| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver fixes from Greg KH:
"Here is a big set of char/misc/other driver fixes for 5.13-rc3.
The majority here is the fallout of the umn.edu re-review of all prior
submissions. That resulted in a bunch of reverts along with the
"correct" changes made, such that there is no regression of any of the
potential fixes that were made by those individuals. I would like to
thank the over 80 different developers who helped with the review and
fixes for this mess.
Other than that, there's a few habanna driver fixes for reported
issues, and some dyndbg fixes for reported problems.
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
problems"
* tag 'char-misc-5.13-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (82 commits)
misc: eeprom: at24: check suspend status before disable regulator
uio_hv_generic: Fix another memory leak in error handling paths
uio_hv_generic: Fix a memory leak in error handling paths
uio/uio_pci_generic: fix return value changed in refactoring
Revert "Revert "ALSA: usx2y: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference""
dyndbg: drop uninformative vpr_info
dyndbg: avoid calling dyndbg_emit_prefix when it has no work
binder: Return EFAULT if we fail BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION
cdrom: gdrom: initialize global variable at init time
brcmfmac: properly check for bus register errors
Revert "brcmfmac: add a check for the status of usb_register"
video: imsttfb: check for ioremap() failures
Revert "video: imsttfb: fix potential NULL pointer dereferences"
net: liquidio: Add missing null pointer checks
Revert "net: liquidio: fix a NULL pointer dereference"
media: gspca: properly check for errors in po1030_probe()
Revert "media: gspca: Check the return value of write_bridge for timeout"
media: gspca: mt9m111: Check write_bridge for timeout
Revert "media: gspca: mt9m111: Check write_bridge for timeout"
media: dvb: Add check on sp8870_readreg return
...
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In smcd_alloc_dev(), if alloc_ordered_workqueue() fails, properly catch
it, clean up and return NULL to let the caller know there was a failure.
Move the call to alloc_ordered_workqueue higher in the function in order
to abort earlier without needing to unwind the call to device_initialize().
Cc: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Anirudh Rayabharam <mail@anirudhrb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-18-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This reverts commit e183d4e414b64711baf7a04e214b61969ca08dfa.
Because of recent interactions with developers from @umn.edu, all
commits from them have been recently re-reviewed to ensure if they were
correct or not.
Upon review, this commit was found to be incorrect for the reasons
below, so it must be reverted. It will be fixed up "correctly" in a
later kernel change.
The original commit causes a memory leak and does not properly fix the
issue it claims to fix. I will send a follow-on patch to resolve this
properly.
Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>
Cc: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503115736.2104747-17-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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32-bit architectures which expect 8-byte alignment for 8-byte integers and
need 64-bit DMA addresses (arm, mips, ppc) had their struct page
inadvertently expanded in 2019. When the dma_addr_t was added, it forced
the alignment of the union to 8 bytes, which inserted a 4 byte gap between
'flags' and the union.
Fix this by storing the dma_addr_t in one or two adjacent unsigned longs.
This restores the alignment to that of an unsigned long. We always
store the low bits in the first word to prevent the PageTail bit from
being inadvertently set on a big endian platform. If that happened,
get_user_pages_fast() racing against a page which was freed and
reallocated to the page_pool could dereference a bogus compound_head(),
which would be hard to trace back to this cause.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210510153211.1504886-1-willy@infradead.org
Fixes: c25fff7171be ("mm: add dma_addr_t to struct page")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
"Networking fixes for 5.13-rc1, including fixes from bpf, can and
netfilter trees. Self-contained fixes, nothing risky.
Current release - new code bugs:
- dsa: ksz: fix a few bugs found by static-checker in the new driver
- stmmac: fix frame preemption handshake not triggering after
interface restart
Previous releases - regressions:
- make nla_strcmp handle more then one trailing null character
- fix stack OOB reads while fragmenting IPv4 packets in openvswitch
and net/sched
- sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a
- sctp: delay auto_asconf init until binding the first addr
- stmmac: clear receive all(RA) bit when promiscuous mode is off
- can: mcp251x: fix resume from sleep before interface was brought up
Previous releases - always broken:
- bpf: fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation
- bpf: fix masking negation logic upon negative dst register
- netfilter: don't assume that skb_header_pointer() will never fail
- only allow init netns to set default tcp cong to a restricted algo
- xsk: fix xp_aligned_validate_desc() when len == chunk_size to avoid
false positive errors
- ethtool: fix missing NLM_F_MULTI flag when dumping
- can: m_can: m_can_tx_work_queue(): fix tx_skb race condition
- sctp: fix a SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB leak in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b
- bridge: fix NULL-deref caused by a races between assigning
rx_handler_data and setting the IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit
Latecomer:
- seg6: add counters support for SRv6 Behaviors"
* tag 'net-5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (73 commits)
atm: firestream: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword
net: stmmac: Do not enable RX FIFO overflow interrupts
mptcp: fix splat when closing unaccepted socket
i40e: Remove LLDP frame filters
i40e: Fix PHY type identifiers for 2.5G and 5G adapters
i40e: fix the restart auto-negotiation after FEC modified
i40e: Fix use-after-free in i40e_client_subtask()
i40e: fix broken XDP support
netfilter: nftables: avoid potential overflows on 32bit arches
netfilter: nftables: avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets()
tcp: Specify cmsgbuf is user pointer for receive zerocopy.
mlxsw: spectrum_mr: Update egress RIF list before route's action
net: ipa: fix inter-EE IRQ register definitions
can: m_can: m_can_tx_work_queue(): fix tx_skb race condition
can: mcp251x: fix resume from sleep before interface was brought up
can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_probe(): add missing can_rx_offload_del() in error path
can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_probe(): fix an error pointer dereference in probe
netfilter: nftables: Fix a memleak from userdata error path in new objects
netfilter: remove BUG_ON() after skb_header_pointer()
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: Fix a missing skb_header_pointer() NULL check
...
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Pablo Neira Ayuso says:
====================
Netfilter fixes for net
1) Add SECMARK revision 1 to fix incorrect layout that prevents
from remove rule with this target, from Phil Sutter.
2) Fix pernet exit path spat in arptables, from Florian Westphal.
3) Missing rcu_read_unlock() for unknown nfnetlink callbacks,
reported by syzbot, from Eric Dumazet.
4) Missing check for skb_header_pointer() NULL pointer in
nfnetlink_osf.
5) Remove BUG_ON() after skb_header_pointer() from packet path
in several conntrack helper and the TCP tracker.
6) Fix memleak in the new object error path of userdata.
7) Avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets(), reported by syzbot,
also from Eric.
8) Avoid overflows in 32bit arches, from Eric.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf:
netfilter: nftables: avoid potential overflows on 32bit arches
netfilter: nftables: avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets()
netfilter: nftables: Fix a memleak from userdata error path in new objects
netfilter: remove BUG_ON() after skb_header_pointer()
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: Fix a missing skb_header_pointer() NULL check
netfilter: nfnetlink: add a missing rcu_read_unlock()
netfilter: arptables: use pernet ops struct during unregister
netfilter: xt_SECMARK: add new revision to fix structure layout
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210507174739.1850-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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User space could ask for very large hash tables, we need to make sure
our size computations wont overflow.
nf_tables_newset() needs to double check the u64 size
will fit into size_t field.
Fixes: 0ed6389c483d ("netfilter: nf_tables: rename set implementations")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Number of buckets being stored in 32bit variables, we have to
ensure that no overflows occur in nft_hash_buckets()
syzbot injected a size == 0x40000000 and reported:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 1 PID: 29539 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327
__roundup_pow_of_two include/linux/log2.h:57 [inline]
nft_hash_buckets net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:411 [inline]
nft_hash_estimate.cold+0x19/0x1e net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:652
nft_select_set_ops net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:3586 [inline]
nf_tables_newset+0xe62/0x3110 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4322
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa09/0x24b0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:488
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:612 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv+0x3af/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:630
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
Fixes: 0ed6389c483d ("netfilter: nf_tables: rename set implementations")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Release object name if userdata allocation fails.
Fixes: b131c96496b3 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add userdata support for nft_object")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Several conntrack helpers and the TCP tracker assume that
skb_header_pointer() never fails based on upfront header validation.
Even if this should not ever happen, BUG_ON() is a too drastic measure,
remove them.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Do not assume that the tcph->doff field is correct when parsing for TCP
options, skb_header_pointer() might fail to fetch these bits.
Fixes: 11eeef41d5f6 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Reported by syzbot :
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:201
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 26899, name: syz-executor.5
1 lock held by syz-executor.5/26899:
#0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_get_subsys net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:148 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1da/0x1300 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:226
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffff8917799e>] preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x90 kernel/sched/core.c:5533
CPU: 1 PID: 26899 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
___might_sleep.cold+0x1f1/0x237 kernel/sched/core.c:8338
might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:201 [inline]
slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:500 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2845 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x33d/0x3e0 mm/slub.c:2960
__alloc_skb+0x20b/0x340 net/core/skbuff.c:413
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1107 [inline]
nlmsg_new include/net/netlink.h:953 [inline]
netlink_ack+0x1ed/0xaa0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2437
netlink_rcv_skb+0x33d/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508
nfnetlink_rcv+0x1ac/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:650
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa8a03ee188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 00000000004665f9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000480 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000004bfce1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
R13: 00007fffe864480f R14: 00007fa8a03ee300 R15: 0000000000022000
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.5/26899 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by syz-executor.5/26899:
#0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_get_subsys net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:148 [inline]
#0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1da/0x1300 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:226
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 26899 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359 rcu_note_context_switch+0xfd/0x16e0 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 26899 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G W 5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0xfd/0x16e0 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359
Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 2e 0d 00 00 8b bd cc 03 00 00 85 ff 7e 02 <0f> 0b 65 48 8b 2c 25 00 f0 01 00 48 8d bd cc 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffffc90002fffdb0 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffff8880b9c36080 RCX: ffffffff8dc99bac
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88808b9d1c80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8dc96917
R10: fffffbfff1b92d22 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88808b9d1c80 R14: ffff88808b9d1c80 R15: ffffc90002ff8000
FS: 00007fa8a03ee700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f09896ed000 CR3: 0000000032070000 CR4: 00000000001526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x214/0x23e0 kernel/sched/core.c:5044
schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5226
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:162 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x13e/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:208
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x5/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:314
asm_sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:637
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9
Fixes: 50f2db9e368f ("netfilter: nfnetlink: consolidate callback types")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Like with iptables and ebtables, hook unregistration has to use the
pernet ops struct, not the template.
This triggered following splat:
hook not found, pf 3 num 0
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 224 at net/netfilter/core.c:480 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x1eb/0x610 net/netfilter/core.c:480
[..]
nf_unregister_net_hook net/netfilter/core.c:502 [inline]
nf_unregister_net_hooks+0x117/0x160 net/netfilter/core.c:576
arpt_unregister_table_pre_exit+0x67/0x80 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c:1565
Fixes: f9006acc8dfe5 ("netfilter: arp_tables: pass table pointer via nf_hook_ops")
Reported-by: syzbot+dcccba8a1e41a38cb9df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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This extension breaks when trying to delete rules, add a new revision to
fix this.
Fixes: 5e6874cdb8de ("[SECMARK]: Add xtables SECMARK target")
Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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If userspace exits before calling accept() on a listener that had at least
one new connection ready, we get:
Attempt to release TCP socket in state 8
This happens because the mptcp socket gets cloned when the TCP connection
is ready, but the socket is never exposed to userspace.
The client additionally sends a DATA_FIN, which brings connection into
CLOSE_WAIT state. This in turn prevents the orphan+state reset fixup
in mptcp_sock_destruct() from doing its job.
Fixes: 3721b9b64676b ("mptcp: Track received DATA_FIN sequence number and add related helpers")
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/185
Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210507001638.225468-1-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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A prior change (1f466e1f15cf) introduces separate handling for
->msg_control depending on whether the pointer is a kernel or user
pointer. However, while tcp receive zerocopy is using this field, it
is not properly annotating that the buffer in this case is a user
pointer. This can cause faults when the improper mechanism is used
within put_cmsg().
This patch simply annotates tcp receive zerocopy's use as explicitly
being a user pointer.
Fixes: 7eeba1706eba ("tcp: Add receive timestamp support for receive zerocopy.")
Signed-off-by: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506223530.2266456-1-arjunroy.kdev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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syzbot is able to setup kTLS on an SMC socket which coincidentally
uses sk_user_data too. Later, kTLS treats it as psock so triggers a
refcnt warning. The root cause is that smc_setsockopt() simply calls
TCP setsockopt() which includes TCP_ULP. I do not think it makes
sense to setup kTLS on top of SMC sockets, so we should just disallow
this setup.
It is hard to find a commit to blame, but we can apply this patch
since the beginning of TCP_ULP.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b54a1ce86ba4a623b7f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 734942cc4ea6 ("tcp: ULP infrastructure")
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When dumping the ethtool information from all the interfaces, the
netlink reply should contain the NLM_F_MULTI flag. This flag allows
userspace tools to identify that multiple messages are expected.
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1953847
Fixes: 365f9ae4ee36 ("ethtool: fix genlmsg_put() failure handling in ethnl_default_dumpit()")
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commits 8a4cd82d ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_connect()")
and c33b1cc62 ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_bind()")
fixed a refcount leak bug in bind/connect but introduced a
use-after-free if the same local is assigned to 2 different sockets.
This can be triggered by the following simple program:
int sock1 = socket( AF_NFC, SOCK_STREAM, NFC_SOCKPROTO_LLCP );
int sock2 = socket( AF_NFC, SOCK_STREAM, NFC_SOCKPROTO_LLCP );
memset( &addr, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) );
addr.sa_family = AF_NFC;
addr.nfc_protocol = NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP;
bind( sock1, (struct sockaddr*) &addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) )
bind( sock2, (struct sockaddr*) &addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) )
close(sock1);
close(sock2);
Fix this by assigning NULL to llcp_sock->local after calling
nfc_llcp_local_put.
This addresses CVE-2021-23134.
Reported-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
Reported-by: Nadav Markus <nmarkus@paloaltonetworks.com>
Fixes: c33b1cc62 ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_bind()")
Signed-off-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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tcp_set_default_congestion_control() is netns-safe in that it writes
to &net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control, but it also sets
ca->flags |= TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED which is not namespaced.
This has the unintended side-effect of changing the global
net.ipv4.tcp_allowed_congestion_control sysctl, despite the fact that it
is read-only: 97684f0970f6 ("net: Make tcp_allowed_congestion_control
readonly in non-init netns")
Resolve this netns "leak" by only allowing the init netns to set the
default algorithm to one that is restricted. This restriction could be
removed if tcp_allowed_congestion_control were namespace-ified in the
future.
This bug was uncovered with
https://github.com/JonathonReinhart/linux-netns-sysctl-verify
Fixes: 6670e1524477 ("tcp: Namespace-ify sysctl_tcp_default_congestion_control")
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Reinhart <jonathon.reinhart@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2021-05-04
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
We've added 5 non-merge commits during the last 4 day(s) which contain
a total of 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Fix libbpf overflow when processing BPF ring buffer in case of extreme
application behavior, from Brendan Jackman.
2) Fix potential data leakage of uninitialized BPF stack under speculative
execution, from Daniel Borkmann.
3) Fix off-by-one when validating xsk pool chunks, from Xuan Zhuo.
4) Fix snprintf BPF selftest with a pid filter to avoid racing its output
test buffer, from Florent Revest.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When desc->len is equal to chunk_size, it is legal. But when the
xp_aligned_validate_desc() got chunk_end from desc->addr + desc->len
pointing to the next chunk during the check, it caused the check to
fail.
This problem was first introduced in bbff2f321a86 ("xsk: new descriptor
addressing scheme"). Later in 2b43470add8c ("xsk: Introduce AF_XDP buffer
allocation API") this piece of code was moved into the new function called
xp_aligned_validate_desc(). This function was then moved into xsk_queue.h
via 26062b185eee ("xsk: Explicitly inline functions and move definitions").
Fixes: bbff2f321a86 ("xsk: new descriptor addressing scheme")
Signed-off-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210428094424.54435-1-xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com
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As Or Cohen described:
If sctp_destroy_sock is called without sock_net(sk)->sctp.addr_wq_lock
held and sp->do_auto_asconf is true, then an element is removed
from the auto_asconf_splist without any proper locking.
This can happen in the following functions:
1. In sctp_accept, if sctp_sock_migrate fails.
2. In inet_create or inet6_create, if there is a bpf program
attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE which denies
creation of the sctp socket.
This patch is to fix it by moving the auto_asconf init out of
sctp_init_sock(), by which inet_create()/inet6_create() won't
need to operate it in sctp_destroy_sock() when calling
sk_common_release().
It also makes more sense to do auto_asconf init while binding the
first addr, as auto_asconf actually requires an ANY addr bind,
see it in sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
This addresses CVE-2021-23133.
Fixes: 610236587600 ("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications")
Reported-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit b166a20b07382b8bc1dcee2a448715c9c2c81b5b.
This one has to be reverted as it introduced a dead lock, as
syzbot reported:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
lock(slock-AF_INET6);
lock(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
lock(slock-AF_INET6);
CPU0 is the thread of sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler(), and CPU1
is that of sctp_close().
The original issue this commit fixed will be fixed in the next
patch.
Reported-by: syzbot+959223586843e69a2674@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Check at start of fill_frame_info that the MAC header in the supplied
skb is large enough to fit a struct hsr_ethhdr, as otherwise this is
not a valid HSR frame. If it is too small, return an error which will
then cause the callers to clean up the skb. Fixes a KMSAN-found
uninit-value bug reported by syzbot at:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f7e9b601f1414f814f7602a82b6619a8d80bce3f
Reported-by: syzbot+e267bed19bfc5478fb33@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Normally SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB is always incremented once asoc enter into
ESTABLISHED from the state < ESTABLISHED and decremented when the asoc
is being deleted.
However, in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(), the asoc's state can be changed to
ESTABLISHED from the state >= ESTABLISHED where it shouldn't increment
SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB. Otherwise, one asoc may increment MIB_CURRESTAB
multiple times but only decrement once at the end.
I was able to reproduce it by using scapy to do the 4-way shakehands,
after that I replayed the COOKIE-ECHO chunk with 'peer_vtag' field
changed to different values, and SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB was incremented
multiple times and never went back to 0 even when the asoc was freed.
This patch is to fix it by only incrementing SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB when
the state < ESTABLISHED in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b().
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit 12dfd78e3a74825e6f0bc8df7ef9f938fbc6bfe3.
This can be reverted as shutdown and cookie_ack chunk are using the
same asoc since commit 35b4f24415c8 ("sctp: do asoc update earlier
in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a").
Reported-by: Jere Leppänen <jere.leppanen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This reverts commit 7e9269a5acec6d841d22e12770a0b02db4f5d8f2.
As Jere notice, commit 35b4f24415c8 ("sctp: do asoc update earlier
in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a") only keeps the SHUTDOWN and COOKIE-ACK
with the same asoc, not transport. So we have to bring this patch
back.
Reported-by: Jere Leppänen <jere.leppanen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The same thing should be done for sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b().
Meanwhile, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC cmd can be removed.
v1->v2:
- Fix the return value in sctp_sf_do_assoc_update().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This can be reverted as shutdown and cookie_ack chunk are using the
same asoc since the last patch.
This reverts commit 145cb2f7177d94bc54563ed26027e952ee0ae03c.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There's a panic that occurs in a few of envs, the call trace is as below:
[] general protection fault, ... 0x29acd70f1000a: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[] RIP: 0010:sctp_ulpevent_notify_peer_addr_change+0x4b/0x1fa [sctp]
[] sctp_assoc_control_transport+0x1b9/0x210 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike.isra.16+0x15c/0x220 [sctp]
[] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.21+0x1231/0x1a10 [sctp]
[] sctp_do_sm+0xc3/0x2a0 [sctp]
[] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x81/0xf0 [sctp]
This is caused by a transport use-after-free issue. When processing a
duplicate COOKIE-ECHO chunk in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(), both COOKIE-ACK
and SHUTDOWN chunks are allocated with the transort from the new asoc.
However, later in the sideeffect machine, the old asoc is used to send
them out and old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to is set to the transport
that SHUTDOWN chunk attached to in sctp_cmd_setup_t2(), which actually
belongs to the new asoc. After the new_asoc is freed and the old asoc
T2 timeout, the old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to that is already freed
would be accessed in sctp_sf_t2_timer_expire().
Thanks Alexander and Jere for helping dig into this issue.
To fix it, this patch is to do the asoc update first, then allocate
the COOKIE-ACK and SHUTDOWN chunks with the 'updated' old asoc. This
would make more sense, as a chunk from an asoc shouldn't be sent out
with another asoc. We had fixed quite a few issues caused by this.
Fixes: 145cb2f7177d ("sctp: Fix bundling of SHUTDOWN with COOKIE-ACK")
Reported-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+bbe538efd1046586f587@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Michal Tesar <mtesar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Variable 'err' is set to zero but this value is never read as it is
overwritten with a new value later on, hence it is a redundant
assignment and can be removed.
Clean up the following clang-analyzer warning:
net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c:948:2: warning: Value stored to 'err' is
never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Variable 'err' is set to -ENOMEM but this value is never read as it is
overwritten with a new value later on, hence the 'If statements' and
assignments are redundantand and can be removed.
Cleans up the following clang-analyzer warning:
net/ipv6/seg6.c:126:4: warning: Value stored to 'err' is never read
[clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit
There is a crash in the function br_get_link_af_size_filtered,
as the port_exists(dev) is true and the rx_handler_data of dev is NULL.
But the rx_handler_data of dev is correct saved in vmcore.
The oops looks something like:
...
pc : br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0x28/0x1c8 [bridge]
...
Call trace:
br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0x28/0x1c8 [bridge]
if_nlmsg_size+0x180/0x1b0
rtnl_calcit.isra.12+0xf8/0x148
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x370
netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x130
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x38
netlink_unicast+0x1f0/0x250
netlink_sendmsg+0x310/0x378
sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x70
__sys_sendto+0x120/0x150
__arm64_sys_sendto+0x30/0x40
el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
el0_svc+0x8/0xc
In br_add_if(), we found there is no guarantee that
assigning rx_handler_data to dev->rx_handler_data
will before setting the IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit of priv_flags.
So there is a possible data competition:
CPU 0: CPU 1:
(RCU read lock) (RTNL lock)
rtnl_calcit() br_add_slave()
if_nlmsg_size() br_add_if()
br_get_link_af_size_filtered() -> netdev_rx_handler_register
...
// The order is not guaranteed
... -> dev->priv_flags |= IFF_BRIDGE_PORT;
// The IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit of priv_flags has been set
-> if (br_port_exists(dev)) {
// The dev->rx_handler_data has NOT been assigned
-> p = br_port_get_rcu(dev);
....
-> rcu_assign_pointer(dev->rx_handler_data, rx_handler_data);
...
Fix it in br_get_link_af_size_filtered, using br_port_get_check_rcu() and checking the return value.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Zhengming <zhangzhengming@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Lei <zhaolei69@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Wang Xiaogang <wangxiaogang3@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously
re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on
kernels built with KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947
CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40
tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred]
tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0
fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower]
tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820
__netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0
__napi_poll+0xaa/0x500
net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0
__do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f
do_softirq+0x71/0x90
</IRQ>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0
ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120
ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60
__ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0
ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0
ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0
raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00
sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110
__sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0
__x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89
RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb
RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0
R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009
flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved)
raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00
>ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
^
ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2
for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment()
ip_skb_dst_mtu()
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
ip_mtu_locked()
the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
Fixes: c129412f74e9 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367
CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
__sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]
this frame has 2 objects:
[32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
[192, 424) 'ovs_rt'
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
^
ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment()
ip_skb_dst_mtu()
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
ip_mtu_locked()
the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
Fixes: d52e5a7e7ca4 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch provides counters for SRv6 Behaviors as defined in [1],
section 6. For each SRv6 Behavior instance, counters defined in [1] are:
- the total number of packets that have been correctly processed;
- the total amount of traffic in bytes of all packets that have been
correctly processed;
In addition, this patch introduces a new counter that counts the number of
packets that have NOT been properly processed (i.e. errors) by an SRv6
Behavior instance.
Counters are not only interesting for network monitoring purposes (i.e.
counting the number of packets processed by a given behavior) but they also
provide a simple tool for checking whether a behavior instance is working
as we expect or not.
Counters can be useful for troubleshooting misconfigured SRv6 networks.
Indeed, an SRv6 Behavior can silently drop packets for very different
reasons (i.e. wrong SID configuration, interfaces set with SID addresses,
etc) without any notification/message to the user.
Due to the nature of SRv6 networks, diagnostic tools such as ping and
traceroute may be ineffective: paths used for reaching a given router can
be totally different from the ones followed by probe packets. In addition,
paths are often asymmetrical and this makes it even more difficult to keep
up with the journey of the packets and to understand which behaviors are
actually processing our traffic.
When counters are enabled on an SRv6 Behavior instance, it is possible to
verify if packets are actually processed by such behavior and what is the
outcome of the processing. Therefore, the counters for SRv6 Behaviors offer
an non-invasive observability point which can be leveraged for both traffic
monitoring and troubleshooting purposes.
[1] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8986.html#name-counters
Troubleshooting using SRv6 Behavior counters
--------------------------------------------
Let's make a brief example to see how helpful counters can be for SRv6
networks. Let's consider a node where an SRv6 End Behavior receives an SRv6
packet whose Segment Left (SL) is equal to 0. In this case, the End
Behavior (which accepts only packets with SL >= 1) discards the packet and
increases the error counter.
This information can be leveraged by the network operator for
troubleshooting. Indeed, the error counter is telling the user that the
packet:
(i) arrived at the node;
(ii) the packet has been taken into account by the SRv6 End behavior;
(iii) but an error has occurred during the processing.
The error (iii) could be caused by different reasons, such as wrong route
settings on the node or due to an invalid SID List carried by the SRv6
packet. Anyway, the error counter is used to exclude that the packet did
not arrive at the node or it has not been processed by the behavior at
all.
Turning on/off counters for SRv6 Behaviors
------------------------------------------
Each SRv6 Behavior instance can be configured, at the time of its creation,
to make use of counters.
This is done through iproute2 which allows the user to create an SRv6
Behavior instance specifying the optional "count" attribute as shown in the
following example:
$ ip -6 route add 2001:db8::1 encap seg6local action End count dev eth0
per-behavior counters can be shown by adding "-s" to the iproute2 command
line, i.e.:
$ ip -s -6 route show 2001:db8::1
2001:db8::1 encap seg6local action End packets 0 bytes 0 errors 0 dev eth0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Impact of counters for SRv6 Behaviors on performance
====================================================
To determine the performance impact due to the introduction of counters in
the SRv6 Behavior subsystem, we have carried out extensive tests.
We chose to test the throughput achieved by the SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior
because, among all the other behaviors implemented so far, it reaches the
highest throughput which is around 1.5 Mpps (per core at 2.4 GHz on a
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3) on kernel 5.12-rc2 using packets of size ~ 100
bytes.
Three different tests were conducted in order to evaluate the overall
throughput of the SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior in the following scenarios:
1) vanilla kernel (without the SRv6 Behavior counters patch) and a single
instance of an SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior;
2) patched kernel with SRv6 Behavior counters and a single instance of
an SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior with counters turned off;
3) patched kernel with SRv6 Behavior counters and a single instance of
SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior with counters turned on.
All tests were performed on a testbed deployed on the CloudLab facilities
[2], a flexible infrastructure dedicated to scientific research on the
future of Cloud Computing.
Results of tests are shown in the following table:
Scenario (1): average 1504764,81 pps (~1504,76 kpps); std. dev 3956,82 pps
Scenario (2): average 1501469,78 pps (~1501,47 kpps); std. dev 2979,85 pps
Scenario (3): average 1501315,13 pps (~1501,32 kpps); std. dev 2956,00 pps
As can be observed, throughputs achieved in scenarios (2),(3) did not
suffer any observable degradation compared to scenario (1).
Thanks to Jakub Kicinski and David Ahern for their valuable suggestions
and comments provided during the discussion of the proposed RFCs.
[2] https://www.cloudlab.us
Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Pull NFS client updates from Trond Myklebust:
"Highlights include:
Stable fixes:
- Add validation of the UDP retrans parameter to prevent shift
out-of-bounds
- Don't discard pNFS layout segments that are marked for return
Bugfixes:
- Fix a NULL dereference crash in xprt_complete_bc_request() when the
NFSv4.1 server misbehaves.
- Fix the handling of NFS READDIR cookie verifiers
- Sundry fixes to ensure attribute revalidation works correctly when
the server does not return post-op attributes.
- nfs4_bitmask_adjust() must not change the server global bitmasks
- Fix major timeout handling in the RPC code.
- NFSv4.2 fallocate() fixes.
- Fix the NFSv4.2 SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA end-of-file handling
- Copy offload attribute revalidation fixes
- Fix an incorrect filehandle size check in the pNFS flexfiles driver
- Fix several RDMA transport setup/teardown races
- Fix several RDMA queue wrapping issues
- Fix a misplaced memory read barrier in sunrpc's call_decode()
Features:
- Micro optimisation of the TCP transmission queue using TCP_CORK
- statx() performance improvements by further splitting up the
tracking of invalid cached file metadata.
- Support the NFSv4.2 'change_attr_type' attribute and use it to
optimise handling of change attribute updates"
* tag 'nfs-for-5.13-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (85 commits)
xprtrdma: Fix a NULL dereference in frwr_unmap_sync()
sunrpc: Fix misplaced barrier in call_decode
NFSv4.2: Remove ifdef CONFIG_NFSD from NFSv4.2 client SSC code.
xprtrdma: Move fr_mr field to struct rpcrdma_mr
xprtrdma: Move the Work Request union to struct rpcrdma_mr
xprtrdma: Move fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mr
xprtrdma: Move cqe to struct rpcrdma_mr
xprtrdma: Move fr_cid to struct rpcrdma_mr
xprtrdma: Remove the RPC/RDMA QP event handler
xprtrdma: Don't display r_xprt memory addresses in tracepoints
xprtrdma: Add an rpcrdma_mr_completion_class
xprtrdma: Add tracepoints showing FastReg WRs and remote invalidation
xprtrdma: Avoid Send Queue wrapping
xprtrdma: Do not wake RPC consumer on a failed LocalInv
xprtrdma: Do not recycle MR after FastReg/LocalInv flushes
xprtrdma: Clarify use of barrier in frwr_wc_localinv_done()
xprtrdma: Rename frwr_release_mr()
xprtrdma: rpcrdma_mr_pop() already does list_del_init()
xprtrdma: Delete rpcrdma_recv_buffer_put()
xprtrdma: Fix cwnd update ordering
...
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The normal mechanism that invalidates and unmaps MRs is
frwr_unmap_async(). frwr_unmap_sync() is used only when an RPC
Reply bearing Write or Reply chunks has been lost (ie, almost
never).
Coverity found that after commit 9a301cafc861 ("xprtrdma: Move
fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mr"), the while() loop in
frwr_unmap_sync() exits only once @mr is NULL, unconditionally
causing subsequent dereferences of @mr to Oops.
I've tested this fix by creating a client that skips invoking
frwr_unmap_async() when RPC Replies complete. That forces all
invalidation tasks to fall upon frwr_unmap_sync(). Simple workloads
with this fix applied to the adulterated client work as designed.
Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1504556 ("Null pointer dereferences")
Fixes: 9a301cafc861 ("xprtrdma: Move fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mr")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Fix a misplaced barrier in call_decode. The struct rpc_rqst is modified
as follows by xprt_complete_rqst:
req->rq_private_buf.len = copied;
/* Ensure all writes are done before we update */
/* req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd */
smp_wmb();
req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd = copied;
And currently read as follows by call_decode:
smp_rmb(); // misplaced
if (!req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd)
goto out;
req->rq_rcv_buf.len = req->rq_private_buf.len;
This patch places the smp_rmb after the if to ensure that
rq_reply_bytes_recvd and rq_private_buf.len are read in order.
Fixes: 9ba828861c56a ("SUNRPC: Don't try to parse incomplete RPC messages")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers <baptiste.lepers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Clean up: The last remaining field in struct rpcrdma_frwr has been
removed, so the struct can be eliminated.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Clean up.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Clean up: Move more of struct rpcrdma_frwr into its parent.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Clean up.
- Simplify variable initialization in the completion handlers.
- Move another field out of struct rpcrdma_frwr.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Clean up (for several purposes):
- The MR's cid is initialized sooner so that tracepoints can show
something reasonable even if the MR is never posted.
- The MR's res.id doesn't change so the cid won't change either.
Initializing the cid once is sufficient.
- struct rpcrdma_frwr is going away soon.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Clean up: The handler only recorded a trace event. If indeed no
action is needed by the RPC/RDMA consumer, then the event can be
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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The Send signaling logic is a little subtle, so add some
observability around it. For every xprtrdma_mr_fastreg event, there
should be an xprtrdma_mr_localinv or xprtrdma_mr_reminv event.
When these tracepoints are enabled, we can see exactly when an MR is
DMA-mapped, registered, invalidated (either locally or remotely) and
then DMA-unmapped.
kworker/u25:2-190 [000] 787.979512: xprtrdma_mr_map: task:351@5 mr.id=4 nents=2 5608@0x8679e0c8f6f56000:0x00000503 (TO_DEVICE)
kworker/u25:2-190 [000] 787.979515: xprtrdma_chunk_read: task:351@5 pos=148 5608@0x8679e0c8f6f56000:0x00000503 (last)
kworker/u25:2-190 [000] 787.979519: xprtrdma_marshal: task:351@5 xid=0x8679e0c8: hdr=52 xdr=148/5608/0 read list/inline
kworker/u25:2-190 [000] 787.979525: xprtrdma_mr_fastreg: task:351@5 mr.id=4 nents=2 5608@0x8679e0c8f6f56000:0x00000503 (TO_DEVICE)
kworker/u25:2-190 [000] 787.979526: xprtrdma_post_send: task:351@5 cq.id=0 cid=73 (2 SGEs)
...
kworker/5:1H-219 [005] 787.980567: xprtrdma_wc_receive: cq.id=1 cid=161 status=SUCCESS (0/0x0) received=164
kworker/5:1H-219 [005] 787.980571: xprtrdma_post_recvs: peer=[192.168.100.55]:20049 r_xprt=0xffff8884974d4000: 0 new recvs, 70 active (rc 0)
kworker/5:1H-219 [005] 787.980573: xprtrdma_reply: task:351@5 xid=0x8679e0c8 credits=64
kworker/5:1H-219 [005] 787.980576: xprtrdma_mr_reminv: task:351@5 mr.id=4 nents=2 5608@0x8679e0c8f6f56000:0x00000503 (TO_DEVICE)
kworker/5:1H-219 [005] 787.980577: xprtrdma_mr_unmap: mr.id=4 nents=2 5608@0x8679e0c8f6f56000:0x00000503 (TO_DEVICE)
Note that I've moved the xprtrdma_post_send tracepoint so that event
always appears after the xprtrdma_mr_fastreg tracepoint. Otherwise
the event log looks counterintuitive (FastReg is always supposed to
happen before Send).
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Send WRs can be signalled or unsignalled. A signalled Send WR
always has a matching Send completion, while a unsignalled Send
has a completion only if the Send WR fails.
xprtrdma has a Send account mechanism that is designed to reduce
the number of signalled Send WRs. This in turn mitigates the
interrupt rate of the underlying device.
RDMA consumers can't leave all Sends unsignaled, however, because
providers rely on Send completions to maintain their Send Queue head
and tail pointers. xprtrdma counts the number of unsignaled Send WRs
that have been posted to ensure that Sends are signalled often
enough to prevent the Send Queue from wrapping.
This mechanism neglected to account for FastReg WRs, which are
posted on the Send Queue but never signalled. As a result, the
Send Queue wrapped on occasion, resulting in duplication completions
of FastReg and LocalInv WRs.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Throw away any reply where the LocalInv flushes or could not be
posted. The registered memory region is in an unknown state until
the disconnect completes.
rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect() will find and release the MR. No need to
put it back on the MR free list in this case.
The client retransmits pending RPC requests once it reestablishes a
fresh connection, so a replacement reply should be forthcoming on
the next connection instance.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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Better not to touch MRs involved in a flush or post error until the
Send and Receive Queues are drained and the transport is fully
quiescent. Simply don't insert such MRs back onto the free list.
They remain on mr_all and will be released when the connection is
torn down.
I had thought that recycling would prevent hardware resources from
being tied up for a long time. However, since v5.7, a transport
disconnect destroys the QP and other hardware-owned resources. The
MRs get cleaned up nicely at that point.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
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