summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/include/linux/random.h
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* remove unused random32() and srandom32()Akinobu Mita2013-05-071-7/+0
| | | | | | | | | | After finishing a naming transition, remove unused backward compatibility wrapper macros Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* soreuseport: infrastructureTom Herbert2013-01-231-0/+6
| | | | | | | Definitions and macros for implementing soreusport. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* prandom: introduce prandom_bytes() and prandom_bytes_state()Akinobu Mita2012-12-171-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add functions to get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. The difference from get_random_bytes() is that it generates pseudo-random numbers by prandom_u32(). It doesn't consume the entropy pool, and the sequence is reproducible if the same rnd_state is used. So it is suitable for generating random bytes for testing. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* random32: rename random32 to prandomAkinobu Mita2012-12-171-5/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows: void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */ u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */ void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed); /* rename from prandom32_seed() */ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); /* rename from prandom32() */ The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o. And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion is getting worse. As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for pseudo-random number library. Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is difficult to rename too many users at once. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linuxDavid Howells2012-10-131-42/+1
| | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
* random: remove rand_initialize_irq()Theodore Ts'o2012-07-191-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop initializing it now. [ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to rand_initialize_irq() ] Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
* random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() functionTheodore Ts'o2012-07-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is present. Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it is avaiable. The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware manufacturer to have not put in a back door. (For example, an increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.) It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise --- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a whitener. Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented to the specifications claimed by Intel. Short of using a tunnelling electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us to tell for sure. Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed. So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into /dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy pool. This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any potential liabilities. The only benefits we forgo is the speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG anyway. For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG, if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch(). Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* random: create add_device_randomness() interfaceLinus Torvalds2012-07-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). [ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware in question. ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something saneTheodore Ts'o2012-07-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy from a somewhat externally controllable source. This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first. During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu pool. Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool. This assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as possible. (Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by tytso.) Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu> Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu> Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu> Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu> Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* Merge branch 'x86-rdrand-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-10-281-0/+13
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip * 'x86-rdrand-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86, random: Verify RDRAND functionality and allow it to be disabled x86, random: Architectural inlines to get random integers with RDRAND random: Add support for architectural random hooks Fix up trivial conflicts in drivers/char/random.c: the architectural random hooks touched "get_random_int()" that was simplified to use MD5 and not do the keyptr thing any more (see commit 6e5714eaf77d: "net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5").
| * random: Add support for architectural random hooksH. Peter Anvin2011-07-311-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the architecture random number generator interfaces for the userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool pointer. Changes in version 3: - Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes(). - Changes the hooks to inlines. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
* | net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.David S. Miller2011-08-061-12/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons. MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.) Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and use a full 32-bit sequence number. For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well. Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictableEric Dumazet2011-07-211-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS attacks. Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide) This patch : 1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper 2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results 3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* lib/random32: export pseudo-random number generator for modulesJoe Eykholt2010-05-271-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch moves the definition of struct rnd_state and the inline __seed() function to linux/random.h. It renames the static __random32() function to prandom32() and exports it for use in modules. prandom32() is useful as a privately-seeded pseudo random number generator that can give the same result every time it is initialized. For FCoE FC-BB-6 VN2VN mode self-selected unique FC address generation, we need an pseudo-random number generator seeded with the 64-bit world-wide port name. A truly random generator or one seeded with randomness won't do because the same sequence of numbers should be generated each time we boot or the link comes up. A prandom32_seed() inline function is added to the header file. It is inlined not for speed, but so the function won't be expanded in the base kernel, but only in the module that uses it. Signed-off-by: Joe Eykholt <jeykholt@cisco.com> Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* headers_check fix: linux/random.hJaswinder Singh Rajput2009-01-311-0/+1
| | | | | | | | fix the following 'make headers_check' warning: usr/include/linux/random.h:39: found __[us]{8,16,32,64} type without #include <linux/types.h> Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh Rajput <jaswinderrajput@gmail.com>
* sparseirq: move set/get_timer_rand_state back to .cYinghai Lu2009-01-031-50/+0
| | | | | | | those two functions only used in that C file Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* sparse irqs: handle !GENIRQ platformsIngo Molnar2008-12-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: build fix fix: In file included from /home/mingo/tip/arch/m68k/amiga/amiints.c:39: /home/mingo/tip/include/linux/interrupt.h:21: error: expected identifier or '(' /home/mingo/tip/arch/m68k/amiga/amiints.c: In function 'amiga_init_IRQ': Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* sparse irq_desc[] array: core kernel and x86 changesYinghai Lu2008-12-081-0/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: new feature Problem on distro kernels: irq_desc[NR_IRQS] takes megabytes of RAM with NR_CPUS set to large values. The goal is to be able to scale up to much larger NR_IRQS value without impacting the (important) common case. To solve this, we generalize irq_desc[NR_IRQS] to an (optional) array of irq_desc pointers. When CONFIG_SPARSE_IRQ=y is used, we use kzalloc_node to get irq_desc, this also makes the IRQ descriptors NUMA-local (to the site that calls request_irq()). This gets rid of the irq_cfg[] static array on x86 as well: irq_cfg now uses desc->chip_data for x86 to store irq_cfg. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* [PATCH] mark struct file_operations const 1Arjan van de Ven2007-02-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to these shared resources. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [RANDOM]: Annotate random.h IP helpers.Al Viro2006-12-021-10/+10
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] rename net_random to random32Stephen Hemminger2006-10-171-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make net_random() more widely available by calling it random32 akpm: hopefully this will permit the removal of carta_random32. That needs confirmation from Stephane - this code looks somewhat more computationally expensive, and has a different (ie: callee-stateful) interface. [akpm@osdl.org: lots of build fixes, cleanups] Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@hpl.hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [INET6]: Generalise tcp_v6_hash_connectArnaldo Carvalho de Melo2006-01-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Renaming it to inet6_hash_connect, making it possible to ditch dccp_v6_hash_connect and share the same code with TCP instead. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [INET]: Generalise tcp_v4_hash_connectArnaldo Carvalho de Melo2006-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Renaming it to inet_hash_connect, making it possible to ditch dccp_v4_hash_connect and share the same code with TCP instead. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [RANDOM]: Introduce secure_dccp_sequence_numberArnaldo Carvalho de Melo2005-08-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | Code contributed by Stephen Hemminger. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+72
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!