summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/integrity/Kconfig
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machineEric Snowberg2022-03-081-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim. The UEFI shim provides what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain. The MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys. These keys can be used to sign an end-users development kernel build. When Linux boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux .platform keyring. Define a new Linux keyring called machine. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new machine keyring will be used in follow on patches. Unlike keys in the platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* powerpc: Load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyringNayna Jain2019-11-131-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> [mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
* integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on itThiago Jung Bauermann2019-08-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | This avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner2019-05-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* s390/ipl: read IPL report at early bootMartin Schwidefsky2019-04-261-1/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Read the IPL Report block provided by secure-boot, add the entries of the certificate list to the system key ring and print the list of components. PR: Adjust to Vasilys bootdata_preserved patch set. Preserve ipl_cert_list for later use in kexec_file. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
* Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-01-021-0/+11
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here)" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: integrity: Remove references to module keyring ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser efi: Add EFI signature data types integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0 x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 ima: add support for arch specific policies ima: refactor ima_init_policy() ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
| * integrity: Define a trusted platform keyringNayna Jain2018-12-121-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel image. It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to store platform keys. This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from userspace. This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotesMasahiro Yamada2018-12-221-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to support bare file paths in the source statement. I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of ambiguity. The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes, and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals. Make it treewide consistent now. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* security: integrity: Remove select to deleted option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSAAndreas Ziegler2016-04-121-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Commit d43de6c780a8 ("akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer") removed the Kconfig option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA, but forgot to remove a 'select' to this option in the definition of INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS. Let's remove the select, as it's ineffective now. Signed-off-by: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* integrity: convert digsig to akcipher apiTadeusz Struk2016-02-181-0/+1
| | | | | | | | Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an optionDavid Howells2016-02-101-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option as /proc/keys is now mandatory if the keyrings facility is enabled (it's used by libkeyutils in userspace). The defconfig references were removed with: perl -p -i -e 's/CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y\n//' \ `git grep -l CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y` and the integrity Kconfig fixed by hand. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
* integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyringDmitry Kasatkin2015-11-231-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Require all keys added to the EVM keyring be signed by an existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring. This patch also switches IMA to use integrity_init_keyring(). Changes in v3: * Added 'init_keyring' config based variable to skip initializing keyring instead of using __integrity_init_keyring() wrapper. * Added dependency back to CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Changes in v2: * Replace CONFIG_EVM_TRUSTED_KEYRING with IMA and EVM common CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING configuration option * Deprecate CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING but keep it for config file compatibility. (Mimi Zohar) Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributesChristoph Jaeger2015-01-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Support for keyword 'boolean' will be dropped later on. No functional change. Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1418003065.git.cj@linux.com Signed-off-by: Christoph Jaeger <cj@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
* integrity: base integrity subsystem kconfig options on integrityDmitry Kasatkin2014-09-091-4/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The integrity subsystem has lots of options and takes more than half of the security menu. This patch consolidates the options under "integrity", which are hidden if not enabled. This change does not affect existing configurations. Re-configuration is not needed. Changes v4: - no need to change "integrity subsystem" to menuconfig as options are hidden, when not enabled. (Mimi) - add INTEGRITY Kconfig help description Changes v3: - dependency to INTEGRITY removed when behind 'if INTEGRITY' Changes v2: - previous patch moved integrity out of the 'security' menu. This version keeps integrity as a security option (Mimi). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* integrity: move asymmetric keys config optionDmitry Kasatkin2014-09-091-12/+12
| | | | | | | | For better visual appearance it is better to co-locate asymmetric key options together with signature support. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()Mimi Zohar2013-06-201-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch moves the integrity_audit_msg() function and defintion to security/integrity/, the parent directory, renames the 'ima_audit' boot command line option to 'integrity_audit', and fixes the Kconfig help text to reflect the actual code. Changelog: - Fixed ifdef inclusion of integrity_audit_msg() (Fengguang Wu) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keysDmitry Kasatkin2013-02-061-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric key infrastructure. Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils was updated to support the new signature format. While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm. The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5 is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be generated using a sha1 hash algorithm. Changes in this patch: - Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of in source #ifdefs. - keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be done using keyctl only. - keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match(). - Kconfig option title was changed Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* integrity: digital signature config option name changeDmitry Kasatkin2012-01-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | Similar to SIGNATURE, rename INTEGRITY_DIGSIG to INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lib: digital signature config option name changeDmitry Kasatkin2012-01-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | It was reported that DIGSIG is confusing name for digital signature module. It was suggested to rename DIGSIG to SIGNATURE. Requested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* digsig: build dependency fixDmitry Kasatkin2011-11-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix build errors by adding Kconfig dependency on KEYS. CRYPTO dependency removed. CC security/integrity/digsig.o security/integrity/digsig.c: In function ?integrity_digsig_verify?: security/integrity/digsig.c:38:4: error: implicit declaration of function ?request_key? security/integrity/digsig.c:38:17: error: ?key_type_keyring? undeclared (first use in this function) security/integrity/digsig.c:38:17: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in make[2]: *** [security/integrity/digsig.o] Error 1 Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* integrity: digital signature verification using multiple keyringsDmitry Kasatkin2011-11-091-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | Define separate keyrings for each of the different use cases - evm, ima, and modules. Using different keyrings improves search performance, and also allows "locking" specific keyring to prevent adding new keys. This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only added from initramfs. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
* evm: re-releaseMimi Zohar2011-07-181-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures). While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper: http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf. EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM. Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(). Changelog v7: - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review) - fix URL in patch description - remove evm_hmac_size definition - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size) - moved linux include before other includes - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure - fail earlier for invalid key - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names Changelog: - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation. - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin) - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin) - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
* integrity: move ima inode integrity data managementMimi Zohar2011-07-181-0/+6
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-09 23:07:15 +0000