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* Merge tag 'audit-pr-20211101' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-11-011-22/+29
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Add some additional audit logging to capture the openat2() syscall open_how struct info. Previous variations of the open()/openat() syscalls allowed audit admins to inspect the syscall args to get the information contained in the new open_how struct used in openat2()" * tag 'audit-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: return early if the filter rule has a lower priority audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" info audit: add support for the openat2 syscall audit: replace magic audit syscall class numbers with macros lsm_audit: avoid overloading the "key" audit field audit: Convert to SPDX identifier audit: rename struct node to struct audit_node to prevent future name collisions
| * audit: return early if the filter rule has a lower priorityGaosheng Cui2021-10-181-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is not necessary for audit_filter_rules() functions to check audit fileds of the rule with a lower priority, and if we did, there might be some unintended effects, such as the ctx->ppid may be changed unexpectedly, so return early if the rule has a lower priority. Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> [PM: slight tweak to the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" infoRichard Guy Briggs2021-10-041-1/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since the openat2(2) syscall uses a struct open_how pointer to communicate its parameters they are not usefully recorded by the audit SYSCALL record's four existing arguments. Add a new audit record type OPENAT2 that reports the parameters in its third argument, struct open_how with fields oflag, mode and resolve. The new record in the context of an event would look like: time->Wed Mar 17 16:28:53 2021 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): proctitle= 73797363616C6C735F66696C652F6F70656E617432002F746D702F61756469742D 7465737473756974652D737641440066696C652D6F70656E617432 type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=1 name="file-openat2" inode=29 dev=00:1f mode=0100600 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=0 name="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests" inode=25 dev=00:1f mode=040700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 type=CWD msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): cwd="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests" type=OPENAT2 msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): oflag=0100302 mode=0600 resolve=0xa type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): arch=c000003e syscall=437 success=yes exit=4 a0=3 a1=7ffe315f1c53 a2=7ffe315f1550 a3=18 items=2 ppid=528 pid=540 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm="openat2" exe="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests/syscalls_file/openat2" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="testsuite-1616012933-bjAUcEPO" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d23fbb89186754487850367224b060e26f9b7181.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [PM: tweak subject, wrap example, move AUDIT_OPENAT2 to 1337] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * audit: add support for the openat2 syscallRichard Guy Briggs2021-10-011-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit fddb5d430ad9 ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall"). Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier. Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f5f1a4d8699613f8c02ce762807228c841c2e26f.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [PM: merge fuzz due to previous header rename, commit line wraps] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * audit: replace magic audit syscall class numbers with macrosRichard Guy Briggs2021-10-011-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace audit syscall class magic numbers with macros. This required putting the macros into new header file include/linux/audit_arch.h since the syscall macros were included for both 64 bit and 32 bit in any compat code, causing redefinition warnings. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2300b1083a32aade7ae7efb95826e8f3f260b1df.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [PM: renamed header to audit_arch.h after consulting with Richard] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * audit: Convert to SPDX identifierCai Huoqing2021-09-141-14/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use SPDX-License-Identifier instead of a verbose license text. Signed-off-by: Cai Huoqing <caihuoqing@baidu.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-11-011-100/+368
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring. As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we were basically missing two things which we're adding here: + establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls) + additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides. The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches earlier in the year. - Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand the background and why this is the proper fix. - Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make use of securityfs, e.g. IMA. * tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security() selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat() binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks binder: use euid from cred instead of using task LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs Smack: Brutalist io_uring support selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() audit: add filtering for io_uring records audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
| * | audit: add filtering for io_uring recordsPaul Moore2021-09-191-14/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds basic audit io_uring filtering, using as much of the existing audit filtering infrastructure as possible. In order to do this we reuse the audit filter rule's syscall mask for the io_uring operation and we create a new filter for io_uring operations as AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT/audit_filter_list[7]. Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for his review, feedback, and work on the corresponding audit userspace changes. Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uringPaul Moore2021-09-191-0/+166
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds basic auditing to io_uring operations, regardless of their context. This is accomplished by allocating audit_context structures for the io-wq worker and io_uring SQPOLL kernel threads as well as explicitly auditing the io_uring operations in io_issue_sqe(). Individual io_uring operations can bypass auditing through the "audit_skip" field in the struct io_op_def definition for the operation; although great care must be taken so that security relevant io_uring operations do not bypass auditing; please contact the audit mailing list (see the MAINTAINERS file) with any questions. The io_uring operations are audited using a new AUDIT_URINGOP record, an example is shown below: type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1631800225.981:37289): uring_op=19 success=yes exit=0 items=0 ppid=15454 pid=15681 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for review and feedback. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscallsPaul Moore2021-09-191-93/+163
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch cleans up some of our audit_context handling by abstracting out the reset and return code fixup handling to dedicated functions. Not only does this help make things easier to read and inspect, it allows for easier reuse by future patches. We also convert the simple audit_context->in_syscall flag into an enum which can be used to by future patches to indicate a calling context other than the syscall context. Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for review and feedback. Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* / audit: fix possible null-pointer dereference in audit_filter_rulesGaosheng Cui2021-10-181-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix possible null-pointer dereference in audit_filter_rules. audit_filter_rules() error: we previously assumed 'ctx' could be null Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bf361231c295 ("audit: add saddr_fam filter field") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: remove trailing spaces and tabsZhen Lei2021-06-101-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Run the following command to find and remove the trailing spaces and tabs: sed -r -i 's/[ \t]+$//' <audit_files> The files to be checked are as follows: kernel/audit* include/linux/audit.h include/uapi/linux/audit.h Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: Rename enum audit_state constants to avoid AUDIT_DISABLED redefinitionSergey Nazarov2021-06-081-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | AUDIT_DISABLED defined in kernel/audit.h as element of enum audit_state and redefined in kernel/audit.c. This produces a warning when kernel builds with syscalls audit disabled and brokes kernel build if -Werror used. enum audit_state used in syscall audit code only. This patch changes enum audit_state constants prefix AUDIT to AUDIT_STATE to avoid AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition. Signed-off-by: Sergey Nazarov <s-nazarov@yandex.ru> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: add blank line after variable declarationsRoni Nevalainen2021-05-101-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | Fix the following checkpatch warning in auditsc.c: WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations Signed-off-by: Roni Nevalainen <kitten@kittenz.dev> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'audit-pr-20210426' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-04-271-7/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another small pull request for audit, most of the patches are documentation updates with only two real code changes: one to fix a compiler warning for a dummy function/macro, and one to cleanup some code since we removed the AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY ages ago (v4.17)" * tag 'audit-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: drop /proc/PID/loginuid documentation Format field audit: avoid -Wempty-body warning audit: document /proc/PID/sessionid audit: document /proc/PID/loginuid MAINTAINERS: update audit files audit: further cleanup of AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY deprecation
| * audit: further cleanup of AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY deprecationRichard Guy Briggs2021-03-121-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the list parameter from the function call since the exit filter list is the only remaining list used by this function. This cleans up commit 5260ecc2e048 ("audit: deprecate the AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY filter") Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variantsPaul Moore2021-03-221-4/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective credentials. This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook implementations and return the correct credentials. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-02-231-2/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner: "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and maintainers. Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here are just a few: - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the implementation of portable home directories in systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at login time. - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged containers without having to change ownership permanently through chown(2). - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their Linux subsystem. - It is possible to share files between containers with non-overlapping idmappings. - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC) permission checking. - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of all files. - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home directory and container and vm scenario. - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only apply as long as the mount exists. Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull this: - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away in their implementation of portable home directories. https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/ - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734 - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is ported. - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers. I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones: https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/ This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and xfs: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to merge this. In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the testsuite. Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is currently marked with. The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern of extensibility. The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped mount: - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in. - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts. - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped. - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem. The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler. By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no behavioral or performance changes are observed. The manpage with a detailed description can be found here: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8 In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify that port has been done correctly. The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform mounts based on file descriptors only. Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2() RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and path resolution. While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing. With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api, covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and projects. There is a simple tool available at https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you decide to pull this in the following weeks: Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home directory: u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 .. -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 .. -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: mnt/my-file # owner: u1001 # group: u1001 user::rw- user:u1001:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r-- u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: home/ubuntu/my-file # owner: ubuntu # group: ubuntu user::rw- user:ubuntu:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r--" * tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits) xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl xfs: support idmapped mounts ext4: support idmapped mounts fat: handle idmapped mounts tests: add mount_setattr() selftests fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP fs: add mount_setattr() fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper fs: split out functions to hold writers namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags nfs: do not export idmapped mounts overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ima: handle idmapped mounts apparmor: handle idmapped mounts fs: make helpers idmap mount aware exec: handle idmapped mounts would_dump: handle idmapped mounts ...
| * commoncap: handle idmapped mountsChristian Brauner2021-01-241-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
* | audit: Make audit_filter_syscall() return voidYang Yang2021-01-271-8/+8
|/ | | | | | | | | | | No invoker uses the return value of audit_filter_syscall(). So make it return void, and amend the comment of audit_filter_syscall(). Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: removed the changelog from the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'audit-pr-20201214' of ↵Linus Torvalds2020-12-161-26/+12
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "A small set of audit patches for v5.11 with four patches in total and only one of any real significance. Richard's patch to trigger accompanying records causes the kernel to emit additional related records when an audit event occurs; helping provide some much needed context to events in the audit log. It is also worth mentioning that this is a revised patch based on an earlier attempt that had to be reverted in the v5.8 time frame. Everything passes our test suite, and with no problems reported please merge this for v5.11" * tag 'audit-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: replace atomic_add_return() audit: fix macros warnings audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules present audit: fix a kernel-doc markup
| * audit: fix macros warningsAlex Shi2020-11-241-6/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some unused macros could cause gcc warning: kernel/audit.c:68:0: warning: macro "AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED" is not used [-Wunused-macros] kernel/auditsc.c:104:0: warning: macro "AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM" is not used [-Wunused-macros] kernel/auditsc.c:82:0: warning: macro "AUDITSC_INVALID" is not used [-Wunused-macros] AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED and AUDITSC_INVALID are still meaningful and should be in incorporated. Just remove AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM. Thanks comments from Richard Guy Briggs and Paul Moore. Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules presentRichard Guy Briggs2020-10-271-20/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When there are no audit rules registered, mandatory records (config, etc.) are missing their accompanying records (syscall, proctitle, etc.). This is due to audit context dummy set on syscall entry based on absence of rules that signals that no other records are to be printed. Clear the dummy bit if any record is generated, open coding this in audit_log_start(). The proctitle context and dummy checks are pointless since the proctitle record will not be printed if no syscall records are printed. The fds array is reset to -1 after the first syscall to indicate it isn't valid any more, but was never set to -1 when the context was allocated to indicate it wasn't yet valid. Check ctx->pwd in audit_log_name(). The audit_inode* functions can be called without going through getname_flags() or getname_kernel() that sets audit_names and cwd, so set the cwd in audit_alloc_name() if it has not already been done so due to audit_names being valid and purge all other audit_getcwd() calls. Revert the LSM dump_common_audit_data() LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* cases from the ghak96 patch since they are no longer necessary due to cwd coverage in audit_alloc_name(). Thanks to bauen1 <j2468h@googlemail.com> for reporting LSM situations in which context->cwd is not valid, inadvertantly fixed by the ghak96 patch. Please see upstream github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/120 This is also related to upstream github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | audit: Migrate to use SYSCALL_WORK flagGabriel Krisman Bertazi2020-11-161-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On architectures using the generic syscall entry code the architecture independent syscall work is moved to flags in thread_info::syscall_work. This removes architecture dependencies and frees up TIF bits. Define SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_AUDIT, use it in the generic entry code and convert the code which uses the TIF specific helper functions to use the new *_syscall_work() helpers which either resolve to the new mode for users of the generic entry code or to the TIF based functions for the other architectures. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116174206.2639648-9-krisman@collabora.com
* Merge tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of ↵Linus Torvalds2020-08-041-7/+38
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Aside from some smaller bug fixes, here are the highlights: - add a new backlog wait metric to the audit status message, this is intended to help admins determine how long processes have been waiting for the audit backlog queue to clear - generate audit records for nftables configuration changes - generate CWD audit records for for the relevant LSM audit records" * tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: report audit wait metric in audit status reply audit: purge audit_log_string from the intra-kernel audit API audit: issue CWD record to accompany LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records audit: use the proper gfp flags in the audit_log_nfcfg() calls audit: remove unused !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL __audit_inode* stubs audit: add gfp parameter to audit_log_nfcfg audit: log nftables configuration change events audit: Use struct_size() helper in alloc_chunk
| * audit: issue CWD record to accompany LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* recordsRichard Guy Briggs2020-07-081-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records for PATH, FILE, IOCTL_OP, DENTRY and INODE are incomplete without the task context of the AUDIT Current Working Directory record. Add it. This record addition can't use audit_dummy_context to determine whether or not to store the record information since the LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records are initiated by various LSMs independent of any audit rules. context->in_syscall is used to determine if it was called in user context like audit_getname. Please see the upstream issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96 Adapted from Vladis Dronov's v2 patch. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * audit: add gfp parameter to audit_log_nfcfgRichard Guy Briggs2020-06-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixed an inconsistent use of GFP flags in nft_obj_notify() that used GFP_KERNEL when a GFP flag was passed in to that function. Given this allocated memory was then used in audit_log_nfcfg() it led to an audit of all other GFP allocations in net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c and a modification of audit_log_nfcfg() to accept a GFP parameter. Reported-by: Dan Carptenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * audit: log nftables configuration change eventsRichard Guy Briggs2020-06-231-3/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | iptables, ip6tables, arptables and ebtables table registration, replacement and unregistration configuration events are logged for the native (legacy) iptables setsockopt api, but not for the nftables netlink api which is used by the nft-variant of iptables in addition to nftables itself. Add calls to log the configuration actions in the nftables netlink api. This uses the same NETFILTER_CFG record format but overloads the table field. type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.878:162) : table=?:0;?:0 family=unspecified entries=2 op=nft_register_gen pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld ... type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.878:162) : table=firewalld:1;?:0 family=inet entries=0 op=nft_register_table pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld ... type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;filter_FORWARD:85 family=inet entries=8 op=nft_register_chain pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld ... type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;filter_FORWARD:85 family=inet entries=101 op=nft_register_rule pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld ... type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;__set0:87 family=inet entries=87 op=nft_register_setelem pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld ... type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-28 17:46:41.911:163) : table=firewalld:1;__set0:87 family=inet entries=0 op=nft_register_set pid=396 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld For further information please see issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/124 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | revert: 1320a4052ea1 ("audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules ↵Paul Moore2020-07-291-0/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | present") Unfortunately the commit listed in the subject line above failed to ensure that the task's audit_context was properly initialized/set before enabling the "accompanying records". Depending on the situation, the resulting audit_context could have invalid values in some of it's fields which could cause a kernel panic/oops when the task/syscall exists and the audit records are generated. We will revisit the original patch, with the necessary fixes, in a future kernel but right now we just want to fix the kernel panic with the least amount of added risk. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1320a4052ea1 ("audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules present") Reported-by: j2468h@googlemail.com Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: add subj creds to NETFILTER_CFG record toRichard Guy Briggs2020-05-201-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some table unregister actions seem to be initiated by the kernel to garbage collect unused tables that are not initiated by any userspace actions. It was found to be necessary to add the subject credentials to cover this case to reveal the source of these actions. A sample record: The uid, auid, tty, ses and exe fields have not been included since they are in the SYSCALL record and contain nothing useful in the non-user context. Here are two sample orphaned records: type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-20 12:14:36.505:5) : table=filter family=ipv4 entries=0 op=register pid=1 subj=kernel comm=swapper/0 type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2020-05-20 12:15:27.701:301) : table=nat family=bridge entries=0 op=unregister pid=30 subj=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 comm=kworker/u4:1 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: make symbol 'audit_nfcfgs' staticZheng Bin2020-05-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Fix sparse warnings: kernel/auditsc.c:138:32: warning: symbol 'audit_nfcfgs' was not declared. Should it be static? Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* netfilter: add audit table unregister actionsRichard Guy Briggs2020-04-281-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | Audit the action of unregistering ebtables and x_tables. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/44 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: tidy and extend netfilter_cfg x_tablesRichard Guy Briggs2020-04-281-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | NETFILTER_CFG record generation was inconsistent for x_tables and ebtables configuration changes. The call was needlessly messy and there were supporting records missing at times while they were produced when not requested. Simplify the logging call into a new audit_log_nfcfg call. Honour the audit_enabled setting while more consistently recording information including supporting records by tidying up dummy checks. Add an op= field that indicates the operation being performed (register or replace). Here is the enhanced sample record: type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(1580905834.919:82970): table=filter family=2 entries=83 op=replace Generate audit NETFILTER_CFG records on ebtables table registration. Previously this was being done for x_tables registration and replacement operations and ebtables table replacement only. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/25 See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/35 See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/43 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules presentRichard Guy Briggs2020-03-121-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When there are no audit rules registered, mandatory records (config, etc.) are missing their accompanying records (syscall, proctitle, etc.). This is due to audit context dummy set on syscall entry based on absence of rules that signals that no other records are to be printed. Clear the dummy bit if any record is generated. The proctitle context and dummy checks are pointless since the proctitle record will not be printed if no syscall records are printed. Please see upstream github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/120 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: enforce op for string fieldsRichard Guy Briggs2019-05-281-3/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The field operator is ignored on several string fields. WATCH, DIR, PERM and FILETYPE field operators are completely ignored and meaningless since the op is not referenced in audit_filter_rules(). Range and bitwise operators are already addressed in ghak73. Honour the operator for WATCH, DIR, PERM, FILETYPE fields as is done in the EXE field. Please see github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/114 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: add saddr_fam filter fieldRichard Guy Briggs2019-05-231-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a method to filter out sockaddr and bind calls by network address family. Existing SOCKADDR records are listed for any network activity. Implement the AUDIT_SADDR_FAM field selector to be able to classify or limit records to specific network address families, such as AF_INET or AF_INET6. An example of a network record that is unlikely to be useful and flood the logs: type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(07/27/2017 12:18:27.019:845) : saddr={ fam=local path=/var/run/nscd/socket } type=SYSCALL msg=audit(07/27/2017 12:18:27.019:845) : arch=x86_64 syscall=connect success=no exit=ENOENT(No such file or directory) a0=0x3 a1=0x7fff229c4980 a2=0x6e a3=0x6 items=1 ppid=3301 pid=6145 auid=sgrubb uid=sgrubb gid=sgrubb euid=sgrubb suid=sgrubb fsuid=sgrubb egid=sgrubb sgid=sgrubb fsgid=sgrubb tty=pts3 ses=4 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=network-test Please see the audit-testsuite PR at https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/pull/87 Please see the github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/64 Please see the github issue for the accompanying userspace support https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/93 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: merge fuzz in auditfilter.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: deliver signal_info regarless of syscallRichard Guy Briggs2019-05-211-16/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a process signals the audit daemon (shutdown, rotate, resume, reconfig) but syscall auditing is not enabled, we still want to know the identity of the process sending the signal to the audit daemon. Move audit_signal_info() out of syscall auditing to general auditing but create a new function audit_signal_info_syscall() to take care of the syscall dependent parts for when syscall auditing is enabled. Please see the github kernel audit issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/111 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge branch 'work.dcache' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-05-071-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc dcache updates from Al Viro: "Most of this pile is putting name length into struct name_snapshot and making use of it. The beginning of this series ("ovl_lookup_real_one(): don't bother with strlen()") ought to have been split in two (separate switch of name_snapshot to struct qstr from overlayfs reaping the trivial benefits of that), but I wanted to avoid a rebase - by the time I'd spotted that it was (a) in -next and (b) close to 5.1-final ;-/" * 'work.dcache' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: audit_compare_dname_path(): switch to const struct qstr * audit_update_watch(): switch to const struct qstr * inotify_handle_event(): don't bother with strlen() fsnotify: switch send_to_group() and ->handle_event to const struct qstr * fsnotify(): switch to passing const struct qstr * for file_name switch fsnotify_move() to passing const struct qstr * for old_name ovl_lookup_real_one(): don't bother with strlen() sysv: bury the broken "quietly truncate the long filenames" logics nsfs: unobfuscate unexport d_alloc_pseudo()
| * audit_compare_dname_path(): switch to const struct qstr *Al Viro2019-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | ntp: Audit NTP parameters adjustmentOndrej Mosnacek2019-04-151-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Emit an audit record every time selected NTP parameters are modified from userspace (via adjtimex(2) or clock_adjtime(2)). These parameters may be used to indirectly change system clock, and thus their modifications should be audited. Such events will now generate records of type AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL containing the following fields: - op -- which value was adjusted: - offset -- corresponding to the time_offset variable - freq -- corresponding to the time_freq variable - status -- corresponding to the time_status variable - adjust -- corresponding to the time_adjust variable - tick -- corresponding to the tick_usec variable - tai -- corresponding to the timekeeping's TAI offset - old -- the old value - new -- the new value Example records: type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.507:7): op=status old=64 new=8256 type=TIME_ADJNTPVAL msg=audit(1530616044.511:11): op=freq old=0 new=49180377088000 The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding syscall records. An overview of parameter changes that can be done via do_adjtimex() (based on information from Miroslav Lichvar) and whether they are audited: __timekeeping_set_tai_offset() -- sets the offset from the International Atomic Time (AUDITED) NTP variables: time_offset -- can adjust the clock by up to 0.5 seconds per call and also speed it up or slow down by up to about 0.05% (43 seconds per day) (AUDITED) time_freq -- can speed up or slow down by up to about 0.05% (AUDITED) time_status -- can insert/delete leap seconds and it also enables/ disables synchronization of the hardware real-time clock (AUDITED) time_maxerror, time_esterror -- change error estimates used to inform userspace applications (NOT AUDITED) time_constant -- controls the speed of the clock adjustments that are made when time_offset is set (NOT AUDITED) time_adjust -- can temporarily speed up or slow down the clock by up to 0.05% (AUDITED) tick_usec -- a more extreme version of time_freq; can speed up or slow down the clock by up to 10% (AUDITED) Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | timekeeping: Audit clock adjustmentsOndrej Mosnacek2019-04-151-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Emit an audit record whenever the system clock is changed (i.e. shifted by a non-zero offset) by a syscall from userspace. The syscalls than can (at the time of writing) trigger such record are: - settimeofday(2), stime(2), clock_settime(2) -- via do_settimeofday64() - adjtimex(2), clock_adjtime(2) -- via do_adjtimex() The new records have type AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET and contain the following fields: - sec -- the 'seconds' part of the offset - nsec -- the 'nanoseconds' part of the offset Example record (time was shifted backwards by ~15.875 seconds): type=TIME_INJOFFSET msg=audit(1530616049.652:13): sec=-16 nsec=124887145 The records of this type will be associated with the corresponding syscall records. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> [PM: fixed a line width problem in __audit_tk_injoffset()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | audit: purge unnecessary list_empty callsRichard Guy Briggs2019-04-081-37/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original conditions that led to the use of list_empty() to optimize list_for_each_entry_rcu() in auditfilter.c and auditsc.c code have been removed without removing the list_empty() call, but this code example has been copied several times. Remove the unnecessary list_empty() calls. Please see upstream github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/112 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | syscall_get_arch: add "struct task_struct *" argumentDmitry V. Levin2019-03-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This argument is required to extend the generic ptrace API with PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO request: syscall_get_arch() is going to be called from ptrace_request() along with syscall_get_nr(), syscall_get_arguments(), syscall_get_error(), and syscall_get_return_value() functions with a tracee as their argument. The primary intent is that the triple (audit_arch, syscall_nr, arg1..arg6) should describe what system call is being called and what its arguments are. Reverts: 5e937a9ae913 ("syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments") Reverts: 1002d94d3076 ("syscall.h: fix doc text for syscall_get_arch()") Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> # for x86 Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> # MIPS parts Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> # seccomp parts Acked-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> # for the c6x bit Cc: Elvira Khabirova <lineprinter@altlinux.org> Cc: Eugene Syromyatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-c6x-dev@linux-c6x.org Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp Cc: linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: nios2-dev@lists.rocketboards.org Cc: openrisc@lists.librecores.org Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | audit: Make audit_log_cap and audit_copy_inode staticYueHaibing2019-03-201-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix sparse warning: kernel/auditsc.c:1150:6: warning: symbol 'audit_log_cap' was not declared. Should it be static? kernel/auditsc.c:1908:6: warning: symbol 'audit_copy_inode' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | audit: fix a memleak caused by auditing load moduleLi RongQing2019-03-181-1/+9
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | module.name will be allocated unconditionally when auditing load module, and audit_log_start() can fail with other reasons, or audit_log_exit maybe not called, caused module.name is not freed so free module.name in audit_free_context and __audit_syscall_exit unreferenced object 0xffff88af90837d20 (size 8): comm "modprobe", pid 1036, jiffies 4294704867 (age 3069.138s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 69 78 67 62 65 00 ff ff ixgbe... backtrace: [<0000000008da28fe>] __audit_log_kern_module+0x33/0x80 [<00000000c1491e61>] load_module+0x64f/0x3850 [<000000007fc9ae3f>] __do_sys_init_module+0x218/0x250 [<0000000000d4a478>] do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400 [<000000004924ded8>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [<000000007dc331dd>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: ca86cad7380e3 ("audit: log module name on init_module") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com> Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> [PM: manual merge fixup in __audit_syscall_exit()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALLRichard Guy Briggs2019-02-031-0/+158
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove audit_context from struct task_struct and struct audit_buffer when CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled but CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is not. Also, audit_log_name() (and supporting inode and fcaps functions) should have been put back in auditsc.c when soft and hard link logging was normalized since it is only used by syscall auditing. See github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/105 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_matchRichard Guy Briggs2019-01-311-9/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack). The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be accessed by audit accessor functions. It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used. Remove it. Please see the github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: fixed the referenced commit title] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: ignore fcaps on umountRichard Guy Briggs2019-01-301-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't fetch fcaps when umount2 is called to avoid a process hang while it waits for the missing resource to (possibly never) re-appear. Note the comment above user_path_mountpoint_at(): * A umount is a special case for path walking. We're not actually interested * in the inode in this situation, and ESTALE errors can be a problem. We * simply want track down the dentry and vfsmount attached at the mountpoint * and avoid revalidating the last component. This can happen on ceph, cifs, 9p, lustre, fuse (gluster) or NFS. Please see the github issue tracker https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: merge fuzz in audit_log_fcaps()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magicRichard Guy Briggs2019-01-251-8/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Like commit 42d5e37654e4 ("audit: filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic") that addresses https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/8 Any user or remote filesystem could become unavailable and effectively block on a forced unmount. -a always,exit -S umount2 -F key=umount2 Provide a method to ignore these user and remote filesystems to prevent them from being impossible to unmount. Extend the "AUDIT_FILTER_FS" filter that uses the field type AUDIT_FSTYPE keying off the filesystem 4-octet hexadecimal magic identifier to filter specific filesystems to cover audit_inode() to address this blockage. An example rule would look like: -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x517B -F key=ignore_smb -a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x6969 -F key=ignore_nfs Arguably the better way to address this issue is to disable auditing processes that touch removable filesystems. Note: refactor __audit_inode_child() to remove two levels of if indentation. Please see the github issue tracker https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/100 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* audit: add support for fcaps v3Richard Guy Briggs2019-01-251-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | V3 namespaced file capabilities were introduced in commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Add support for these by adding the "frootid" field to the existing fcaps fields in the NAME and BPRM_FCAPS records. Please see github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/103 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> [PM: comment tweak to fit an 80 char line width] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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