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* bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooksKP Singh2020-03-301-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h. * The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
* Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-09-281-5/+6
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris: "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others. From the original description: This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand. The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer to not requiring external patches. There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline: - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/ - Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven, rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism. The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line: lockdown={integrity|confidentiality} Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract confidential information from the kernel are also disabled. This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and overriden by kernel configuration. New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in include/linux/security.h for details. The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way. Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing this under category (c) of the DCO" * 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits) kexec: Fix file verification on S390 security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down ...
| * security: Add a static lockdown policy LSMMatthew Garrett2019-08-191-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | docs: x86: move two x86-specific files to x86 arch dirMauro Carvalho Chehab2019-07-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Those two docs belong to the x86 architecture: Documentation/Intel-IOMMU.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel-iommu.rst Documentation/intel_txt.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
* | Merge tag 'v5.2-rc4' into mauroJonathan Corbet2019-06-141-0/+1
|\| | | | | | | | | We need to pick up post-rc1 changes to various document files so they don't get lost in Mauro's massive RST conversion push.
| * treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner2019-05-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | docs: fix broken documentation linksMauro Carvalho Chehab2019-06-081-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Reviewed-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* Merge tag 'meminit-v5.2-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-05-071-0/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull compiler-based variable initialization updates from Kees Cook: "This is effectively part of my gcc-plugins tree, but as this adds some Clang support, it felt weird to still call it "gcc-plugins". :) This consolidates Kconfig for the existing stack variable initialization (via structleak and stackleak gcc plugins) and adds Alexander Potapenko's support for Clang's new similar functionality. Summary: - Consolidate memory initialization Kconfigs (Kees) - Implement support for Clang's stack variable auto-init (Alexander)" * tag 'meminit-v5.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: security: Implement Clang's stack initialization security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening security: Create "kernel hardening" config area
| * security: Create "kernel hardening" config areaKees Cook2019-04-241-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization options from the gcc-plugins. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
* | LSM: Revive CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* for "make oldconfig"Kees Cook2019-03-291-0/+38
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM") removed CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_{SELINUX,SMACK,TOMOYO,APPARMOR,DAC} from security/Kconfig and changed CONFIG_LSM to provide a fixed ordering as a default value. That commit expected that existing users (upgrading from Linux 5.0 and earlier) will edit CONFIG_LSM value in accordance with their CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* choice in their old kernel configs. But since users might forget to edit CONFIG_LSM value, this patch revives the choice (only for providing the default value for CONFIG_LSM) in order to make sure that CONFIG_LSM reflects CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* from their old kernel configs. Note that since TOMOYO can be fully stacked against the other legacy major LSMs, when it is selected, it explicitly disables the other LSMs to avoid them also initializing since TOMOYO does not expect this currently. Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Fixes: 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM") Co-developed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in KconfigPetr Vorel2019-03-011-2/+1
| | | | | | | | Remove modules not using it (SELinux and SMACK aren't the only ones not using it). Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid callsMicah Morton2019-01-251-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* Yama: Initialize as ordered LSMKees Cook2019-01-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSMKees Cook2019-01-081-38/+1
| | | | | | | This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selectionKees Cook2019-01-081-1/+2
| | | | | | | Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new "lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSMKees Cook2019-01-081-0/+9
| | | | | | | | This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotesMasahiro Yamada2018-12-221-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to support bare file paths in the source statement. I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of ambiguity. The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes, and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals. Make it treewide consistent now. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* Revert "x86/mm/legacy: Populate the user page-table with user pgd's"Joerg Roedel2018-09-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 1f40a46cf47c12d93a5ad9dccd82bd36ff8f956a. It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the kernel and in the user page-table. That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway, remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used. Fixes: 7757d607c6b3 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32') Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
* Merge tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-08-151-1/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull hardened usercopy updates from Kees Cook: "This cleans up a minor Kconfig issue and adds a kernel boot option for disabling hardened usercopy for distro users that may have corner-case performance issues (e.g. high bandwidth small-packet UDP traffic). Summary: - drop unneeded Kconfig "select BUG" (Kamal Mostafa) - add "hardened_usercopy=off" rare performance needs (Chris von Recklinghausen)" * tag 'hardened-usercopy-v4.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY
| * usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPYKamal Mostafa2018-07-021-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled. The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG. Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32Joerg Roedel2018-07-201-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow PTI to be compiled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-38-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
* Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-02-031-0/+14
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook: "Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the next several releases without breaking anyone's system. The series has roughly the following sections: - remove %p and improve reporting with offset - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc - update VFS subsystem with whitelists - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists - update network subsystem with whitelists - update process memory with whitelists - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage" * tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits) lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache ...
| * usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelistsKees Cook2018-01-151-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive. If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists immediately. Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Merge tag 'char-misc-4.16-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-02-011-0/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH: "Here is the big pull request for char/misc drivers for 4.16-rc1. There's a lot of stuff in here. Three new driver subsystems were added for various types of hardware busses: - siox - slimbus - soundwire as well as a new vboxguest subsystem for the VirtualBox hypervisor drivers. There's also big updates from the FPGA subsystem, lots of Android binder fixes, the usual handful of hyper-v updates, and lots of other smaller driver updates. All of these have been in linux-next for a long time, with no reported issues" * tag 'char-misc-4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (155 commits) char: lp: use true or false for boolean values android: binder: use VM_ALLOC to get vm area android: binder: Use true and false for boolean values lkdtm: fix handle_irq_event symbol for INT_HW_IRQ_EN EISA: Delete error message for a failed memory allocation in eisa_probe() EISA: Whitespace cleanup misc: remove AVR32 dependencies virt: vbox: Add error mapping for VERR_INVALID_NAME and VERR_NO_MORE_FILES soundwire: Fix a signedness bug uio_hv_generic: fix new type mismatch warnings uio_hv_generic: fix type mismatch warnings auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION/AUTHOR/LICENSE uio_hv_generic: add rescind support uio_hv_generic: check that host supports monitor page uio_hv_generic: create send and receive buffers uio: document uio_hv_generic regions doc: fix documentation about uio_hv_generic vmbus: add monitor_id and subchannel_id to sysfs per channel vmbus: fix ABI documentation uio_hv_generic: use ISR callback method ...
| * \ Merge 4.15-rc6 into char-misc-nextGreg Kroah-Hartman2018-01-021-0/+10
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We want the fixes in here as well. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | | /dev/mem: Add bounce buffer for copy-outKees Cook2017-12-181-0/+1
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As done for /proc/kcore in commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") this adds a bounce buffer when reading memory via /dev/mem. This is needed to allow kernel text memory to be read out when built with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY (which refuses to read out kernel text) and without CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM (which would have refused to read any RAM contents at all). Since this build configuration isn't common (most systems with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY also have CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM), this also tries to inform Kconfig about the recommended settings. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's changes to /dev/mem code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Reported-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | | security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTIW. Trevor King2018-01-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final documentation has a different file name. Fix it up to point to the proper file. Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig") Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us
* | | x86/pti: Enable PTI by defaultThomas Gleixner2018-01-031-0/+1
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* | x86/mm/pti: Add KconfigDave Hansen2017-12-231-0/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Finally allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to be enabled. PARAVIRT generally requires that the kernel not manage its own page tables. It also means that the hypervisor and kernel must agree wholeheartedly about what format the page tables are in and what they contain. PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, unfortunately, changes the rules and they can not be used together. I've seen conflicting feedback from maintainers lately about whether they want the Kconfig magic to go first or last in a patch series. It's going last here because the partially-applied series leads to kernels that can not boot in a bunch of cases. I did a run through the entire series with CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y to look for build errors, though. [ tglx: Removed SMP and !PARAVIRT dependencies as they not longer exist ] Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functionsDaniel Micay2017-07-121-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPsDaniel Jurgens2017-05-231-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Sync to mainline for security submaintainers to work againstJames Morris2017-05-221-9/+0
|\
| * Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-05-031-0/+5
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: IMA: - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules KEYS: - add a system blacklist keyring - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction functionality to userland via keyctl() LSM: - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux - revive security_task_alloc hook TPM: - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits) tpm: Fix reference count to main device tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836 apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls(). smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str() KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type ...
| * | HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY is unconditional nowAl Viro2017-04-261-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | security: Grammar s/allocates/allocated/Geert Uytterhoeven2017-05-151-1/+1
| |/ |/| | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | security: introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKSJames Morris2017-03-061-0/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible. Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS, and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case. Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper()Greg Kroah-Hartman2017-01-191-0/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some usermode helper applications are defined at kernel build time, while others can be changed at runtime. To provide a sane way to filter these, add a new kernel option "STATIC_USERMODEHELPER". This option routes all call_usermodehelper() calls through this binary, no matter what the caller wishes to have called. The new binary (by default set to /sbin/usermode-helper, but can be changed through the STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH option) can properly filter the requested programs to be run by the kernel by looking at the first argument that is passed to it. All other options should then be passed onto the proper program if so desired. To disable all call_usermodehelper() calls by the kernel, set STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string. Thanks to Neil Brown for the idea of this feature. Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc6-part2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-09-071-0/+11
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull more hardened usercopyfixes from Kees Cook: - force check_object_size() to be inline too - move page-spanning check behind a CONFIG since it's triggering false positives [ Changed the page-spanning config option to depend on EXPERT in the merge. That way it still gets build testing, and you can enable it if you want to, but is never enabled for "normal" configurations ] * tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc6-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: usercopy: remove page-spanning test for now usercopy: force check_object_size() inline
| * usercopy: remove page-spanning test for nowKees Cook2016-09-071-0/+11
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be tracked down later. [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326 Reported-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@freedesktop.org> Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* Make the hardened user-copy code depend on having a hardened allocatorLinus Torvalds2016-08-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The kernel test robot reported a usercopy failure in the new hardened sanity checks, due to a page-crossing copy of the FPU state into the task structure. This happened because the kernel test robot was testing with SLOB, which doesn't actually do the required book-keeping for slab allocations, and as a result the hardening code didn't realize that the task struct allocation was one single allocation - and the sanity checks fail. Since SLOB doesn't even claim to support hardening (and you really shouldn't use it), the straightforward solution is to just make the usercopy hardening code depend on the allocator supporting it. Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: Hardened usercopyKees Cook2016-07-261-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel. This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object being copied to/from: - address range doesn't wrap around - address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size) - if on the slab allocator: - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches) - otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved and CMA ranges) - if on the stack - object must not extend before/after the current process stack - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is arch/build support for identifying stack frames) - object must not overlap with kernel text Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
* LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictionsKees Cook2016-04-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Yama: remove needless CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKEDKees Cook2015-07-281-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively a no-op change. Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilitiesIulia Manda2015-04-151-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on arm on arm64Colin Cross2014-02-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is selected. Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 && COMPAT to prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that are mapped at 0x8000. Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
* KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/KconfigDavid Howells2012-05-111-67/+1
| | | | | | | | Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot of key-related options. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
* security: Yama LSMKees Cook2012-02-101-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependencyMimi Zohar2011-09-141-1/+3
| | | | | | | | Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or, for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key. This patch removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
* integrity: move ima inode integrity data managementMimi Zohar2011-07-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
* security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on ARM.Paul Gortmaker2011-03-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says: For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map. So select the right value if we know we are building ARM. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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