Linux - Linux kernel mainline tree

	Commit message (Collapse)	Author	Age	Files	Lines
*	landlock: Rename "ptrace" files to "task"	Mickaël Salaün	2024-03-08	1	-14/+0
\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \|	ptrace.[ch] are currently only used for the ptrace LSM hooks but their scope will expand with IPCs and audit support. Rename ptrace.[ch] to task.[ch], which better reflect their content. Similarly, rename landlock_add_ptrace_hooks() to landlock_add_task_hooks(). Keep header files for now. Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307093923.1466071-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
*	landlock: Add ptrace restrictions	Mickaël Salaün	2021-04-22	1	-0/+14
	Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee. A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer). Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-5-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>