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* bpf: fix inner map masking to prevent oob under speculationDaniel Borkmann2019-01-181-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During review I noticed that inner meta map setup for map in map is buggy in that it does not propagate all needed data from the reference map which the verifier is later accessing. In particular one such case is index masking to prevent out of bounds access under speculative execution due to missing the map's unpriv_array/index_mask field propagation. Fix this such that the verifier is generating the correct code for inlined lookups in case of unpriviledged use. Before patch (test_verifier's 'map in map access' dump): # bpftool prog dump xla id 3 0: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -4 3: (18) r1 = map[id:4] 5: (07) r1 += 272 | 6: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) | 7: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+6 | Inlined map in map lookup 8: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | with index masking for 9: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array. 10: (0f) r0 += r1 | 11: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) | 12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 | 13: (05) goto pc+1 | 14: (b7) r0 = 0 | 15: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 16: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0 17: (bf) r2 = r10 18: (07) r2 += -4 19: (bf) r1 = r0 20: (07) r1 += 272 | 21: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) | Index masking missing (!) 22: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+3 | for inner map despite 23: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array set. 24: (0f) r0 += r1 | 25: (05) goto pc+1 | 26: (b7) r0 = 0 | 27: (b7) r0 = 0 28: (95) exit After patch: # bpftool prog dump xla id 1 0: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -4 3: (18) r1 = map[id:2] 5: (07) r1 += 272 | 6: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) | 7: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+6 | Same inlined map in map lookup 8: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | with index masking due to 9: (67) r0 <<= 3 | map->unpriv_array. 10: (0f) r0 += r1 | 11: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) | 12: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 | 13: (05) goto pc+1 | 14: (b7) r0 = 0 | 15: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+12 16: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0 17: (bf) r2 = r10 18: (07) r2 += -4 19: (bf) r1 = r0 20: (07) r1 += 272 | 21: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) | 22: (35) if r0 >= 0x1 goto pc+4 | Now fixed inlined inner map 23: (54) (u32) r0 &= (u32) 0 | lookup with proper index masking 24: (67) r0 <<= 3 | for map->unpriv_array. 25: (0f) r0 += r1 | 26: (05) goto pc+1 | 27: (b7) r0 = 0 | 28: (b7) r0 = 0 29: (95) exit Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Annotate implicit fall through in cgroup_dev_func_protoMathieu Malaterre2019-01-171-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and this place in the code produced a warnings (W=1). This commit removes the following warning: kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:719:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* bpf: Make function btf_name_offset_valid staticMathieu Malaterre2019-01-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Initially in commit 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)") the function 'btf_name_offset_valid' was introduced as static function it was later on changed to a non-static one, and then finally in commit 23127b33ec80 ("bpf: Create a new btf_name_by_offset() for non type name use case") the function prototype was removed. Revert back to original implementation and make the function static. Remove warning triggered with W=1: kernel/bpf/btf.c:470:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'btf_name_offset_valid' [-Wmissing-prototypes] Fixes: 23127b33ec80 ("bpf: Create a new btf_name_by_offset() for non type name use case") Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* bpf: zero out build_id for BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IPStanislav Fomichev2019-01-171-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | When returning BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_IP from stack_map_get_build_id_offset, make sure that build_id field is empty. Since we are using percpu free list, there is a possibility that we might reuse some previous bpf_stack_build_id with non-zero build_id. Fixes: 615755a77b24 ("bpf: extend stackmap to save binary_build_id+offset instead of address") Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* bpf: don't assume build-id length is always 20 bytesStanislav Fomichev2019-01-171-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Build-id length is not fixed to 20, it can be (`man ld` /--build-id): * 128-bit (uuid) * 160-bit (sha1) * any length specified in ld --build-id=0xhexstring To fix the issue of missing BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_VALID for shorter build-ids, assume that build-id is somewhere in the range of 1 .. 20. Set the remaining bytes to zero. v2: * don't introduce new "len = min(BPF_BUILD_ID_SIZE, nhdr->n_descsz)", we already know that nhdr->n_descsz <= BPF_BUILD_ID_SIZE if we enter this 'if' condition Fixes: 615755a77b24 ("bpf: extend stackmap to save binary_build_id+offset instead of address") Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* bpf: fix bpffs bitfield pretty printYonghong Song2019-01-111-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 9d5f9f701b18 ("bpf: btf: fix struct/union/fwd types with kind_flag") introduced kind_flag and used bitfield_size in the btf_member to directly pretty print member values. The commit contained a bug where the incorrect parameters could be passed to function btf_bitfield_seq_show(). The bits_offset parameter in the function expects a value less than 8. Instead, the member offset in the structure is passed. The below is btf_bitfield_seq_show() func signature: void btf_bitfield_seq_show(void *data, u8 bits_offset, u8 nr_bits, struct seq_file *m) both bits_offset and nr_bits are u8 type. If the bitfield member offset is greater than 256, incorrect value will be printed. This patch fixed the issue by calculating correct proper data offset and bits_offset similar to non kind_flag case. Fixes: 9d5f9f701b18 ("bpf: btf: fix struct/union/fwd types with kind_flag") Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* bpf: fix panic in stack_map_get_build_id() on i386 and arm32Song Liu2019-01-101-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | As Naresh reported, test_stacktrace_build_id() causes panic on i386 and arm32 systems. This is caused by page_address() returns NULL in certain cases. This patch fixes this error by using kmap_atomic/kunmap_atomic instead of page_address. Fixes: 615755a77b24 (" bpf: extend stackmap to save binary_build_id+offset instead of address") Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
* bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different pathsDaniel Borkmann2019-01-051-13/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer came from two different map values with different map properties such as value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program instead. Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() functionLinus Torvalds2019-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmeticDaniel Borkmann2019-01-021-6/+179
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access: While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example: - Load a map value pointer into R6 - Load an index into R7 - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy) - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch) - Load R0 = R6[R7] - Load R0 = R6[R0] For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation. In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF. Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds. There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows: ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source. The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ... PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm) PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON [...] ... which under speculation could end up as ... PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] [...] ... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program. Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints. With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...] For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example: [...] 16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 17: (1f) r11 -= r2 18: (4f) r11 |= r2 19: (87) r11 = -r11 20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 21: (5f) r2 &= r11 22: (0f) r2 += r0 23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) [...] JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10: [...] d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax [...] Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully. [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offsetDaniel Borkmann2019-01-021-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In check_map_access() we probe actual bounds through __check_map_access() with offset of reg->smin_value + off for lower bound and offset of reg->umax_value + off for the upper bound. However, even though the reg->smin_value could have a negative value, the final result of the sum with off could be positive when pointer arithmetic with known and unknown scalars is combined. In this case we reject the program with an error such as "R<x> min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check." even though the access itself would be fine. Therefore extend the check to probe whether the actual resulting reg->smin_value + off is less than zero. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivilegedDaniel Borkmann2019-01-021-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | For unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds, meaning their smin_value is negative and their smax_value is positive, we need to reject arithmetic with pointer to map value. For unprivileged the goal is to mask every map pointer arithmetic and this cannot reliably be done when it is unknown at verification time whether the scalar value is negative or positive. Given this is a corner case, the likelihood of breaking should be very small. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivilegedDaniel Borkmann2019-01-021-22/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with a stack pointer as a destination we simulate a check_stack_access() of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is rejected for unprivileged program loads. This is analog to map value pointer arithmetic and needed for masking later on. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivilegedDaniel Borkmann2019-01-021-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with a map value pointer as a destination it will simulate a check_map_access() of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is rejected for unprivileged program loads. We use this later on for masking any pointer arithmetic with the remainder of the map value space. The likelihood of breaking any existing real-world unprivileged eBPF program is very small for this corner case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewriteDaniel Borkmann2019-01-021-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now we are using BPF ax register in JIT for constant blinding as well as in interpreter as temporary variable. Verifier will not be able to use it simply because its use will get overridden from the former in bpf_jit_blind_insn(). However, it can be made to work in that blinding will be skipped if there is prior use in either source or destination register on the instruction. Taking constraints of ax into account, the verifier is then open to use it in rewrites under some constraints. Note, ax register already has mappings in every eBPF JIT. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreterDaniel Borkmann2019-01-021-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This change moves the on-stack 64 bit tmp variable in ___bpf_prog_run() into the hidden ax register. The latter is currently only used in JITs for constant blinding as a temporary scratch register, meaning the BPF interpreter will never see the use of ax. Therefore it is safe to use it for the cases where tmp has been used earlier. This is needed to later on allow restricted hidden use of ax in both interpreter and JITs. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier envDaniel Borkmann2019-01-021-38/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Move prev_insn_idx and insn_idx from the do_check() function into the verifier environment, so they can be read inside the various helper functions for handling the instructions. It's easier to put this into the environment rather than changing all call-sites only to pass it along. insn_idx is useful in particular since this later on allows to hold state in env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-nextDavid S. Miller2018-12-207-100/+702
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2018-12-21 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. There is a merge conflict in test_verifier.c. Result looks as follows: [...] }, { "calls: cross frame pruning", .insns = { [...] .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER, .errstr_unpriv = "function calls to other bpf functions are allowed for root only", .result_unpriv = REJECT, .errstr = "!read_ok", .result = REJECT, }, { "jset: functional", .insns = { [...] { "jset: unknown const compare not taken", .insns = { BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSET, BPF_REG_0, 1, 1), BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER, .errstr_unpriv = "!read_ok", .result_unpriv = REJECT, .errstr = "!read_ok", .result = REJECT, }, [...] { "jset: range", .insns = { [...] }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER, .result_unpriv = ACCEPT, .result = ACCEPT, }, The main changes are: 1) Various BTF related improvements in order to get line info working. Meaning, verifier will now annotate the corresponding BPF C code to the error log, from Martin and Yonghong. 2) Implement support for raw BPF tracepoints in modules, from Matt. 3) Add several improvements to verifier state logic, namely speeding up stacksafe check, optimizations for stack state equivalence test and safety checks for liveness analysis, from Alexei. 4) Teach verifier to make use of BPF_JSET instruction, add several test cases to kselftests and remove nfp specific JSET optimization now that verifier has awareness, from Jakub. 5) Improve BPF verifier's slot_type marking logic in order to allow more stack slot sharing, from Jiong. 6) Add sk_msg->size member for context access and add set of fixes and improvements to make sock_map with kTLS usable with openssl based applications, from John. 7) Several cleanups and documentation updates in bpftool as well as auto-mount of tracefs for "bpftool prog tracelog" command, from Quentin. 8) Include sub-program tags from now on in bpf_prog_info in order to have a reliable way for user space to get all tags of the program e.g. needed for kallsyms correlation, from Song. 9) Add BTF annotations for cgroup_local_storage BPF maps and implement bpf fs pretty print support, from Roman. 10) Fix bpftool in order to allow for cross-compilation, from Ivan. 11) Update of bpftool license to GPLv2-only + BSD-2-Clause in order to be compatible with libbfd and allow for Debian packaging, from Jakub. 12) Remove an obsolete prog->aux sanitation in dump and get rid of version check for prog load, from Daniel. 13) Fix a memory leak in libbpf's line info handling, from Prashant. 14) Fix cpumap's frame alignment for build_skb() so that skb_shared_info does not get unaligned, from Jesper. 15) Fix test_progs kselftest to work with older compilers which are less smart in optimizing (and thus throwing build error), from Stanislav. 16) Cleanup and simplify AF_XDP socket teardown, from Björn. 17) Fix sk lookup in BPF kselftest's test_sock_addr with regards to netns_id argument, from Andrey. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * bpf/cpumap: make sure frame_size for build_skb is aligned if headroom isn'tJesper Dangaard Brouer2018-12-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The frame_size passed to build_skb must be aligned, else it is possible that the embedded struct skb_shared_info gets unaligned. For correctness make sure that xdpf->headroom in included in the alignment. No upstream drivers can hit this, as all XDP drivers provide an aligned headroom. This was discovered when playing with implementing XDP support for mvneta, which have a 2 bytes DSA header, and this Marvell ARM64 platform didn't like doing atomic operations on an unaligned skb_shinfo(skb)->dataref addresses. Fixes: 1c601d829ab0 ("bpf: cpumap xdp_buff to skb conversion and allocation") Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: verifier: reorder stack size check with dead code sanitizationJakub Kicinski2018-12-201-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reorder the calls to check_max_stack_depth() and sanitize_dead_code() to separate functions which can rewrite instructions from pure checks. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: verifier: teach the verifier to reason about the BPF_JSET instructionJakub Kicinski2018-12-201-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some JITs (nfp) try to optimize code on their own. It could make sense in case of BPF_JSET instruction which is currently not interpreted by the verifier, meaning for instance that dead could would not be detected if it was under BPF_JSET branch. Teach the verifier basics of BPF_JSET, JIT optimizations will be removed shortly. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: Ensure line_info.insn_off cannot point to insn with zero codeMartin KaFai Lau2018-12-191-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch rejects a line_info if the bpf insn code referred by line_info.insn_off is 0. F.e. a broken userspace tool might generate a line_info.insn_off that points to the second 8 bytes of a BPF_LD_IMM64. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: log struct/union attribute for forward typeYonghong Song2018-12-191-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Current btf internal verbose logger logs fwd type as [2] FWD A type_id=0 where A is the type name. Commit 9d5f9f701b18 ("bpf: btf: fix struct/union/fwd types with kind_flag") introduced kind_flag which can be used to distinguish whether a forward type is a struct or union. Also, "type_id=0" does not carry any meaningful information for fwd type as btf_type.type = 0 is simply enforced during btf verification and is not used anywhere else. This commit changed the log to [2] FWD A struct if kind_flag = 0, or [2] FWD A union if kind_flag = 1. Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: correct slot_type marking logic to allow more stack slot sharingJiong Wang2018-12-181-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Verifier is supposed to support sharing stack slot allocated to ptr with SCALAR_VALUE for privileged program. However this doesn't happen for some cases. The reason is verifier is not clearing slot_type STACK_SPILL for all bytes, it only clears part of them, while verifier is using: slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL as a convention to check one slot is ptr type. So, the consequence of partial clearing slot_type is verifier could treat a partially overridden ptr slot, which should now be a SCALAR_VALUE slot, still as ptr slot, and rejects some valid programs. Before this patch, test_xdp_noinline.o under bpf selftests, bpf_lxc.o and bpf_netdev.o under Cilium bpf repo, when built with -mattr=+alu32 are rejected due to this issue. After this patch, they all accepted. There is no processed insn number change before and after this patch on Cilium bpf programs. Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: support raw tracepoints in modulesMatt Mullins2018-12-181-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Distributions build drivers as modules, including network and filesystem drivers which export numerous tracepoints. This enables bpf(BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN) to attach to those tracepoints. Signed-off-by: Matt Mullins <mmullins@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: enable cgroup local storage map pretty print with kind_flagYonghong Song2018-12-182-22/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 970289fc0a83 ("bpf: add bpffs pretty print for cgroup local storage maps") added bpffs pretty print for cgroup local storage maps. The commit worked for struct without kind_flag set. This patch refactored and made pretty print also work with kind_flag set for the struct. Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: btf: fix struct/union/fwd types with kind_flagYonghong Song2018-12-181-20/+260
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixed two issues with BTF. One is related to struct/union bitfield encoding and the other is related to forward type. Issue #1 and solution: ====================== Current btf encoding of bitfield follows what pahole generates. For each bitfield, pahole will duplicate the type chain and put the bitfield size at the final int or enum type. Since the BTF enum type cannot encode bit size, pahole workarounds the issue by generating an int type whenever the enum bit size is not 32. For example, -bash-4.4$ cat t.c typedef int ___int; enum A { A1, A2, A3 }; struct t { int a[5]; ___int b:4; volatile enum A c:4; } g; -bash-4.4$ gcc -c -O2 -g t.c The current kernel supports the following BTF encoding: $ pahole -JV t.o [1] TYPEDEF ___int type_id=2 [2] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED [3] ENUM A size=4 vlen=3 A1 val=0 A2 val=1 A3 val=2 [4] STRUCT t size=24 vlen=3 a type_id=5 bits_offset=0 b type_id=9 bits_offset=160 c type_id=11 bits_offset=164 [5] ARRAY (anon) type_id=2 index_type_id=2 nr_elems=5 [6] INT sizetype size=8 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=64 encoding=(none) [7] VOLATILE (anon) type_id=3 [8] INT int size=1 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=4 encoding=(none) [9] TYPEDEF ___int type_id=8 [10] INT (anon) size=1 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=4 encoding=SIGNED [11] VOLATILE (anon) type_id=10 Two issues are in the above: . by changing enum type to int, we lost the original type information and this will not be ideal later when we try to convert BTF to a header file. . the type duplication for bitfields will cause BTF bloat. Duplicated types cannot be deduplicated later if the bitfield size is different. To fix this issue, this patch implemented a compatible change for BTF struct type encoding: . the bit 31 of struct_type->info, previously reserved, now is used to indicate whether bitfield_size is encoded in btf_member or not. . if bit 31 of struct_type->info is set, btf_member->offset will encode like: bit 0 - 23: bit offset bit 24 - 31: bitfield size if bit 31 is not set, the old behavior is preserved: bit 0 - 31: bit offset So if the struct contains a bit field, the maximum bit offset will be reduced to (2^24 - 1) instead of MAX_UINT. The maximum bitfield size will be 256 which is enough for today as maximum bitfield in compiler can be 128 where int128 type is supported. This kernel patch intends to support the new BTF encoding: $ pahole -JV t.o [1] TYPEDEF ___int type_id=2 [2] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED [3] ENUM A size=4 vlen=3 A1 val=0 A2 val=1 A3 val=2 [4] STRUCT t kind_flag=1 size=24 vlen=3 a type_id=5 bitfield_size=0 bits_offset=0 b type_id=1 bitfield_size=4 bits_offset=160 c type_id=7 bitfield_size=4 bits_offset=164 [5] ARRAY (anon) type_id=2 index_type_id=2 nr_elems=5 [6] INT sizetype size=8 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=64 encoding=(none) [7] VOLATILE (anon) type_id=3 Issue #2 and solution: ====================== Current forward type in BTF does not specify whether the original type is struct or union. This will not work for type pretty print and BTF-to-header-file conversion as struct/union must be specified. $ cat tt.c struct t; union u; int foo(struct t *t, union u *u) { return 0; } $ gcc -c -g -O2 tt.c $ pahole -JV tt.o [1] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED [2] FWD t type_id=0 [3] PTR (anon) type_id=2 [4] FWD u type_id=0 [5] PTR (anon) type_id=4 To fix this issue, similar to issue #1, type->info bit 31 is used. If the bit is set, it is union type. Otherwise, it is a struct type. $ pahole -JV tt.o [1] INT int size=4 bit_offset=0 nr_bits=32 encoding=SIGNED [2] FWD t kind_flag=0 type_id=0 [3] PTR (anon) kind_flag=0 type_id=2 [4] FWD u kind_flag=1 type_id=0 [5] PTR (anon) kind_flag=0 type_id=4 Pahole/LLVM change: =================== The new kind_flag functionality has been implemented in pahole and llvm: https://github.com/yonghong-song/pahole/tree/bitfield https://github.com/yonghong-song/llvm/tree/bitfield Note that pahole hasn't implemented func/func_proto kind and .BTF.ext. So to print function signature with bpftool, the llvm compiler should be used. Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)") Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: btf: refactor btf_int_bits_seq_show()Yonghong Song2018-12-181-14/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Refactor function btf_int_bits_seq_show() by creating function btf_bitfield_seq_show() which has no dependence on btf and btf_type. The function btf_bitfield_seq_show() will be in later patch to directly dump bitfield member values. Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: remove useless version check for prog loadDaniel Borkmann2018-12-171-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Existing libraries and tracing frameworks work around this kernel version check by automatically deriving the kernel version from uname(3) or similar such that the user does not need to do it manually; these workarounds also make the version check useless at the same time. Moreover, most other BPF tracing types enabling bpf_probe_read()-like functionality have /not/ adapted this check, and in general these days it is well understood anyway that all the tracing programs are not stable with regards to future kernels as kernel internal data structures are subject to change from release to release. Back at last netconf we discussed [0] and agreed to remove this check from bpf_prog_load() and instead document it here in the uapi header that there is no such guarantee for stable API for these programs. [0] http://vger.kernel.org/netconf2018_files/DanielBorkmann_netconf2018.pdf Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: add self-check logic to liveness analysisAlexei Starovoitov2018-12-151-1/+107
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce REG_LIVE_DONE to check the liveness propagation and prepare the states for merging. See algorithm description in clean_live_states(). Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: improve stacksafe state comparisonAlexei Starovoitov2018-12-151-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "if (old->allocated_stack > cur->allocated_stack)" check is too conservative. In some cases explored stack could have allocated more space, but that stack space was not live. The test case improves from 19 to 15 processed insns and improvement on real programs is significant as well: before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1940 1831 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3089 3029 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1065 1064 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 28052 26309 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 35487 33517 bpf_netdev.o 10864 9713 bpf_overlay.o 6643 6184 bpf_lcx_jit.o 38437 37335 Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: speed up stacksafe checkAlexei Starovoitov2018-12-151-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't check the same stack liveness condition 8 times. once is enough. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: verbose log bpf_line_info in verifierMartin KaFai Lau2018-12-141-5/+69
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds bpf_line_info during the verifier's verbose. It can give error context for debug purpose. ~~~~~~~~~~ Here is the verbose log for backedge: while (a) { a += bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); bpf_trace_printk(fmt, sizeof(fmt), a); } ~> bpftool prog load ./test_loop.o /sys/fs/bpf/test_loop type tracepoint 13: while (a) { 3: a += bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); back-edge from insn 13 to 3 ~~~~~~~~~~ Here is the verbose log for invalid pkt access: Modification to test_xdp_noinline.c: data = (void *)(long)xdp->data; data_end = (void *)(long)xdp->data_end; /* if (data + 4 > data_end) return XDP_DROP; */ *(u32 *)data = dst->dst; ~> bpftool prog load ./test_xdp_noinline.o /sys/fs/bpf/test_xdp_noinline type xdp ; data = (void *)(long)xdp->data; 224: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -112) 225: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) ; *(u32 *)data = dst->dst; 226: (63) *(u32 *)(r2 +0) = r1 invalid access to packet, off=0 size=4, R2(id=0,off=0,r=0) R2 offset is outside of the packet Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: Create a new btf_name_by_offset() for non type name use caseMartin KaFai Lau2018-12-142-13/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current btf_name_by_offset() is returning "(anon)" type name for the offset == 0 case and "(invalid-name-offset)" for the out-of-bound offset case. It fits well for the internal BTF verbose log purpose which is focusing on type. For example, offset == 0 => "(anon)" => anonymous type/name. Returning non-NULL for the bad offset case is needed during the BTF verification process because the BTF verifier may complain about another field first before discovering the name_off is invalid. However, it may not be ideal for the newer use case which does not necessary mean type name. For example, when logging line_info in the BPF verifier in the next patch, it is better to log an empty src line instead of logging "(anon)". The existing bpf_name_by_offset() is renamed to __bpf_name_by_offset() and static to btf.c. A new bpf_name_by_offset() is added for generic context usage. It returns "\0" for name_off == 0 (note that btf->strings[0] is "\0") and NULL for invalid offset. It allows the caller to decide what is the best output in its context. The new btf_name_by_offset() is overlapped with btf_name_offset_valid(). Hence, btf_name_offset_valid() is removed from btf.h to keep the btf.h API minimal. The existing btf_name_offset_valid() usage in btf.c could also be replaced later. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: remove obsolete prog->aux sanitation in bpf_insn_prepare_dumpDaniel Borkmann2018-12-131-7/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This logic is not needed anymore since we got rid of the verifier rewrite that was using prog->aux address in f6069b9aa993 ("bpf: fix redirect to map under tail calls"). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: include sub program tags in bpf_prog_infoSong Liu2018-12-131-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Changes v2 -> v3: 1. remove check for bpf_dump_raw_ok(). Changes v1 -> v2: 1. Fix error path as Martin suggested. This patch adds nr_prog_tags and prog_tags to bpf_prog_info. This is a reliable way for user space to get tags of all sub programs. Before this patch, user space need to find sub program tags via kallsyms. This feature will be used in BPF introspection, where user space queries information about BPF programs via sys_bpf. Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: Remove bpf_dump_raw_ok() check for func_info and line_infoMartin KaFai Lau2018-12-131-20/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The func_info and line_info have the bpf insn offset but they do not contain kernel address. They will still be useful for the userspace tool to annotate the xlated insn. This patch removes the bpf_dump_raw_ok() guard for the func_info and line_info during bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(). The guard stays for jited_line_info which contains the kernel address. Although this bpf_dump_raw_ok() guard behavior has started since the earlier func_info patch series, I marked the Fixes tag to the latest line_info patch series which contains both func_info and line_info and this patch is fixing for both of them. Fixes: c454a46b5efd ("bpf: Add bpf_line_info support") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
| * bpf: add bpffs pretty print for cgroup local storage mapsRoman Gushchin2018-12-122-1/+114
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement bpffs pretty printing for cgroup local storage maps (both shared and per-cpu). Output example (captured for tools/testing/selftests/bpf/netcnt_prog.c): Shared: $ cat /sys/fs/bpf/map_2 # WARNING!! The output is for debug purpose only # WARNING!! The output format will change {4294968594,1}: {9999,1039896} Per-cpu: $ cat /sys/fs/bpf/map_1 # WARNING!! The output is for debug purpose only # WARNING!! The output format will change {4294968594,1}: { cpu0: {0,0,0,0,0} cpu1: {0,0,0,0,0} cpu2: {1,104,0,0,0} cpu3: {0,0,0,0,0} } Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: pass struct btf pointer to the map_check_btf() callbackRoman Gushchin2018-12-123-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If key_type or value_type are of non-trivial data types (e.g. structure or typedef), it's not possible to check them without the additional information, which can't be obtained without a pointer to the btf structure. So, let's pass btf pointer to the map_check_btf() callbacks. Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2018-12-202-9/+25
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Lots of conflicts, by happily all cases of overlapping changes, parallel adds, things of that nature. Thanks to Stephen Rothwell, Saeed Mahameed, and others for their guidance in these resolutions. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differencesJakub Kicinski2018-12-131-3/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently for liveness and state pruning the register parentage chains don't include states of the callee. This makes some sense as the callee can't access those registers. However, this means that READs done after the callee returns will not propagate into the states of the callee. Callee will then perform pruning disregarding differences in caller state. Example: 0: (85) call bpf_user_rnd_u32 1: (b7) r8 = 0 2: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+1 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r1 = r8 5: (85) call pc+4 6: (15) if r8 == 0x1 goto pc+1 7: (05) *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r3 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit 10: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+0 11: (95) exit Here we acquire unknown state with call to get_random() [1]. Then we store this random state in r8 (either 0 or 1) [1 - 3], and make a call on line 5. Callee does nothing but a trivial conditional jump (to create a pruning point). Upon return caller checks the state of r8 and either performs an unsafe read or not. Verifier will first explore the path with r8 == 1, creating a pruning point at [11]. The parentage chain for r8 will include only callers states so once verifier reaches [6] it will mark liveness only on states in the caller, and not [11]. Now when verifier walks the paths with r8 == 0 it will reach [11] and since REG_LIVE_READ on r8 was not propagated there it will prune the walk entirely (stop walking the entire program, not just the callee). Since [6] was never walked with r8 == 0, [7] will be considered dead and replaced with "goto -1" causing hang at runtime. This patch weaves the callee's explored states onto the callers parentage chain. Rough parentage for r8 would have looked like this before: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [10] [11] [6] [7] | | ,---|----. | | | sl0: sl0: / sl0: \ sl0: sl0: sl0: fr0: r8 <-- fr0: r8<+--fr0: r8 `fr0: r8 ,fr0: r8<-fr0: r8 \ fr1: r8 <- fr1: r8 / \__________________/ after: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [10] [11] [6] [7] | | | | | | sl0: sl0: sl0: sl0: sl0: sl0: fr0: r8 <-- fr0: r8 <- fr0: r8 <- fr0: r8 <-fr0: r8<-fr0: r8 fr1: r8 <- fr1: r8 Now the mark from instruction 6 will travel through callees states. Note that we don't have to connect r0 because its overwritten by callees state on return and r1 - r5 because those are not alive any more once a call is made. v2: - don't connect the callees registers twice (Alexei: suggestion & code) - add more details to the comment (Ed & Alexei) v1: don't unnecessarily link caller saved regs (Jiong) Fixes: f4d7e40a5b71 ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)") Reported-by: David Beckett <david.beckett@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64KDaniel Borkmann2018-12-111-6/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Michael and Sandipan report: Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000, and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined. For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit value: root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit -1673527296 and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported: setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8}, 16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524) and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9 host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC with no noticeable errors in the logs. Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For 4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec() so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init(). Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}. Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions in future. Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations") Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-nextDavid S. Miller2018-12-104-99/+458
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2018-12-11 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. It has three minor merge conflicts, resolutions: 1) tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c Take first chunk with alignment_prevented_execution. 2) net/core/filter.c [...] case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct __sk_buff, flow_keys): case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, wire_len): return false; [...] 3) include/uapi/linux/bpf.h Take the second chunk for the two cases each. The main changes are: 1) Add support for BPF line info via BTF and extend libbpf as well as bpftool's program dump to annotate output with BPF C code to facilitate debugging and introspection, from Martin. 2) Add support for BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X} in interpreter and all JIT backends, from Jiong. 3) Improve BPF test coverage on archs with no efficient unaligned access by adding an "any alignment" flag to the BPF program load to forcefully disable verifier alignment checks, from David. 4) Add a new bpf_prog_test_run_xattr() API to libbpf which allows for proper use of BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN with data_out, from Lorenz. 5) Extend tc BPF programs to use a new __sk_buff field called wire_len for more accurate accounting of packets going to wire, from Petar. 6) Improve bpftool to allow dumping the trace pipe from it and add several improvements in bash completion and map/prog dump, from Quentin. 7) Optimize arm64 BPF JIT to always emit movn/movk/movk sequence for kernel addresses and add a dedicated BPF JIT backend allocator, from Ard. 8) Add a BPF helper function for IR remotes to report mouse movements, from Sean. 9) Various cleanups in BPF prog dump e.g. to make UAPI bpf_prog_info member naming consistent with existing conventions, from Yonghong and Song. 10) Misc cleanups and improvements in allowing to pass interface name via cmdline for xdp1 BPF example, from Matteo. 11) Fix a potential segfault in BPF sample loader's kprobes handling, from Daniel T. 12) Fix SPDX license in libbpf's README.rst, from Andrey. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | bpf: rename *_info_cnt to nr_*_info in bpf_prog_infoYonghong Song2018-12-101-19/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In uapi bpf.h, currently we have the following fields in the struct bpf_prog_info: __u32 func_info_cnt; __u32 line_info_cnt; __u32 jited_line_info_cnt; The above field names "func_info_cnt" and "line_info_cnt" also appear in union bpf_attr for program loading. The original intention is to keep the names the same between bpf_prog_info and bpf_attr so it will imply what we returned to user space will be the same as what the user space passed to the kernel. Such a naming convention in bpf_prog_info is not consistent with other fields like: __u32 nr_jited_ksyms; __u32 nr_jited_func_lens; This patch made this adjustment so in bpf_prog_info newly introduced *_info_cnt becomes nr_*_info. Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * | bpf: clean up bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd()Song Liu2018-12-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | info.nr_jited_ksyms and info.nr_jited_func_lens cannot be 0 in these two statements, so we don't need to check them. Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * | bpf: relax verifier restriction on BPF_MOV | BPF_ALUJiong Wang2018-12-101-4/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, the destination register is marked as unknown for 32-bit sub-register move (BPF_MOV | BPF_ALU) whenever the source register type is SCALAR_VALUE. This is too conservative that some valid cases will be rejected. Especially, this may turn a constant scalar value into unknown value that could break some assumptions of verifier. For example, test_l4lb_noinline.c has the following C code: struct real_definition *dst 1: if (!get_packet_dst(&dst, &pckt, vip_info, is_ipv6)) 2: return TC_ACT_SHOT; 3: 4: if (dst->flags & F_IPV6) { get_packet_dst is responsible for initializing "dst" into valid pointer and return true (1), otherwise return false (0). The compiled instruction sequence using alu32 will be: 412: (54) (u32) r7 &= (u32) 1 413: (bc) (u32) r0 = (u32) r7 414: (95) exit insn 413, a BPF_MOV | BPF_ALU, however will turn r0 into unknown value even r7 contains SCALAR_VALUE 1. This causes trouble when verifier is walking the code path that hasn't initialized "dst" inside get_packet_dst, for which case 0 is returned and we would then expect verifier concluding line 1 in the above C code pass the "if" check, therefore would skip fall through path starting at line 4. Now, because r0 returned from callee has became unknown value, so verifier won't skip analyzing path starting at line 4 and "dst->flags" requires dereferencing the pointer "dst" which actually hasn't be initialized for this path. This patch relaxed the code marking sub-register move destination. For a SCALAR_VALUE, it is safe to just copy the value from source then truncate it into 32-bit. A unit test also included to demonstrate this issue. This test will fail before this patch. This relaxation could let verifier skipping more paths for conditional comparison against immediate. It also let verifier recording a more accurate/strict value for one register at one state, if this state end up with going through exit without rejection and it is used for state comparison later, then it is possible an inaccurate/permissive value is better. So the real impact on verifier processed insn number is complex. But in all, without this fix, valid program could be rejected. >From real benchmarking on kernel selftests and Cilium bpf tests, there is no impact on processed instruction number when tests ares compiled with default compilation options. There is slightly improvements when they are compiled with -mattr=+alu32 after this patch. Also, test_xdp_noinline/-mattr=+alu32 now passed verification. It is rejected before this fix. Insn processed before/after this patch: default -mattr=+alu32 Kernel selftest === test_xdp.o 371/371 369/369 test_l4lb.o 6345/6345 5623/5623 test_xdp_noinline.o 2971/2971 rejected/2727 test_tcp_estates.o 429/429 430/430 Cilium bpf === bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o: 2085/2085 1685/1687 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o: 2287/2287 1986/1982 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o: 690/690 622/622 bpf_lxc.o: 95033/95033 N/A bpf_netdev.o: 7245/7245 N/A bpf_overlay.o: 2898/2898 3085/2947 NOTE: - bpf_lxc.o and bpf_netdev.o compiled by -mattr=+alu32 are rejected by verifier due to another issue inside verifier on supporting alu32 binary. - Each cilium bpf program could generate several processed insn number, above number is sum of them. v1->v2: - Restrict the change on SCALAR_VALUE. - Update benchmark numbers on Cilium bpf tests. Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * | bpf: Add bpf_line_info supportMartin KaFai Lau2018-12-094-33/+368
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds bpf_line_info support. It accepts an array of bpf_line_info objects during BPF_PROG_LOAD. The "line_info", "line_info_cnt" and "line_info_rec_size" are added to the "union bpf_attr". The "line_info_rec_size" makes bpf_line_info extensible in the future. The new "check_btf_line()" ensures the userspace line_info is valid for the kernel to use. When the verifier is translating/patching the bpf_prog (through "bpf_patch_insn_single()"), the line_infos' insn_off is also adjusted by the newly added "bpf_adj_linfo()". If the bpf_prog is jited, this patch also provides the jited addrs (in aux->jited_linfo) for the corresponding line_info.insn_off. "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" is added to fill the aux->jited_linfo. It is currently called by the x86 jit. Other jits can also use "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" and it will be done in the followup patches. In the future, if it deemed necessary, a particular jit could also provide its own "bpf_prog_fill_jited_linfo()" implementation. A few "*line_info*" fields are added to the bpf_prog_info such that the user can get the xlated line_info back (i.e. the line_info with its insn_off reflecting the translated prog). The jited_line_info is available if the prog is jited. It is an array of __u64. If the prog is not jited, jited_line_info_cnt is 0. The verifier's verbose log with line_info will be done in a follow up patch. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * | bpf: verifier remove the rejection on BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSHJiong Wang2018-12-071-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch remove the rejection on BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH as we have supported them on interpreter and all JIT back-ends Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * | bpf: interpreter support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSHJiong Wang2018-12-071-22/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements interpreting BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH. Do arithmetic right shift on low 32-bit sub-register, and zero the high 32 bits. Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * | bpf: Change insn_offset to insn_off in bpf_func_infoMartin KaFai Lau2018-12-051-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The later patch will introduce "struct bpf_line_info" which has member "line_off" and "file_off" referring back to the string section in btf. The line_"off" and file_"off" are more consistent to the naming convention in btf.h that means "offset" (e.g. name_off in "struct btf_type"). The to-be-added "struct bpf_line_info" also has another member, "insn_off" which is the same as the "insn_offset" in "struct bpf_func_info". Hence, this patch renames "insn_offset" to "insn_off" for "struct bpf_func_info". Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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