summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/include/linux/ima.h
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-08-151-0/+7
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers - Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file descriptor, from Mimi Zohar. - Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from Mimi. - Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if using signed firmware), from Mimi. - Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be measured by IMA, from Mimi. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append() security: export security_kernel_load_data function ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module ima: add build time policy ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
| * ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel imagesMimi Zohar2018-07-161-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load syscall. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | IMA: don't propagate opened through the entire thingAl Viro2018-07-121-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | just check ->f_mode in ima_appraise_measurement() Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()Mimi Zohar2017-06-211-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | Only return enabled if in enforcing mode, not fix or log modes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Changes: - Define is_ima_appraise_enabled() as a bool (Thiago Bauermann)
* ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement listMimi Zohar2016-12-201-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate a TPM's quote after a soft reboot (eg. kexec -e), the IMA measurement list of the running kernel must be saved and restored on boot. This patch uses the kexec buffer passing mechanism to pass the serialized IMA binary_runtime_measurements to the next kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscallMimi Zohar2016-05-011-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 3034a14 "ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files" stopped identifying empty files as new files. However new empty files can be created using the mknodat syscall. On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled, these empty files are not labeled with security.ima extended attributes properly, preventing them from subsequently being opened in order to write the file data contents. This patch defines a new hook named ima_post_path_mknod() to mark these empty files, created using mknodat, as new in order to allow the file data contents to be written. In addition, files with security.ima xattrs containing a file signature are considered "immutable" and can not be modified. The file contents need to be written, before signing the file. This patch relaxes this requirement for new files, allowing the file signature to be written before the file contents. Changelog: - defer identifying files with signatures stored as security.ima (based on Dmitry Rozhkov's comments) - removing tests (eg. dentry, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_size == 0) (based on Al's review) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Al Viro <<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
* module: replace copy_module_from_fd with kernel versionMimi Zohar2016-02-211-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to measure/appraise signed kernel modules. The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file() security hook. This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security call. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* security: define kernel_read_file hookMimi Zohar2016-02-211-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file into memory. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_read_file() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* firmware: replace call to fw_read_file_contents() with kernel versionMimi Zohar2016-02-211-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook, IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy. Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once. This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call. Changelog v4+: - revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky v3: - remove kernel_fw_from_file hook - use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis v2: - reordered and squashed firmware patches - fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
* ima: define a new hook to measure and appraise a file already in memoryMimi Zohar2016-02-201-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by the normal IMA policy based processing. Changelog v5: - fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL v3: - rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file() v1: - split patch Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
* ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created filesDmitry Kasatkin2014-09-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Empty files and missing xattrs do not guarantee that a file was just created. This patch passes FILE_CREATED flag to IMA to reliably identify new files. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 3.14+
* ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmwareMimi Zohar2014-07-251-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel. This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's integrity. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* Remove spurious _H suffixes from ifdef commentsPaul Bolle2013-03-271-2/+2
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* ima: support new kernel module syscallMimi Zohar2012-12-141-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system. This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an extensible and consistent manner. To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional patches could pass the signature as the first parameter. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and callsMimi Zohar2012-09-071-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security' xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() functions. (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c) Changelog: - take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin) - ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. (Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu) - Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags, forcing re-appraisal. - Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN - static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs - ima_protect_xattr should be static Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
* ima: add inode_post_setattr callMimi Zohar2012-09-071-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | Changing an inode's metadata may result in our not needing to appraise the file. In such cases, we must remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
* integrity: move ima inode integrity data managementMimi Zohar2011-07-181-13/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
* IMA: maintain i_readcount in the VFS layerMimi Zohar2011-02-101-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | ima_counts_get() updated the readcount and invalidated the PCR, as necessary. Only update the i_readcount in the VFS layer. Move the PCR invalidation checks to ima_file_check(), where it belongs. Maintaining the i_readcount in the VFS layer, will allow other subsystems to use i_readcount. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_checkMimi Zohar2010-02-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | ima_path_check actually deals with files! call it ima_file_check instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fix ima breakageMimi Zohar2010-02-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The "Untangling ima mess, part 2 with counters" patch messed up the counters. Based on conversations with Al Viro, this patch streamlines ima_path_check() by removing the counter maintaince. The counters are now updated independently, from measuring the file, in __dentry_open() and alloc_file() by calling ima_counts_get(). ima_path_check() is called from nfsd and do_filp_open(). It also did not measure all files that should have been measured. Reason: ima_path_check() got bogus value passed as mask. [AV: mea culpa] [AV: add missing nfsd bits] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Untangling ima mess, part 3: kill dead code in imaAl Viro2009-12-161-10/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Kill the 'update' argument of ima_path_check(), kill dead code in ima. Current rules: ima counters are bumped at the same time when the file switches from put_filp() fodder to fput() one. Which happens exactly in two places - alloc_file() and __dentry_open(). Nothing else needs to do that at all. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* integrity: add ima_counts_put (updated)Mimi Zohar2009-06-291-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes an imbalance message as reported by J.R. Okajima. The IMA file counters are incremented in ima_path_check. If the actual open fails, such as ETXTBSY, decrement the counters to prevent unnecessary imbalance messages. Reported-by: J.R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: path_check updateMimi Zohar2009-05-221-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | - Add support in ima_path_check() for integrity checking without incrementing the counts. (Required for nfsd.) - rename and export opencount_get to ima_counts_get - replace ima_shm_check calls with ima_counts_get - export ima_path_check Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: shmem zero fixMimi Zohar2009-02-111-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on comments from Mike Frysinger and Randy Dunlap: (http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/2/9/262) - moved ima.h include before CONFIG_SHMEM test to fix compiler error on Blackfin: mm/shmem.c: In function 'shmem_zero_setup': mm/shmem.c:2670: error: implicit declaration of function 'ima_shm_check' - added 'struct linux_binprm' in ima.h to fix compiler warning on Blackfin: In file included from mm/shmem.c:32: include/linux/ima.h:25: warning: 'struct linux_binprm' declared inside parameter list include/linux/ima.h:25: warning: its scope is only this definition or declaration, which is probably not what you want - moved fs.h include within _LINUX_IMA_H definition Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Integrity: IMA file free imbalanceMimi Zohar2009-02-061-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The number of calls to ima_path_check()/ima_file_free() should be balanced. An extra call to fput(), indicates the file could have been accessed without first being measured. Although f_count is incremented/decremented in places other than fget/fput, like fget_light/fput_light and get_file, the current task must already hold a file refcnt. The call to __fput() is delayed until the refcnt becomes 0, resulting in ima_file_free() flagging any changes. - add hook to increment opencount for IPC shared memory(SYSV), shmat files, and /dev/zero - moved NULL iint test in opencount_get() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: IMA as an integrity service providerMimi Zohar2009-02-061-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: IMA hooksMimi Zohar2009-02-061-0/+44
This patch replaces the generic integrity hooks, for which IMA registered itself, with IMA integrity hooks in the appropriate places directly in the fs directory. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-12 01:43:31 +0000