summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* ima: fix the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration orderingMimi Zohar2016-05-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes the string representation of the LSM/IMA hook enumeration ordering used for displaying the IMA policy. Fixes: d9ddf077bb85 ("ima: support for kexec image and initramfs") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge branch 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-03-201-1/+8
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar: "This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys). There's a background article at LWN.net: https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/ The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of user-controllable permission masks in the pte. So instead of having a fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of) protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected virtual memory range. This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions. It also allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that below). This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys - if a user-space application calls: mmap(..., PROT_EXEC); or mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC); (note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice this special case, and will set a special protection key on this memory range. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and unwritable. So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true' PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies PROT_READ as well. Unreadable executable mappings have security advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either. We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion. There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this pull request. Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled (like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment. If there's any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or flip the default" * 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits) x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey() mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error() mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling ...
| * mm/gup: Introduce get_user_pages_remote()Dave Hansen2016-02-161-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections should be enforced in software or not. In general, we enforce protections when working on our own task, but not when on others. We call these "current" and "remote" operations. This patch introduces a new get_user_pages() variant: get_user_pages_remote() Which is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on non-current tsk/mm. We also introduce a new gup flag: FOLL_REMOTE which can be used for the "__" gup variants to get this new behavior. The uprobes is_trap_at_addr() location holds mmap_sem and calls get_user_pages(current->mm) on an instruction address. This makes it a pretty unique gup caller. Being an instruction access and also really originating from the kernel (vs. the app), I opted to consider this a 'remote' access where protection keys will not be enforced. Without protection keys, this patch should not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: jack@suse.cz Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210154.3F0E51EA@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | Merge tag 'tty-4.6-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-03-171-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty Pull tty/serial updates from Greg KH: "Here's the big tty/serial driver pull request for 4.6-rc1. Lots of changes in here, Peter has been on a tear again, with lots of refactoring and bugs fixes, many thanks to the great work he has been doing. Lots of driver updates and fixes as well, full details in the shortlog. All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues" * tag 'tty-4.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (220 commits) serial: 8250: describe CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_RSA serial: samsung: optimize UART rx fifo access routine serial: pl011: add mark/space parity support serial: sa1100: make sa1100_register_uart_fns a function tty: serial: 8250: add MOXA Smartio MUE boards support serial: 8250: convert drivers to use up_to_u8250p() serial: 8250/mediatek: fix building with SERIAL_8250=m serial: 8250/ingenic: fix building with SERIAL_8250=m serial: 8250/uniphier: fix modular build Revert "drivers/tty/serial: make 8250/8250_ingenic.c explicitly non-modular" Revert "drivers/tty/serial: make 8250/8250_mtk.c explicitly non-modular" serial: mvebu-uart: initial support for Armada-3700 serial port serial: mctrl_gpio: Add missing module license serial: ifx6x60: avoid uninitialized variable use tty/serial: at91: fix bad offset for UART timeout register tty/serial: at91: restore dynamic driver binding serial: 8250: Add hardware dependency to RT288X option TTY, devpts: document pty count limiting tty: goldfish: support platform_device with id -1 drivers: tty: goldfish: Add device tree bindings ...
| * | Merge 4.5-rc4 into tty-nextGreg Kroah-Hartman2016-02-142-1/+3
| |\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We want the fixes in here, and this resolves a merge error in tty_io.c Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | Merge 4.5-rc2 into tty-nextGreg Kroah-Hartman2016-02-011-1/+2
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We want the tty/serial fixes in here as well to make merges easier. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * | | tty: Make tty_files_lock per-ttyPeter Hurley2016-01-271-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Access to tty->tty_files list is always per-tty, never for all ttys simultaneously. Replace global tty_files_lock spinlock with per-tty ->files_lock. Initialize when the ->tty_files list is inited, in alloc_tty_struct(). Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | | | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-03-1720-227/+450
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "There are a bunch of fixes to the TPM, IMA, and Keys code, with minor fixes scattered across the subsystem. IMA now requires signed policy, and that policy is also now measured and appraised" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (67 commits) X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad sign-file: fix build with CMS support disabled MAINTAINERS: update tpmdd urls MODSIGN: linux/string.h should be #included to get memcpy() certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTime X.509: Support leap seconds Handle ISO 8601 leap seconds and encodings of midnight in mktime64() X.509: Fix leap year handling again PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want' firmware: change kernel read fail to dev_dbg() KEYS: Use the symbol value for list size, updated by scripts/insert-sys-cert KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds tpm_tis: fix build warning with tpm_tis_resume ima: require signed IMA policy ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself ima: load policy using path ...
| * \ \ \ Merge tag 'keys-next-20160303' of ↵James Morris2016-03-045-25/+12
| |\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
| | * | | | X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enumDavid Howells2016-03-032-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| | * | | | akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layerDavid Howells2016-03-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type. To make this work, the following changes have been made: (1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the padding and returns just the message hash. (2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this, and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present. (3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does and and has been merged into public_key.c. (4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead. Thoughts: (*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates registered that share most of the code? Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| | * | | | security/keys: make big_key.c explicitly non-modularPaul Gortmaker2016-02-181-14/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is: config BIG_KEYS bool "Large payload keys" ...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone. Lets remove the modular code that is essentially orphaned, so that when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only. Since module_init translates to device_initcall in the non-modular case, the init ordering remains unchanged with this commit. We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag since all that information is already contained at the top of the file in the comments. Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | | | integrity: convert digsig to akcipher apiTadeusz Struk2016-02-182-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | | | KEYS: CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an optionDavid Howells2016-02-101-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS is no longer an option as /proc/keys is now mandatory if the keyrings facility is enabled (it's used by libkeyutils in userspace). The defconfig references were removed with: perl -p -i -e 's/CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y\n//' \ `git grep -l CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y` and the integrity Kconfig fixed by hand. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
| | * | | | KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a keyDavid Howells2016-02-091-0/+2
| | | |/ / | | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN set rather than setting it after the fact. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | | Merge branch 'stable-4.6' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2016-03-041-1/+1
| |\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | | | selinux: use absolute path to include directoryAndy Shevchenko2016-01-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Compiler warns us a lot that it can't find include folder because it's provided in relative form. CC security/selinux/netlabel.o cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory cc1: warning: security/selinux/include: No such file or directory Add $(srctree) prefix to the path. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> [PM: minor description edits to fit under 80char width] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | | Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris2016-02-2613-163/+418
| |\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
| | * | | | | ima: require signed IMA policyMimi Zohar2016-02-211-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Require the IMA policy to be signed when additional rules can be added. v1: - initialize the policy flag - include IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY in the policy flag Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
| | * | | | | ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itselfMimi Zohar2016-02-214-3/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for measuring and appraising the IMA policy itself. Changelog v4: - use braces on both if/else branches, even if single line on one of the branches - Dmitry - Use the id mapping - Dmitry Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
| | * | | | | ima: load policy using pathDmitry Kasatkin2016-02-211-2/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We currently cannot do appraisal or signature vetting of IMA policies since we currently can only load IMA policies by writing the contents of the policy directly in, as follows: cat policy-file > <securityfs>/ima/policy If we provide the kernel the path to the IMA policy so it can load the policy itself it'd be able to later appraise or vet the file signature if it has one. This patch adds support to load the IMA policy with a given path as follows: echo /etc/ima/ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy Changelog v4+: - moved kernel_read_file_from_path() error messages to callers v3: - moved kernel_read_file_from_path() to a separate patch v2: - after re-ordering the patches, replace calling integrity_kernel_read() to read the file with kernel_read_file_from_path() (Mimi) - Patch description re-written by Luis R. Rodriguez Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | | | | ima: support for kexec image and initramfsMimi Zohar2016-02-213-7/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add IMA policy support for measuring/appraising the kexec image and initramfs. Two new IMA policy identifiers KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK are defined. Example policy rules: measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK appraise_type=imasig Moving the enumeration to the vfs layer simplified the patches, allowing the IMA changes, for the most part, to be separated from the other changes. Unfortunately, passing either a kernel_read_file_id or a ima_hooks enumeration within IMA is messy. Option 1: duplicate kernel_read_file enumeration in ima_hooks enum kernel_read_file_id { ... READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, READING_MAX_ID enum ima_hooks { ... KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK Option 2: define ima_hooks as extension of kernel_read_file eg: enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = READING_MAX_ID, MMAP_CHECK, In order to pass both kernel_read_file_id and ima_hooks values, we would need to specify a struct containing a union. struct caller_id { union { enum ima_hooks func_id; enum kernel_read_file_id read_id; }; }; Option 3: incorportate the ima_hooks enumeration into kernel_read_file_id, perhaps changing the enumeration name. For now, duplicate the new READING_KEXEC_IMAGE/INITRAMFS in the ima_hooks. Changelog v4: - replaced switch statement with a kernel_read_file_id to an ima_hooks id mapping array - Dmitry - renamed ima_hook tokens KEXEC_CHECK and INITRAMFS_CHECK to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK respectively - Dave Young Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
| | * | | | | ima: remove firmware and module specific cached status infoMimi Zohar2016-02-215-39/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Each time a file is read by the kernel, the file should be re-measured and the file signature re-appraised, based on policy. As there is no need to preserve the status information, this patch replaces the firmware and module specific cache status with a generic one named read_file. This change simplifies adding support for other files read by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
| | * | | | | module: replace copy_module_from_fd with kernel versionMimi Zohar2016-02-212-34/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace copy_module_from_fd() with kernel_read_file_from_fd(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_module_from_file hook, IMA is called, based on policy, to prevent unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall and to measure/appraise signed kernel modules. The security function security_kernel_module_from_file() was called prior to reading a kernel module. Preventing unsigned kernel modules from being loaded by the original kernel module syscall remains on the pre-read kernel_read_file() security hook. Instead of reading the kernel module twice, once for measuring/appraising and again for loading the kernel module, the signature validation is moved to the kernel_post_read_file() security hook. This patch removes the security_kernel_module_from_file() hook and security call. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
| | * | | | | security: define kernel_read_file hookMimi Zohar2016-02-212-0/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The kernel_read_file security hook is called prior to reading the file into memory. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_read_file() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | | firmware: replace call to fw_read_file_contents() with kernel versionMimi Zohar2016-02-212-24/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path(). Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook, IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy. Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once. This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call. Changelog v4+: - revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky v3: - remove kernel_fw_from_file hook - use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis v2: - reordered and squashed firmware patches - fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
| | * | | | | ima: define a new hook to measure and appraise a file already in memoryMimi Zohar2016-02-207-15/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch defines a new IMA hook ima_post_read_file() for measuring and appraising files read by the kernel. The caller loads the file into memory before calling this function, which calculates the hash followed by the normal IMA policy based processing. Changelog v5: - fail ima_post_read_file() if either file or buf is NULL v3: - rename ima_hash_and_process_file() to ima_post_read_file() v1: - split patch Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
| | * | | | | ima: calculate the hash of a buffer using aynchronous hash(ahash)Mimi Zohar2016-02-181-2/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Setting up ahash has some overhead. Only use ahash to calculate the hash of a buffer, if the buffer is larger than ima_ahash_minsize. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
| | * | | | | ima: provide buffer hash calculation functionDmitry Kasatkin2016-02-182-0/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch provides convenient buffer hash calculation function. Changelog v3: - fix while hash calculation - Dmitry v1: - rewrite to support loff_t sized buffers - Mimi (based on Fenguang Wu's testing) Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | | | | vfs: define kernel_read_file_id enumerationMimi Zohar2016-02-181-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To differentiate between the kernel_read_file() callers, this patch defines a new enumeration named kernel_read_file_id and includes the caller identifier as an argument. Subsequent patches define READING_KEXEC_IMAGE, READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS, READING_FIRMWARE, READING_MODULE, and READING_POLICY. Changelog v3: - Replace the IMA specific enumeration with a generic one. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| | * | | | | vfs: define a generic function to read a file from the kernelMimi Zohar2016-02-181-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For a while it was looked down upon to directly read files from Linux. These days there exists a few mechanisms in the kernel that do just this though to load a file into a local buffer. There are minor but important checks differences on each. This patch set is the first attempt at resolving some of these differences. This patch introduces a common function for reading files from the kernel with the corresponding security post-read hook and function. Changelog v4+: - export security_kernel_post_read_file() - Fengguang Wu v3: - additional bounds checking - Luis v2: - To simplify patch review, re-ordered patches Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| | * | | | | ima: use "ima_hooks" enum as function argumentMimi Zohar2016-02-185-27/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cleanup the function arguments by using "ima_hooks" enumerator as needed. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
| | * | | | | ima: refactor ima_policy_show() to display "ima_hooks" rulesMimi Zohar2016-02-181-27/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Define and call a function to display the "ima_hooks" rules. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
| | * | | | | ima: separate 'security.ima' reading functionality from collectDmitry Kasatkin2016-02-188-40/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of passing pointers to pointers to ima_collect_measurent() to read and return the 'security.ima' xattr value, this patch moves the functionality to the calling process_measurement() to directly read the xattr and pass only the hash algo to the ima_collect_measurement(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | | | | IMA: fix non-ANSI declaration of ima_check_policy()Colin Ian King2016-02-081-1/+1
| | | |/ / / | | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ima_check_policy() has no parameters, so use the normal void parameter convention to make it match the prototype in the header file security/integrity/ima/ima.h Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | | | Merge branch 'smack-for-4.6' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris2016-02-221-32/+14
| |\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | | | | smack: fix cache of access labelsJosé Bollo2016-02-161-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Before this commit, removing the access property of a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64 was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned. This patch fixes that problem. Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | | Smack: Remove pointless hooksCasey Schaufler2016-02-111-30/+8
| | |/ / / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing a security module hook that does nothing, as the default hook would get called if the module did not supply one. With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that don't actually do anything. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * / / / / tpm: fix checks for policy digest existence in tpm2_seal_trusted()Jarkko Sakkinen2016-02-101-6/+5
| |/ / / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue. Fixes: 5beb0c435bdd ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* | | | | Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-03-171-32/+50
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu: "Here is the crypto update for 4.6: API: - Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher. - Remove crypto_hash interface. - Remove crypto_pcomp interface. - Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers. - Add akcipher documentation. - Add skcipher documentation. Algorithms: - Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32. - Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer. Drivers: - Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver. - Add PIC32 hwrng driver. - Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver. - Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat. - Use crypto engine in omap-aes. - Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha. - Make atmel-sha available again. - Make sahara hashing available again. - Make ccp hashing available again. - Make sha1-mb available again. - Add support for multiple devices in ccp. - Improve DMA performance in caam. - Add hashing support to rockchip" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits) crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource() crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource() crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline" lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode. crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number lib/mpi: Endianness fix crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288 crypto: xts - fix compile errors crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling ...
| * | | | | crypto: keys - Revert "convert public key to akcipher api"Herbert Xu2016-02-092-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This needs to go through the security tree so I'm reverting the patches for now. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | | | | integrity: convert digsig to akcipher apiTadeusz Struk2016-02-062-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert asymmetric_verify to akcipher api. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | | | | KEYS: Use skcipherHerbert Xu2016-01-271-32/+50
| | |_|/ / | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch replaces uses of blkcipher with skcipher. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | | | | Merge branch 'stable-4.5' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2016-02-261-1/+1
|\ \ \ \ \ | |_|_|_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | into for-linus
| * | | | selinux: Don't sleep inside inode_getsecid hookAndreas Gruenbacher2016-02-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The inode_getsecid hook is called from contexts in which sleeping is not allowed, so we cannot revalidate inode security labels from there. Use the non-validating version of inode_security() instead. Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | | | EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisonsRyan Ware2016-02-121-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq(). Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | | | | selinux: nlmsgtab: add SOCK_DESTROY to the netlink mapping tablesLorenzo Colitti2016-02-091-0/+1
| |_|/ / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Without this, using SOCK_DESTROY in enforcing mode results in: SELinux: unrecognized netlink message type=21 for sclass=32 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | | KEYS: Only apply KEY_FLAG_KEEP to a key if a parent keyring has it setDavid Howells2016-01-281-1/+2
| |/ / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | KEY_FLAG_KEEP should only be applied to a key if the keyring it is being linked into has KEY_FLAG_KEEP set. To this end, partially revert the following patch: commit 1d6d167c2efcfe9539d9cffb1a1be9c92e39c2c0 Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Thu Jan 7 07:46:36 2016 -0500 KEYS: refcount bug fix to undo the change that made it unconditional (Mimi got it right the first time). Without undoing this change, it becomes impossible to delete, revoke or invalidate keys added to keyrings through __key_instantiate_and_link() where the keyring has itself been linked to. To test this, run the following command sequence: keyctl newring foo @s keyctl add user a a %:foo keyctl unlink %user:a %:foo keyctl clear %:foo With the commit mentioned above the third and fourth commands fail with EPERM when they should succeed. Reported-by: Stephen Gallager <sgallagh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | | wrappers for ->i_mutex accessAl Viro2016-01-223-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested}, inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex). Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle ->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held only shared. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checksJann Horn2016-01-201-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>