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* randstruct: Whitelist NIU struct page overloadingKees Cook2017-06-221-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The NIU ethernet driver intentionally stores a page struct pointer on top of the "mapping" field. Whitelist this case: drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c: In function ‘niu_rx_pkt_ignore’: drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c:3402:10: note: found mismatched ssa struct pointer types: ‘struct page’ and ‘struct address_space’ *link = (struct page *) page->mapping; ~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloadingKees Cook2017-06-221-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The big_key payload structure intentionally stores a struct path in two void pointers to avoid header soup. Whitelist this case: security/keys/big_key.c: In function ‘big_key_read’: security/keys/big_key.c:293:16: note: found mismatched rhs struct pointer types: ‘struct path’ and ‘void *’ struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; ^~~~ Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB castKees Cook2017-06-221-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is another false positive in bad cast detection: net/unix/af_unix.c: In function ‘unix_skb_scm_eq’: net/unix/af_unix.c:1621:31: note: found mismatched rhs struct pointer types: ‘struct unix_skb_parms’ and ‘char’ const struct unix_skb_parms *u = &UNIXCB(skb); ^ UNIXCB is: #define UNIXCB(skb) (*(struct unix_skb_parms *)&((skb)->cb)) And ->cb is: char cb[48] __aligned(8); This is a rather crazy cast, but appears to be safe in the face of randomization, so whitelist it in the plugin. Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads castKees Cook2017-06-221-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The LSM initialization routines walk security_hook_heads as an array of struct list_head instead of via names to avoid a ton of needless source. Whitelist this to avoid the false positive warning from the plugin: security/security.c: In function ‘security_init’: security/security.c:59:20: note: found mismatched op0 struct pointer types: ‘struct list_head’ and ‘struct security_hook_heads’ struct list_head *list = (struct list_head *) &security_hook_heads; ^ Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct pluginKees Cook2017-06-225-0/+1042
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* gcc-plugins: Detail c-common.h location for GCC 4.6Kees Cook2017-05-281-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | The c-common.h file moved in stock gcc 4.7, not gcc 4.6. However, most people building plugins with gcc 4.6 are using the Debian or Ubuntu version, which includes a patch to move the headers to the 4.7 location. In case anyone trips over this with a stock gcc 4.6, add a pointer to the patch used by Debian/Ubuntu. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.11-rc2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-03-091-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull gcc-plugins fix from Kees Cook: "Fixes a typo in sancov plugin, exposed in earlier compiler versions" * tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.11-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: gcc-plugins: fix sancov_plugin for gcc-5
| * gcc-plugins: fix sancov_plugin for gcc-5Arnd Bergmann2017-02-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The name of the local variable was inadvertantly changed from sancov_plugin_pass_info to sancov_pass_info: scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c: In function ‘int plugin_init(plugin_name_args*, plugin_gcc_version*)’: scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.c:136:67: error: ‘sancov_plugin_pass_info’ was not declared in this scope This changes the conditional reference to this variable as well. Fixes: 5a45a4c5c3f5 ("gcc-plugins: consolidate on PASS_INFO macro") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-next/gcc-plugin/structleak' into for-linus/gcc-pluginsKees Cook2017-02-211-0/+246
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| * gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initializationKees Cook2017-01-181-0/+246
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This plugin detects any structures that contain __user attributes and makes sure it is being fully initialized so that a specific class of information exposure is eliminated. (This plugin was originally designed to block the exposure of siginfo in CVE-2013-2141.) Ported from grsecurity/PaX. This version adds a verbose option to the plugin and the Kconfig. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | gcc-plugins: consolidate on PASS_INFO macroKees Cook2017-01-133-17/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | Now that PASS_INFO() exists, use it in the other existing gcc plugins, instead of always open coding the same thing. Based on updates to the grsecurity/PaX gcc plugins. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* gcc-plugins: add PASS_INFO and build_const_char_string()Kees Cook2017-01-101-11/+44
| | | | | | | | | This updates the GCC plugins gcc-common.h from PaX Team to include more helpers and header files, specifically adds the PASS_INFO() macro to make plugin declarations nicer and a helper for proper const string building. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* gcc-plugins: update gcc-common.h for gcc-7Kees Cook2017-01-031-0/+85
| | | | | | | | This updates gcc-common.h from Emese Revfy for gcc 7. This fixes issues seen by Kugan and Arnd. Build tested with gcc 5.4 and 7 snapshot. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* latent_entropy: fix ARM build error on earlier gccKees Cook2017-01-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes build errors seen on gcc-4.9.3 or gcc-5.3.1 for an ARM: arm-soc/init/initramfs.c: In function 'error': arm-soc/init/initramfs.c:50:1: error: unrecognizable insn: } ^ (insn 26 25 27 5 (set (reg:SI 111 [ local_entropy.243 ]) (rotatert:SI (reg:SI 116 [ local_entropy.243 ]) (const_int -30 [0xffffffffffffffe2]))) -1 (nil)) Patch from PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* treewide: Fix printk() message errorsMasanari Iida2016-12-142-2/+2
| | | | | | | | This patch fix spelling typos in printk and kconfig. Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* latent_entropy: Fix wrong gcc code generation with 64 bit variablesKees Cook2016-10-311-10/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The stack frame size could grow too large when the plugin used long long on 32-bit architectures when the given function had too many basic blocks. The gcc warning was: drivers/pci/hotplug/ibmphp_ebda.c: In function 'ibmphp_access_ebda': drivers/pci/hotplug/ibmphp_ebda.c:409:1: warning: the frame size of 1108 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=] This switches latent_entropy from u64 to unsigned long. Thanks to PaX Team and Emese Revfy for the patch. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* gcc-plugins: Export symbols needed by gccKees Cook2016-10-314-7/+8
| | | | | | | | This explicitly exports symbols that gcc expects from plugins. Based on code from Emese Revfy. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy pluginEmese Revfy2016-10-101-0/+640
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering, thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc). At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals. The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function) is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement, if/then/else branching, etc). To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken). Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(), though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents of the global are just used to mix the pool. Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical hardware will not have the same starting values. Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> [kees: expanded commit message and code comments] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* gcc-plugins: Add support for plugin subdirectoriesEmese Revfy2016-08-081-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | This adds support for building more complex gcc plugins that live in a subdirectory instead of just in a single source file. Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> [kees: clarified commit message] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* gcc-plugins: Automate make rule generationEmese Revfy2016-08-081-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | There's no reason to repeat the same names in the Makefile when the .so files have already been listed. The .o list can be generated from them. Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> [kees: clarified commit message] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* Add sancov pluginEmese Revfy2016-06-072-0/+150
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The sancov gcc plugin inserts a __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() call at the start of basic blocks. This plugin is a helper plugin for the kcov feature. It supports all gcc versions with plugin support (from gcc-4.5 on). It is based on the gcc commit "Add fuzzing coverage support" by Dmitry Vyukov (https://gcc.gnu.org/viewcvs/gcc?limit_changes=0&view=revision&revision=231296). Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
* Add Cyclomatic complexity GCC pluginEmese Revfy2016-06-072-0/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a very simple plugin to demonstrate the GCC plugin infrastructure. This GCC plugin computes the cyclomatic complexity of each function. The complexity M of a function's control flow graph is defined as: M = E - N + 2P where E = the number of edges N = the number of nodes P = the number of connected components (exit nodes). Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
* GCC plugin infrastructureEmese Revfy2016-06-076-0/+1664
This patch allows to build the whole kernel with GCC plugins. It was ported from grsecurity/PaX. The infrastructure supports building out-of-tree modules and building in a separate directory. Cross-compilation is supported too. Currently the x86, arm, arm64 and uml architectures enable plugins. The directory of the gcc plugins is scripts/gcc-plugins. You can use a file or a directory there. The plugins compile with these options: * -fno-rtti: gcc is compiled with this option so the plugins must use it too * -fno-exceptions: this is inherited from gcc too * -fasynchronous-unwind-tables: this is inherited from gcc too * -ggdb: it is useful for debugging a plugin (better backtrace on internal errors) * -Wno-narrowing: to suppress warnings from gcc headers (ipa-utils.h) * -Wno-unused-variable: to suppress warnings from gcc headers (gcc_version variable, plugin-version.h) The infrastructure introduces a new Makefile target called gcc-plugins. It supports all gcc versions from 4.5 to 6.0. The scripts/gcc-plugin.sh script chooses the proper host compiler (gcc-4.7 can be built by either gcc or g++). This script also checks the availability of the included headers in scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h. The gcc-common.h header contains frequently included headers for GCC plugins and it has a compatibility layer for the supported gcc versions. The gcc-generate-*-pass.h headers automatically generate the registration structures for GIMPLE, SIMPLE_IPA, IPA and RTL passes. Note that 'make clean' keeps the *.so files (only the distclean or mrproper targets clean all) because they are needed for out-of-tree modules. Based on work created by the PaX Team. Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>