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* crypto: ccp - Use list_move_tail instead of list_del/list_add_tail in ↵Baokun Li2021-06-171-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | ccp-dmaengine.c Using list_move_tail() instead of list_del() + list_add_tail() in ccp-dmaengine.c. Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp: ccp-dev: Fix a little doc-rotLee Jones2021-05-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s): drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c:476: warning: Function parameter or member 'sp' not described in 'ccp_alloc_struct' drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c:476: warning: Excess function parameter 'dev' description in 'ccp_alloc_struct' drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c:476: warning: Function parameter or member 'sp' not described in 'ccp_alloc_struct' drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev.c:476: warning: Excess function parameter 'dev' description in 'ccp_alloc_struct' Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - Fix a resource leak in an error handling pathChristophe JAILLET2021-05-231-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | If an error occurs after calling 'sp_get_irqs()', 'sp_free_irqs()' must be called as already done in the error handling path. Fixes: f4d18d656f88 ("crypto: ccp - Abstract interrupt registeration") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Acked-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - Annotate SEV Firmware file namesJoerg Roedel2021-05-141-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Annotate the firmware files CCP might need using MODULE_FIRMWARE(). This will get them included into an initrd when CCP is also included there. Otherwise the CCP module will not find its firmware when loaded before the root-fs is mounted. This can cause problems when the pre-loaded SEV firmware is too old to support current SEV and SEV-ES virtualization features. Fixes: e93720606efd ("crypto: ccp - Allow SEV firmware to be chosen based on Family and Model") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds2021-05-012-99/+98
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini: "This is a large update by KVM standards, including AMD PSP (Platform Security Processor, aka "AMD Secure Technology") and ARM CoreSight (debug and trace) changes. ARM: - CoreSight: Add support for ETE and TRBE - Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected mode - Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode - Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode - ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1 - nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces - Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver - Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler x86: - AMD PSP driver changes - Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code - AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL - Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation, zap under read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under read lock - /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon) - support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context - support SGX in virtual machines - add a few more statistics - improved directed yield heuristics - Lots and lots of cleanups Generic: - Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing the architecture-specific code - a handful of "Get rid of oprofile leftovers" patches - Some selftests improvements" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (379 commits) KVM: selftests: Speed up set_memory_region_test selftests: kvm: Fix the check of return value KVM: x86: Take advantage of kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt() KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported) KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables KVM: SEV: Mask CPUID[0x8000001F].eax according to supported features KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c KVM: SVM: Disable SEV/SEV-ES if NPT is disabled KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled' KVM: x86: Move reverse CPUID helpers to separate header file KVM: x86: Rename GPR accessors to make mode-aware variants the defaults ...
| * crypto: ccp: Use the stack and common buffer for INIT commandSean Christopherson2021-04-212-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Drop the dedicated init_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable. Now that the low level helper uses an internal buffer for all commands, using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-8-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * crypto: ccp: Use the stack and common buffer for status commandsSean Christopherson2021-04-212-16/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Drop the dedicated status_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable for PLATFORM_STATUS. Now that the low level helper uses an internal buffer for all commands, using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-7-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * crypto: ccp: Use the stack for small SEV command buffersSean Christopherson2021-04-211-73/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For commands with small input/output buffers, use the local stack to "allocate" the structures used to communicate with the PSP. Now that __sev_do_cmd_locked() gracefully handles vmalloc'd buffers, there's no reason to avoid using the stack, e.g. CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y will just work. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-6-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * crypto: ccp: Play nice with vmalloc'd memory for SEV command structsSean Christopherson2021-04-212-5/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Copy the incoming @data comman to an internal buffer so that callers can put SEV command buffers on the stack without running afoul of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y, i.e. without bombing on vmalloc'd pointers. As of today, the largest supported command takes a 68 byte buffer, i.e. pretty much every command can be put on the stack. Because sev_cmd_mutex is held for the entirety of a transaction, only a single bounce buffer is required. Use the internal buffer unconditionally, as the majority of in-kernel users will soon switch to using the stack. At that point, checking virt_addr_valid() becomes (negligible) overhead in most cases, and supporting both paths slightly increases complexity. Since the commands are all quite small, the cost of the copies is insignificant compared to the latency of communicating with the PSP. Allocate a full page for the buffer as opportunistic preparation for SEV-SNP, which requires the command buffer to be in firmware state for commands that trigger memory writes from the PSP firmware. Using a full page now will allow SEV-SNP support to simply transition the page as needed. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-5-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * crypto: ccp: Reject SEV commands with mismatching command bufferSean Christopherson2021-04-211-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | WARN on and reject SEV commands that provide a valid data pointer, but do not have a known, non-zero length. And conversely, reject commands that take a command buffer but none is provided (data is null). Aside from sanity checking input, disallowing a non-null pointer without a non-zero size will allow a future patch to cleanly handle vmalloc'd data by copying the data to an internal __pa() friendly buffer. Note, this also effectively prevents callers from using commands that have a non-zero length and are not known to the kernel. This is not an explicit goal, but arguably the side effect is a good thing from the kernel's perspective. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-4-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * crypto: ccp: Detect and reject "invalid" addresses destined for PSPSean Christopherson2021-04-211-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Explicitly reject using pointers that are not virt_to_phys() friendly as the source for SEV commands that are sent to the PSP. The PSP works with physical addresses, and __pa()/virt_to_phys() will not return the correct address in these cases, e.g. for a vmalloc'd pointer. At best, the bogus address will cause the command to fail, and at worst lead to system instability. While it's unlikely that callers will deliberately use a bad pointer for SEV buffers, a caller can easily use a vmalloc'd pointer unknowingly when running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y as it's not obvious that putting the command buffers on the stack would be bad. The command buffers are relative small and easily fit on the stack, and the APIs to do not document that the incoming pointer must be a physically contiguous, __pa() friendly pointer. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-3-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * crypto: ccp: Free SEV device if SEV init failsSean Christopherson2021-04-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Free the SEV device if later initialization fails. The memory isn't technically leaked as it's tracked in the top-level device's devres list, but unless the top-level device is removed, the memory won't be freed and is effectively leaked. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-2-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL commandSteve Rutherford2021-04-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can issue the SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so that a cancelled migration can restart with a new target later. Reviewed-by: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Message-Id: <20210412194408.2458827-1-srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | ccp: ccp - add support for Green SardineDevaraj Rangasamy2021-04-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new PCI device entry for Green Sardine APU. Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Tested-by: Babulu Ellune <Babulu.Ellune@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: ccp - Make ccp_dev_suspend and ccp_dev_resume void functionsTian Tao2021-04-223-29/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since ccp_dev_suspend() and ccp_dev_resume() only return 0 which causes ret to equal 0 in sp_suspend and sp_resume, making the if condition impossible to use. it might be a more appropriate fix to have these be void functions and eliminate the if condition in sp_suspend() and sp_resume(). Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Acked-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: ccp - Use DEFINE_SPINLOCK() for spinlockTang Yizhou2021-04-091-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | spinlock can be initialized automatically with DEFINE_SPINLOCK() rather than explicitly calling spin_lock_init(). Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tang Yizhou <tangyizhou@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: ccp - A value assigned to a variable is never usedJiapeng Chong2021-04-091-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the following whitescan warning: Assigning value "64" to "dst.address" here, but that stored value is overwritten before it can be used. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: ccp - fix command queuing to TEE ring bufferRijo Thomas2021-03-262-16/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Multiple threads or clients can submit a command to the TEE ring buffer. This patch helps to synchronize command submission to the ring. One thread shall write a command to a TEE ring buffer entry only if: - Trusted OS has notified that the TEE command for the given entry has been processed and driver has copied the TEE response into client buffer. - The command entry is empty and can be written into. After a command has been written to the TEE ring buffer, the global wptr (mutex protected) shall be incremented for use by next client. If PSP became unresponsive while processing TEE request from a client, then further command submission to queue will be disabled. Fixes: 33960acccfbd (crypto: ccp - add TEE support for Raven Ridge) Reviewed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: ccp - reduce tee command status polling interval from 5ms to 1msRijo Thomas2021-03-261-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PSP TEE device driver polls the command status variable every 5ms to check for command completion. Reduce this time to 1ms so that there is an improvement in driver response time to clients which submit TEE commands. Reviewed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: ccp - Don't initialize SEV support without the SEV featureTom Lendacky2021-03-131-0/+6
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If SEV has been disabled (e.g. through BIOS), the driver probe will still issue SEV firmware commands. The SEV INIT firmware command will return an error in this situation, but the error code is a general error code that doesn't highlight the exact reason. Add a check for X86_FEATURE_SEV in sev_dev_init() and emit a meaningful message and skip attempting to initialize the SEV firmware if the feature is not enabled. Since building the SEV code is dependent on X86_64, adding the check won't cause any build problems. Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-By: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* KVM/SVM: add support for SEV attestation commandBrijesh Singh2021-02-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SEV FW version >= 0.23 added a new command that can be used to query the attestation report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory encrypted through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_{DATA, VMSA} commands and sign the report with the Platform Endorsement Key (PEK). See the SEV FW API spec section 6.8 for more details. Note there already exist a command (KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE) that can be used to get the SHA-256 digest. The main difference between the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE and KVM_SEV_ATTESTATION_REPORT is that the latter can be called while the guest is running and the measurement value is signed with PEK. Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Tested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Message-Id: <20210104151749.30248-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* crypto: sha - split sha.h into sha1.h and sha2.hEric Biggers2020-11-202-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2, and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3. This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA versions, and usage of it should be phased out. Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and <crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both. This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - fix error handlingPavel Machek2020-10-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Fix resource leak in error handling. Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de> Acked-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: algapi - Remove skbuff.h inclusionHerbert Xu2020-08-201-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | The header file algapi.h includes skbuff.h unnecessarily since all we need is a forward declaration for struct sk_buff. This patch removes that inclusion. Unfortunately skbuff.h pulls in a lot of things and drivers over the years have come to rely on it so this patch adds a lot of missing inclusions that result from this. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()Waiman Long2020-08-071-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* crypto: ccp - use generic power managementVaibhav Gupta2020-07-315-22/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Drivers using legacy power management .suspen()/.resume() callbacks have to manage PCI states and device's PM states themselves. They also need to take care of standard configuration registers. Switch to generic power management framework using a single "struct dev_pm_ops" variable to take the unnecessary load from the driver. This also avoids the need for the driver to directly call most of the PCI helper functions and device power state control functions as through the generic framework, PCI Core takes care of the necessary operations, and drivers are required to do only device-specific jobs. Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Gupta <vaibhavgupta40@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: drivers - set the flag CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORYMikulas Patocka2020-07-166-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Set the flag CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY in the crypto drivers that allocate memory. drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-core.c: sun8i_ce_cipher drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-core.c: sun8i_ss_cipher drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c: meson_cipher drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c: artpec6_crypto_common_init drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c: spu_skcipher_rx_sg_create drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c: aead_edesc_alloc drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c: aead_edesc_alloc drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c: aead_edesc_alloc drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c: hash_digest_key drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/cptvf_algs.c: process_request drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_aead.c: nitrox_process_se_request drivers/crypto/cavium/nitrox/nitrox_skcipher.c: nitrox_process_se_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-cmac.c: ccp_do_cmac_update drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-galois.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-des3.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-sha.c: ccp_crypto_enqueue_request drivers/crypto/chelsio/chcr_algo.c: create_cipher_wr drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec/sec_algs.c: sec_alloc_and_fill_hw_sgl drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c: sec_alloc_req_id drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_cipher.c: safexcel_queue_req drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c: safexcel_ahash_enqueue drivers/crypto/ixp4xx_crypto.c: ablk_perform drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/cipher.c: mv_cesa_skcipher_dma_req_init drivers/crypto/marvell/cesa/hash.c: mv_cesa_ahash_dma_req_init drivers/crypto/marvell/octeontx/otx_cptvf_algs.c: create_ctx_hdr drivers/crypto/n2_core.c: n2_compute_chunks drivers/crypto/picoxcell_crypto.c: spacc_sg_to_ddt drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c: qat_alg_skcipher_encrypt drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c: qce_skcipher_async_req_handle drivers/crypto/talitos.c : talitos_edesc_alloc drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_algs.c: __virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req drivers/crypto/xilinx/zynqmp-aes-gcm.c: zynqmp_aes_aead_cipher Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> [EB: avoid overly-long lines] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - Silence strncpy warningHerbert Xu2020-07-161-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | This patch kills an strncpy by using strscpy instead. The name would be silently truncated if it is too long. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - permit asynchronous skcipher as fallbackArd Biesheuvel2020-07-162-18/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Even though the ccp driver implements an asynchronous version of xts(aes), the fallback it allocates is required to be synchronous. Given that SIMD based software implementations are usually asynchronous as well, even though they rarely complete asynchronously (this typically only happens in cases where the request was made from softirq context, while SIMD was already in use in the task context that it interrupted), these implementations are disregarded, and either the generic C version or another table based version implemented in assembler is selected instead. Since falling back to synchronous AES is not only a performance issue, but potentially a security issue as well (due to the fact that table based AES is not time invariant), let's fix this, by allocating an ordinary skcipher as the fallback, and invoke it with the completion routine that was given to the outer request. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - Fix sparse warningsHerbert Xu2020-07-093-13/+12
| | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a number of endianness marking issues in the ccp driver. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - Fix use of merged scatterlistsJohn Allen2020-07-032-11/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Running the crypto manager self tests with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS may result in several types of errors when using the ccp-crypto driver: alg: skcipher: cbc-des3-ccp encryption failed on test vector 0; expected_error=0, actual_error=-5 ... alg: skcipher: ctr-aes-ccp decryption overran dst buffer on test vector 0 ... alg: ahash: sha224-ccp test failed (wrong result) on test vector ... These errors are the result of improper processing of scatterlists mapped for DMA. Given a scatterlist in which entries are merged as part of mapping the scatterlist for DMA, the DMA length of a merged entry will reflect the combined length of the entries that were merged. The subsequent scatterlist entry will contain DMA information for the scatterlist entry after the last merged entry, but the non-DMA information will be that of the first merged entry. The ccp driver does not take this scatterlist merging into account. To address this, add a second scatterlist pointer to track the current position in the DMA mapped representation of the scatterlist. Both the DMA representation and the original representation of the scatterlist must be tracked as while most of the driver can use just the DMA representation, scatterlist_map_and_copy() must use the original representation and expects the scatterlist pointer to be accurate to the original representation. In order to properly walk the original scatterlist, the scatterlist must be walked until the combined lengths of the entries seen is equal to the DMA length of the current entry being processed in the DMA mapped representation. Fixes: 63b945091a070 ("crypto: ccp - CCP device driver and interface support") Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - remove redundant assignment to variable retColin Ian King2020-06-261-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | The variable ret is being assigned with a value that is never read and it is being updated later with a new value. The assignment is redundant and can be removed. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - Fix sparse warnings in sev-devHerbert Xu2020-06-151-7/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a bunch of sparse warnings in sev-dev where the __user marking is incorrectly handled. Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Fixes: 7360e4b14350 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT...") Fixes: e799035609e1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl...") Fixes: 76a2b524a4b1 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT...") Fixes: d6112ea0cb34 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* Merge branch 'uaccess.access_ok' of ↵Linus Torvalds2020-06-011-12/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull uaccess/access_ok updates from Al Viro: "Removals of trivially pointless access_ok() calls. Note: the fiemap stuff was removed from the series, since they are duplicates with part of ext4 series carried in Ted's tree" * 'uaccess.access_ok' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: vmci_host: get rid of pointless access_ok() hfi1: get rid of pointless access_ok() usb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls lpfc_debugfs: get rid of pointless access_ok() efi_test: get rid of pointless access_ok() drm_read(): get rid of pointless access_ok() via-pmu: don't bother with access_ok() drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access_ok() omapfb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls amifb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-dma-region.c: get rid of pointless access_ok() drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-pr.c: get rid of pointless access_ok() cm4000_cs.c cmm_ioctl(): get rid of pointless access_ok() nvram: drop useless access_ok() n_hdlc_tty_read(): remove pointless access_ok() tomoyo_write_control(): get rid of pointless access_ok() btrfs_ioctl_send(): don't bother with access_ok() fat_dir_ioctl(): hadn't needed that access_ok() for more than a decade... dlmfs_file_write(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
| * drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()Al Viro2020-05-291-12/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Contrary to the comments, those do *NOT* verify anything about writability of memory, etc. In all cases addresses are passed only to copy_to_user(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | crypto: ccp - use crypto_shash_tfm_digest()Eric Biggers2020-05-081-7/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of manually allocating a 'struct shash_desc' on the stack and calling crypto_shash_digest(), switch to using the new helper function crypto_shash_tfm_digest() which does this for us. Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: ccp - Add support for SEV-ES to the PSP driverTom Lendacky2020-04-301-0/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To provide support for SEV-ES, the hypervisor must provide an area of memory to the PSP. Once this Trusted Memory Region (TMR) is provided to the PSP, the contents of this area of memory are no longer available to the x86. Update the PSP driver to allocate a 1MB region for the TMR that is 1MB aligned and then provide it to the PSP through the SEV INIT command. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: ccp -- don't "select" CONFIG_DMADEVICESArnd Bergmann2020-04-161-2/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | DMADEVICES is the top-level option for the slave DMA subsystem, and should not be selected by device drivers, as this can cause circular dependencies such as: drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:6:error: recursive dependency detected! drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:6: symbol NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE depends on PPC_BESTCOMM drivers/dma/bestcomm/Kconfig:6: symbol PPC_BESTCOMM depends on DMADEVICES drivers/dma/Kconfig:6: symbol DMADEVICES is selected by CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig:10: symbol CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP depends on CRYPTO crypto/Kconfig:16: symbol CRYPTO is selected by LIBCRC32C lib/Kconfig:222: symbol LIBCRC32C is selected by LIQUIDIO drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/Kconfig:65: symbol LIQUIDIO depends on PTP_1588_CLOCK drivers/ptp/Kconfig:8: symbol PTP_1588_CLOCK is implied by FEC drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/Kconfig:23: symbol FEC depends on NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE The LIQUIDIO driver causing this problem is addressed in a separate patch, but this change is needed to prevent it from happening again. Using "depends on DMADEVICES" is what we do for all other implementations of slave DMA controllers as well. Fixes: b3c2fee5d66b ("crypto: ccp - Ensure all dependencies are specified") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - use file mode for sev ioctl permissionsConnor Kuehl2020-03-121-16/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of using CAP_SYS_ADMIN which is restricted to the root user, check the file mode for write permissions before executing commands that can affect the platform. This allows for more fine-grained access control to the SEV ioctl interface. This would allow a SEV-only user or group the ability to administer the platform without requiring them to be root or granting them overly powerful permissions. For example: chown root:root /dev/sev chmod 600 /dev/sev setfacl -m g:sev:r /dev/sev setfacl -m g:sev-admin:rw /dev/sev In this instance, members of the "sev-admin" group have the ability to perform all ioctl calls (including the ones that modify platform state). Members of the "sev" group only have access to the ioctls that do not modify the platform state. This also makes opening "/dev/sev" more consistent with how file descriptors are usually handled. By only checking for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, the file descriptor could be opened read-only but could still execute ioctls that modify the platform state. This patch enforces that the file descriptor is opened with write privileges if it is going to be used to modify the platform state. This flexibility is completely opt-in, and if it is not desirable by the administrator then they do not need to give anyone else access to /dev/sev. Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - Cleanup sp_dev_master in psp_dev_destroy()John Allen2020-03-123-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | Introduce clear_psp_master_device() to ensure that sp_dev_master gets properly cleared on the release of a psp device. Fixes: 2a6170dfe755 ("crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support") Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - Cleanup misc_dev on sev_exit()John Allen2020-03-121-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Explicitly free and clear misc_dev in sev_exit(). Since devm_kzalloc() associates misc_dev with the first device that gets probed, change from devm_kzalloc() to kzalloc() and explicitly free memory in sev_exit() as the first device probed is not guaranteed to be the last device released. To ensure that the variable gets properly set to NULL, remove the local definition of misc_dev. Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support") Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LENEric Biggers2020-01-094-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless. Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key. Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309, rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/. Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths. So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs. -EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys". That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test. So just remove this flag. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* tee: amdtee: check TEE status during driver initializationRijo Thomas2020-01-041-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The AMD-TEE driver should check if TEE is available before registering itself with TEE subsystem. This ensures that there is a TEE which the driver can talk to before proceeding with tee device node allocation. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Acked-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - provide in-kernel API to submit TEE commandsRijo Thomas2019-12-202-0/+127
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extend the functionality of AMD Secure Processor (SP) driver by providing an in-kernel API to submit commands to TEE ring buffer for processing by Trusted OS running on AMD Secure Processor. Following TEE commands are supported by Trusted OS: * TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA : Load Trusted Application (TA) binary into TEE environment * TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA : Unload TA binary from TEE environment * TEE_CMD_ID_OPEN_SESSION : Open session with loaded TA * TEE_CMD_ID_CLOSE_SESSION : Close session with loaded TA * TEE_CMD_ID_INVOKE_CMD : Invoke a command with loaded TA * TEE_CMD_ID_MAP_SHARED_MEM : Map shared memory * TEE_CMD_ID_UNMAP_SHARED_MEM : Unmap shared memory Linux AMD-TEE driver will use this API to submit command buffers for processing in Trusted Execution Environment. The AMD-TEE driver shall be introduced in a separate patch. Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - add TEE support for Raven RidgeRijo Thomas2019-12-207-4/+431
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adds a PCI device entry for Raven Ridge. Raven Ridge is an APU with a dedicated AMD Secure Processor having Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) support. The TEE provides a secure environment for running Trusted Applications (TAs) which implement security-sensitive parts of a feature. This patch configures AMD Secure Processor's TEE interface by initializing a ring buffer (shared memory between Rich OS and Trusted OS) which can hold multiple command buffer entries. The TEE interface is facilitated by a set of CPU to PSP mailbox registers. The next patch will address how commands are submitted to the ring buffer. Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - check whether PSP supports SEV or TEE before initializationRijo Thomas2019-12-201-5/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Read PSP feature register to check for TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) support. If neither SEV nor TEE is supported by PSP, then skip PSP initialization. Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - move SEV vdata to a dedicated data structureRijo Thomas2019-12-204-10/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PSP can support both SEV and TEE interface. Therefore, move SEV specific registers to a dedicated data structure. TEE interface specific registers will be added in a later patch. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - create a generic psp-dev fileRijo Thomas2019-12-206-193/+367
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PSP (Platform Security Processor) provides support for key management commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode, along with software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to enable third-party Trusted Applications. Therefore, introduce psp-dev.c and psp-dev.h files, which can invoke SEV (or TEE) initialization based on platform feature support. TEE interface support will be introduced in a later patch. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - rename psp-dev files to sev-devRijo Thomas2019-12-204-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a preliminary patch for creating a generic PSP device driver file, which will have support for both SEV and TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) interface. This patch does not introduce any new functionality, but simply renames psp-dev.c and psp-dev.h files to sev-dev.c and sev-dev.h files respectively. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Co-developed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: ccp - set max RSA modulus size for v3 platform devices as wellArd Biesheuvel2019-12-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AMD Seattle incorporates a non-PCI version of the v3 CCP crypto accelerator, and this version was left behind when the maximum RSA modulus size was parameterized in order to support v5 hardware which supports larger moduli than v3 hardware does. Due to this oversight, RSA acceleration no longer works at all on these systems. Fix this by setting the .rsamax property to the appropriate value for v3 platform hardware. Fixes: e28c190db66830c0 ("csrypto: ccp - Expand RSA support for a v5 ccp") Cc: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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