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* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-05-1934-185/+909
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified cryptographically via dm-verity). This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing). - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key. Lots of general fixes and updates. - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits) LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting seccomp: Fix comment typo ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory fs: fix over-zealous use of "const" selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration Yama: consolidate error reporting string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it selinux: Change bool variable name to index. KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command ...
| * LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIGKees Cook2016-05-172-6/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected, provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains available. Suggested-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * Merge branch 'stable-4.7' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2016-05-065-60/+127
| |\ | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacksStephen Smalley2016-04-261-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The execstack check was only being applied on the main process stack. Thread stacks allocated via mmap were only subject to the execmem permission check. Augment the check to apply to the current thread stack as well. Note that this does NOT prevent making a different thread's stack executable. Suggested-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checksStephen Smalley2016-04-262-17/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Distinguish capability checks against a target associated with the init user namespace versus capability checks against a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining and using separate security classes for the latter. This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace. Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode labelPaul Moore2016-04-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no point in trying to revalidate an inode's security label if the security server is not yet initialized. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possiblePaul Moore2016-04-191-8/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since looking up an inode's label can result in revalidation, delay the lookup as long as possible to limit the performance impact. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting itPaul Moore2016-04-191-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no point in attempting to revalidate an inode's security label when we are in the process of setting it. Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: Change bool variable name to index.Prarit Bhargava2016-04-142-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_get_bool_value(int bool) argument "bool" conflicts with in-kernel macros such as BUILD_BUG(). This patch changes this to index which isn't a type. Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andrew Perepechko <anserper@ya.ru> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> [PM: wrapped description for checkpatch.pl, use "selinux:..." as subj] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: restrict kernel module loadingJeff Vander Stoep2016-04-052-1/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Utilize existing kernel_read_file hook on kernel module load. Add module_load permission to the system class. Enforces restrictions on kernel module origin when calling the finit_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has permission module_load for the target type. Example for finit_module: allow foo bar_file:system module_load; Similarly restrictions are enforced on kernel module loading when calling the init_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has permission module_load with itself as the target object because the kernel module is sourced from the calling process. Example for init_module: allow foo foo:system module_load; Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> [PM: fixed return value of selinux_kernel_read_file()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: consolidate the ptrace parent lookup codePaul Moore2016-04-051-21/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We lookup the tracing parent in two places, using effectively the same code, let's consolidate it. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZEDPaul Moore2016-04-052-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED. Also adjust the revalidate code to reload the label whenever the label is not INITIALIZED so we are less sensitive to label state in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * selinux: don't revalidate inodes in selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()Paul Moore2016-04-051-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We don't have to worry about socket inodes being invalidated so use inode_security_novalidate() to fetch the inode's security blob. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | Merge tag 'keys-next-20160505' of ↵James Morris2016-05-0619-112/+516
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
| | * \ Merge branch 'keys-trust' into keys-nextDavid Howells2016-05-0410-62/+128
| | |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a set of patches that changes how certificates/keys are determined to be trusted. That's currently a two-step process: (1) Up until recently, when an X.509 certificate was parsed - no matter the source - it was judged against the keys in .system_keyring, assuming those keys to be trusted if they have KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set upon them. This has just been changed such that any key in the .ima_mok keyring, if configured, may also be used to judge the trustworthiness of a new certificate, whether or not the .ima_mok keyring is meant to be consulted for whatever process is being undertaken. If a certificate is determined to be trustworthy, KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED will be set upon a key it is loaded into (if it is loaded into one), no matter what the key is going to be loaded for. (2) If an X.509 certificate is loaded into a key, then that key - if KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED gets set upon it - can be linked into any keyring with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY set upon it. This was meant to be the system keyring only, but has been extended to various IMA keyrings. A user can at will link any key marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED into any keyring marked KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY if the relevant permissions masks permit it. These patches change that: (1) Trust becomes a matter of consulting the ring of trusted keys supplied when the trust is evaluated only. (2) Every keyring can be supplied with its own manager function to restrict what may be added to that keyring. This is called whenever a key is to be linked into the keyring to guard against a key being created in one keyring and then linked across. This function is supplied with the keyring and the key type and payload[*] of the key being linked in for use in its evaluation. It is permitted to use other data also, such as the contents of other keyrings such as the system keyrings. [*] The type and payload are supplied instead of a key because as an optimisation this function may be called whilst creating a key and so may reject the proposed key between preparse and allocation. (3) A default manager function is provided that permits keys to be restricted to only asymmetric keys that are vouched for by the contents of the system keyring. A second manager function is provided that just rejects with EPERM. (4) A key allocation flag, KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, is made available so that the kernel can initialise keyrings with keys that form the root of the trust relationship. (5) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY are removed, along with key_preparsed_payload::trusted. This change also makes it possible in future for userspace to create a private set of trusted keys and then to have it sealed by setting a manager function where the private set is wholly independent of the kernel's trust relationships. Further changes in the set involve extracting certain IMA special keyrings and making them generally global: (*) .system_keyring is renamed to .builtin_trusted_keys and remains read only. It carries only keys built in to the kernel. It may be where UEFI keys should be loaded - though that could better be the new secondary keyring (see below) or a separate UEFI keyring. (*) An optional secondary system keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys) is added to replace the IMA MOK keyring. (*) Keys can be added to the secondary keyring by root if the keys can be vouched for by either ring of system keys. (*) Module signing and kexec only use .builtin_trusted_keys and do not use the new secondary keyring. (*) Config option SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS now depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE as that's the only type currently permitted on the system keyrings. (*) A new config option, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY, is provided to allow keys to be added to IMA keyrings, subject to the restriction that such keys are validly signed by a key already in the system keyrings. If this option is enabled, but secondary keyrings aren't, additions to the IMA keyrings will be restricted to signatures verifiable by keys in the builtin system keyring only. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | | * | IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mokDavid Howells2016-04-114-53/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY) that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the system trusted keyrings. EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the signature doesn't match. Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned. If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled. Intermediate keys between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain - provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings. The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | | * | KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTEDDavid Howells2016-04-113-39/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure. Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to restrict_link(). Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | | * | KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()David Howells2016-04-112-4/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | | * | KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyringDavid Howells2016-04-118-33/+124
| | | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide blacklisting. This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE. To this end: (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to the vetting function. This is called as: int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *key_type, unsigned long key_flags, const union key_payload *key_payload), where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED. [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed. The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the link. The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set through keyring_alloc(). Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function is called. (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the restriction check. (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted. (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL. (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for authoritative keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE commandMat Martineau2016-04-126-0/+193
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds userspace access to Diffie-Hellman computations through a new keyctl() syscall command to calculate shared secrets or public keys using input parameters stored in the keyring. Input key ids are provided in a struct due to the current 5-arg limit for the keyctl syscall. Only user keys are supported in order to avoid exposing the content of logon or encrypted keys. The output is written to the provided buffer, based on the assumption that the values are only needed in userspace. Future support for other types of key derivation would involve a new command, like KEYCTL_ECDH_COMPUTE. Once Diffie-Hellman support is included in the crypto API, this code can be converted to use the crypto API to take advantage of possible hardware acceleration and reduce redundant code. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | Security: Keys: Big keys stored encryptedKirill Marinushkin2016-04-122-18/+184
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Solved TODO task: big keys saved to shmem file are now stored encrypted. The encryption key is randomly generated and saved to payload[big_key_data]. Signed-off-by: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | KEYS: user_update should use copy of payload made during preparsingDavid Howells2016-04-121-31/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The payload preparsing routine for user keys makes a copy of the payload provided by the caller and stashes it in the key_preparsed_payload struct for ->instantiate() or ->update() to use. However, ->update() takes another copy of this to attach to the keyring. ->update() should be using this directly and clearing the pointer in the preparse data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | security: integrity: Remove select to deleted option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSAAndreas Ziegler2016-04-121-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit d43de6c780a8 ("akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer") removed the Kconfig option PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA, but forgot to remove a 'select' to this option in the definition of INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS. Let's remove the select, as it's ineffective now. Signed-off-by: Andreas Ziegler <andreas.ziegler@fau.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | | Yama: use atomic allocations when reportingSasha Levin2016-05-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Access reporting often happens from atomic contexes. Avoid lockups when allocating memory for command lines. Fixes: 8a56038c2ae ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
| * | | ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscallMimi Zohar2016-05-012-1/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 3034a14 "ima: pass 'opened' flag to identify newly created files" stopped identifying empty files as new files. However new empty files can be created using the mknodat syscall. On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled, these empty files are not labeled with security.ima extended attributes properly, preventing them from subsequently being opened in order to write the file data contents. This patch defines a new hook named ima_post_path_mknod() to mark these empty files, created using mknodat, as new in order to allow the file data contents to be written. In addition, files with security.ima xattrs containing a file signature are considered "immutable" and can not be modified. The file contents need to be written, before signing the file. This patch relaxes this requirement for new files, allowing the file signature to be written before the file contents. Changelog: - defer identifying files with signatures stored as security.ima (based on Dmitry Rozhkov's comments) - removing tests (eg. dentry, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_size == 0) (based on Al's review) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Al Viro <<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
| * | | ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattrMimi Zohar2016-05-012-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Changing file metadata (eg. uid, guid) could result in having to re-appraise a file's integrity, but does not change the "new file" status nor the security.ima xattr. The IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO and IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flags are policy rule specific. This patch only resets these flags, not the IMA_NEW_FILE or IMA_DIGSIG flags. With this patch, changing the file timestamp will not remove the file signature on new files. Reported-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <dmitry.rozhkov@linux.intel.com>
| * | | LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictionsKees Cook2016-04-216-0/+205
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | | Yama: consolidate error reportingKees Cook2016-04-211-10/+21
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use a common error reporting function for Yama violation reports, and give more detail into the process command lines. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * / security: drop the unused hook skb_owned_byPaolo Abeni2016-04-111-1/+0
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The skb_owned_by hook was added with the commit ca10b9e9a8ca ("selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook") and later removed when said commit was reverted. Later on, when switching to list of hooks, a field named 'skb_owned_by' was included into the security_hook_head struct, but without any users nor caller. This commit removes the said left-over field. Fixes: b1d9e6b0646d ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds2016-05-171-1/+3
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull networking updates from David Miller: "Highlights: 1) Support SPI based w5100 devices, from Akinobu Mita. 2) Partial Segmentation Offload, from Alexander Duyck. 3) Add GMAC4 support to stmmac driver, from Alexandre TORGUE. 4) Allow cls_flower stats offload, from Amir Vadai. 5) Implement bpf blinding, from Daniel Borkmann. 6) Optimize _ASYNC_ bit twiddling on sockets, unless the socket is actually using FASYNC these atomics are superfluous. From Eric Dumazet. 7) Run TCP more preemptibly, also from Eric Dumazet. 8) Support LED blinking, EEPROM dumps, and rxvlan offloading in mlx5e driver, from Gal Pressman. 9) Allow creating ppp devices via rtnetlink, from Guillaume Nault. 10) Improve BPF usage documentation, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer. 11) Support tunneling offloads in qed, from Manish Chopra. 12) aRFS offloading in mlx5e, from Maor Gottlieb. 13) Add RFS and RPS support to SCTP protocol, from Marcelo Ricardo Leitner. 14) Add MSG_EOR support to TCP, this allows controlling packet coalescing on application record boundaries for more accurate socket timestamp sampling. From Martin KaFai Lau. 15) Fix alignment of 64-bit netlink attributes across the board, from Nicolas Dichtel. 16) Per-vlan stats in bridging, from Nikolay Aleksandrov. 17) Several conversions of drivers to ethtool ksettings, from Philippe Reynes. 18) Checksum neutral ILA in ipv6, from Tom Herbert. 19) Factorize all of the various marvell dsa drivers into one, from Vivien Didelot 20) Add VF support to qed driver, from Yuval Mintz" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1649 commits) Revert "phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m" Revert "phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional" r8169: default to 64-bit DMA on recent PCIe chips phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m bpf: arm64: remove callee-save registers use for tmp registers asix: Fix offset calculation in asix_rx_fixup() causing slow transmissions switchdev: pass pointer to fib_info instead of copy net_sched: close another race condition in tcf_mirred_release() tipc: fix nametable publication field in nl compat drivers: net: Don't print unpopulated net_device name qed: add support for dcbx. ravb: Add missing free_irq() calls to ravb_close() qed: Remove a stray tab net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phydev from struct net_device bpf, doc: fix typo on bpf_asm descriptions stmmac: hardware TX COE doesn't work when force_thresh_dma_mode is set net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phydev from struct net_device ...
| * \ Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2016-05-091-2/+2
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In netdevice.h we removed the structure in net-next that is being changes in 'net'. In macsec.c and rtnetlink.c we have overlaps between fixes in 'net' and the u64 attribute changes in 'net-next'. The mlx5 conflicts have to do with vxlan support dependencies. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | | rtnetlink: add new RTM_GETSTATS message to dump link statsRoopa Prabhu2016-04-201-1/+3
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a new RTM_GETSTATS message to query link stats via netlink from the kernel. RTM_NEWLINK also dumps stats today, but RTM_NEWLINK returns a lot more than just stats and is expensive in some cases when frequent polling for stats from userspace is a common operation. RTM_GETSTATS is an attempt to provide a light weight netlink message to explicity query only link stats from the kernel on an interface. The idea is to also keep it extensible so that new kinds of stats can be added to it in the future. This patch adds the following attribute for NETDEV stats: struct nla_policy ifla_stats_policy[IFLA_STATS_MAX + 1] = { [IFLA_STATS_LINK_64] = { .len = sizeof(struct rtnl_link_stats64) }, }; Like any other rtnetlink message, RTM_GETSTATS can be used to get stats of a single interface or all interfaces with NLM_F_DUMP. Future possible new types of stat attributes: link af stats: - IFLA_STATS_LINK_IPV6 (nested. for ipv6 stats) - IFLA_STATS_LINK_MPLS (nested. for mpls/mdev stats) extended stats: - IFLA_STATS_LINK_EXTENDED (nested. extended software netdev stats like bridge, vlan, vxlan etc) - IFLA_STATS_LINK_HW_EXTENDED (nested. extended hardware stats which are available via ethtool today) This patch also declares a filter mask for all stat attributes. User has to provide a mask of stats attributes to query. filter mask can be specified in the new hdr 'struct if_stats_msg' for stats messages. Other important field in the header is the ifindex. This api can also include attributes for global stats (eg tcp) in the future. When global stats are included in a stats msg, the ifindex in the header must be zero. A single stats message cannot contain both global and netdev specific stats. To easily distinguish them, netdev specific stat attributes name are prefixed with IFLA_STATS_LINK_ Without any attributes in the filter_mask, no stats will be returned. This patch has been tested with mofified iproute2 ifstat. Suggested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | Merge branch 'work.const-path' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-05-1713-106/+83
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull 'struct path' constification update from Al Viro: "'struct path' is passed by reference to a bunch of Linux security methods; in theory, there's nothing to stop them from modifying the damn thing and LSM community being what it is, sooner or later some enterprising soul is going to decide that it's a good idea. Let's remove the temptation and constify all of those..." * 'work.const-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: constify ima_d_path() constify security_sb_pivotroot() constify security_path_chroot() constify security_path_{link,rename} apparmor: remove useless checks for NULL ->mnt constify security_path_{mkdir,mknod,symlink} constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir} apparmor: constify common_perm_...() apparmor: constify aa_path_link() apparmor: new helper - common_path_perm() constify chmod_common/security_path_chmod constify security_sb_mount() constify chown_common/security_path_chown tomoyo: constify assorted struct path * apparmor_path_truncate(): path->mnt is never NULL constify vfs_truncate() constify security_path_truncate() [apparmor] constify struct path * in a bunch of helpers
| * | | constify ima_d_path()Al Viro2016-03-282-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify security_sb_pivotroot()Al Viro2016-03-282-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify security_path_chroot()Al Viro2016-03-282-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify security_path_{link,rename}Al Viro2016-03-283-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | apparmor: remove useless checks for NULL ->mntAl Viro2016-03-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify security_path_{mkdir,mknod,symlink}Al Viro2016-03-283-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ... as well as unix_mknod() and may_o_create() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir}Al Viro2016-03-283-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | apparmor: constify common_perm_...()Al Viro2016-03-281-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | apparmor: constify aa_path_link()Al Viro2016-03-282-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | apparmor: new helper - common_path_perm()Al Viro2016-03-281-35/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | was open-coded in several places... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify chmod_common/security_path_chmodAl Viro2016-03-283-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify security_sb_mount()Al Viro2016-03-283-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify chown_common/security_path_chownAl Viro2016-03-283-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | tomoyo: constify assorted struct path *Al Viro2016-03-283-13/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | apparmor_path_truncate(): path->mnt is never NULLAl Viro2016-03-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | constify security_path_truncate()Al Viro2016-03-283-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | | [apparmor] constify struct path * in a bunch of helpersAl Viro2016-03-275-8/+8
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>