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* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-06-271-279/+676
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking, allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor). See https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/ This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits) tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add() vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level. ima: update builtin policies ima: extend "mask" policy matching support ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii() Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj() selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS selinux: Remove unused permission definitions selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files. selinux: update netlink socket classes signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds() selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation() ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter ...
| * LSM: Switch to lists of hooksCasey Schaufler2015-05-121-96/+474
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate. The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation. The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module. The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * LSM: Introduce security hook calling MacrosCasey Schaufler2015-05-121-207/+226
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the security operations vector. The marco versions here do not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * LSM: Split security.hCasey Schaufler2015-05-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security.h header file serves two purposes, interfaces for users of the security modules and interfaces for security modules. Users of the security modules don't need to know about what's in the security_operations structure, so pull it out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.h Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk awareNeilBrown2015-05-111-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | inode_follow_link now takes an inode and rcu flag as well as the dentry. inode is used in preference to d_backing_inode(dentry), particularly in RCU-walk mode. selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set. Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not actually drop the RCU read-lock. However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | SECURITY: remove nameidata arg from inode_follow_link.NeilBrown2015-05-101-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | No ->inode_follow_link() methods use the nameidata arg, and it is about to become private to namei.c. So remove from all inode_follow_link() functions. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotationsDavid Howells2015-04-151-25/+25
| | | | | | | | most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would go to, i.e. d_backing_inode() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'for-davem' into for-nextAl Viro2015-04-111-5/+0
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| * Revert "selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook"Eric Dumazet2015-03-201-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit ca10b9e9a8ca7342ee07065289cbe74ac128c169. No longer needed after commit eb8895debe1baba41fcb62c78a16f0c63c21662a ("tcp: tcp_make_synack() should use sock_wmalloc") When under SYNFLOOD, we build lot of SYNACK and hit false sharing because of multiple modifications done on sk_listener->sk_wmem_alloc Since tcp_make_synack() uses sock_wmalloc(), there is no need to call skb_set_owner_w() again, as this adds two atomic operations. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | switch security_inode_getattr() to struct path *Al Viro2015-04-111-3/+3
|/ | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-02-151-0/+23
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc Pull char / misc patches from Greg KH: "Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1. Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog. Nothing major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which was all acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to come through this tree. All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while" * tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (90 commits) coresight: fix function etm_writel_cp14() parameter order coresight-etm: remove check for unknown Kconfig macro coresight: fixing CPU hwid lookup in device tree coresight: remove the unnecessary function coresight_is_bit_set() coresight: fix the debug AMBA bus name coresight: remove the extra spaces coresight: fix the link between orphan connection and newly added device coresight: remove the unnecessary replicator property coresight: fix the replicator subtype value pdfdocs: Fix 'make pdfdocs' failure for 'uio-howto.tmpl' mcb: Fix error path of mcb_pci_probe virtio/console: verify device has config space ti-st: clean up data types (fix harmless memory corruption) mei: me: release hw from reset only during the reset flow mei: mask interrupt set bit on clean reset bit extcon: max77693: Constify struct regmap_config extcon: adc-jack: Release IIO channel on driver remove extcon: Remove duplicated include from extcon-class.c Drivers: hv: vmbus: hv_process_timer_expiration() can be static Drivers: hv: vmbus: serialize Offer and Rescind offer ...
| * Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.Stephen Smalley2015-01-251-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux. The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for controlling what process can become the binder context manager (binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction), controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file). These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3. (Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver, changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and to add inline documentation for the hooks). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | fs: introduce f_op->mmap_capabilities for nommu mmap supportChristoph Hellwig2015-01-201-7/+6
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since "BDI: Provide backing device capability information [try #3]" the backing_dev_info structure also provides flags for the kind of mmap operation available in a nommu environment, which is entirely unrelated to it's original purpose. Introduce a new nommu-only file operation to provide this information to the nommu mmap code instead. Splitting this from the backing_dev_info structure allows to remove lots of backing_dev_info instance that aren't otherwise needed, and entirely gets rid of the concept of providing a backing_dev_info for a character device. It also removes the need for the mtd_inodefs filesystem. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
* security: make security_file_set_fowner, f_setown and __f_setown void returnJeff Layton2014-09-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and __f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the callers. Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
* ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmwareMimi Zohar2014-07-251-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel. This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's integrity. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hookKees Cook2014-07-251-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
* Merge commit 'v3.15' into nextJames Morris2014-06-241-2/+20
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| * vfs: add cross-renameMiklos Szeredi2014-04-011-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE then exchange source and destination files. There's no restriction on the type of the files; e.g. a directory can be exchanged with a symlink. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
| * security: add flags to rename hooksMiklos Szeredi2014-04-011-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add flags to security_path_rename() and security_inode_rename() hooks. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
* | Merge tag 'keys-20140314' of ↵James Morris2014-04-141-1/+1
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
| * KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.hDavid Howells2014-03-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the permissions mask flags used in key->perm. Whilst we're at it: (1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h. (2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related directly to that. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
* | selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callersNikolay Aleksandrov2014-03-101-2/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into ↵James Morris2013-10-221-9/+4
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| * Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinuxPaul Moore2013-09-181-9/+4
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts() between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use() simplification patch.
| | * lsm: split the xfrm_state_alloc_security() hook implementationPaul Moore2013-07-251-9/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel: * xfrm_state_alloc * xfrm_state_alloc_acquire Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux code; no other LSMs are affected. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | | xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr".Tetsuo Handa2013-07-251-5/+3
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2] Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | NFS: Extend NFS xattr handlers to accept the security namespaceDavid Quigley2013-06-081-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing NFSv4 xattr handlers do not accept xattr calls to the security namespace. This patch extends these handlers to accept xattrs from the security namespace in addition to the default NFSv4 ACL namespace. Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* | LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data.David Quigley2013-06-081-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no way to differentiate if a text mount option is passed from user space or the kernel. A flags field is being added to the security_sb_set_mnt_opts hook to allow for in kernel security flags to be sent to the LSM for processing in addition to the text options received from mount. This patch also updated existing code to fix compilation errors. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* | Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model.David Quigley2013-06-081-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* | Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry.David Quigley2013-06-081-0/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2013-04-301-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "Just some minor updates across the subsystem" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement() TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C) char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions. Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir() Smack: add support for modification of existing rules smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm() Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
| * selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatchJeff Layton2013-04-021-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the second context= option is ignored. For instance: # mount server:/export /mnt/test1 # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 # ls -dZ /mnt/test1 drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1 # ls -dZ /mnt/test2 drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2 When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock, it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this case cannot take effect. This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the admin why the second mount failed. Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts, then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways. For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the server: # mount server:/ /mnt/test1 # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified ...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch. The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already present with the wrong context. OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work, because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons: # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/ -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one. Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hookEric Dumazet2013-04-091-0/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 90ba9b1986b5ac (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb()) broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet. Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big, and we would like it to happen only if really needed. This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method, that is a void operation unless selinux is active. Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti <mvadkert@redhat.com> Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Tested-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devicesPaul Moore2013-01-141-5/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* ima: support new kernel module syscallMimi Zohar2012-12-141-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system. This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an extensible and consistent manner. To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional patches could pass the signature as the first parameter. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hookKees Cook2012-12-141-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example, read extended attributes for signatures, etc. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* consitify do_mount() argumentsAl Viro2012-10-111-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-10-021-0/+27
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline attacks - Integrity: add digital signature verification - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions) - IBM vTPM support on ppc64 - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels" Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools ima: change flags container data type Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label Smack: remove task_wait() hook. ima: audit log hashes ima: generic IMA action flag handling ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure audit: export audit_log_task_info tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390 ima: digital signature verification support ima: add support for different security.ima data types ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls ima: add inode_post_setattr call ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock ima: allocating iint improvements ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules ima: integrity appraisal extension vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file ...
| * ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and callsMimi Zohar2012-09-071-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security' xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() functions. (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c) Changelog: - take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin) - ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. (Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu) - Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags, forcing re-appraisal. - Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN - static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs - ima_protect_xattr should be static Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
| * security: allow Yama to be unconditionally stackedKees Cook2012-09-051-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected, no matter what LSM module is primary. Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * security: Fix nommu build.Paul Mundt2012-07-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgidsEric W. Biederman2012-09-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | security: Fix nommu build.Paul Mundt2012-07-031-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helperAl Viro2012-06-011-18/+28
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_semAl Viro2012-06-011-3/+30
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()Al Viro2012-05-311-4/+8
| | | | | | ... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_openEric Paris2012-04-091-2/+2
| | | | | | dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* security: trim security.hAl Viro2012-02-141-0/+2
| | | | | | | Trim security.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* mm: collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single functionAl Viro2012-02-141-14/+0
| | | | | | | Collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single function. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: create task_free security callbackKees Cook2012-02-101-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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