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* KEYS: trusted: Do not use WARN when encode failsJarkko Sakkinen2024-05-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When asn1_encode_sequence() fails, WARN is not the correct solution. 1. asn1_encode_sequence() is not an internal function (located in lib/asn1_encode.c). 2. Location is known, which makes the stack trace useless. 3. Results a crash if panic_on_warn is set. It is also noteworthy that the use of WARN is undocumented, and it should be avoided unless there is a carefully considered rationale to use it. Replace WARN with pr_err, and print the return value instead, which is only useful piece of information. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_key_encode()Jarkko Sakkinen2024-05-211-6/+18
| | | | | | | | | 'scratch' is never freed. Fix this by calling kfree() in the success, and in the error case. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # +v5.13 Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240513' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-05-151-1/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - The security/* portion of the effort to remove the empty sentinel elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays - Update the file list associated with the LSM / "SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" entry in the MAINTAINERS file (and then fix a typo in then update) * tag 'lsm-pr-20240513' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: MAINTAINERS: repair file entry in SECURITY SUBSYSTEM MAINTAINERS: update the LSM file list lsm: remove the now superfluous sentinel element from ctl_table array
| * lsm: remove the now superfluous sentinel element from ctl_table arrayJoel Granados2024-04-151-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which will reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time memory bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link : https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%2FcBo@bombadil.infradead.org/) Remove the sentinel from all files under security/ that register a sysctl table. Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> # loadpin & yama Tested-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'keys-next-6.10-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-05-133-24/+30
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd Pull keys updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: - do not overwrite the key expiration once it is set - move key quota updates earlier into key_put(), instead of updating them in key_gc_unused_keys() * tag 'keys-next-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: keys: Fix overwrite of key expiration on instantiation keys: update key quotas in key_put()
| * | keys: Fix overwrite of key expiration on instantiationSilvio Gissi2024-05-091-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The expiry time of a key is unconditionally overwritten during instantiation, defaulting to turn it permanent. This causes a problem for DNS resolution as the expiration set by user-space is overwritten to TIME64_MAX, disabling further DNS updates. Fix this by restoring the condition that key_set_expiry is only called when the pre-parser sets a specific expiry. Fixes: 39299bdd2546 ("keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiry") Signed-off-by: Silvio Gissi <sifonsec@amazon.com> cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Hazem Mohamed Abuelfotoh <abuehaze@amazon.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * | keys: update key quotas in key_put()Luis Henriques2024-05-093-23/+28
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Delaying key quotas update when key's refcount reaches 0 in key_put() has been causing some issues in fscrypt testing, specifically in fstest generic/581. This commit fixes this test flakiness by dealing with the quotas immediately, and leaving all the other clean-ups to the key garbage collector. This is done by moving the updates to the qnkeys and qnbytes fields in struct key_user from key_gc_unused_keys() into key_put(). Unfortunately, this also means that we need to switch to the irq-version of the spinlock that protects these fields and use spin_lock_{irqsave,irqrestore} in all the code that touches these fields. Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@kernel.org>
* | Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-6.10-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-05-132-53/+106
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd Pull TPM updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: "These are the changes for the TPM driver with a single major new feature: TPM bus encryption and integrity protection. The key pair on TPM side is generated from so called null random seed per power on of the machine [1]. This supports the TPM encryption of the hard drive by adding layer of protection against bus interposer attacks. Other than that, a few minor fixes and documentation for tpm_tis to clarify basics of TPM localities for future patch review discussions (will be extended and refined over times, just a seed)" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240429202811.13643-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com/ [1] * tag 'tpmdd-next-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: (28 commits) Documentation: tpm: Add TPM security docs toctree entry tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes Documentation: add tpm-security.rst tpm: add the null key name as a sysfs export KEYS: trusted: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() tpm: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend() tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions tpm: Add TCG mandated Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) tpm: Add NULL primary creation tpm: export the context save and load commands tpm: add buffer function to point to returned parameters crypto: lib - implement library version of AES in CFB mode KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Use struct tpm_buf for sized buffers tpm: Add tpm_buf_read_{u8,u16,u32} tpm: TPM2B formatted buffers tpm: Store the length of the tpm_buf data separately. tpm: Update struct tpm_buf documentation comments ...
| * | KEYS: trusted: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal pathJames Bottomley2024-05-091-27/+61
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If some entity is snooping the TPM bus, the can see the data going in to be sealed and the data coming out as it is unsealed. Add parameter and response encryption to these cases to ensure that no secrets are leaked even if the bus is snooped. As part of doing this conversion it was discovered that policy sessions can't work with HMAC protected authority because of missing pieces (the tpm Nonce). I've added code to work the same way as before, which will result in potential authority exposure (while still adding security for the command and the returned blob), and a fixme to redo the API to get rid of this security hole. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * | KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Use struct tpm_buf for sized buffersJarkko Sakkinen2024-05-091-23/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Take advantage of the new sized buffer (TPM2B) mode of struct tpm_buf in tpm2_seal_trusted(). This allows to add robustness to the command construction without requiring to calculate buffer sizes manually. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * | tpm: Store the length of the tpm_buf data separately.Jarkko Sakkinen2024-05-091-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TPM2B buffers, or sized buffers, have a two byte header, which contains the length of the payload as a 16-bit big-endian number, without counting in the space taken by the header. This differs from encoding in the TPM header where the length includes also the bytes taken by the header. Unbound the length of a tpm_buf from the value stored to the TPM command header. A separate encoding and decoding step so that different buffer types can be supported, with variant header format and length encoding. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * | tpm: Remove tpm_send()Jarkko Sakkinen2024-05-091-2/+12
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Open code the last remaining call site for tpm_send(). Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new trust sourceDavid Gstir2024-05-091-0/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new trust source: - Describe security properties of DCP trust source - Describe key usage - Document blob format Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keysDavid Gstir2024-05-094-1/+328
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP. Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob mechanism similar to what CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and parsing the blob has to happen in software (i.e. the kernel). The software-based blob format used by DCP trusted keys encrypts the payload using AES-128-GCM with a freshly generated random key and nonce. The random key itself is AES-128-ECB encrypted using the DCP unique or OTP key. The DCP trusted key blob format is: /* * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format. * * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1 * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload, * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP. * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption. * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload. * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key, * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it. * * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len + * AES_BLOCK_SIZE. */ struct dcp_blob_fmt { __u8 fmt_version; __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128]; __le32 payload_len; __u8 payload[]; } __packed; By default the unique key is used. It is also possible to use the OTP key. While the unique key should be unique it is not documented how this key is derived. Therefore selection the OTP key is supported as well via the use_otp_key module parameter. Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | KEYS: trusted: improve scalability of trust source configDavid Gstir2024-05-091-2/+8
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enabling trusted keys requires at least one trust source implementation (currently TPM, TEE or CAAM) to be enabled. Currently, this is done by checking each trust source's config option individually. This does not scale when more trust sources like the one for DCP are added, because the condition will get long and hard to read. Add config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS which is set to true by each trust source once its enabled and adapt the check for having at least one active trust source to use this option. Whenever a new trust source is added, it now needs to select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> # for TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* ima: Move to LSM infrastructureRoberto Sassu2024-02-151-8/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like 'integrity'). Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM, and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were hardcoded. Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(), which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm(). Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always executed to mark files as new, as before the move. A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod, inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub and kernel-internal tmpfs files. Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hookRoberto Sassu2024-02-151-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the key_post_create_or_update hook. Depending on policy, IMA measures the key content after creation or update, so that remote verifiers are aware of the operation. Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful key creation or update. The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be reverted. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"Mimi Zohar2024-01-241-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882. New encrypted keys are created either from kernel-generated random numbers or user-provided decrypted data. Revert the change requiring user-provided decrypted data. Reported-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* Merge tag 'integrity-v6.8' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-01-091-0/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: - Add a new IMA/EVM maintainer and reviewer - Disable EVM on overlayfs The EVM HMAC and the original file signatures contain filesystem specific metadata (e.g. i_ino, i_generation and s_uuid), preventing the security.evm xattr from directly being copied up to the overlay. Further before calculating and writing out the overlay file's EVM HMAC, EVM must first verify the existing backing file's 'security.evm' value. For now until a solution is developed, disable EVM on overlayfs. - One bug fix and two cleanups * tag 'integrity-v6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: overlay: disable EVM evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystems evm: don't copy up 'security.evm' xattr MAINTAINERS: Add Eric Snowberg as a reviewer to IMA MAINTAINERS: Add Roberto Sassu as co-maintainer to IMA and EVM KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep ima: Remove EXPERIMENTAL from Kconfig ima: Reword IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
| * KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsepChen Ni2023-11-271-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add check for strsep() in order to transfer the error. Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") Signed-off-by: Chen Ni <nichen@iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | Merge tag 'vfs-6.8.iov_iter' of ↵Linus Torvalds2024-01-081-3/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs Pull vfs iov_iter cleanups from Christian Brauner: "This contains a minor cleanup. The patches drop an unused argument from import_single_range() allowing to replace import_single_range() with import_ubuf() and dropping import_single_range() completely" * tag 'vfs-6.8.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: iov_iter: replace import_single_range() with import_ubuf() iov_iter: remove unused 'iov' argument from import_single_range()
| * | iov_iter: replace import_single_range() with import_ubuf()Jens Axboe2023-12-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the removal of the 'iov' argument to import_single_range(), the two functions are now fully identical. Convert the import_single_range() callers to import_ubuf(), and remove the former fully. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204174827.1258875-3-axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
| * | iov_iter: remove unused 'iov' argument from import_single_range()Jens Axboe2023-12-051-2/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is entirely unused, just get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204174827.1258875-2-axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
* / keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiryDavid Howells2023-12-214-22/+37
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a key has an expiration time, then when that time passes, the key is left around for a certain amount of time before being collected (5 mins by default) so that EKEYEXPIRED can be returned instead of ENOKEY. This is a problem for DNS keys because we want to redo the DNS lookup immediately at that point. Fix this by allowing key types to be marked such that keys of that type don't have this extra period, but are reclaimed as soon as they expire and turn this on for dns_resolver-type keys. To make this easier to handle, key->expiry is changed to be permanent if TIME64_MAX rather than 0. Furthermore, give such new-style negative DNS results a 1s default expiry if no other expiry time is set rather than allowing it to stick around indefinitely. This shouldn't be zero as ls will follow a failing stat call immediately with a second with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW added. Fixes: 1a4240f4764a ("DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver code") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Markus Suvanto <markus.suvanto@gmail.com> cc: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com> cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
* Merge tag 'v6.7-p1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-11-021-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface - Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls - Remove ahash alignmask attribute Algorithms: - Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc - Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1) - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad - Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum - Remove zlib-deflate Drivers: - Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver - Add STM32MP13x support in stm32 - Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng - Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip" * tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (283 commits) crypto: adiantum - flush destination page before unmapping crypto: testmgr - move pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-*) to correct place Documentation/module-signing.txt: bring up to date module: enable automatic module signing with FIPS 202 SHA-3 crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signatures crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support crypto: FIPS 202 SHA-3 register in hash info for IMA x509: Add OIDs for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash and signatures crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash crypto: ahash - check for shash type instead of not ahash type crypto: hash - move "ahash wrapping shash" functions to ahash.c crypto: talitos - stop using crypto_ahash::init crypto: chelsio - stop using crypto_ahash::init crypto: ahash - improve file comment crypto: ahash - remove struct ahash_request_priv crypto: ahash - remove crypto_ahash_alignmask crypto: gcm - stop using alignmask of ahash crypto: chacha20poly1305 - stop using alignmask of ahash crypto: ccm - stop using alignmask of ahash net: ipv6: stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask ...
| * KEYS: encrypted: Do not include crypto/algapi.hHerbert Xu2023-09-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The header file crypto/algapi.h is for internal use only. Use the header file crypto/utils.h instead. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | Merge tag 'for-6.7/block-2023-10-30' of git://git.kernel.dk/linuxLinus Torvalds2023-11-011-0/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull block updates from Jens Axboe: - Improvements to the queue_rqs() support, and adding null_blk support for that as well (Chengming) - Series improving badblocks support (Coly) - Key store support for sed-opal (Greg) - IBM partition string handling improvements (Jan) - Make number of ublk devices supported configurable (Mike) - Cancelation improvements for ublk (Ming) - MD pull requests via Song: - Handle timeout in md-cluster, by Denis Plotnikov - Cleanup pers->prepare_suspend, by Yu Kuai - Rewrite mddev_suspend(), by Yu Kuai - Simplify md_seq_ops, by Yu Kuai - Reduce unnecessary locking array_state_store(), by Mariusz Tkaczyk - Make rdev add/remove independent from daemon thread, by Yu Kuai - Refactor code around quiesce() and mddev_suspend(), by Yu Kuai - NVMe pull request via Keith: - nvme-auth updates (Mark) - nvme-tcp tls (Hannes) - nvme-fc annotaions (Kees) - Misc cleanups and improvements (Jiapeng, Joel) * tag 'for-6.7/block-2023-10-30' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: (95 commits) block: ublk_drv: Remove unused function md: cleanup pers->prepare_suspend() nvme-auth: allow mixing of secret and hash lengths nvme-auth: use transformed key size to create resp nvme-auth: alloc nvme_dhchap_key as single buffer nvmet-tcp: use 'spin_lock_bh' for state_lock() powerpc/pseries: PLPKS SED Opal keystore support block: sed-opal: keystore access for SED Opal keys block:sed-opal: SED Opal keystore ublk: simplify aborting request ublk: replace monitor with cancelable uring_cmd ublk: quiesce request queue when aborting queue ublk: rename mm_lock as lock ublk: move ublk_cancel_dev() out of ub->mutex ublk: make sure io cmd handled in submitter task context ublk: don't get ublk device reference in ublk_abort_queue() ublk: Make ublks_max configurable ublk: Limit dev_id/ub_number values md-cluster: check for timeout while a new disk adding nvme: rework NVME_AUTH Kconfig selection ...
| * | security/keys: export key_lookup()Hannes Reinecke2023-10-111-0/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For in-kernel consumers one cannot readily assign a user (eg when running from a workqueue), so the normal key search permissions cannot be applied. This patch exports the 'key_lookup()' function for a simple lookup of keys without checking for permissions. Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
* | keys: Remove unused extern declarationsYueHaibing2023-10-241-7/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since commit b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") iterate_over_keyring() is never used, so can be removed. And commit b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys") left behind keyring_search_instkey(). Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | KEYS: trusted: tee: Refactor register SHM usageSumit Garg2023-10-241-44/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The OP-TEE driver using the old SMC based ABI permits overlapping shared buffers, but with the new FF-A based ABI each physical page may only be registered once. As the key and blob buffer are allocated adjancently, there is no need for redundant register shared memory invocation. Also, it is incompatibile with FF-A based ABI limitation. So refactor register shared memory implementation to use only single invocation to register both key and blob buffers. [jarkko: Added cc to stable.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.16+ Fixes: 4615e5a34b95 ("optee: add FF-A support") Reported-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | KEYS: trusted: Rollback init_trusted() consistentlyJarkko Sakkinen2023-10-241-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do bind neither static calls nor trusted_key_exit() before a successful init, in order to maintain a consistent state. In addition, depart the init_trusted() in the case of a real error (i.e. getting back something else than -ENODEV). Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAHk-=whOPoLaWM8S8GgoOPT7a2+nMH5h3TLKtn=R_3w4R1_Uvg@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usageSumit Garg2023-10-101-8/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and __exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y. However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init() and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead. Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not. Reported-and-tested-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework") Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpyAzeem Shaikh2023-08-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first. This read may exceed the destination size limit. This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1]. In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace strlcpy() here with strscpy(). No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89 Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* sysctl: set variable key_sysctls storage-class-specifier to staticTom Rix2023-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | smatch reports security/keys/sysctl.c:12:18: warning: symbol 'key_sysctls' was not declared. Should it be static? This variable is only used in its defining file, so it should be static. Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* security: keys: perform capable check only on privileged operationsChristian Göttsche2023-07-281-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the current task fails the check for the queried capability via `capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` LSMs like SELinux generate a denial message. Issuing such denial messages unnecessarily can lead to a policy author granting more privileges to a subject than needed to silence them. Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks after the check whether the operation is actually privileged. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* security: keys: Modify mismatched function nameJiapeng Chong2023-07-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | No functional modification involved. security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:203: warning: expecting prototype for tpm_buf_append_auth(). Prototype was for tpm2_buf_append_auth() instead. Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=5524 Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* keys: Fix linking a duplicate key to a keyring's assoc_arrayPetr Pavlu2023-07-171-11/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When making a DNS query inside the kernel using dns_query(), the request code can in rare cases end up creating a duplicate index key in the assoc_array of the destination keyring. It is eventually found by a BUG_ON() check in the assoc_array implementation and results in a crash. Example report: [2158499.700025] kernel BUG at ../lib/assoc_array.c:652! [2158499.700039] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [2158499.700065] CPU: 3 PID: 31985 Comm: kworker/3:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.3.18-150300.59.90-default #1 SLE15-SP3 [2158499.700096] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 [2158499.700351] Workqueue: cifsiod cifs_resolve_server [cifs] [2158499.700380] RIP: 0010:assoc_array_insert+0x85f/0xa40 [2158499.700401] Code: ff 74 2b 48 8b 3b 49 8b 45 18 4c 89 e6 48 83 e7 fe e8 95 ec 74 00 3b 45 88 7d db 85 c0 79 d4 0f 0b 0f 0b 0f 0b e8 41 f2 be ff <0f> 0b 0f 0b 81 7d 88 ff ff ff 7f 4c 89 eb 4c 8b ad 58 ff ff ff 0f [2158499.700448] RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd6187faf0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [2158499.700470] RAX: ffff9f1ea7da2fe8 RBX: ffff9f1ea7da2fc1 RCX: 0000000000000005 [2158499.700492] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000000 [2158499.700515] RBP: ffffc0bd6187fbb0 R08: ffff9f185faf1100 R09: 0000000000000000 [2158499.700538] R10: ffff9f1ea7da2cc0 R11: 000000005ed8cec8 R12: ffffc0bd6187fc28 [2158499.700561] R13: ffff9f15feb8d000 R14: ffff9f1ea7da2fc0 R15: ffff9f168dc0d740 [2158499.700585] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f185fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2158499.700610] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2158499.700630] CR2: 00007fdd94fca238 CR3: 0000000809d8c006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [2158499.700702] Call Trace: [2158499.700741] ? key_alloc+0x447/0x4b0 [2158499.700768] ? __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700790] __key_link_begin+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700814] request_key_and_link+0x2c7/0x730 [2158499.700847] ? dns_resolver_read+0x20/0x20 [dns_resolver] [2158499.700873] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [2158499.700898] request_key_tag+0x43/0xa0 [2158499.700926] dns_query+0x114/0x2ca [dns_resolver] [2158499.701127] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x194/0x310 [cifs] [2158499.701164] ? scnprintf+0x49/0x90 [2158499.701190] ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70 [2158499.701211] ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70 [2158499.701405] reconn_set_ipaddr_from_hostname+0x81/0x2a0 [cifs] [2158499.701603] cifs_resolve_server+0x4b/0xd0 [cifs] [2158499.701632] process_one_work+0x1f8/0x3e0 [2158499.701658] worker_thread+0x2d/0x3f0 [2158499.701682] ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0 [2158499.701703] kthread+0x10d/0x130 [2158499.701723] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0 [2158499.701746] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 The situation occurs as follows: * Some kernel facility invokes dns_query() to resolve a hostname, for example, "abcdef". The function registers its global DNS resolver cache as current->cred.thread_keyring and passes the query to request_key_net() -> request_key_tag() -> request_key_and_link(). * Function request_key_and_link() creates a keyring_search_context object. Its match_data.cmp method gets set via a call to type->match_preparse() (resolves to dns_resolver_match_preparse()) to dns_resolver_cmp(). * Function request_key_and_link() continues and invokes search_process_keyrings_rcu() which returns that a given key was not found. The control is then passed to request_key_and_link() -> construct_alloc_key(). * Concurrently to that, a second task similarly makes a DNS query for "abcdef." and its result gets inserted into the DNS resolver cache. * Back on the first task, function construct_alloc_key() first runs __key_link_begin() to determine an assoc_array_edit operation to insert a new key. Index keys in the array are compared exactly as-is, using keyring_compare_object(). The operation finds that "abcdef" is not yet present in the destination keyring. * Function construct_alloc_key() continues and checks if a given key is already present on some keyring by again calling search_process_keyrings_rcu(). This search is done using dns_resolver_cmp() and "abcdef" gets matched with now present key "abcdef.". * The found key is linked on the destination keyring by calling __key_link() and using the previously calculated assoc_array_edit operation. This inserts the "abcdef." key in the array but creates a duplicity because the same index key is already present. Fix the problem by postponing __key_link_begin() in construct_alloc_key() until an actual key which should be linked into the destination keyring is determined. [jarkko@kernel.org: added a fixes tag and cc to stable] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+ Fixes: df593ee23e05 ("keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin()") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* sysctl: move security keys sysctl registration to its own fileLuis Chamberlain2023-06-081-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security keys sysctls are already declared on its own file, just move the sysctl registration to its own file to help avoid merge conflicts on sysctls.c, and help with clearing up sysctl.c further. This creates a small penalty of 23 bytes: ./scripts/bloat-o-meter vmlinux.1 vmlinux.2 add/remove: 2/0 grow/shrink: 0/1 up/down: 49/-26 (23) Function old new delta init_security_keys_sysctls - 33 +33 __pfx_init_security_keys_sysctls - 16 +16 sysctl_init_bases 85 59 -26 Total: Before=21256937, After=21256960, chg +0.00% But soon we'll be saving tons of bytes anyway, as we modify the sysctl registrations to use ARRAY_SIZE and so we get rid of all the empty array elements so let's just clean this up now. Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
* keys: Do not cache key in task struct if key is requested from kernel threadDavid Howells2023-03-211-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The key which gets cached in task structure from a kernel thread does not get invalidated even after expiry. Due to which, a new key request from kernel thread will be served with the cached key if it's present in task struct irrespective of the key validity. The change is to not cache key in task_struct when key requested from kernel thread so that kernel thread gets a valid key on every key request. The problem has been seen with the cifs module doing DNS lookups from a kernel thread and the results getting pinned by being attached to that kernel thread's cache - and thus not something that can be easily got rid of. The cache would ordinarily be cleared by notify-resume, but kernel threads don't do that. This isn't seen with AFS because AFS is doing request_key() within the kernel half of a user thread - which will do notify-resume. Fixes: 7743c48e54ee ("keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct") Signed-off-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com> cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAGypqWw951d=zYRbdgNR4snUDvJhWL=q3=WOyh7HhSJupjz2vA@mail.gmail.com/
* Merge tag 'v6.3-p1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-02-211-25/+5
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu: "API: - Use kmap_local instead of kmap_atomic - Change request callback to take void pointer - Print FIPS status in /proc/crypto (when enabled) Algorithms: - Add rfc4106/gcm support on arm64 - Add ARIA AVX2/512 support on x86 Drivers: - Add TRNG driver for StarFive SoC - Delete ux500/hash driver (subsumed by stm32/hash) - Add zlib support in qat - Add RSA support in aspeed" * tag 'v6.3-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (156 commits) crypto: x86/aria-avx - Do not use avx2 instructions crypto: aspeed - Fix modular aspeed-acry crypto: hisilicon/qm - fix coding style issues crypto: hisilicon/qm - update comments to match function crypto: hisilicon/qm - change function names crypto: hisilicon/qm - use min() instead of min_t() crypto: hisilicon/qm - remove some unused defines crypto: proc - Print fips status crypto: crypto4xx - Call dma_unmap_page when done crypto: octeontx2 - Fix objects shared between several modules crypto: nx - Fix sparse warnings crypto: ecc - Silence sparse warning tls: Pass rec instead of aead_req into tls_encrypt_done crypto: api - Remove completion function scaffolding tls: Remove completion function scaffolding tipc: Remove completion function scaffolding net: ipv6: Remove completion function scaffolding net: ipv4: Remove completion function scaffolding net: macsec: Remove completion function scaffolding dm: Remove completion function scaffolding ...
| * KEYS: DH: Use crypto_wait_reqHerbert Xu2023-02-131-25/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch replaces the custom crypto completion function with crypto_req_done. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | KEYS: Add new function key_create()Thomas Weißschuh2023-02-131-37/+100
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | key_create() works like key_create_or_update() but does not allow updating an existing key, instead returning ERR_PTR(-EEXIST). key_create() will be used by the blacklist keyring which should not create duplicate entries or update existing entries. Instead a dedicated message with appropriate severity will be logged. Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'integrity-v6.2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-12-131-3/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Aside from the one cleanup, the other changes are bug fixes: Cleanup: - Include missing iMac Pro 2017 in list of Macs with T2 security chip Bug fixes: - Improper instantiation of "encrypted" keys with user provided data - Not handling delay in updating LSM label based IMA policy rules (-ESTALE) - IMA and integrity memory leaks on error paths - CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 hash algorithm renamed" * tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Fix hash dependency to correct algorithm ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields() integrity: Fix memory leakage in keyring allocation error path ima: Fix memory leak in __ima_inode_hash() ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match() ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list efi: Add iMac Pro 2017 to uefi skip cert quirk KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
| * KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided dataNikolaus Voss2022-10-191-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead. Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a small shell script, e.g.: BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32) keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long. The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter. The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been fixed (see link below). Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/ Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | Merge tag 'pull-iov_iter' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-12-121-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull iov_iter updates from Al Viro: "iov_iter work; most of that is about getting rid of direction misannotations and (hopefully) preventing more of the same for the future" * tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers iov_iter: saner checks for attempt to copy to/from iterator [xen] fix "direction" argument of iov_iter_kvec() [vhost] fix 'direction' argument of iov_iter_{init,bvec}() [target] fix iov_iter_bvec() "direction" argument [s390] memcpy_real(): WRITE is "data source", not destination... [s390] zcore: WRITE is "data source", not destination... [infiniband] READ is "data destination", not source... [fsi] WRITE is "data source", not destination... [s390] copy_oldmem_kernel() - WRITE is "data source", not destination csum_and_copy_to_iter(): handle ITER_DISCARD get rid of unlikely() on page_copy_sane() calls
| * | use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializersAl Viro2022-11-251-2/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are "data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as "we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly the wrong way. Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder to misinterpret... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* / KEYS: trusted: tee: Make registered shm dependency explicitSumit Garg2022-12-081-1/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | TEE trusted keys support depends on registered shared memory support since the key buffers are needed to be registered with OP-TEE. So make that dependency explicit to not register trusted keys support if underlying implementation doesn't support registered shared memory. Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Tested-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v6.1-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-101-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: "Just a few bug fixes this time" * tag 'tpmdd-next-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: selftest: tpm2: Add Client.__del__() to close /dev/tpm* handle security/keys: Remove inconsistent __user annotation char: move from strlcpy with unused retval to strscpy
| * security/keys: Remove inconsistent __user annotationVincenzo Frascino2022-10-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The declaration of keyring_read does not match the definition (security/keys/keyring.c). In this case the definition is correct because it matches what defined in "struct key_type::read" (linux/key-type.h). Fix the declaration removing the inconsistent __user annotation. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | KEYS: Move KEY_LOOKUP_ to include/linux/key.h and define KEY_LOOKUP_ALLRoberto Sassu2022-09-211-2/+0
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In preparation for the patch that introduces the bpf_lookup_user_key() eBPF kfunc, move KEY_LOOKUP_ definitions to include/linux/key.h, to be able to validate the kfunc parameters. Add them to enum key_lookup_flag, so that all the current ones and the ones defined in the future are automatically exported through BTF and available to eBPF programs. Also, add KEY_LOOKUP_ALL to the enum, with the logical OR of currently defined flags as value, to facilitate checking whether a variable contains only those flags. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220920075951.929132-7-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-22 22:23:45 +0000