summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/fs/file_table.c
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* fs: Fix imbalance in freeze protection in mark_files_ro()Jan Kara2012-12-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | File descriptors (even those for writing) do not hold freeze protection. Thus mark_files_ro() must call __mnt_drop_write() to only drop protection against remount read-only. Calling mnt_drop_write_file() as we do now results in: [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] 3.7.0-rc6-00028-g88e75b6 #101 Not tainted ------------------------------------- kworker/1:2/79 is trying to release lock (sb_writers) at: [<ffffffff811b33b4>] mnt_drop_write+0x24/0x30 but there are no more locks to release! Reported-by: Zdenek Kabelac <zkabelac@redhat.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* lglock: add DEFINE_STATIC_LGLOCK()Lai Jiangshan2012-10-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | When the lglock doesn't need to be exported we can use DEFINE_STATIC_LGLOCK(). Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-10-021-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline attacks - Integrity: add digital signature verification - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions) - IBM vTPM support on ppc64 - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels" Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools ima: change flags container data type Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label Smack: remove task_wait() hook. ima: audit log hashes ima: generic IMA action flag handling ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure audit: export audit_log_task_info tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390 ima: digital signature verification support ima: add support for different security.ima data types ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls ima: add inode_post_setattr call ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock ima: allocating iint improvements ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules ima: integrity appraisal extension vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file ...
| * vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the fileMimi Zohar2012-09-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ima_file_free(), called on __fput(), currently flags files that have changed, so that the file is re-measured. For appraising a files's integrity, the file's hash must be re-calculated and stored in the 'security.ima' xattr to reflect any changes. This patch moves the ima_file_free() call to before releasing the file in preparation of ima-appraisal measuring the file and updating the 'security.ima' xattr. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
* | take fget() and friends to fs/file.cAl Viro2012-09-261-106/+0
|/ | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: Add freezing handling to mnt_want_write() / mnt_drop_write()Jan Kara2012-07-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Most of places where we want freeze protection coincides with the places where we also have remount-ro protection. So make mnt_want_write() and mnt_drop_write() (and their _file alternative) prevent freezing as well. For the few cases that are really interested only in remount-ro protection provide new function variants. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/897421 Tested-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Tested-by: Peter M. Petrakis <peter.petrakis@canonical.com> Tested-by: Dann Frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Tested-by: Massimo Morana <massimo.morana@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* uninline file_free_rcu()Al Viro2012-07-291-1/+1
| | | | | | What inline? Its only use is passing its address to call_rcu(), for fuck sake! Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* switch fput to task_work_addAl Viro2012-07-221-2/+70
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ... and schedule_work() for interrupt/kernel_thread callers (and yes, now it *is* OK to call from interrupt). We are guaranteed that __fput() will be done before we return to userland (or exit). Note that for fput() from a kernel thread we get an async behaviour; it's almost always OK, but sometimes you might need to have __fput() completed before you do anything else. There are two mechanisms for that - a general barrier (flush_delayed_fput()) and explicit __fput_sync(). Both should be used with care (as was the case for fput() from kernel threads all along). See comments in fs/file_table.c for details. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* mark_files_ro(): don't bother with mntget/mntputAl Viro2012-07-141-8/+1
| | | | | | mnt_drop_write_file() is safe under any lock Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* brlocks/lglocks: API cleanupsAndi Kleen2012-05-291-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | lglocks and brlocks are currently generated with some complicated macros in lglock.h. But there's no reason to not just use common utility functions and put all the data into a common data structure. In preparation, this patch changes the API to look more like normal function calls with pointers, not magic macros. The patch is rather large because I move over all users in one go to keep it bisectable. This impacts the VFS somewhat in terms of lines changed. But no actual behaviour change. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* brlocks/lglocks: turn into functionsAndi Kleen2012-05-291-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | lglocks and brlocks are currently generated with some complicated macros in lglock.h. But there's no reason to not just use common utility functions and put all the data into a common data structure. Since there are at least two users it makes sense to share this code in a library. This is also easier maintainable than a macro forest. This will also make it later possible to dynamically allocate lglocks and also use them in modules (this would both still need some additional, but now straightforward, code) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* vfs: drop_file_write_access() made staticAl Viro2012-03-201-2/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* vfs: prevent remount read-only if pending removesMiklos Szeredi2012-01-061-23/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | If there are any inodes on the super block that have been unlinked (i_nlink == 0) but have not yet been deleted then prevent the remounting the super block read-only. Reported-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* atomic: use <linux/atomic.h>Arun Sharma2011-07-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h> (atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h> Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-03-161-1/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: fix cdev leak on O_PATH final fput()
| * fix cdev leak on O_PATH final fput()Miklos Szeredi2011-03-161-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | __fput doesn't need a cdev_put() for O_PATH handles. Signed-off-by: mszeredi@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-03-161-1/+4
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits) AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open. Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking" selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking ...
| * Merge branch 'master'; commit 'v2.6.38-rc7' into nextJames Morris2011-03-081-2/+2
| |\
| * | IMA: maintain i_readcount in the VFS layerMimi Zohar2011-02-101-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ima_counts_get() updated the readcount and invalidated the PCR, as necessary. Only update the i_readcount in the VFS layer. Move the PCR invalidation checks to ima_file_check(), where it belongs. Maintaining the i_readcount in the VFS layer, will allow other subsystems to use i_readcount. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | | Allow passing O_PATH descriptors via SCM_RIGHTS datagramsAl Viro2011-03-151-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Just need to make sure that AF_UNIX garbage collector won't confuse O_PATHed socket on filesystem for real AF_UNIX opened socket. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | New kind of open files - "location only".Al Viro2011-03-151-5/+48
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | New flag for open(2) - O_PATH. Semantics: * pathname is resolved, but the file itself is _NOT_ opened as far as filesystem is concerned. * almost all operations on the resulting descriptors shall fail with -EBADF. Exceptions are: 1) operations on descriptors themselves (i.e. close(), dup(), dup2(), dup3(), fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD), fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, ...), fcntl(fd, F_GETFD), fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, ...)) 2) fcntl(fd, F_GETFL), for a common non-destructive way to check if descriptor is open 3) "dfd" arguments of ...at(2) syscalls, i.e. the starting points of pathname resolution * closing such descriptor does *NOT* affect dnotify or posix locks. * permissions are checked as usual along the way to file; no permission checks are applied to the file itself. Of course, giving such thing to syscall will result in permission checks (at the moment it means checking that starting point of ....at() is a directory and caller has exec permissions on it). fget() and fget_light() return NULL on such descriptors; use of fget_raw() and fget_raw_light() is needed to get them. That protects existing code from dealing with those things. There are two things still missing (they come in the next commits): one is handling of symlinks (right now we refuse to open them that way; see the next commit for semantics related to those) and another is descriptor passing via SCM_RIGHTS datagrams. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | CRED: Fix kernel panic upon security_file_alloc() failure.Tetsuo Handa2011-02-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In get_empty_filp() since 2.6.29, file_free(f) is called with f->f_cred == NULL when security_file_alloc() returned an error. As a result, kernel will panic() due to put_cred(NULL) call within RCU callback. Fix this bug by assigning f->f_cred before calling security_file_alloc(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | fs: Remove unlikely() from fget_light()Steven Rostedt2011-01-171-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There's an unlikely() in fget_light() that assumes the file ref count will be 1. Running the annotate branch profiler on a desktop that is performing daily tasks (running firefox, evolution, xchat and is also part of a distcc farm), it shows that the ref count is not 1 that often. correct incorrect % Function File Line ------- --------- - -------- ---- ---- 1035099358 6209599193 85 fget_light file_table.c 315 Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: allow for more than 2^31 filesEric Dumazet2010-10-261-10/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Robin Holt tried to boot a 16TB system and found af_unix was overflowing a 32bit value : <quote> We were seeing a failure which prevented boot. The kernel was incapable of creating either a named pipe or unix domain socket. This comes down to a common kernel function called unix_create1() which does: atomic_inc(&unix_nr_socks); if (atomic_read(&unix_nr_socks) > 2 * get_max_files()) goto out; The function get_max_files() is a simple return of files_stat.max_files. files_stat.max_files is a signed integer and is computed in fs/file_table.c's files_init(). n = (mempages * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024)) / 10; files_stat.max_files = n; In our case, mempages (total_ram_pages) is approx 3,758,096,384 (0xe0000000). That leaves max_files at approximately 1,503,238,553. This causes 2 * get_max_files() to integer overflow. </quote> Fix is to let /proc/sys/fs/file-nr & /proc/sys/fs/file-max use long integers, and change af_unix to use an atomic_long_t instead of atomic_t. get_max_files() is changed to return an unsigned long. get_nr_files() is changed to return a long. unix_nr_socks is changed from atomic_t to atomic_long_t, while not strictly needed to address Robin problem. Before patch (on a 64bit kernel) : # echo 2147483648 >/proc/sys/fs/file-max # cat /proc/sys/fs/file-max -18446744071562067968 After patch: # echo 2147483648 >/proc/sys/fs/file-max # cat /proc/sys/fs/file-max 2147483648 # cat /proc/sys/fs/file-nr 704 0 2147483648 Reported-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Tested-by: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: scale files_lockNick Piggin2010-08-181-18/+90
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fs: scale files_lock Improve scalability of files_lock by adding per-cpu, per-sb files lists, protected with an lglock. The lglock provides fast access to the per-cpu lists to add and remove files. It also provides a snapshot of all the per-cpu lists (although this is very slow). One difficulty with this approach is that a file can be removed from the list by another CPU. We must track which per-cpu list the file is on with a new variale in the file struct (packed into a hole on 64-bit archs). Scalability could suffer if files are frequently removed from different cpu's list. However loads with frequent removal of files imply short interval between adding and removing the files, and the scheduler attempts to avoid moving processes too far away. Also, even in the case of cross-CPU removal, the hardware has much more opportunity to parallelise cacheline transfers with N cachelines than with 1. A worst-case test of 1 CPU allocating files subsequently being freed by N CPUs degenerates to contending on a single lock, which is no worse than before. When more than one CPU are allocating files, even if they are always freed by different CPUs, there will be more parallelism than the single-lock case. Testing results: On a 2 socket, 8 core opteron, I measure the number of times the lock is taken to remove the file, the number of times it is removed by the same CPU that added it, and the number of times it is removed by the same node that added it. Booting: locks= 25049 cpu-hits= 23174 (92.5%) node-hits= 23945 (95.6%) kbuild -j16 locks=2281913 cpu-hits=2208126 (96.8%) node-hits=2252674 (98.7%) dbench 64 locks=4306582 cpu-hits=4287247 (99.6%) node-hits=4299527 (99.8%) So a file is removed from the same CPU it was added by over 90% of the time. It remains within the same node 95% of the time. Tim Chen ran some numbers for a 64 thread Nehalem system performing a compile. throughput 2.6.34-rc2 24.5 +patch 24.9 us sys idle IO wait (in %) 2.6.34-rc2 51.25 28.25 17.25 3.25 +patch 53.75 18.5 19 8.75 So significantly less CPU time spent in kernel code, higher idle time and slightly higher throughput. Single threaded performance difference was within the noise of microbenchmarks. That is not to say penalty does not exist, the code is larger and more memory accesses required so it will be slightly slower. Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: cleanup files_lock lockingNick Piggin2010-08-181-24/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fs: cleanup files_lock locking Lock tty_files with a new spinlock, tty_files_lock; provide helpers to manipulate the per-sb files list; unexport the files_lock spinlock. Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Revert "fsnotify: store struct file not struct path"Linus Torvalds2010-08-121-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 3bcf3860a4ff9bbc522820b4b765e65e4deceb3e (and the accompanying commit c1e5c954020e "vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput" that was a horribly ugly hack to make it work at all). The 'struct file' approach not only causes that disgusting hack, it somehow breaks pulseaudio, probably due to some other subtlety with f_count handling. Fix up various conflicts due to later fsnotify work. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* vfs: improve comment describing fget_light()Tony Battersby2010-08-111-5/+14
| | | | | | | | | | Improve the description of fget_light(), which is currently incorrect about needing a prior refcnt (judging by the way it is actually used). Signed-off-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fputEric Paris2010-07-281-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fanotify almost works like so: user context calls fsnotify_* function with a struct file. fsnotify takes a reference on the struct path user context goes about it's buissiness at some later point in time the fsnotify listener gets the struct path fanotify listener calls dentry_open() to create a file which userspace can deal with listener drops the reference on the struct path at some later point the listener calls close() on it's new file With the switch from struct path to struct file this presents a problem for fput() and fsnotify_close(). fsnotify_close() is called when the filp has already reached 0 and __fput() wants to do it's cleanup. The solution presented here is a bit odd. If an event is created from a struct file we take a reference on the file. We check however if the f_count was already 0 and if so we take an EXTRA reference EVEN THOUGH IT WAS ZERO. In __fput() (where we know the f_count hit 0 once) we check if the f_count is non-zero and if so we drop that 'extra' ref and return without destroying the file. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* get rid of the magic around f_count in aioAl Viro2010-05-271-11/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | __aio_put_req() plays sick games with file refcount. What it wants is fput() from atomic context; it's almost always done with f_count > 1, so they only have to deal with delayed work in rare cases when their reference happens to be the last one. Current code decrements f_count and if it hasn't hit 0, everything is fine. Otherwise it keeps a pointer to struct file (with zero f_count!) around and has delayed work do __fput() on it. Better way to do it: use atomic_long_add_unless( , -1, 1) instead of !atomic_long_dec_and_test(). IOW, decrement it only if it's not the last reference, leave refcount alone if it was. And use normal fput() in delayed work. I've made that atomic_long_add_unless call a new helper - fput_atomic(). Drops a reference to file if it's safe to do in atomic (i.e. if that's not the last one), tells if it had been able to do that. aio.c converted to it, __fput() use is gone. req->ki_file *always* contributes to refcount now. And __fput() became static. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* vfs: take f_lock on modifying f_mode after open timeWu Fengguang2010-03-061-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | We'll introduce FMODE_RANDOM which will be runtime modified. So protect all runtime modification to f_mode with f_lock to avoid races. Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.33.x] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Take ima_file_free() to proper place.Al Viro2010-02-071-0/+1
| | | | | | Hooks: Just Say No. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* alloc_file(): simplify handling of mnt_clone_write() errorsRoland Dreier2009-12-221-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | When alloc_file() and init_file() were combined, the error handling of mnt_clone_write() was taken into alloc_file() in a somewhat obfuscated way. Since we don't use the error code for anything except warning, we might as well warn directly without an extra variable. Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* re-export alloc_file()Roland Dreier2009-12-161-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 3d1e4631 ("get rid of init_file()") removed the export of alloc_file() -- possibly inadvertently, since that commit mainly consisted of deleting the lines between the end of alloc_file() and the start of the code in init_file(). There is in fact one modular use of alloc_file() in the tree, in drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c, so re-add the export to fix: ERROR: "alloc_file" [drivers/infiniband/core/ib_uverbs.ko] undefined! when CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_ACCESS=m. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Untangling ima mess, part 1: alloc_file()Al Viro2009-12-161-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | There are 2 groups of alloc_file() callers: * ones that are followed by ima_counts_get * ones giving non-regular files So let's pull that ima_counts_get() into alloc_file(); it's a no-op in case of non-regular files. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: move get_empty_filp() deffinition to internal.hEric Paris2009-12-161-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | All users outside of fs/ of get_empty_filp() have been removed. This patch moves the definition from the include/ directory to internal.h so no new users crop up and removes the EXPORT_SYMBOL. I'd love to see open intents stop using it too, but that's a problem for another day and a smarter developer! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* switch alloc_file() to passing struct pathAl Viro2009-12-161-7/+6
| | | | | | | ... and have the caller grab both mnt and dentry; kill leak in infiniband, while we are at it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* get rid of init_file()Al Viro2009-12-161-28/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* unexport get_empty_filp()Al Viro2009-12-161-2/+0
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* LSM: imbed ima calls in the security hooksMimi Zohar2009-10-251-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to the existing security_ hooks. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* sysctl: remove "struct file *" argument of ->proc_handlerAlexey Dobriyan2009-09-241-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's unused. It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl shouldn't care about the rest. It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: move mark_files_ro into file_table.cnpiggin@suse.de2009-06-111-0/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | This function walks the s_files lock, and operates primarily on the files in a superblock, so it better belongs here (eg. see also fs_may_remount_ro). [AV: ... and it shouldn't be static after that move] Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: introduce mnt_clone_writenpiggin@suse.de2009-06-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch speeds up lmbench lat_mmap test by about another 2% after the first patch. Before: avg = 462.286 std = 5.46106 After: avg = 453.12 std = 9.58257 (50 runs of each, stddev gives a reasonable confidence) It does this by introducing mnt_clone_write, which avoids some heavyweight operations of mnt_want_write if called on a vfsmount which we know already has a write count; and mnt_want_write_file, which can call mnt_clone_write if the file is open for write. After these two patches, mnt_want_write and mnt_drop_write go from 7% on the profile down to 1.3% (including mnt_clone_write). [AV: mnt_want_write_file() should take file alone and derive mnt from it; not only all callers have that form, but that's the only mnt about which we know that it's already held for write if file is opened for write] Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* trivial: remove unused variable 'path' in alloc_file()Tero Roponen2009-03-301-1/+0
| | | | | | | 'struct path' is not used in alloc_file(). Signed-off-by: Tero Roponen <tero.roponen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* Merge branch 'bkl-removal' of git://git.lwn.net/linux-2.6Linus Torvalds2009-03-261-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'bkl-removal' of git://git.lwn.net/linux-2.6: Rationalize fasync return values Move FASYNC bit handling to f_op->fasync() Use f_lock to protect f_flags Rename struct file->f_ep_lock
| * Rename struct file->f_ep_lockJonathan Corbet2009-03-161-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This lock moves out of the CONFIG_EPOLL ifdef and becomes f_lock. For now, epoll remains the only user, but a future patch will use it to protect f_flags as well. Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* | Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2009-02-061-1/+9
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: fs/namei.c Manually merged per: diff --cc fs/namei.c index 734f2b5,bbc15c2..0000000 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@@ -860,9 -848,8 +849,10 @@@ static int __link_path_walk(const char nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE; err = exec_permission_lite(inode); if (err == -EAGAIN) - err = vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC); + err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode, + MAY_EXEC); + if (!err) + err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC); if (err) break; @@@ -1525,14 -1506,9 +1509,14 @@@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc flag &= ~O_TRUNC; } - error = vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode); + error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode); if (error) return error; + - error = ima_path_check(&nd->path, ++ error = ima_path_check(path, + acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + if (error) + return error; /* * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing. */ Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * filp_cachep can be static in fs/file_table.cEric Dumazet2008-12-311-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of creating the "filp" kmem_cache in vfs_caches_init(), we can do it a litle be later in files_init(), so that filp_cachep is static to fs/file_table.c Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | integrity: IMA hooksMimi Zohar2009-02-061-0/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | This patch replaces the generic integrity hooks, for which IMA registered itself, with IMA integrity hooks in the appropriate places directly in the fs directory. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* CRED: Use creds in file structsDavid Howells2008-11-141-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | Attach creds to file structs and discard f_uid/f_gid. file_operations::open() methods (such as hppfs_open()) should use file->f_cred rather than current_cred(). At the moment file->f_cred will be current_cred() at this point. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-09 12:07:42 +0000