| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features:
- increase left match history buffer size to provide improved
conflict resolution in overlapping execution rules.
- switch buffer allocation to use a memory pool and GFP_KERNEL where
possible.
- add compression of policy blobs to reduce memory usage.
Cleanups:
- fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"
Bug fixes:
- fix unsigned len comparison in update_for_len macro
- fix sparse warning for type-casting of current->real_cred"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-12-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: make it so work buffers can be allocated from atomic context
apparmor: reduce rcu_read_lock scope for aa_file_perm mediation
apparmor: fix wrong buffer allocation in aa_new_mount
apparmor: fix unsigned len comparison with less than zero
apparmor: increase left match history buffer size
apparmor: Switch to GFP_KERNEL where possible
apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches
apparmor: Force type-casting of current->real_cred
apparmor: fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"
apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load
apparmor: fix missing ZLIB defines
apparmor: fix blob compression build failure on ppc
apparmor: Initial implementation of raw policy blob compression
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
In some situations AppArmor needs to be able to use its work buffers
from atomic context. Add the ability to specify when in atomic context
and hold a set of work buffers in reserve for atomic context to
reduce the chance that a large work buffer allocation will need to
be done.
Fixes: df323337e507 ("apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
There have been cases reported where a history buffer size of 8 was
not enough to resolve conflict overlaps. Increase the buffer to and
get rid of the size element which is currently just storing the
constant WB_HISTORY_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The get_buffers() macro may provide one or two buffers to the caller.
Those buffers are pre-allocated on init for each CPU. By default it
allocates
2* 2 * MAX_PATH * POSSIBLE_CPU
which equals 64KiB on a system with 4 CPUs or 1MiB with 64 CPUs and so
on.
Replace the per-CPU buffers with a common memory pool which is shared
across all CPUs. The pool grows on demand and never shrinks. The pool
starts with two (UP) or four (SMP) elements. By using this pool it is
possible to request a buffer and keeping preemption enabled which avoids
the hack in profile_transition().
It has been pointed out by Tetsuo Handa that GFP_KERNEL allocations for
small amount of memory do not fail. In order not to have an endless
retry, __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL is passed (so the memory allocation is not
repeated until success) and retried once hoping that in the meantime a
buffer has been returned to the pool. Since now NULL is possible all
allocation paths check the buffer pointer and return -ENOMEM on failure.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
This adds an initial implementation of raw policy blob compression,
using deflate. Compression level can be controlled via a new sysctl,
"apparmor.rawdata_compression_level", which can be set to a value
between 0 (no compression) and 9 (highest compression).
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
While commit 11c236b89d7c2 ("apparmor: add a default null dfa") ensure
every profile has a policy.dfa it does not resize the policy.start[]
to have entries for every possible start value. Which means
PROFILE_MEDIATES is not safe to use on untrusted input. Unforunately
commit b9590ad4c4f2 ("apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE") did not
take into account the start value usage.
The input string in profile_query_cb() is user controlled and is not
properly checked to be within the limited start[] entries, even worse
it can't be as userspace policy is allowed to make us of entries types
the kernel does not know about. This mean usespace can currently cause
the kernel to access memory up to 240 entries beyond the start array
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b9590ad4c4f2 ("apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2 of the license
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.
Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.
Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.
All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: mark expected switch fall-through
audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
audit: join tty records to their syscall
audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
audit: ignore fcaps on umount
audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
audit: add support for fcaps v3
audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
AppArmor will no longer be the only user of task blob
after TOMOYO started using task blob.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: f4ad8f2c4076 ("LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security")
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Move management of the task_struct->security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use
is abstracted to avoid future conflict.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Add support for parsing secmark policy provided by userspace, and
store that in the overall policy.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Reserve a secid value that we can use as a wildcard, allowing us to
define policy that's expected to match against all secids.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
As a comment above begin_current_label_crit_section() explains,
begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.
Until now, the ptrace access check (which runs with a task lock held)
violated this rule.
Also add a might_sleep() assertion to begin_current_label_crit_section(),
because asserts are less likely to be ignored than comments.
Fixes: b2d09ae449ced ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Don't read past the end of the buffer containing permissions
characters or write past the end of the destination string.
Detected by CoverityScan CID#1415361, 1415376 ("Out-of-bounds access")
Fixes: e53cfe6c7caa ("apparmor: rework perm mapping to a slightly broader set")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The IDR conversion did not handle an error case for when allocating a
mapping fails, and it did not ensure that mappings did not allocate or
use a 0 value, which is used as an invalid secid. Which is used when a
mapping fails.
Fixes: 3ae7eb49a2be ("apparmor: Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This patch adds support to Apparmor for integrating with audit rule
filtering. Right now it only handles SUBJ_ROLE, interpreting it as a
single component of a label. This is sufficient to get Apparmor working
with IMA's appraisal rules without any modifications on the IMA side.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Refactor get_buffers so the cpu_ptr can be obtained in the outer
layer, instead of inside the macro.
This also enables us to cleanup the code and use get_cpu_ptr,
to handle the preempt_disable()
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Use a radix tree to provide a map between the secid and the label,
and along with it a basic ability to provide secctx conversion.
Shared/cached secctx will be added later.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features:
- add base infrastructure for socket mediation. ABI bump and
additional checks to ensure only v8 compliant policy uses socket af
mediation.
- improve and cleanup dfa verification
- improve profile attachment logic
- improve overlapping expression handling
- add the xattr matching to the attachment logic
- improve signal mediation handling with stacked labels
- improve handling of no_new_privs in a label stack
Cleanups and changes:
- use dfa to parse string split
- bounded version of label_parse
- proper line wrap nulldfa.in
- split context out into task and cred naming to better match usage
- simplify code in aafs
Bug fixes:
- fix display of .ns_name for containers
- fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
- fix logging of the existence test for signals
- fix resource audit messages when auditing peer
- fix display of .ns_name for containers
- fix an error code in verify_table_headers()
- fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path
- fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-04-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (36 commits)
apparmor: fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path
apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement
apparmor: Fix an error code in verify_table_headers()
apparmor: fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t
apparmor: update MAINTAINERS file git and wiki locations
apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE
apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution
apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matching
apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value
apparmor: cleanup: simplify code to get ns symlink name
apparmor: cleanup create_aafs() error path
apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers
apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding
apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro
apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnp
apparmor: move context.h to cred.h
apparmor: move task related defines and fns to task.X files
apparmor: cleanup, drop unused fn __aa_task_is_confined()
apparmor: cleanup fixup description of aa_replace_profiles
...
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The unpack code now makes sure every profile has a dfa so the safe
version of POLICY_MEDIATES is no longer needed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
version 2 - Force an abi break. Network mediation will only be
available in v8 abi complaint policy.
Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.
the user space rule hav the basic form of
NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
[ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]
DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','
TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' | 'rdm' | 'raw' |
'packet' )
PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )
eg.
network,
network inet,
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Overlapping domain attachments using the current longest left exact
match fail in some simple cases, and with the fix to ensure consistent
behavior by failing unresolvable attachments it becomes important to
do a better job.
eg. under the current match the following are unresolvable where
the alternation is clearly a better match under the most specific
left match rule.
/**
/{bin/,}usr/
Use a counting match that detects when a loop in the state machine is
enter, and return the match count to provide a better specific left
match resolution.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
This converts profile attachment based on xattrs to a fixed extended
conditional using dfa matching.
This has a couple of advantages
- pattern matching can be used for the xattr match
- xattrs can be optional for an attachment or marked as required
- the xattr attachment conditional will be able to be combined with
other extended conditionals when the flexible extended conditional
work lands.
The xattr fixed extended conditional is appended to the xmatch
conditional. If an xattr attachment is specified the profile xmatch
will be generated regardless of whether there is a pattern match on
the executable name.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Make it possible to tie Apparmor profiles to the presence of one or more
extended attributes, and optionally their values. An example usecase for
this is to automatically transition to a more privileged Apparmor profile
if an executable has a valid IMA signature, which can then be appraised
by the IMA subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
State differential encoding can provide better compression for
apparmor policy, without having significant impact on match time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Domain transition so far have been largely blocked by no new privs,
unless the transition has been provably a subset of the previous
confinement. There was a couple problems with the previous
implementations,
- transitions that weren't explicitly a stack but resulted in a subset
of confinement were disallowed
- confinement subsets were only calculated from the previous
confinement instead of the confinement being enforced at the time of
no new privs, so transitions would have to get progressively
tighter.
Fix this by detecting and storing a reference to the task's
confinement at the "time" no new privs is set. This reference is then
used to determine whether a transition is a subsystem of the
confinement at the time no new privs was set.
Unfortunately the implementation is less than ideal in that we have to
detect no new privs after the fact when a task attempts a domain
transition. This is adequate for the currently but will not work in a
stacking situation where no new privs could be conceivably be set in
both the "host" and in the container.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Now that file contexts have been moved into file, and task context
fns() and data have been split from the context, only the cred context
remains in context.h so rename to cred.h to better reflect what it
deals with.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
With the task domain change information now stored in the task->security
context, the cred->security context only stores the label. We can get
rid of the cred_ctx and directly reference the label, removing a layer
of indirection, and unneeded extra allocations.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The task domain change info is task specific and its and abuse of
the cred to store the information in there. Now that a task->security
field exists store it in the proper place.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Allow apparmor to audit the number of a signal that it does not
provide a mapping for and is currently being reported only as
unknown.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
some label/context sources might not be guaranteed to be null terminiated
provide a size bounded version of label parse to deal with these.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The current split scheme is actually wrong in that it splits
///&
where that is invalid and should fail. Use the dfa to do a proper
bounded split without having to worry about getting the string
processing right in code.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Splitting the management struct from the actual data blob will allow
us in the future to do some sharing and other data reduction
techniques like replacing the the raw data with compressed data.
Prepare for this by separating the management struct from the data
blob.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The existence test is not being properly logged as the signal mapping
maps it to the last entry in the named signal table. This is done
to help catch bugs by making the 0 mapped signal value invalid so
that we can catch the signal value not being filled in.
When fixing the off-by-one comparision logic the reporting of the
existence test was broken, because the logic behind the mapped named
table was hidden. Fix this by adding a define for the name lookup
and using it.
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: f7dc4c9a855a1 ("apparmor: fix off-by-one comparison on MAXMAPPED_SIG")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Resource auditing is using the peer field which is not available
when the rlim data struct is used, because it is a different element
of the same union. Accessing peer during resource auditing could
cause garbage log entries or even oops the kernel.
Move the rlim data block into the same struct as the peer field
so they can be used together.
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 86b92cb782b3 ("apparmor: move resource checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
move COUNT_ARGS() macro from apparmor to generic header and extend it
to count till twelve.
COUNT() was an alternative name for this logic, but it's used for
different purpose in many other places.
Similarly for CONCATENATE() macro.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Given a label with a profile stack of
A//&B or A//&C ...
A ptrace rule should be able to specify a generic trace pattern with
a rule like
ptrace trace A//&**,
however this is failing because while the correct label match routine
is called, it is being done post label decomposition so it is always
being done against a profile instead of the stacked label.
To fix this refactor the cross check to pass the full peer label in to
the label_match.
Fixes: 290f458a4f16 ("apparmor: allow ptrace checks to be finer grained than just capability")
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Tested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor bugfix from John Johansen:
"Fix oops in audit_signal_cb hook marked for stable"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-11-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix oops in audit_signal_cb hook
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The apparmor_audit_data struct ordering got messed up during a merge
conflict, resulting in the signal integer and peer pointer being in
a union instead of a struct.
For most of the 4.13 and 4.14 life cycle, this was hidden by
commit 651e28c5537a ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket
mediation") which fixed the apparmor_audit_data struct when its data
was added. When that commit was reverted in -rc7 the signal audit bug
was exposed, and unfortunately it never showed up in any of the
testing until after 4.14 was released. Shaun Khan, Zephaniah
E. Loss-Cutler-Hull filed nearly simultaneous bug reports (with
different oopes, the smaller of which is included below).
Full credit goes to Tetsuo Handa for jumping on this as well and
noticing the audit data struct problem and reporting it.
[ 76.178568] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
ffffffff0eee3bc0
[ 76.178579] IP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
[ 76.178581] PGD 1a640a067 P4D 1a640a067 PUD 0
[ 76.178586] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 76.178589] Modules linked in: fuse rfcomm bnep usblp uvcvideo btusb
btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ip6table_filter ip6_tables
xt_tcpudp nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack
iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables intel_rapl joydev wmi_bmof serio_raw
iwldvm iwlwifi shpchp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass autofs4 algif_skcipher
nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel
[ 76.178620] CPU: 0 PID: 10675 Comm: pidgin Not tainted
4.14.0-f1-dirty #135
[ 76.178623] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook Folio
9470m/18DF, BIOS 68IBD Ver. F.62 10/22/2015
[ 76.178625] task: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 task.stack: ffffa09b02a4c000
[ 76.178628] RIP: 0010:audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
[ 76.178631] RSP: 0018:ffffa09b02a4fc08 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 76.178634] RAX: ffffa09b02a4fd60 RBX: ffff9c7aee0741f8 RCX:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178636] RDX: ffffffffee012290 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI:
ffff9c7a9493d800
[ 76.178638] RBP: ffffa09b02a4fd40 R08: 000000000000004d R09:
ffffa09b02a4fc46
[ 76.178641] R10: ffffa09b02a4fcb8 R11: ffff9c7ab44f5072 R12:
ffffa09b02a4fd40
[ 76.178643] R13: ffffffff9e447be0 R14: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 R15:
0000000000000001
[ 76.178646] FS: 00007f8b11ba2a80(0000) GS:ffff9c7afea00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 76.178648] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 76.178650] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0 CR3: 00000003d5209002 CR4:
00000000001606f0
[ 76.178652] Call Trace:
[ 76.178660] common_lsm_audit+0x1da/0x780
[ 76.178665] ? d_absolute_path+0x60/0x90
[ 76.178669] ? aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
[ 76.178672] aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
[ 76.178675] profile_signal_perm.part.0+0x90/0xa0
[ 76.178679] aa_may_signal+0x16e/0x1b0
[ 76.178686] apparmor_task_kill+0x51/0x120
[ 76.178690] security_task_kill+0x44/0x60
[ 76.178695] group_send_sig_info+0x25/0x60
[ 76.178699] kill_pid_info+0x36/0x60
[ 76.178703] SYSC_kill+0xdb/0x180
[ 76.178707] ? preempt_count_sub+0x92/0xd0
[ 76.178712] ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30
[ 76.178716] ? task_work_run+0x6a/0x90
[ 76.178720] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x80/0xa0
[ 76.178723] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
[ 76.178727] RIP: 0033:0x7f8b0e58b767
[ 76.178729] RSP: 002b:00007fff19efd4d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000003e
[ 76.178732] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557f3e3c2050 RCX:
00007f8b0e58b767
[ 76.178735] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
000000000000263b
[ 76.178737] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557f3e3c2270 R09:
0000000000000001
[ 76.178739] R10: 000000000000022d R11: 0000000000000206 R12:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178741] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000557f3e3c13c0 R15:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178745] Code: 48 8b 55 18 48 89 df 41 b8 20 00 08 01 5b 5d 48 8b
42 10 48 8b 52 30 48 63 48 4c 48 8b 44 c8 48 31 c9 48 8b 70 38 e9 f4 fd
00 00 <48> 8b 14 d5 40 27 e5 9e 48 c7 c6 7d 07 19 9f 48 89 df e8 fd 35
[ 76.178794] RIP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0 RSP: ffffa09b02a4fc08
[ 76.178796] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0
[ 76.178799] ---[ end trace 514af9529297f1a3 ]---
Fixes: cd1dbf76b23d ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Reported-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com>
Reported-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Ivan Kozik <ivan@ludios.org>
Tested-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <warp-spam_kernel@aehallh.com>
Tested-by: Christian Boltz <apparmor@cboltz.de>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel
superblock flags.
The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the
moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to.
Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call,
while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags.
The script to do this was:
# places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be
# touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but
# there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags.
FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \
include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h"
# the list of MS_... constants
SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \
DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \
POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \
I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \
ACTIVE NOUSER"
SED_PROG=
for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done
# we want files that contain at least one of MS_...,
# with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded.
L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c')
for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|\|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Conflicts:
include/linux/compiler-clang.h
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
include/linux/compiler-intel.h
include/uapi/linux/stddef.h
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|