| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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There are no remaining callers of set_fs(), so CONFIG_SET_FS
can be removed globally, along with the thread_info field and
any references to it.
This turns access_ok() into a cheaper check against TASK_SIZE_MAX.
As CONFIG_SET_FS is now gone, drop all remaining references to
set_fs()/get_fs(), mm_segment_t, user_addr_max() and uaccess_kernel().
Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> # for sparc32 changes
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich@synopsys.com> # for arc changes
Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> # [openrisc, asm-generic]
Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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When opening user access to only perform reads, only open read access.
When opening user access to only perform writes, only open write
access.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2e73bc57125c2c6ab12a587586a4eed3a47105fc.1585898438.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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strnlen_user()
The range passed to user_access_begin() by strncpy_from_user() and
strnlen_user() starts at 'src' and goes up to the limit of userspace
although reads will be limited by the 'count' param.
On 32 bits powerpc (book3s/32) access has to be granted for each
256Mbytes segment and the cost increases with the number of segments to
unlock.
Limit the range with 'count' param.
Fixes: 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a
struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields
result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and
kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases).
While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only
one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for
(userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to
userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an
error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very
syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls
(a good example of this problem is [1]).
Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented
the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls
implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future
patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of
copy_struct_from_user().
Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and
various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage.
[1]: commit 1251201c0d34 ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and
robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code")
[2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do
similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2)
always rejects differently-sized struct arguments.
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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Patch series "arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel", v19.
=== Overview
arm64 has a feature called Top Byte Ignore, which allows to embed pointer
tags into the top byte of each pointer. Userspace programs (such as
HWASan, a memory debugging tool [1]) might use this feature and pass
tagged user pointers to the kernel through syscalls or other interfaces.
Right now the kernel is already able to handle user faults with tagged
pointers, due to these patches:
1. 81cddd65 ("arm64: traps: fix userspace cache maintenance emulation on a
tagged pointer")
2. 7dcd9dd8 ("arm64: hw_breakpoint: fix watchpoint matching for tagged
pointers")
3. 276e9327 ("arm64: entry: improve data abort handling of tagged
pointers")
This patchset extends tagged pointer support to syscall arguments.
As per the proposed ABI change [3], tagged pointers are only allowed to be
passed to syscalls when they point to memory ranges obtained by anonymous
mmap() or sbrk() (see the patchset [3] for more details).
For non-memory syscalls this is done by untaging user pointers when the
kernel performs pointer checking to find out whether the pointer comes
from userspace (most notably in access_ok). The untagging is done only
when the pointer is being checked, the tag is preserved as the pointer
makes its way through the kernel and stays tagged when the kernel
dereferences the pointer when perfoming user memory accesses.
The mmap and mremap (only new_addr) syscalls do not currently accept
tagged addresses. Architectures may interpret the tag as a background
colour for the corresponding vma.
Other memory syscalls (mprotect, etc.) don't do user memory accesses but
rather deal with memory ranges, and untagged pointers are better suited to
describe memory ranges internally. Thus for memory syscalls we untag
pointers completely when they enter the kernel.
=== Other approaches
One of the alternative approaches to untagging that was considered is to
completely strip the pointer tag as the pointer enters the kernel with
some kind of a syscall wrapper, but that won't work with the countless
number of different ioctl calls. With this approach we would need a
custom wrapper for each ioctl variation, which doesn't seem practical.
An alternative approach to untagging pointers in memory syscalls prologues
is to inspead allow tagged pointers to be passed to find_vma() (and other
vma related functions) and untag them there. Unfortunately, a lot of
find_vma() callers then compare or subtract the returned vma start and end
fields against the pointer that was being searched. Thus this approach
would still require changing all find_vma() callers.
=== Testing
The following testing approaches has been taken to find potential issues
with user pointer untagging:
1. Static testing (with sparse [2] and separately with a custom static
analyzer based on Clang) to track casts of __user pointers to integer
types to find places where untagging needs to be done.
2. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that call
find_vma() (and other similar functions) or directly compare against
vm_start/vm_end fields of vma.
3. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that compare
user pointers with TASK_SIZE or other similar consts and macros.
4. Dynamic testing: adding BUG_ON(has_tag(addr)) to find_vma() and running
a modified syzkaller version that passes tagged pointers to the kernel.
Based on the results of the testing the requried patches have been added
to the patchset.
=== Notes
This patchset is meant to be merged together with "arm64 relaxed ABI" [3].
This patchset is a prerequisite for ARM's memory tagging hardware feature
support [4].
This patchset has been merged into the Pixel 2 & 3 kernel trees and is
now being used to enable testing of Pixel phones with HWASan.
Thanks!
[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html
[2] https://github.com/lucvoo/sparse-dev/commit/5f960cb10f56ec2017c128ef9d16060e0145f292
[3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/12/745
[4] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a
This patch (of 11)
This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass
tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than
0x00) as syscall arguments.
strncpy_from_user and strnlen_user accept user addresses as arguments, and
do not go through the same path as copy_from_user and others, so here we
need to handle the case of tagged user addresses separately.
Untag user pointers passed to these functions.
Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform
validity checks, but then uses them as is to perform user memory accesses.
[andreyknvl@google.com: fix sparc4 build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAAeHK+yx4a-P0sDrXTUxMvO2H0CJZUFPffBrg_cU7oJOZyC7ew@mail.gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5a78bcad3e94d6cda71fcaa60a423231ae71e4c.1563904656.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Randy reported objtool triggered on his (GCC-7.4) build:
lib/strncpy_from_user.o: warning: objtool: strncpy_from_user()+0x315: call to __ubsan_handle_add_overflow() with UACCESS enabled
lib/strnlen_user.o: warning: objtool: strnlen_user()+0x337: call to __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow() with UACCESS enabled
This is due to UBSAN generating signed-overflow-UB warnings where it
should not. Prior to GCC-8 UBSAN ignored -fwrapv (which the kernel
uses through -fno-strict-overflow).
Make the functions use 'unsigned long' throughout.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190424072208.754094071@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.
But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.
If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But
nothing really forces the range check.
By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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no callers, no consistent semantics, no sane way to use it...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit
5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched
accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our
traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success,
or -EFAULT on failure.
That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for
good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check
the error value for each access.
In particular, since the error handling is already internally
implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for
various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just
jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit
checking after each operation.
So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking
the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing
more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place
to use the new interface).
So rather than
if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr))
... handle error ..
the interface is now
unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label);
where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to
'label' in the caller.
Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a
"if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception
label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be
fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model.
Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever
exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the
use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual
value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the
long term.
[ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to
actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this
commit only changes the error handling semantics ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This converts the generic user string functions to use the batched user
access functions.
It makes a big difference on Skylake, which is the first x86
microarchitecture to implement SMAP. The STAC/CLAC instructions are not
very fast, and doing them for each access inside the loop that copies
strings from user space (which is what the pathname handling does for
every pathname the kernel uses, for example) is very inefficient.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes are:
- lockless wakeup support for futexes and IPC message queues
(Davidlohr Bueso, Peter Zijlstra)
- Replace spinlocks with atomics in thread_group_cputimer(), to
improve scalability (Jason Low)
- NUMA balancing improvements (Rik van Riel)
- SCHED_DEADLINE improvements (Wanpeng Li)
- clean up and reorganize preemption helpers (Frederic Weisbecker)
- decouple page fault disabling machinery from the preemption
counter, to improve debuggability and robustness (David
Hildenbrand)
- SCHED_DEADLINE documentation updates (Luca Abeni)
- topology CPU masks cleanups (Bartosz Golaszewski)
- /proc/sched_debug improvements (Srikar Dronamraju)"
* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (79 commits)
sched/deadline: Remove needless parameter in dl_runtime_exceeded()
sched: Remove superfluous resetting of the p->dl_throttled flag
sched/deadline: Drop duplicate init_sched_dl_class() declaration
sched/deadline: Reduce rq lock contention by eliminating locking of non-feasible target
sched/deadline: Make init_sched_dl_class() __init
sched/deadline: Optimize pull_dl_task()
sched/preempt: Add static_key() to preempt_notifiers
sched/preempt: Fix preempt notifiers documentation about hlist_del() within unsafe iteration
sched/stop_machine: Fix deadlock between multiple stop_two_cpus()
sched/debug: Add sum_sleep_runtime to /proc/<pid>/sched
sched/debug: Replace vruntime with wait_sum in /proc/sched_debug
sched/debug: Properly format runnable tasks in /proc/sched_debug
sched/numa: Only consider less busy nodes as numa balancing destinations
Revert 095bebf61a46 ("sched/numa: Do not move past the balance point if unbalanced")
sched/fair: Prevent throttling in early pick_next_task_fair()
preempt: Reorganize the notrace definitions a bit
preempt: Use preempt_schedule_context() as the official tracing preemption point
sched: Make preempt_schedule_context() function-tracing safe
x86: Remove cpu_sibling_mask() and cpu_core_mask()
x86: Replace cpu_**_mask() with topology_**_cpumask()
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enabled
In general, non-atomic variants of user access functions must not sleep
if pagefaults are disabled.
Let's update all relevant comments in uaccess code. This also reflects
the might_sleep() checks in might_fault().
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David.Laight@ACULAB.COM
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: airlied@linux.ie
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com
Cc: daniel.vetter@intel.com
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Cc: hocko@suse.cz
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: mst@redhat.com
Cc: paulus@samba.org
Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: yang.shi@windriver.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431359540-32227-4-git-send-email-dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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strnlen_user() can return a number in a range 0 to count +
sizeof(unsigned long) - 1. Clarify the comment at the top of the
function so that users don't think the function returns at most count+1.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[ Also added commentary about preferably not using this function ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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If the specified maximum length of the string is a multiple of unsigned
long, we would load one long behind the specified maximum. If that
happens to be in a next page, we can hit a page fault although we were
not expected to.
Fix the off-by-one bug in the test whether we are at the end of the
specified range.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The aligned_byte_mask() definition is wrong for 32-bit big-endian
machines: the "7-(n)" part of the definition assumes a long is 8
bytes. This fixes it by using BITS_PER_LONG - 8 instead of 8*7.
Tested on 32-bit and 64-bit PowerPC.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This adds a new generic optimized strnlen_user() function that uses the
<asm/word-at-a-time.h> infrastructure to portably do efficient string
handling.
In many ways, strnlen is much simpler than strncpy, and in particular we
can always pre-align the words we load from memory. That means that all
the worries about alignment etc are a non-issue, so this one can easily
be used on any architecture. You obviously do have to do the
appropriate word-at-a-time.h macros.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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