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* Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into ↵James Morris2013-10-221-9/+4
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| * Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinuxPaul Moore2013-09-181-9/+4
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts() between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use() simplification patch.
| | * lsm: split the xfrm_state_alloc_security() hook implementationPaul Moore2013-07-251-9/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel: * xfrm_state_alloc * xfrm_state_alloc_acquire Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux code; no other LSMs are affected. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | | xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr".Tetsuo Handa2013-07-251-5/+3
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2] Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | NFS: Extend NFS xattr handlers to accept the security namespaceDavid Quigley2013-06-081-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing NFSv4 xattr handlers do not accept xattr calls to the security namespace. This patch extends these handlers to accept xattrs from the security namespace in addition to the default NFSv4 ACL namespace. Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* | LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data.David Quigley2013-06-081-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no way to differentiate if a text mount option is passed from user space or the kernel. A flags field is being added to the security_sb_set_mnt_opts hook to allow for in kernel security flags to be sent to the LSM for processing in addition to the text options received from mount. This patch also updated existing code to fix compilation errors. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* | Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model.David Quigley2013-06-081-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* | Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry.David Quigley2013-06-081-0/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2013-04-301-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "Just some minor updates across the subsystem" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement() TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C) char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions. Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir() Smack: add support for modification of existing rules smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm() Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
| * selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatchJeff Layton2013-04-021-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the second context= option is ignored. For instance: # mount server:/export /mnt/test1 # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 # ls -dZ /mnt/test1 drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1 # ls -dZ /mnt/test2 drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2 When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock, it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this case cannot take effect. This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the admin why the second mount failed. Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts, then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways. For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the server: # mount server:/ /mnt/test1 # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified ...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch. The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already present with the wrong context. OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work, because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons: # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/ -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one. Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hookEric Dumazet2013-04-091-0/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 90ba9b1986b5ac (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb()) broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet. Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big, and we would like it to happen only if really needed. This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method, that is a void operation unless selinux is active. Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti <mvadkert@redhat.com> Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Tested-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devicesPaul Moore2013-01-141-5/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* ima: support new kernel module syscallMimi Zohar2012-12-141-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system. This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an extensible and consistent manner. To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional patches could pass the signature as the first parameter. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hookKees Cook2012-12-141-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example, read extended attributes for signatures, etc. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* consitify do_mount() argumentsAl Viro2012-10-111-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-10-021-0/+27
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline attacks - Integrity: add digital signature verification - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions) - IBM vTPM support on ppc64 - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels" Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools ima: change flags container data type Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label Smack: remove task_wait() hook. ima: audit log hashes ima: generic IMA action flag handling ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure audit: export audit_log_task_info tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390 ima: digital signature verification support ima: add support for different security.ima data types ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls ima: add inode_post_setattr call ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock ima: allocating iint improvements ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules ima: integrity appraisal extension vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file ...
| * ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and callsMimi Zohar2012-09-071-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security' xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() functions. (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c) Changelog: - take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin) - ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. (Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu) - Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags, forcing re-appraisal. - Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN - static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs - ima_protect_xattr should be static Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
| * security: allow Yama to be unconditionally stackedKees Cook2012-09-051-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected, no matter what LSM module is primary. Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * security: Fix nommu build.Paul Mundt2012-07-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgidsEric W. Biederman2012-09-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | security: Fix nommu build.Paul Mundt2012-07-031-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helperAl Viro2012-06-011-18/+28
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_semAl Viro2012-06-011-3/+30
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()Al Viro2012-05-311-4/+8
| | | | | | ... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_openEric Paris2012-04-091-2/+2
| | | | | | dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* security: trim security.hAl Viro2012-02-141-0/+2
| | | | | | | Trim security.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* mm: collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single functionAl Viro2012-02-141-14/+0
| | | | | | | Collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single function. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: create task_free security callbackKees Cook2012-02-101-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds2012-01-141-30/+5
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable() ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert() Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv(): - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()") - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API") causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the issue.
| * security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()Eric Paris2012-01-051-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the capable() call. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * capabilities: remove all _real_ interfacesEric Paris2012-01-051-24/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The name security_real_capable and security_real_capable_noaudit just don't make much sense to me. Convert them to use security_capable and security_capable_noaudit. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
| * capabilities: introduce security_capable_noauditEric Paris2012-01-051-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Exactly like security_capable except don't audit any denials. This is for places where the kernel may make decisions about what to do if a task has a given capability, but which failing that capability is not a sign of a security policy violation. An example is checking if a task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN to lower it's likelyhood of being killed by the oom killer. This check is not a security violation if it is denied. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
| * capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capableEric Paris2012-01-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_capable takes ns, cred, cap. But the LSM capable() hook takes cred, ns, cap. The capability helper functions also take cred, ns, cap. Rather than flip argument order just to flip it back, leave them alone. Heck, this should be a little faster since argument will be in the right place! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirelyEric Paris2012-01-051-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor. I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it. The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *Al Viro2012-01-061-4/+3
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch ->path_mknod() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch ->path_mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch security_path_chmod() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch ->mknod() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch ->create() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent and it's the only caller of the method Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | switch vfs_mkdir() and ->mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro2012-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | security: Fix security_old_inode_init_security() when CONFIG_SECURITY is not setJan Kara2012-01-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 1e39f384bb01 ("evm: fix build problems") makes the stub version of security_old_inode_init_security() return 0 when CONFIG_SECURITY is not set. But that makes callers such as reiserfs_security_init() assume that security_old_inode_init_security() has set name, value, and len arguments properly - but security_old_inode_init_security() left them uninitialized which then results in interesting failures. Revert security_old_inode_init_security() to the old behavior of returning EOPNOTSUPP since both callers (reiserfs and ocfs2) handle this just fine. [ Also fixed the S_PRIVATE(inode) case of the actual non-stub security_old_inode_init_security() function to return EOPNOTSUPP for the same reason, as pointed out by Mimi Zohar. It got incorrectly changed to match the new function in commit fb88c2b6cbb1: "evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return code". - Linus ] Reported-by: Jorge Bastos <mysql.jorge@decimal.pt> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds2011-10-251-11/+65
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits) TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek. Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option. Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access Smack: compilation fix Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte Smack: domain transition protections (v3) Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) Smack: Clean up comments Smack: Repair processing of fcntl Smack: Rule list lookup performance Smack: check permissions from user space (v2) TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector. TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock. TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning. TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock. TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector. TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings. target: check hex2bin result encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result ...
| * evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return codeMimi Zohar2011-09-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_inode_init_security previously returned -EOPNOTSUPP, for S_PRIVATE inodes, and relied on the callers to change it to 0. As the callers do not change the return code anymore, return 0, intead of -EOPNOTSUPP. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
| * security: sparse fix: Move security_fixup_op to security.hJames Morris2011-09-091-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fix sparse warning by moving declaraion to global header. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * Merge branch 'next-evm' of ↵James Morris2011-08-091-7/+64
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6 into next Conflicts: fs/attr.c Resolve conflict manually. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| | * evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evmMimi Zohar2011-07-181-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode. Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
| | * evm: call evm_inode_init_security from security_inode_init_securityMimi Zohar2011-07-181-6/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Changelog v7: - moved the initialization call to security_inode_init_security, renaming evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security - increase size of xattr array for EVM xattr Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
| | * security: imbed evm calls in security hooksMimi Zohar2011-07-181-2/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode. (Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.) Changelog: - Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled. - xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *' Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
| | * integrity: move ima inode integrity data managementMimi Zohar2011-07-181-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
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