when INIT_EX data file might not be
opened successfully and fail the sev initialization:
1. In user namespaces, normal user tasks (e.g. VMM) can change their
current->fs->root to point to arbitrary directories. While
init_ex_path is provided as a module param related to root file
system. Solution: use the root directory of init_task to avoid
accessing the wrong file.
2. Normal user tasks (e.g. VMM) don't have the privilege to access
the INIT_EX data file. Solution: open the file as root and
restore permissions immediately.
Fixes: 3d725965f836 ("crypto: ccp - Add SEV_INIT_EX support")
Signed-off-by: Jacky Li <jackyli@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently when the PSP returns a SECURE_DATA_INVALID error on INIT or
INIT_EX the driver retries the command once which should reset the PSP's
state SEV related state, meaning the PSP will regenerate its keying
material. This is logged with a dbg log but given this will change
system state this should be logged at a higher priority and with more
information.
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Initialize psp_ret inside of __sev_platform_init_locked() because there
are many failure paths with PSP initialization that do not set
__sev_do_cmd_locked().
Fixes: e423b9d75e77: ("crypto: ccp - Move SEV_INIT retry for corrupted data")
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Eliminate the following coccicheck warning:
./drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:263:2-3: Unneeded semicolon
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add new module parameter to allow users to use SEV_INIT_EX instead of
SEV_INIT. This helps users who lock their SPI bus to use the PSP for SEV
functionality. The 'init_ex_path' parameter defaults to NULL which means
the kernel will use SEV_INIT, if a path is specified SEV_INIT_EX will be
used with the data found at the path. On certain PSP commands this
file is written to as the PSP updates the NV memory region. Depending on
file system initialization this file open may fail during module init
but the CCP driver for SEV already has sufficient retries for platform
initialization. During normal operation of PSP system and SEV commands
if the PSP has not been initialized it is at run time. If the file at
'init_ex_path' does not exist the PSP will not be initialized. The user
must create the file prior to use with 32Kb of 0xFFs per spec.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add psp_init_on_probe module parameter that allows for skipping the
PSP's SEV platform initialization during module init. User may decouple
module init from PSP init due to use of the INIT_EX support in upcoming
patch which allows for users to save PSP's internal state to file. The
file may be unavailable at module init.
Also moves the PSP ABI version log message to after successful PSP init
instead of module init in case this new parameter is used.
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Create a helper function sev_fw_alloc() which can be used to allocate
aligned memory regions for use by the PSP firmware. Currently only used
for the SEV-ES TMR region but will be used for the SEV_INIT_EX NV memory
region.
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the data corrupted retry of SEV_INIT into the
__sev_platform_init_locked() function. This is for upcoming INIT_EX
support as well as helping direct callers of
__sev_platform_init_locked() which currently do not support the
retry.
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently only the firmware error code is printed. This is incomplete
and also incorrect as error cases exists where the firmware is never
called and therefore does not set an error code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Extra tab in sev_cmd_buffer_len().
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The commit 97f9ac3db6612 ("crypto: ccp - Add support for SEV-ES to the
PSP driver") added support to allocate Trusted Memory Region (TMR)
used during the SEV-ES firmware initialization. The TMR gets locked
during the firmware initialization and unlocked during the shutdown.
While the TMR is locked, access to it is disallowed.
Currently, the CCP driver does not shutdown the firmware during the
kexec reboot, leaving the TMR memory locked.
Register a callback to shutdown the SEV firmware on the kexec boot.
Fixes: 97f9ac3db6612 ("crypto: ccp - Add support for SEV-ES to the PSP driver")
Reported-by: Lucas Nussbaum <lucas.nussbaum@inria.fr>
Tested-by: Lucas Nussbaum <lucas.nussbaum@inria.fr>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Annotate the firmware files CCP might need using MODULE_FIRMWARE().
This will get them included into an initrd when CCP is also included
there. Otherwise the CCP module will not find its firmware when loaded
before the root-fs is mounted.
This can cause problems when the pre-loaded SEV firmware is too old to
support current SEV and SEV-ES virtualization features.
Fixes: e93720606efd ("crypto: ccp - Allow SEV firmware to be chosen based on Family and Model")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"This is a large update by KVM standards, including AMD PSP (Platform
Security Processor, aka "AMD Secure Technology") and ARM CoreSight
(debug and trace) changes.
ARM:
- CoreSight: Add support for ETE and TRBE
- Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected
mode
- Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode
- Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode
- ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1
- nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces
- Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver
- Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler
x86:
- AMD PSP driver changes
- Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code
- AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL
- Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation, zap under
read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under read lock
- /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon)
- support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context
- support SGX in virtual machines
- add a few more statistics
- improved directed yield heuristics
- Lots and lots of cleanups
Generic:
- Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing the
architecture-specific code
- a handful of "Get rid of oprofile leftovers" patches
- Some selftests improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (379 commits)
KVM: selftests: Speed up set_memory_region_test
selftests: kvm: Fix the check of return value
KVM: x86: Take advantage of kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt()
KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()
KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported)
KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables
KVM: SEV: Mask CPUID[0x8000001F].eax according to supported features
KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Disable SEV/SEV-ES if NPT is disabled
KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
KVM: x86: Move reverse CPUID helpers to separate header file
KVM: x86: Rename GPR accessors to make mode-aware variants the defaults
...
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Drop the dedicated init_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable. Now
that the low level helper uses an internal buffer for all commands,
using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when running with
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-8-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop the dedicated status_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable for
PLATFORM_STATUS. Now that the low level helper uses an internal buffer
for all commands, using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when
running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-7-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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For commands with small input/output buffers, use the local stack to
"allocate" the structures used to communicate with the PSP. Now that
__sev_do_cmd_locked() gracefully handles vmalloc'd buffers, there's no
reason to avoid using the stack, e.g. CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y will just work.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-6-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Copy the incoming @data comman to an internal buffer so that callers can
put SEV command buffers on the stack without running afoul of
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y, i.e. without bombing on vmalloc'd pointers. As of
today, the largest supported command takes a 68 byte buffer, i.e. pretty
much every command can be put on the stack. Because sev_cmd_mutex is
held for the entirety of a transaction, only a single bounce buffer is
required.
Use the internal buffer unconditionally, as the majority of in-kernel
users will soon switch to using the stack. At that point, checking
virt_addr_valid() becomes (negligible) overhead in most cases, and
supporting both paths slightly increases complexity. Since the commands
are all quite small, the cost of the copies is insignificant compared to
the latency of communicating with the PSP.
Allocate a full page for the buffer as opportunistic preparation for
SEV-SNP, which requires the command buffer to be in firmware state for
commands that trigger memory writes from the PSP firmware. Using a full
page now will allow SEV-SNP support to simply transition the page as
needed.
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-5-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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WARN on and reject SEV commands that provide a valid data pointer, but do
not have a known, non-zero length. And conversely, reject commands that
take a command buffer but none is provided (data is null).
Aside from sanity checking input, disallowing a non-null pointer without
a non-zero size will allow a future patch to cleanly handle vmalloc'd
data by copying the data to an internal __pa() friendly buffer.
Note, this also effectively prevents callers from using commands that
have a non-zero length and are not known to the kernel. This is not an
explicit goal, but arguably the side effect is a good thing from the
kernel's perspective.
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-4-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly reject using pointers that are not virt_to_phys() friendly
as the source for SEV commands that are sent to the PSP. The PSP works
with physical addresses, and __pa()/virt_to_phys() will not return the
correct address in these cases, e.g. for a vmalloc'd pointer. At best,
the bogus address will cause the command to fail, and at worst lead to
system instability.
While it's unlikely that callers will deliberately use a bad pointer for
SEV buffers, a caller can easily use a vmalloc'd pointer unknowingly when
running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y as it's not obvious that putting the
command buffers on the stack would be bad. The command buffers are
relative small and easily fit on the stack, and the APIs to do not
document that the incoming pointer must be a physically contiguous,
__pa() friendly pointer.
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-3-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Free the SEV device if later initialization fails. The memory isn't
technically leaked as it's tracked in the top-level device's devres
list, but unless the top-level device is removed, the memory won't be
freed and is effectively leaked.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-2-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can
issue the SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so
that a cancelled migration can restart with a new target later.
Reviewed-by: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210412194408.2458827-1-srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If SEV has been disabled (e.g. through BIOS), the driver probe will still
issue SEV firmware commands. The SEV INIT firmware command will return an
error in this situation, but the error code is a general error code that
doesn't highlight the exact reason.
Add a check for X86_FEATURE_SEV in sev_dev_init() and emit a meaningful
message and skip attempting to initialize the SEV firmware if the feature
is not enabled. Since building the SEV code is dependent on X86_64, adding
the check won't cause any build problems.
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-By: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The SEV FW version >= 0.23 added a new command that can be used to query
the attestation report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory
encrypted through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_{DATA, VMSA} commands and
sign the report with the Platform Endorsement Key (PEK).
See the SEV FW API spec section 6.8 for more details.
Note there already exist a command (KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE) that can be
used to get the SHA-256 digest. The main difference between the
KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE and KVM_SEV_ATTESTATION_REPORT is that the latter
can be called while the guest is running and the measurement value is
signed with PEK.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20210104151749.30248-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This patch fixes a bunch of sparse warnings in sev-dev where the
__user marking is incorrectly handled.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 7360e4b14350 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT...")
Fixes: e799035609e1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl...")
Fixes: 76a2b524a4b1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT...")
Fixes: d6112ea0cb34 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull uaccess/access_ok updates from Al Viro:
"Removals of trivially pointless access_ok() calls.
Note: the fiemap stuff was removed from the series, since they are
duplicates with part of ext4 series carried in Ted's tree"
* 'uaccess.access_ok' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
vmci_host: get rid of pointless access_ok()
hfi1: get rid of pointless access_ok()
usb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
lpfc_debugfs: get rid of pointless access_ok()
efi_test: get rid of pointless access_ok()
drm_read(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
via-pmu: don't bother with access_ok()
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
omapfb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
amifb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-dma-region.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-pr.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
cm4000_cs.c cmm_ioctl(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
nvram: drop useless access_ok()
n_hdlc_tty_read(): remove pointless access_ok()
tomoyo_write_control(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
btrfs_ioctl_send(): don't bother with access_ok()
fat_dir_ioctl(): hadn't needed that access_ok() for more than a decade...
dlmfs_file_write(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
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Contrary to the comments, those do *NOT* verify anything about
writability of memory, etc.
In all cases addresses are passed only to copy_to_user().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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To provide support for SEV-ES, the hypervisor must provide an area of
memory to the PSP. Once this Trusted Memory Region (TMR) is provided to
the PSP, the contents of this area of memory are no longer available to
the x86.
Update the PSP driver to allocate a 1MB region for the TMR that is 1MB
aligned and then provide it to the PSP through the SEV INIT command.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Instead of using CAP_SYS_ADMIN which is restricted to the root user,
check the file mode for write permissions before executing commands that
can affect the platform. This allows for more fine-grained access
control to the SEV ioctl interface. This would allow a SEV-only user
or group the ability to administer the platform without requiring them
to be root or granting them overly powerful permissions.
For example:
chown root:root /dev/sev
chmod 600 /dev/sev
setfacl -m g:sev:r /dev/sev
setfacl -m g:sev-admin:rw /dev/sev
In this instance, members of the "sev-admin" group have the ability to
perform all ioctl calls (including the ones that modify platform state).
Members of the "sev" group only have access to the ioctls that do not
modify the platform state.
This also makes opening "/dev/sev" more consistent with how file
descriptors are usually handled. By only checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
the file descriptor could be opened read-only but could still execute
ioctls that modify the platform state. This patch enforces that the file
descriptor is opened with write privileges if it is going to be used to
modify the platform state.
This flexibility is completely opt-in, and if it is not desirable by
the administrator then they do not need to give anyone else access to
/dev/sev.
Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Explicitly free and clear misc_dev in sev_exit(). Since devm_kzalloc()
associates misc_dev with the first device that gets probed, change from
devm_kzalloc() to kzalloc() and explicitly free memory in sev_exit() as
the first device probed is not guaranteed to be the last device released.
To ensure that the variable gets properly set to NULL, remove the local
definition of misc_dev.
Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support")
Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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PSP can support both SEV and TEE interface. Therefore, move
SEV specific registers to a dedicated data structure.
TEE interface specific registers will be added in a later
patch.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The PSP (Platform Security Processor) provides support for key management
commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode, along with
software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to enable third-party
Trusted Applications.
Therefore, introduce psp-dev.c and psp-dev.h files, which can invoke
SEV (or TEE) initialization based on platform feature support.
TEE interface support will be introduced in a later patch.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This is a preliminary patch for creating a generic PSP device driver
file, which will have support for both SEV and TEE (Trusted Execution
Environment) interface.
This patch does not introduce any new functionality, but simply renames
psp-dev.c and psp-dev.h files to sev-dev.c and sev-dev.h files
respectively.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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