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* security/min_addr.c: make init_mmap_min_addr() staticH Hartley Sweeten2009-12-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | init_mmap_min_addr() is a pure_initcall and should be static. Signed-off-by: H Hartley Sweeten <hsweeten@visionengravers.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* sysctl: require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to set mmap_min_addrKees Cook2009-11-091-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the mmap_min_addr value can only be bypassed during mmap when the task has CAP_SYS_RAWIO. However, the mmap_min_addr sysctl value itself can be adjusted to 0 if euid == 0, allowing a bypass without CAP_SYS_RAWIO. This patch adds a check for the capability before allowing mmap_min_addr to be changed. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* sysctl: remove "struct file *" argument of ->proc_handlerAlexey Dobriyan2009-09-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's unused. It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl shouldn't care about the rest. It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addrEric Paris2009-08-171-0/+49
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>