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* mm: memcontrol: account kernel stack per nodeShakeel Butt2020-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the kernel stack is being accounted per-zone. There is no need to do that. In addition due to being per-zone, memcg has to keep a separate MEMCG_KERNEL_STACK_KB. Make the stat per-node and deprecate MEMCG_KERNEL_STACK_KB as memcg_stat_item is an extension of node_stat_item. In addition localize the kernel stack stats updates to account_kernel_stack(). Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200630161539.1759185-1-shakeelb@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* scs: Report SCS usage in bytes rather than number of entriesWill Deacon2020-06-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Fix the SCS debug usage check so that we report the number of bytes used, rather than the number of entries. Fixes: 5bbaf9d1fcb9 ("scs: Add support for stack usage debugging") Reported-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
* scs: Remove references to asm/scs.h from core codeWill Deacon2020-05-181-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | asm/scs.h is no longer needed by the core code, so remove a redundant header inclusion and update the stale Kconfig text. Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
* scs: Move scs_overflow_check() out of architecture codeWill Deacon2020-05-181-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is nothing architecture-specific about scs_overflow_check() as it's just a trivial wrapper around scs_corrupted(). For parity with task_stack_end_corrupted(), rename scs_corrupted() to task_scs_end_corrupted() and call it from schedule_debug() when CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK_is enabled, which better reflects its purpose as a debug feature to catch inadvertent overflow of the SCS. Finally, remove the unused scs_overflow_check() function entirely. This has absolutely no impact on architectures that do not support SCS (currently arm64 only). Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
* scs: Move accounting into alloc/free functionsWill Deacon2020-05-181-24/+21
| | | | | | | | | | There's no need to perform the shadow stack page accounting independently of the lifetime of the underlying allocation, so call the accounting code from the {alloc,free}() functions and simplify the code in the process. Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
* arm64: scs: Store absolute SCS stack pointer value in thread_infoWill Deacon2020-05-181-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Storing the SCS information in thread_info as a {base,offset} pair introduces an additional load instruction on the ret-to-user path, since the SCS stack pointer in x18 has to be converted back to an offset by subtracting the base. Replace the offset with the absolute SCS stack pointer value instead and avoid the redundant load. Tested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
* scs: Add support for stack usage debuggingSami Tolvanen2020-05-151-1/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | Implements CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE for shadow stacks. When enabled, also prints out the highest shadow stack usage per process. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [will: rewrote most of scs_check_usage()] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
* scs: Add page accounting for shadow call stack allocationsSami Tolvanen2020-05-151-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | This change adds accounting for the memory allocated for shadow stacks. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
* scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)Sami Tolvanen2020-05-151-0/+65
This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [will: Numerous cosmetic changes] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>