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* Merge tag 'ecryptfs-3.9-rc2-fixes' of ↵Linus Torvalds2013-03-071-2/+38
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs Pull ecryptfs fixes from Tyler Hicks: "Minor code cleanups and new Kconfig option to disable /dev/ecryptfs The code cleanups fix up W=1 compiler warnings and some unnecessary checks. The new Kconfig option, defaulting to N, allows the rarely used eCryptfs kernel to userspace communication channel to be compiled out. This may be the first step in it being eventually removed." Hmm. I'm not sure whether these should be called "fixes", and it probably should have gone in the merge window. But I'll let it slide. * tag 'ecryptfs-3.9-rc2-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs: eCryptfs: allow userspace messaging to be disabled eCryptfs: Fix redundant error check on ecryptfs_find_daemon_by_euid() ecryptfs: ecryptfs_msg_ctx_alloc_to_free(): remove kfree() redundant null check eCryptfs: decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(): remove kfree() redundant null check eCryptfs: remove unneeded checks in virt_to_scatterlist() eCryptfs: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings eCryptfs: Fix -Wunused-but-set-variable warnings eCryptfs: initialize payload_len in keystore.c
| * eCryptfs: allow userspace messaging to be disabledKees Cook2013-03-031-2/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the userspace messaging (for the less common case of userspace key wrap/unwrap via ecryptfsd) is not needed, allow eCryptfs to build with it removed. This saves on kernel code size and reduces potential attack surface by removing the /dev/ecryptfs node. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
* | switch vfs_getattr() to struct pathAl Viro2013-02-261-0/+6
|/ | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge tag 'ecryptfs-3.6-rc1-fixes' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-08-021-17/+7
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs Pull ecryptfs fixes from Tyler Hicks: - Fixes a bug when the lower filesystem mount options include 'acl', but the eCryptfs mount options do not - Cleanups in the messaging code - Better handling of empty files in the lower filesystem to improve usability. Failed file creations are now cleaned up and empty lower files are converted into eCryptfs during open(). - The write-through cache changes are being reverted due to bugs that are not easy to fix. Stability outweighs the performance enhancements here. - Improvement to the mount code to catch unsupported ciphers specified in the mount options * tag 'ecryptfs-3.6-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs: eCryptfs: check for eCryptfs cipher support at mount eCryptfs: Revert to a writethrough cache model eCryptfs: Initialize empty lower files when opening them eCryptfs: Unlink lower inode when ecryptfs_create() fails eCryptfs: Make all miscdev functions use daemon ptr in file private_data eCryptfs: Remove unused messaging declarations and function eCryptfs: Copy up POSIX ACL and read-only flags from lower mount
| * eCryptfs: Initialize empty lower files when opening themTyler Hicks2012-07-081-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Historically, eCryptfs has only initialized lower files in the ecryptfs_create() path. Lower file initialization is the act of writing the cryptographic metadata from the inode's crypt_stat to the header of the file. The ecryptfs_open() path already expects that metadata to be in the header of the file. A number of users have reported empty lower files in beneath their eCryptfs mounts. Most of the causes for those empty files being left around have been addressed, but the presence of empty files causes problems due to the lack of proper cryptographic metadata. To transparently solve this problem, this patch initializes empty lower files in the ecryptfs_open() error path. If the metadata is unreadable due to the lower inode size being 0, plaintext passthrough support is not in use, and the metadata is stored in the header of the file (as opposed to the user.ecryptfs extended attribute), the lower file will be initialized. The number of nested conditionals in ecryptfs_open() was getting out of hand, so a helper function was created. To avoid the same nested conditional problem, the conditional logic was reversed inside of the helper function. https://launchpad.net/bugs/911507 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
| * eCryptfs: Make all miscdev functions use daemon ptr in file private_dataTyler Hicks2012-07-081-11/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that a pointer to a valid struct ecryptfs_daemon is stored in the private_data of an opened /dev/ecryptfs file, the remaining miscdev functions can utilize the pointer rather than looking up the ecryptfs_daemon at the beginning of each operation. The security model of /dev/ecryptfs is simplified a little bit with this patch. Upon opening /dev/ecryptfs, a per-user ecryptfs_daemon is registered. Another daemon cannot be registered for that user until the last file reference is released. During the lifetime of the ecryptfs_daemon, access checks are not performed on the /dev/ecryptfs operations because it is assumed that the application securely handles the opened file descriptor and does not unintentionally leak it to processes that are not trusted. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
| * eCryptfs: Remove unused messaging declarations and functionTyler Hicks2012-07-081-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | These are no longer needed. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
* | ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completionAl Viro2012-07-231-14/+0
|/ | | | | | ... and keep the sodding requests on stack - they are small enough. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* eCryptfs: Improve statfs reportingTyler Hicks2012-02-161-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | statfs() calls on eCryptfs files returned the wrong filesystem type and, when using filename encryption, the wrong maximum filename length. If mount-wide filename encryption is enabled, the cipher block size and the lower filesystem's max filename length will determine the max eCryptfs filename length. Pre-tested, known good lengths are used when the lower filesystem's namelen is 255 and a cipher with 8 or 16 byte block sizes is used. In other, less common cases, we fall back to a safe rounded-down estimate when determining the eCryptfs namelen. https://launchpad.net/bugs/885744 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* eCryptfs: Replace miscdev read/write magic numbersTyler Hicks2012-01-251-0/+5
| | | | | | | | ecryptfs_miscdev_read() and ecryptfs_miscdev_write() contained many magic numbers for specifying packet header field sizes and offsets. This patch defines those values and replaces the magic values. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
* eCryptfs: Prevent file create race conditionTyler Hicks2011-11-231-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written to the lower file. This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory. https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org
* treewide: use __printf not __attribute__((format(printf,...)))Joe Perches2011-10-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Standardize the style for compiler based printf format verification. Standardized the location of __printf too. Done via script and a little typing. $ grep -rPl --include=*.[ch] -w "__attribute__" * | \ grep -vP "^(tools|scripts|include/linux/compiler-gcc.h)" | \ xargs perl -n -i -e 'local $/; while (<>) { s/\b__attribute__\s*\(\s*\(\s*format\s*\(\s*printf\s*,\s*(.+)\s*,\s*(.+)\s*\)\s*\)\s*\)/__printf($1, $2)/g ; print; }' [akpm@linux-foundation.org: revert arch bits] Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: added support for the encrypted key typeRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-2/+39
| | | | | | | | | | The function ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig() has been modified in order to search keys of both 'user' and 'encrypted' types. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: export global eCryptfs definitions to include/linux/ecryptfs.hRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-108/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Some eCryptfs specific definitions, such as the current version and the authentication token structure, are moved to the new include file 'include/linux/ecryptfs.h', in order to be available for all kernel subsystems. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Remove ecryptfs_header_cache_2Tyler Hicks2011-05-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | Now that ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() is no longer using ecryptfs_header_cache_2 to read in metadata, the kmem_cache can be removed and the ecryptfs_header_cache_1 kmem_cache can be renamed to ecryptfs_header_cache. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Cleanup and optimize ecryptfs_lookup_interpose()Tyler Hicks2011-05-291-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() has turned into spaghetti code over the years. This is an effort to clean it up. - Shorten overly descriptive variable names such as ecryptfs_dentry - Simplify gotos and error paths - Create helper function for reading plaintext i_size from metadata It also includes an optimization when reading i_size from the metadata. A complete page-sized kmem_cache_alloc() was being done to read in 16 bytes of metadata. The buffer for that is now statically declared. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Fix new inode race conditionTyler Hicks2011-05-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Only unlock and d_add() new inodes after the plaintext inode size has been read from the lower filesystem. This fixes a race condition that was sometimes seen during a multi-job kernel build in an eCryptfs mount. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36002 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: David <david@unsolicited.net> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
* eCryptfs: Cleanup inode initialization codeTyler Hicks2011-05-291-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The eCryptfs inode get, initialization, and dentry interposition code has two separate paths. One is for when dentry interposition is needed after doing things like a mkdir in the lower filesystem and the other is needed after a lookup. Unlocking new inodes and doing a d_add() needs to happen at different times, depending on which type of dentry interposing is being done. This patch cleans up the inode get and initialization code paths and splits them up so that the locking and d_add() differences mentioned above can be handled appropriately in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
* eCryptfs: Consolidate inode functions into inode.cTyler Hicks2011-05-291-7/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | These functions should live in inode.c since their focus is on inodes and they're primarily used by functions in inode.c. Also does a simple cleanup of ecryptfs_inode_test() and rolls ecryptfs_init_inode() into ecryptfs_inode_set(). Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
* eCryptfs: Handle failed metadata read in lookupTyler Hicks2011-04-251-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When failing to read the lower file's crypto metadata during a lookup, eCryptfs must continue on without throwing an error. For example, there may be a plaintext file in the lower mount point that the user wants to delete through the eCryptfs mount. If an error is encountered while reading the metadata in lookup(), the eCryptfs inode's size could be incorrect. We must be sure to reread the plaintext inode size from the metadata when performing an open() or setattr(). The metadata is already being read in those paths, so this adds minimal performance overhead. This patch introduces a flag which will track whether or not the plaintext inode size has been read so that an incorrect i_size can be fixed in the open() or setattr() paths. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/509180 Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Add reference counting to lower filesTyler Hicks2011-04-251-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For any given lower inode, eCryptfs keeps only one lower file open and multiplexes all eCryptfs file operations through that lower file. The lower file was considered "persistent" and stayed open from the first lookup through the lifetime of the inode. This patch keeps the notion of a single, per-inode lower file, but adds reference counting around the lower file so that it is closed when not currently in use. If the reference count is at 0 when an operation (such as open, create, etc.) needs to use the lower file, a new lower file is opened. Since the file is no longer persistent, all references to the term persistent file are changed to lower file. Locking is added around the sections of code that opens the lower file and assign the pointer in the inode info, as well as the code the fputs the lower file when all eCryptfs users are done with it. This patch is needed to fix issues, when mounted on top of the NFSv3 client, where the lower file is left silly renamed until the eCryptfs inode is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: verify authentication tokens before their useRoberto Sassu2011-03-281-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Authentication tokens content may change if another requestor calls the update() method of the corresponding key. The new function ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key() retrieves the authentication token from the provided key and verifies if it is still valid before being used to encrypt or decrypt an eCryptfs file. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> [tyhicks: Minor formatting changes] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: modified size of keysig in the ecryptfs_key_sig structureRoberto Sassu2011-03-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | The size of the 'keysig' array is incremented of one byte in order to make room for the NULL character. The 'keysig' variable is used, in the function ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(), to find an authentication token with the given signature and is printed a debug message if it cannot be retrieved. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: removed num_global_auth_toks from ecryptfs_mount_crypt_statRoberto Sassu2011-03-281-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the 'num_global_auth_toks' field of the ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat structure, used to count the number of items in the 'global_auth_tok_list' list. This variable is not needed because there are no checks based upon it. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ecryptfs: modify write path to encrypt page in writepageThieu Le2011-03-281-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Change the write path to encrypt the data only when the page is written to disk in ecryptfs_writepage. Previously, ecryptfs encrypts the page in ecryptfs_write_end which means that if there are multiple write requests to the same page, ecryptfs ends up re-encrypting that page over and over again. This patch minimizes the number of encryptions needed. Signed-off-by: Thieu Le <thieule@chromium.org> [tyhicks: Changed NULL .drop_inode sop pointer to generic_drop_inode] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Remove ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE crypt stat flagTyler Hicks2011-03-281-13/+12
| | | | | | | | | Now that grow_file() is not called in the ecryptfs_create() path, the ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE flag is no longer needed. It helped ecryptfs_readpage() know not to decrypt zeroes that were read from the lower file in the grow_file() path. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Handle NULL nameidata pointersTyler Hicks2011-02-211-2/+1
| | | | | | | Allow for NULL nameidata pointers in eCryptfs create, lookup, and d_revalidate functions. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* fs/ecryptfs: Add printf format/argument verification and fix falloutJoe Perches2011-01-171-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Add __attribute__((format... to __ecryptfs_printk Make formats and arguments match. Add casts to (unsigned long long) for %llu. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> [tyhicks: 80 columns cleanup and fixed typo] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ecryptfs: moved ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC definition to linux/magic.hRoberto Sassu2011-01-171-1/+0
| | | | | | | | The definition of ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC has been moved to the include file 'linux/magic.h' to become available to other kernel subsystems. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2010-10-291-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6: eCryptfs: Print mount_auth_tok_only param in ecryptfs_show_options ecryptfs: added ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only mount parameter ecryptfs: checking return code of ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig() ecryptfs: release keys loaded in ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig() eCryptfs: Clear LOOKUP_OPEN flag when creating lower file ecryptfs: call vfs_setxattr() in ecryptfs_setxattr()
| * ecryptfs: added ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only mount parameterRoberto Sassu2010-10-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a new mount parameter 'ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only' to force ecryptfs to use only authentication tokens which signature has been specified at mount time with parameters 'ecryptfs_sig' and 'ecryptfs_fnek_sig'. In this way, after disabling the passthrough and the encrypted view modes, it's possible to make available to users only files encrypted with the specified authentication token. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> [Tyler: Clean up coding style errors found by checkpatch] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* | fs/ecryptfs: Remove unnecessary casts of private_dataJoe Perches2010-09-231-1/+1
|/ | | | | Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* switch ecryptfs_write() to struct inode *, kill on-stack fake filesAl Viro2010-05-211-2/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* switch ecryptfs_get_locked_page() to struct inode *Al Viro2010-05-211-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* ecryptfs: add bdi backing to mount sessionJens Axboe2010-04-221-0/+2
| | | | | | This ensures that dirty data gets flushed properly. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
* eCryptfs: Strip metadata in xattr flag in encrypted viewTyler Hicks2010-03-231-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option provides a unified way of viewing encrypted eCryptfs files. If the metadata is stored in a xattr, the metadata is moved to the file header when the file is read inside the eCryptfs mount. Because of this, we should strip the ECRYPTFS_METADATA_IN_XATTR flag from the header's flag section. This allows eCryptfs to treat the file as an eCryptfs file with a header at the front. Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Rename ecryptfs_crypt_stat.num_header_bytes_at_frontTyler Hicks2010-03-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | This patch renames the num_header_bytes_at_front variable to metadata_size since it now contains the max size of the metadata. Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* eCryptfs: Fix metadata in xattr feature regressionTyler Hicks2010-03-231-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes regression in 8faece5f906725c10e7a1f6caf84452abadbdc7b When using the ecryptfs_xattr_metadata mount option, eCryptfs stores the metadata (normally stored at the front of the file) in the user.ecryptfs xattr. This causes ecryptfs_crypt_stat.num_header_bytes_at_front to be 0, since there is no header data at the front of the file. This results in too much memory being requested and ENOMEM being returned from ecryptfs_write_metadata(). This patch fixes the problem by using the num_header_bytes_at_front variable for specifying the max size of the metadata, despite whether it is stored in the header or xattr. Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* const: mark remaining address_space_operations constAlexey Dobriyan2009-09-221-1/+1
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Remove ecryptfs_unlink_sigs warningsTyler Hicks2009-04-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | A feature was added to the eCryptfs umount helper to automatically unlink the keys used for an eCryptfs mount from the kernel keyring upon umount. This patch keeps the unrecognized mount option warnings for ecryptfs_unlink_sigs out of the logs. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* constify dentry_operations: ecryptfsAl Viro2009-03-271-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* eCryptfs: NULL crypt_stat dereference during lookupTyler Hicks2009-03-221-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If ecryptfs_encrypted_view or ecryptfs_xattr_metadata were being specified as mount options, a NULL pointer dereference of crypt_stat was possible during lookup. This patch moves the crypt_stat assignment into ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower(), ensuring that crypt_stat will not be NULL before we attempt to dereference it. Thanks to Dan Carpenter and his static analysis tool, smatch, for finding this bug. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: don't encrypt file key with filename keyTyler Hicks2009-03-141-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK. This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: filldir, lookup, and readlinkMichael Halcrow2009-01-061-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(), and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions. Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to inode crypt_stat. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Header updatesMichael Halcrow2009-01-061-12/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Tag 70 packetsMichael Halcrow2009-01-061-1/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter. Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename. Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower filesystem. Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are already near the maximum filename length. In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that directory. Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development of this patchset. This patch: A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag 70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()David Howells2008-11-141-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself when it opens its null chardev. The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the dentry_open hook in struct security_operations. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* eCryptfs: remove netlink transportTyler Hicks2008-10-161-23/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace transport. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Make all persistent file opens delayedMichael Halcrow2008-07-241-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no good reason to immediately open the lower file, and that can cause problems with files that the user does not intend to immediately open, such as device nodes. This patch removes the persistent file open from the interpose step and pushes that to the locations where eCryptfs really does need the lower persistent file, such as just before reading or writing the metadata stored in the lower file header. Two functions are jumping to out_dput when they should just be jumping to out on error paths. This patch also fixes these. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: do not try to open device files on mknodMichael Halcrow2008-07-241-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | When creating device nodes, eCryptfs needs to delay actually opening the lower persistent file until an application tries to open. Device handles may not be backed by anything when they first come into existence. [Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu: build fix] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu} Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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