From 7e7f8a036b8e2b2a300df016da5e7128c8a9192e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Baron Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2006 16:56:28 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] make vm86 call audit_syscall_exit hi, The motivation behind the patch below was to address messages in /var/log/messages such as: Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=252 name_count=0: freeing multiple contexts (1) Jan 31 10:54:15 mets kernel: audit(:0): major=113 name_count=0: freeing multiple contexts (2) I can reproduce by running 'get-edid' from: http://john.fremlin.de/programs/linux/read-edid/. These messages come about in the log b/c the vm86 calls do not exit via the normal system call exit paths and thus do not call 'audit_syscall_exit'. The next system call will then free the context for itself and for the vm86 context, thus generating the above messages. This patch addresses the issue by simply adding a call to 'audit_syscall_exit' from the vm86 code. Besides fixing the above error messages the patch also now allows vm86 system calls to become auditable. This is useful since strace does not appear to properly record the return values from sys_vm86. I think this patch is also a step in the right direction in terms of cleaning up some core auditing code. If we can correct any other paths that do not properly call the audit exit and entries points, then we can also eliminate the notion of context chaining. I've tested this patch by verifying that the log messages no longer appear, and that the audit records for sys_vm86 appear to be correct. Also, 'read_edid' produces itentical output. thanks, -Jason Signed-off-by: Jason Baron Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c | 12 ++++++++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ----- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c index f51c894a7da5..aee14fafd13d 100644 --- a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c +++ b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -252,6 +253,7 @@ out: static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk) { struct tss_struct *tss; + long eax; /* * make sure the vm86() system call doesn't try to do anything silly */ @@ -305,13 +307,19 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap; if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP) mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm); + __asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t"); + __asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax)); + + /*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */ + if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) + audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax); + __asm__ __volatile__( - "xorl %%eax,%%eax; movl %%eax,%%fs; movl %%eax,%%gs\n\t" "movl %0,%%esp\n\t" "movl %1,%%ebp\n\t" "jmp resume_userspace" : /* no outputs */ - :"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)) : "ax"); + :"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk))); /* we never return here */ } diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index d7e7e637b92a..cfaa4a277f08 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -966,11 +966,6 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, if (context->in_syscall) { struct audit_context *newctx; -#if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old) - /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */ - if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old) - return; -#endif #if AUDIT_DEBUG printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" -- cgit v1.2.3 From b0dd25a8263dde3c30b0d7d72a8bd92d7ba0e3f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2005 12:47:11 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] AUDIT: kerneldoc for kernel/audit*.c - add kerneldoc for non-static functions; - don't init static data to 0; - limit lines to < 80 columns; - fix long-format style; - delete whitespace at end of some lines; (chrisw: resend and update to current audit-2.6 tree) Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Chris Wright Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- kernel/audit.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- kernel/auditsc.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 0a813d2883e5..973ca5a9e0d6 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int audit_failure = AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK; * contains the (non-zero) pid. */ int audit_pid; -/* If audit_limit is non-zero, limit the rate of sending audit records +/* If audit_rate_limit is non-zero, limit the rate of sending audit records * to that number per second. This prevents DoS attacks, but results in * audit records being dropped. */ static int audit_rate_limit; @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static struct sock *audit_sock; * than AUDIT_MAXFREE are in use, the audit buffer is freed instead of * being placed on the freelist). */ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(audit_freelist_lock); -static int audit_freelist_count = 0; +static int audit_freelist_count; static LIST_HEAD(audit_freelist); static struct sk_buff_head audit_skb_queue; @@ -186,8 +186,14 @@ static inline int audit_rate_check(void) return retval; } -/* Emit at least 1 message per second, even if audit_rate_check is - * throttling. */ +/** + * audit_log_lost - conditionally log lost audit message event + * @message: the message stating reason for lost audit message + * + * Emit at least 1 message per second, even if audit_rate_check is + * throttling. + * Always increment the lost messages counter. +*/ void audit_log_lost(const char *message) { static unsigned long last_msg = 0; @@ -218,7 +224,6 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message) audit_backlog_limit); audit_panic(message); } - } static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid) @@ -302,6 +307,19 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) } } +/** + * audit_send_reply - send an audit reply message via netlink + * @pid: process id to send reply to + * @seq: sequence number + * @type: audit message type + * @done: done (last) flag + * @multi: multi-part message flag + * @payload: payload data + * @size: payload size + * + * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the pid. + * No failure notifications. + */ void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, void *payload, int size) { @@ -376,7 +394,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (err) return err; - /* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd, start kauditd to talk to it */ + /* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd, + * start kauditd to talk to it */ if (!kauditd_task) kauditd_task = kthread_run(kauditd_thread, NULL, "kauditd"); if (IS_ERR(kauditd_task)) { @@ -469,9 +488,11 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) return err < 0 ? err : 0; } -/* Get message from skb (based on rtnetlink_rcv_skb). Each message is +/* + * Get message from skb (based on rtnetlink_rcv_skb). Each message is * processed by audit_receive_msg. Malformed skbs with wrong length are - * discarded silently. */ + * discarded silently. + */ static void audit_receive_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) { int err; @@ -600,7 +621,10 @@ err: return NULL; } -/* Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are +/** + * audit_serial - compute a serial number for the audit record + * + * Compute a serial number for the audit record. Audit records are * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete * audit record may be written in several pieces. The timestamp of the * record and this serial number are used by the user-space tools to @@ -612,8 +636,8 @@ err: * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them * all at syscall exit. However, this could delay the reporting of * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system - * halts). */ - + * halts). + */ unsigned int audit_serial(void) { static spinlock_t serial_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; @@ -649,6 +673,21 @@ static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, * will be written at syscall exit. If there is no associated task, tsk * should be NULL. */ +/** + * audit_log_start - obtain an audit buffer + * @ctx: audit_context (may be NULL) + * @gfp_mask: type of allocation + * @type: audit message type + * + * Returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on error. + * + * Obtain an audit buffer. This routine does locking to obtain the + * audit buffer, but then no locking is required for calls to + * audit_log_*format. If the task (ctx) is a task that is currently in a + * syscall, then the syscall is marked as auditable and an audit record + * will be written at syscall exit. If there is no associated task, then + * task context (ctx) should be NULL. + */ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type) { @@ -713,6 +752,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, /** * audit_expand - expand skb in the audit buffer * @ab: audit_buffer + * @extra: space to add at tail of the skb * * Returns 0 (no space) on failed expansion, or available space if * successful. @@ -729,10 +769,12 @@ static inline int audit_expand(struct audit_buffer *ab, int extra) return skb_tailroom(skb); } -/* Format an audit message into the audit buffer. If there isn't enough +/* + * Format an audit message into the audit buffer. If there isn't enough * room in the audit buffer, more room will be allocated and vsnprint * will be called a second time. Currently, we assume that a printk - * can't format message larger than 1024 bytes, so we don't either. */ + * can't format message larger than 1024 bytes, so we don't either. + */ static void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, va_list args) { @@ -757,7 +799,8 @@ static void audit_log_vformat(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, /* The printk buffer is 1024 bytes long, so if we get * here and AUDIT_BUFSIZ is at least 1024, then we can * log everything that printk could have logged. */ - avail = audit_expand(ab, max_t(unsigned, AUDIT_BUFSIZ, 1+len-avail)); + avail = audit_expand(ab, + max_t(unsigned, AUDIT_BUFSIZ, 1+len-avail)); if (!avail) goto out; len = vsnprintf(skb->tail, avail, fmt, args2); @@ -768,8 +811,14 @@ out: return; } -/* Format a message into the audit buffer. All the work is done in - * audit_log_vformat. */ +/** + * audit_log_format - format a message into the audit buffer. + * @ab: audit_buffer + * @fmt: format string + * @...: optional parameters matching @fmt string + * + * All the work is done in audit_log_vformat. + */ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; @@ -781,9 +830,18 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...) va_end(args); } -/* This function will take the passed buf and convert it into a string of - * ascii hex digits. The new string is placed onto the skb. */ -void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, +/** + * audit_log_hex - convert a buffer to hex and append it to the audit skb + * @ab: the audit_buffer + * @buf: buffer to convert to hex + * @len: length of @buf to be converted + * + * No return value; failure to expand is silently ignored. + * + * This function will take the passed buf and convert it into a string of + * ascii hex digits. The new string is placed onto the skb. + */ +void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { int i, avail, new_len; @@ -812,10 +870,16 @@ void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, skb_put(skb, len << 1); /* new string is twice the old string */ } -/* This code will escape a string that is passed to it if the string - * contains a control character, unprintable character, double quote mark, +/** + * audit_log_unstrustedstring - log a string that may contain random characters + * @ab: audit_buffer + * @string: string to be logged + * + * This code will escape a string that is passed to it if the string + * contains a control character, unprintable character, double quote mark, * or a space. Unescaped strings will start and end with a double quote mark. - * Strings that are escaped are printed in hex (2 digits per char). */ + * Strings that are escaped are printed in hex (2 digits per char). + */ void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string) { const unsigned char *p = string; @@ -854,10 +918,15 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix, kfree(path); } -/* The netlink_* functions cannot be called inside an irq context, so - * the audit buffer is places on a queue and a tasklet is scheduled to +/** + * audit_log_end - end one audit record + * @ab: the audit_buffer + * + * The netlink_* functions cannot be called inside an irq context, so + * the audit buffer is placed on a queue and a tasklet is scheduled to * remove them from the queue outside the irq context. May be called in - * any context. */ + * any context. + */ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab) { if (!ab) @@ -878,9 +947,18 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab) audit_buffer_free(ab); } -/* Log an audit record. This is a convenience function that calls - * audit_log_start, audit_log_vformat, and audit_log_end. It may be - * called in any context. */ +/** + * audit_log - Log an audit record + * @ctx: audit context + * @gfp_mask: type of allocation + * @type: audit message type + * @fmt: format string to use + * @...: variable parameters matching the format string + * + * This is a convenience function that calls audit_log_start, + * audit_log_vformat, and audit_log_end. It may be called + * in any context. + */ void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type, const char *fmt, ...) { diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index cfaa4a277f08..51a4f58a4d81 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -330,6 +330,15 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) return 0; } +/** + * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type + * @type: audit message type + * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages + * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages + * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number + * @data: payload data + * @loginuid: loginuid of sender + */ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, uid_t loginuid) { @@ -527,7 +536,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit - * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). + * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). */ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx, @@ -721,10 +730,15 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) return context; } -/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context +/** + * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task + * @tsk: task + * + * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is - * needed. */ + * needed. + */ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct audit_context *context; @@ -911,8 +925,12 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) } } -/* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and - * __put_task_struct. */ +/** + * audit_free - free a per-task audit context + * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free + * + * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct. + */ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct audit_context *context; @@ -934,13 +952,24 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) audit_free_context(context); } -/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the +/** + * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry + * @tsk: task being audited + * @arch: architecture type + * @major: major syscall type (function) + * @a1: additional syscall register 1 + * @a2: additional syscall register 2 + * @a3: additional syscall register 3 + * @a4: additional syscall register 4 + * + * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it - * be written). */ + * be written). + */ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) @@ -950,7 +979,8 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, BUG_ON(!context); - /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system + /* + * This happens only on certain architectures that make system * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you @@ -1009,11 +1039,18 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); } -/* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as +/** + * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call + * @tsk: task being audited + * @valid: success/failure flag + * @return_code: syscall return value + * + * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, - * free the names stored from getname(). */ + * free the names stored from getname(). + */ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) { struct audit_context *context; @@ -1048,7 +1085,13 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) put_task_struct(tsk); } -/* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */ +/** + * audit_getname - add a name to the list + * @name: name to add + * + * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. + * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). + */ void audit_getname(const char *name) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; @@ -1077,10 +1120,13 @@ void audit_getname(const char *name) } -/* Intercept a putname request. Called from - * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from - * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall - * exit. */ +/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request + * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname + * + * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, + * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. + * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). + */ void audit_putname(const char *name) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; @@ -1117,8 +1163,14 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name) #endif } -/* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from - * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */ +/** + * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup + * @name: name being audited + * @inode: inode being audited + * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup()) + * + * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). + */ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) { int idx; @@ -1154,6 +1206,14 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; } +/** + * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values + * @ctx: audit_context for the task + * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context + * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context + * + * Also sets the context as auditable. + */ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) { @@ -1165,6 +1225,15 @@ void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, ctx->auditable = 1; } +/** + * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid + * @task: task whose audit context is being modified + * @loginuid: loginuid value + * + * Returns 0. + * + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). + */ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) { if (task->audit_context) { @@ -1183,11 +1252,26 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) return 0; } +/** + * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context + * @ctx: the audit_context + * + * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL. + */ uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) { return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; } +/** + * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc + * @qbytes: msgq bytes + * @uid: msgq user id + * @gid: msgq group id + * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) + * + * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. + */ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; @@ -1211,6 +1295,13 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) return 0; } +/** + * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall + * @nargs: number of args + * @args: args array + * + * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. + */ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) { struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax; @@ -1232,6 +1323,13 @@ int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) return 0; } +/** + * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto + * @len: data length in user space + * @a: data address in kernel space + * + * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. + */ int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) { struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax; @@ -1253,6 +1351,15 @@ int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) return 0; } +/** + * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions + * @dentry: dentry to record + * @mnt: mnt to record + * + * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. + * + * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit() + */ int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) { struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; @@ -1274,6 +1381,14 @@ int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) return 0; } +/** + * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem + * @sig: signal value + * @t: task being signaled + * + * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) + * and uid that is doing that. + */ void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; @@ -1290,4 +1405,3 @@ void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) } } } - -- cgit v1.2.3 From b63862f46547487388e582e8ac9083830d34f058 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dustin Kirkland Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2005 15:41:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Filter rule comparators Currently, audit only supports the "=" and "!=" operators in the -F filter rules. This patch reworks the support for "=" and "!=", and adds support for ">", ">=", "<", and "<=". This turned out to be a pretty clean, and simply process. I ended up using the high order bits of the "field", as suggested by Steve and Amy. This allowed for no changes whatsoever to the netlink communications. See the documentation within the patch in the include/linux/audit.h area, where there is a table that explains the reasoning of the bitmask assignments clearly. The patch adds a new function, audit_comparator(left, op, right). This function will perform the specified comparison (op, which defaults to "==" for backward compatibility) between two values (left and right). If the negate bit is on, it will negate whatever that result was. This value is returned. Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- include/linux/audit.h | 29 ++++++++++++- kernel/auditsc.c | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index da3c01955f3d..2408cb77899c 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -98,6 +98,13 @@ #define AUDIT_WORD(nr) ((__u32)((nr)/32)) #define AUDIT_BIT(nr) (1 << ((nr) - AUDIT_WORD(nr)*32)) +/* This bitmask is used to validate user input. It represents all bits that + * are currently used in an audit field constant understood by the kernel. + * If you are adding a new #define AUDIT_, please ensure that + * AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS is updated if need be. */ +#define AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS 0x0FFFFC00 + + /* Rule fields */ /* These are useful when checking the * task structure at task creation time @@ -128,8 +135,28 @@ #define AUDIT_ARG2 (AUDIT_ARG0+2) #define AUDIT_ARG3 (AUDIT_ARG0+3) -#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000 +#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000 +/* These are the supported operators. + * 4 2 1 + * = > < + * ------- + * 0 0 0 0 nonsense + * 0 0 1 1 < + * 0 1 0 2 > + * 0 1 1 3 != + * 1 0 0 4 = + * 1 0 1 5 <= + * 1 1 0 6 >= + * 1 1 1 7 all operators + */ +#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN 0x10000000 +#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN 0x20000000 +#define AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL 0x30000000 +#define AUDIT_EQUAL 0x40000000 +#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL (AUDIT_LESS_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL) +#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL (AUDIT_GREATER_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL) +#define AUDIT_OPERATORS (AUDIT_EQUAL|AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL) /* Status symbols */ /* Mask values */ diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 51a4f58a4d81..95076fa12202 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. * * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. + * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation * All Rights Reserved. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify @@ -27,6 +28,9 @@ * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. * + * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was + * added by Dustin Kirkland , 2005. + * */ #include @@ -252,6 +256,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, struct list_head *list) { struct audit_entry *entry; + int i; /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only * addition routine. */ @@ -261,6 +266,16 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, } } + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) + return -EINVAL; + if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE ) + rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; + else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 ) + rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL; + rule->fields[i] &= (~AUDIT_NEGATE); + } + if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) return -ENOMEM; if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) { @@ -394,6 +409,26 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, return err; } +static int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right) +{ + switch (op) { + case AUDIT_EQUAL: + return (left == right); + case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL: + return (left != right); + case AUDIT_LESS_THAN: + return (left < right); + case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL: + return (left <= right); + case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN: + return (left > right); + case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL: + return (left >= right); + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} + /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 * otherwise. */ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, @@ -404,62 +439,63 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, int i, j; for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE; + u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; + u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; u32 value = rule->values[i]; int result = 0; switch (field) { case AUDIT_PID: - result = (tsk->pid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_UID: - result = (tsk->uid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_EUID: - result = (tsk->euid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_SUID: - result = (tsk->suid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_FSUID: - result = (tsk->fsuid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_GID: - result = (tsk->gid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_EGID: - result = (tsk->egid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_SGID: - result = (tsk->sgid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_FSGID: - result = (tsk->fsgid == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_PERS: - result = (tsk->personality == value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, op, value); break; case AUDIT_ARCH: - if (ctx) - result = (ctx->arch == value); + if (ctx) + result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, op, value); break; case AUDIT_EXIT: if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) - result = (ctx->return_code == value); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, op, value); break; case AUDIT_SUCCESS: if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { if (value) - result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); else - result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); } break; case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { + if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) { ++result; break; } @@ -469,7 +505,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) { + if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) { ++result; break; } @@ -479,7 +515,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_INODE: if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) { + if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value)) { ++result; break; } @@ -489,19 +525,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_LOGINUID: result = 0; if (ctx) - result = (ctx->loginuid == value); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_ARG0: case AUDIT_ARG1: case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: if (ctx) - result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0], op, value); break; } - if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) - result = !result; if (!result) return 0; } @@ -550,49 +584,48 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, rcu_read_lock(); if (!list_empty(list)) { - int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); - int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { - if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit - && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - return state; - } - } + int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); + int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { + if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit + && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return state; + } + } } rcu_read_unlock(); return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; } static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, - struct audit_rule *rule, - enum audit_state *state) + struct audit_rule *rule, + enum audit_state *state) { int i; for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE; + u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; + u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; u32 value = rule->values[i]; int result = 0; switch (field) { case AUDIT_PID: - result = (cb->creds.pid == value); + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_UID: - result = (cb->creds.uid == value); + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_GID: - result = (cb->creds.gid == value); + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, op, value); break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID: - result = (cb->loginuid == value); + result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, op, value); break; } - if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) - result = !result; if (!result) return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 90d526c074ae5db484388da56c399acf892b6c17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve Grubb Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2005 15:48:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages. The attached patch updates various items for the new user space messages. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- include/linux/audit.h | 19 +++++++++++++++---- kernel/audit.c | 2 ++ security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 2408cb77899c..fd65078e794a 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -33,11 +33,20 @@ * 1200 - 1299 messages internal to the audit daemon * 1300 - 1399 audit event messages * 1400 - 1499 SE Linux use - * 1500 - 1999 future use - * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages + * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events + * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events + * 1700 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events) + * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy) + * 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel) + * 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records + * 2200 - 2299 user space actions taken in response to anomalies + * 2300 - 2399 user space generated LSPP events + * 2400 - 2499 user space crypto events + * 2500 - 2999 future user space (maybe integrity labels and related events) * - * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 are exclusively user - * space. Anything over that is kernel --> user space communication. + * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 & 2100 - 2999 are + * exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space + * communication. */ #define AUDIT_GET 1000 /* Get status */ #define AUDIT_SET 1001 /* Set status (enable/disable/auditd) */ @@ -54,6 +63,8 @@ #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */ #define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG 1199 +#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 2100 /* More user space messages */ +#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2 2999 #define AUDIT_DAEMON_START 1200 /* Daemon startup record */ #define AUDIT_DAEMON_END 1201 /* Daemon normal stop record */ diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 973ca5a9e0d6..6d61dd79a605 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type) break; case AUDIT_USER: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: + case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2: if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) err = -EPERM; break; @@ -449,6 +450,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) break; case AUDIT_USER: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: + case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2: if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC) return 0; diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 69b9329b2054..d7c0e912c5f3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -145,8 +145,10 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm) break; case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET: - if (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG && - nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) { + if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG && + nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) || + (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 && + nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) { *perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY; } else { err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms, -- cgit v1.2.3 From f38aa94224c5517a40ba56d453779f70d3229803 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amy Griffis Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2005 15:57:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks. The audit hooks (to be added shortly) will want to see dentry->d_inode too, not just the name. Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- fs/namei.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/fsnotify.h | 9 +++++---- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 8dc2b038d5d9..f6619af9e957 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, DQUOT_INIT(dir); error = dir->i_op->create(dir, dentry, mode, nd); if (!error) - fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name); + fsnotify_create(dir, dentry); return error; } @@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) DQUOT_INIT(dir); error = dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); if (!error) - fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name); + fsnotify_create(dir, dentry); return error; } @@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) DQUOT_INIT(dir); error = dir->i_op->mkdir(dir, dentry, mode); if (!error) - fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry->d_name.name); + fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry); return error; } @@ -2133,7 +2133,7 @@ int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname, i DQUOT_INIT(dir); error = dir->i_op->symlink(dir, dentry, oldname); if (!error) - fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name); + fsnotify_create(dir, dentry); return error; } @@ -2210,7 +2210,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de error = dir->i_op->link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); mutex_unlock(&old_dentry->d_inode->i_mutex); if (!error) - fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry->d_name.name); + fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry); return error; } diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h index 03b8e7932b83..b5ff64d2f092 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h +++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h @@ -70,19 +70,20 @@ static inline void fsnotify_inoderemove(struct inode *inode) /* * fsnotify_create - 'name' was linked in */ -static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, const char *name) +static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) { inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE); - inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, name); + inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, dentry->d_name.name); } /* * fsnotify_mkdir - directory 'name' was created */ -static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, const char *name) +static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) { inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE); - inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0, name); + inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0, + dentry->d_name.name); } /* diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 95076fa12202..55ba331757c5 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_INODE: if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value)) { + if ( audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value)) { ++result; break; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 73241ccca0f7786933f1d31b3d86f2456549953a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amy Griffis Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2005 16:00:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing. This patch augments the collection of inode info during syscall processing. It represents part of the functionality that was provided by the auditfs patch included in RHEL4. Specifically, it: - Collects information for target inodes created or removed during syscalls. Previous code only collects information for the target inode's parent. - Adds the audit_inode() hook to syscalls that operate on a file descriptor (e.g. fchown), enabling audit to do inode filtering for these calls. - Modifies filtering code to check audit context for either an inode # or a parent inode # matching a given rule. - Modifies logging to provide inode # for both parent and child. - Protect debug info from NULL audit_names.name. [AV: folded a later typo fix from the same author] Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- fs/namei.c | 1 + fs/open.c | 8 ++- fs/xattr.c | 11 +++- include/linux/audit.h | 18 +++++- include/linux/fsnotify.h | 5 ++ kernel/auditsc.c | 142 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index f6619af9e957..51cfc9c3ed00 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -1353,6 +1353,7 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir,struct dentry *victim,int isdir) return -ENOENT; BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir); + audit_inode_child(victim->d_name.name, victim->d_inode, dir->i_ino); error = permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, NULL); if (error) diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 70e0230d8e77..70510004d06e 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -626,6 +627,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int fd, mode_t mode) dentry = file->f_dentry; inode = dentry->d_inode; + audit_inode(NULL, inode, 0); + err = -EROFS; if (IS_RDONLY(inode)) goto out_putf; @@ -775,7 +778,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group) file = fget(fd); if (file) { - error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group); + struct dentry * dentry; + dentry = file->f_dentry; + audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0); + error = chown_common(dentry, user, group); fput(file); } return error; diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 80eca7d3d69f..e416190f5e9c 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -234,12 +235,15 @@ sys_fsetxattr(int fd, char __user *name, void __user *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct file *f; + struct dentry *dentry; int error = -EBADF; f = fget(fd); if (!f) return error; - error = setxattr(f->f_dentry, name, value, size, flags); + dentry = f->f_dentry; + audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0); + error = setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); fput(f); return error; } @@ -458,12 +462,15 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fremovexattr(int fd, char __user *name) { struct file *f; + struct dentry *dentry; int error = -EBADF; f = fget(fd); if (!f) return error; - error = removexattr(f->f_dentry, name); + dentry = f->f_dentry; + audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0); + error = removexattr(dentry, name); fput(f); return error; } diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index fd65078e794a..739b954cb242 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -260,7 +260,20 @@ extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, int arch, extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int failed, long return_code); extern void audit_getname(const char *name); extern void audit_putname(const char *name); -extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags); +extern void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags); +extern void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode, + unsigned long pino); +static inline void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, + unsigned flags) { + if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) + __audit_inode(name, inode, flags); +} +static inline void audit_inode_child(const char *dname, + const struct inode *inode, + unsigned long pino) { + if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) + __audit_inode_child(dname, inode, pino); +} /* Private API (for audit.c only) */ extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, @@ -283,7 +296,10 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type); #define audit_syscall_exit(t,f,r) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_getname(n) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_putname(n) do { ; } while (0) +#define __audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0) +#define __audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_receive_filter(t,p,u,s,d,l) ({ -EOPNOTSUPP; }) #define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0) #define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; }) diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h index b5ff64d2f092..94919c376a72 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h +++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include +#include /* * fsnotify_move - file old_name at old_dir was moved to new_name at new_dir @@ -45,6 +46,8 @@ static inline void fsnotify_move(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, if (source) { inotify_inode_queue_event(source, IN_MOVE_SELF, 0, NULL); } + audit_inode_child(old_name, source, old_dir->i_ino); + audit_inode_child(new_name, target, new_dir->i_ino); } /* @@ -74,6 +77,7 @@ static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) { inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE); inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, dentry->d_name.name); + audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino); } /* @@ -84,6 +88,7 @@ static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry) inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE); inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0, dentry->d_name.name); + audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino); } /* diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 55ba331757c5..73f932b7deb6 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. * * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. + * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation * All Rights Reserved. * @@ -31,11 +32,16 @@ * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was * added by Dustin Kirkland , 2005. * + * Modified by Amy Griffis to collect additional + * filesystem information. */ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -97,12 +103,12 @@ enum audit_state { struct audit_names { const char *name; unsigned long ino; + unsigned long pino; dev_t dev; umode_t mode; uid_t uid; gid_t gid; dev_t rdev; - unsigned flags; }; struct audit_aux_data { @@ -515,7 +521,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_INODE: if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if ( audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value)) { + if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value) || + audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, op, value)) { ++result; break; } @@ -696,17 +703,17 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 if (context->auditable ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { - printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" + printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" " name_count=%d put_count=%d" " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", - __LINE__, + __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, context->name_count, context->put_count, context->ino_count); for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, context->names[i].name, - context->names[i].name); + context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); dump_stack(); return; } @@ -932,27 +939,34 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) } } for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { + unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino; + unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino; + ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH); if (!ab) continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); - if (context->names[i].name) { - audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + if (context->names[i].name) audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); - } - audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags); - - if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1) - audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" - " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", - context->names[i].ino, - MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), - MINOR(context->names[i].dev), - context->names[i].mode, - context->names[i].uid, - context->names[i].gid, - MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), + else + audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); + + if (pino != (unsigned long)-1) + audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino); + if (ino != (unsigned long)-1) + audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino); + if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1)) + audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" + " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", + MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), + MINOR(context->names[i].dev), + context->names[i].mode, + context->names[i].uid, + context->names[i].gid, + MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); audit_log_end(ab); } @@ -1174,7 +1188,7 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name) for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, context->names[i].name, - context->names[i].name); + context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); } #endif __putname(name); @@ -1204,7 +1218,7 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name) * * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */ -void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) +void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) { int idx; struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; @@ -1230,13 +1244,93 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) ++context->ino_count; #endif } - context->names[idx].flags = flags; - context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; + if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) && + (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) { + context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; + context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino; + } else { + context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; + context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1; + } +} + +/** + * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects + * @dname: inode's dentry name + * @inode: inode being audited + * @pino: inode number of dentry parent + * + * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode + * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. + * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. + * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after + * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object + * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during + * unsuccessful attempts. + */ +void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode, + unsigned long pino) +{ + int idx; + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + + if (!context->in_syscall) + return; + + /* determine matching parent */ + if (dname) + for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) + if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) { + const char *n; + const char *name = context->names[idx].name; + int dlen = strlen(dname); + int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0; + + if (nlen < dlen) + continue; + + /* disregard trailing slashes */ + n = name + nlen - 1; + while ((*n == '/') && (n > name)) + n--; + + /* find last path component */ + n = n - dlen + 1; + if (n < name) + continue; + else if (n > name) { + if (*--n != '/') + continue; + else + n++; + } + + if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0) + goto update_context; + } + + /* catch-all in case match not found */ + idx = context->name_count++; + context->names[idx].name = NULL; + context->names[idx].pino = pino; +#if AUDIT_DEBUG + context->ino_count++; +#endif + +update_context: + if (inode) { + context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; + context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; + context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; + context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; + context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; + context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; + } } /** -- cgit v1.2.3 From c8edc80c8b8c397c53f4f659a05b9ea6208029bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dustin Kirkland Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2005 16:12:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type - Add a new, 5th filter called "exclude". - And add a new field AUDIT_MSGTYPE. - Define a new function audit_filter_exclude() that takes a message type as input and examines all rules in the filter. It returns '1' if the message is to be excluded, and '0' otherwise. - Call the audit_filter_exclude() function near the top of audit_log_start() just after asserting audit_initialized. If the message type is not to be audited, return NULL very early, before doing a lot of work. [combined with followup fix for bug in original patch, Nov 4, same author] [combined with later renaming AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE->AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE and audit_filter_exclude() -> audit_filter_type()] Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- include/linux/audit.h | 5 ++++- kernel/audit.c | 3 +++ kernel/auditsc.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 739b954cb242..8fa1a8fbc04d 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ #define AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY 0x02 /* Apply rule at syscall entry */ #define AUDIT_FILTER_WATCH 0x03 /* Apply rule to file system watches */ #define AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT 0x04 /* Apply rule at syscall exit */ +#define AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE 0x05 /* Apply rule at audit_log_start */ -#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 5 +#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 6 #define AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND 0x10 /* Prepend to front of list */ @@ -132,6 +133,7 @@ #define AUDIT_LOGINUID 9 #define AUDIT_PERS 10 #define AUDIT_ARCH 11 +#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12 /* These are ONLY useful when checking * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */ @@ -289,6 +291,7 @@ extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr); extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt); extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t); extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type); +extern int audit_filter_type(int type); #else #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; }) #define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 6d61dd79a605..1c3eb1b12bfc 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -702,6 +702,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, if (!audit_initialized) return NULL; + if (unlikely(audit_filter_type(type))) + return NULL; + if (gfp_mask & __GFP_WAIT) reserve = 0; else diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 73f932b7deb6..31917ac730af 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -187,7 +187,8 @@ static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), -#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5 + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]), +#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser #endif }; @@ -663,6 +664,38 @@ int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type) return ret; /* Audit by default */ } +int audit_filter_type(int type) +{ + struct audit_entry *e; + int result = 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE])) + goto unlock_and_return; + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE], + list) { + struct audit_rule *rule = &e->rule; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; + u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; + u32 value = rule->values[i]; + if ( field == AUDIT_MSGTYPE ) { + result = audit_comparator(type, op, value); + if (!result) + break; + } + } + if (result) + goto unlock_and_return; + } +unlock_and_return: + rcu_read_unlock(); + return result; +} + + /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, int return_valid, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8c8570fb8feef2bc166bee75a85748b25cda22d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dustin Kirkland Date: Thu, 3 Nov 2005 17:15:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information. This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver of an action. These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the appropriate record in the audit code. This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP). [AV: fixed kmalloc flags use] [folded leak fixes] [folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)] [folded audit_inode_context() leak fix] [folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT] Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++- include/linux/security.h | 27 +++++++++ ipc/msg.c | 5 +- ipc/sem.c | 5 +- ipc/shm.c | 4 +- kernel/audit.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/dummy.c | 6 ++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 96 +++++++++++++++----------------- 9 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 8fa1a8fbc04d..1912d8e8ae90 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -285,13 +285,14 @@ extern void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial); extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid); extern uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx); -extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode); +extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp); extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args); extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr); extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt); extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t); extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type); extern int audit_filter_type(int type); +extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name); #else #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; }) #define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0) @@ -306,12 +307,13 @@ extern int audit_filter_type(int type); #define audit_receive_filter(t,p,u,s,d,l) ({ -EOPNOTSUPP; }) #define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0) #define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; }) -#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m) ({ 0; }) +#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; }) #define audit_socketcall(n,a) ({ 0; }) #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; }) #define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; }) #define audit_signal_info(s,t) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_filter_user(cb,t) ({ 1; }) +#define audit_set_macxattr(n) do { ; } while (0) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT @@ -340,6 +342,7 @@ extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, void *payload, int size); extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); +extern void audit_panic(const char *message); extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem; #else #define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0) @@ -350,6 +353,7 @@ extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem; #define audit_log_hex(a,b,l) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_untrustedstring(a,s) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_d_path(b,p,d,v) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_panic(m) do { ; } while (0) #endif #endif #endif diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 7cbef482e13a..ec0bbbc3ffc2 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -869,6 +869,11 @@ struct swap_info_struct; * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @ipc_getsecurity: + * Copy the security label associated with the ipc object into + * @buffer. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer + * required. @size indicates the size of @buffer in bytes. Return + * number of bytes used/required on success. * * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues * @msg_msg_alloc_security: @@ -1168,6 +1173,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name); int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name); + char *(*inode_xattr_getsuffix) (void); int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err); int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); @@ -1217,6 +1223,7 @@ struct security_operations { void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag); + int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size); int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg); void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg); @@ -1674,6 +1681,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) return security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name); } +static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) +{ + return security_ops->inode_xattr_getsuffix(); +} + static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode))) @@ -1869,6 +1881,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, return security_ops->ipc_permission (ipcp, flag); } +static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + return security_ops->ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, buffer, size); +} + static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg) { return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security (msg); @@ -2316,6 +2333,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); } +static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix (void) +{ + return NULL ; +} + static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -2499,6 +2521,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, return 0; } +static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg) { return 0; diff --git a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c index fbf757064a32..8c30ec2f6e34 100644 --- a/ipc/msg.c +++ b/ipc/msg.c @@ -429,8 +429,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf) return -EFAULT; if (copy_msqid_from_user (&setbuf, buf, version)) return -EFAULT; - if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode))) - return err; break; case IPC_RMID: break; @@ -461,6 +459,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf) switch (cmd) { case IPC_SET: { + if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp))) + goto out_unlock_up; + err = -EPERM; if (setbuf.qbytes > msg_ctlmnb && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) goto out_unlock_up; diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c index 31fd4027d2b5..59696a840be1 100644 --- a/ipc/sem.c +++ b/ipc/sem.c @@ -809,8 +809,6 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun if(cmd == IPC_SET) { if(copy_semid_from_user (&setbuf, arg.buf, version)) return -EFAULT; - if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode))) - return err; } sma = sem_lock(semid); if(sma==NULL) @@ -821,7 +819,6 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun goto out_unlock; } ipcp = &sma->sem_perm; - if (current->euid != ipcp->cuid && current->euid != ipcp->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err=-EPERM; @@ -838,6 +835,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun err = 0; break; case IPC_SET: + if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp))) + goto out_unlock; ipcp->uid = setbuf.uid; ipcp->gid = setbuf.gid; ipcp->mode = (ipcp->mode & ~S_IRWXUGO) diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c index 9162123a7b23..a88c8a02e7f3 100644 --- a/ipc/shm.c +++ b/ipc/shm.c @@ -620,13 +620,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf) err = -EFAULT; goto out; } - if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode))) - return err; down(&shm_ids.sem); shp = shm_lock(shmid); err=-EINVAL; if(shp==NULL) goto out_up; + if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm)))) + goto out_unlock_up; err = shm_checkid(shp,shmid); if(err) goto out_unlock_up; diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 1c3eb1b12bfc..45c123ef77a7 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static void audit_set_pid(struct audit_buffer *ab, pid_t pid) nlh->nlmsg_pid = pid; } -static void audit_panic(const char *message) +void audit_panic(const char *message) { switch (audit_failure) { diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 31917ac730af..4e2256ec7cf3 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ * * Modified by Amy Griffis to collect additional * filesystem information. + * + * Subject and object context labeling support added by + * and for LSPP certification compliance. */ #include @@ -53,6 +56,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* 0 = no checking 1 = put_count checking @@ -109,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_names { uid_t uid; gid_t gid; dev_t rdev; + char *ctx; }; struct audit_aux_data { @@ -125,6 +130,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl { uid_t uid; gid_t gid; mode_t mode; + char *ctx; }; struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { @@ -743,10 +749,11 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, context->name_count, context->put_count, context->ino_count); - for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) + for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, context->names[i].name, context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); + } dump_stack(); return; } @@ -756,9 +763,13 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) context->ino_count = 0; #endif - for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) + for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { + char *p = context->names[i].ctx; + context->names[i].ctx = NULL; + kfree(p); if (context->names[i].name) __putname(context->names[i].name); + } context->name_count = 0; if (context->pwd) dput(context->pwd); @@ -778,6 +789,12 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) dput(axi->dentry); mntput(axi->mnt); } + if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) { + struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; + if (axi->ctx) + kfree(axi->ctx); + } + context->aux = aux->next; kfree(aux); } @@ -862,7 +879,38 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); } -static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) +static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask) +{ + char *ctx = NULL; + ssize_t len = 0; + + len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0); + if (len < 0) { + if (len != -EINVAL) + goto error_path; + return; + } + + ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask); + if (!ctx) { + goto error_path; + return; + } + + len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len); + if (len < 0 ) + goto error_path; + + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); + +error_path: + if (ctx) + kfree(ctx); + audit_panic("security_getprocattr error in audit_log_task_context"); + return; +} + +static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask) { char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; @@ -875,6 +923,10 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) if (!mm) return; + /* + * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have + * NULL current->mm and we won't get here. + */ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); vma = mm->mmap; while (vma) { @@ -888,6 +940,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab) vma = vma->vm_next; } up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask); } static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) @@ -923,7 +976,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) context->gid, context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid); - audit_log_task_info(ab); + audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask); audit_log_end(ab); for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { @@ -936,8 +989,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) case AUDIT_IPC: { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; audit_log_format(ab, - " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x", - axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode); + " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s", + axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx); break; } case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { @@ -1001,6 +1054,11 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) context->names[i].gid, MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); + if (context->names[i].ctx) { + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", + context->names[i].ctx); + } + audit_log_end(ab); } } @@ -1243,6 +1301,39 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name) #endif } +void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode) +{ + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + char *ctx = NULL; + int len = 0; + + if (!security_inode_xattr_getsuffix()) + return; + + len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, (char *)security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(), NULL, 0, 0); + if (len < 0) + goto error_path; + + ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + goto error_path; + + len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, (char *)security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(), ctx, len, 0); + if (len < 0) + goto error_path; + + kfree(context->names[idx].ctx); + context->names[idx].ctx = ctx; + return; + +error_path: + if (ctx) + kfree(ctx); + audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context"); + return; +} + + /** * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup * @name: name being audited @@ -1282,6 +1373,7 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; + audit_inode_context(idx, inode); if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) && (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) { context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; @@ -1363,6 +1455,7 @@ update_context: context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; + audit_inode_context(idx, inode); } } @@ -1423,6 +1516,38 @@ uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; } +static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) +{ + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + char *ctx = NULL; + int len = 0; + + if (likely(!context)) + return NULL; + + len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0); + if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP) + goto ret; + if (len < 0) + goto error_path; + + ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ctx) + goto error_path; + + len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len); + if (len < 0) + goto error_path; + + return ctx; + +error_path: + kfree(ctx); + audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context"); +ret: + return NULL; +} + /** * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc * @qbytes: msgq bytes @@ -1432,7 +1557,7 @@ uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) * * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. */ -int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) +int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; @@ -1440,7 +1565,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) if (likely(!context)) return 0; - ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); + ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!ax) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1448,6 +1573,7 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) ax->uid = uid; ax->gid = gid; ax->mode = mode; + ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp); ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; ax->d.next = context->aux; diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index f1a5bd98bf10..6febe7d39fa0 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -558,6 +558,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return 0; } +static int dummy_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg) { return 0; @@ -959,6 +964,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index b65c201e9ff5..9c08a19cc81b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -117,6 +117,32 @@ static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL; static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock); +/* Return security context for a given sid or just the context + length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */ +static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + char *context; + unsigned len; + int rc; + + rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (!buffer || !size) + goto getsecurity_exit; + + if (size < len) { + len = -ERANGE; + goto getsecurity_exit; + } + memcpy(buffer, context, len); + +getsecurity_exit: + kfree(context); + return len; +} + /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task) @@ -2209,6 +2235,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) return -EACCES; } +static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) +{ + return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; +} + /* * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to @@ -2219,44 +2250,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; - char *context; - unsigned len; - int rc; - - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) { - rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; - goto out; - } - - rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); - if (rc) - goto out; - - /* Probe for required buffer size */ - if (!buffer || !size) { - rc = len; - goto out_free; - } - if (size < len) { - rc = -ERANGE; - goto out_free; - } + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (err > 0) { - if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) { - /* Don't need to canonicalize value */ - rc = err; - goto out_free; - } - memset(buffer, 0, size); - } - memcpy(buffer, context, len); - rc = len; -out_free: - kfree(context); -out: - return rc; + return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size); } static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, @@ -4022,6 +4020,13 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } +static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; + + return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size); +} + /* module stacking operations */ static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) { @@ -4063,8 +4068,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; - u32 sid, len; - char *context; + u32 sid; int error; if (current != p) { @@ -4073,9 +4077,6 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, return error; } - if (!size) - return -ERANGE; - tsec = p->security; if (!strcmp(name, "current")) @@ -4092,16 +4093,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, if (!sid) return 0; - error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); - if (error) - return error; - if (len > size) { - kfree(context); - return -ERANGE; - } - memcpy(value, context, len); - kfree(context); - return len; + return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size); } static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, @@ -4259,6 +4251,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, + .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix, .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, @@ -4296,6 +4289,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, + .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity, .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7306a0b9b3e2056a616c84841288ca2431a05627 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dustin Kirkland Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2005 15:53:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently added to -mm1: * fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode * fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off due to a missing function in security/dummy.c * fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing return just before an error_path label * some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(), audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context() Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++---- kernel/auditsc.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------- security/dummy.c | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index ec0bbbc3ffc2..2a502250eb5c 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1173,8 +1173,8 @@ struct security_operations { int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name); int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name); - char *(*inode_xattr_getsuffix) (void); - int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err); + const char *(*inode_xattr_getsuffix) (void); + int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err); int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); @@ -1686,7 +1686,7 @@ static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) return security_ops->inode_xattr_getsuffix(); } -static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) +static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode))) return 0; @@ -2338,7 +2338,7 @@ static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix (void) return NULL ; } -static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) +static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 4e2256ec7cf3..4ef14515da35 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -892,21 +892,20 @@ static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask) } ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask); - if (!ctx) { + if (!ctx) goto error_path; - return; - } len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len); if (len < 0 ) goto error_path; audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); + return; error_path: if (ctx) kfree(ctx); - audit_panic("security_getprocattr error in audit_log_task_context"); + audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); return; } @@ -1304,13 +1303,16 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name) void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(); char *ctx = NULL; int len = 0; - if (!security_inode_xattr_getsuffix()) - return; + if (!suffix) + goto ret; - len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, (char *)security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(), NULL, 0, 0); + len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0); + if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP) + goto ret; if (len < 0) goto error_path; @@ -1318,18 +1320,19 @@ void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode) if (!ctx) goto error_path; - len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, (char *)security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(), ctx, len, 0); + len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0); if (len < 0) goto error_path; kfree(context->names[idx].ctx); context->names[idx].ctx = ctx; - return; + goto ret; error_path: if (ctx) kfree(ctx); audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context"); +ret: return; } diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 6febe7d39fa0..0a553d39729f 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) return 0; } -static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) +static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -393,6 +393,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu return 0; } +static const char *dummy_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; @@ -930,6 +935,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_xattr_getsuffix); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 9c08a19cc81b..81b726b1a419 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) * * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. */ -static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) +static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ee436dc46a762f430e37952d375a23d87735f73f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2005 14:43:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing. Original 2.6.9 patch and explanation from somewhere within HP via bugzilla... ia64 stores a success/failure code in r10, and the return value (normal return, or *positive* errno) in r8. The patch also sets the exit code to negative errno if it's a failure result for consistency with other architectures. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c index eaed14aac6aa..9887c8787e7a 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -1656,8 +1656,14 @@ syscall_trace_leave (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3, long arg4, long arg5, long arg6, long arg7, struct pt_regs regs) { - if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) - audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10), regs.r8); + if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) { + int success = AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10); + long result = regs.r8; + + if (success != AUDITSC_SUCCESS) + result = -result; + audit_syscall_exit(current, success, result); + } if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From fe7752bab26a9ac0651b695ad4f55659761f68f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2005 18:33:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL This fixes the per-user and per-message-type filtering when syscall auditing isn't enabled. [AV: folded followup fix from the same author] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- include/linux/audit.h | 18 +-- kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 1 + kernel/audit.h | 70 ++++++++++ kernel/auditfilter.c | 378 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 380 +------------------------------------------------- 6 files changed, 459 insertions(+), 390 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/audit.h create mode 100644 kernel/auditfilter.c diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 1912d8e8ae90..fbc21d6267f3 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -278,8 +278,6 @@ static inline void audit_inode_child(const char *dname, } /* Private API (for audit.c only) */ -extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, - void *data, uid_t loginuid); extern unsigned int audit_serial(void); extern void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial); @@ -290,8 +288,6 @@ extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args); extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr); extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt); extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t); -extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type); -extern int audit_filter_type(int type); extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name); #else #define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; }) @@ -304,7 +300,6 @@ extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name); #define __audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0) -#define audit_receive_filter(t,p,u,s,d,l) ({ -EOPNOTSUPP; }) #define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0) #define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; }) #define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; }) @@ -312,7 +307,6 @@ extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name); #define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; }) #define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; }) #define audit_signal_info(s,t) do { ; } while (0) -#define audit_filter_user(cb,t) ({ 1; }) #define audit_set_macxattr(n) do { ; } while (0) #endif @@ -337,13 +331,11 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix, struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt); - /* Private API (for auditsc.c only) */ -extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, - int done, int multi, - void *payload, int size); -extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); -extern void audit_panic(const char *message); -extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem; + /* Private API (for audit.c only) */ +extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type); +extern int audit_filter_type(int type); +extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, + void *data, uid_t loginuid); #else #define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; }) diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 4ae0fbde815d..58cf129e5622 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o obj-$(CONFIG_CPUSETS) += cpuset.o obj-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG) += configs.o obj-$(CONFIG_STOP_MACHINE) += stop_machine.o -obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o +obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o auditfilter.o obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSFS) += ksysfs.o diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 45c123ef77a7..07c5d2bdd38c 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) remove_wait_queue(&kauditd_wait, &wait); } } + return 0; } /** diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7643e46daeb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* audit -- definition of audit_context structure and supporting types + * + * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc. + * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. + * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#include +#include + +/* 0 = no checking + 1 = put_count checking + 2 = verbose put_count checking +*/ +#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0 + +/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using + a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by + the syscall filter. */ +enum audit_state { + AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context. + * No syscall-specific audit records can + * be generated. */ + AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, + * but don't necessarily fill it in at + * syscall entry time (i.e., filter + * instead). */ + AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, + * and always fill it in at syscall + * entry time. This makes a full + * syscall record available if some + * other part of the kernel decides it + * should be recorded. */ + AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context, + * always fill it in at syscall entry + * time, and always write out the audit + * record at syscall exit time. */ +}; + +/* Rule lists */ +struct audit_entry { + struct list_head list; + struct rcu_head rcu; + struct audit_rule rule; +}; + + +extern int audit_pid; +extern int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right); + +extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, + int done, int multi, + void *payload, int size); +extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); +extern void audit_panic(const char *message); +extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7f347c360876 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -0,0 +1,378 @@ +/* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events + * + * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc. + * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. + * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "audit.h" + +/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation + * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at + * syscall exit time. */ +struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]), + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]), + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), + LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]), +#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6 +#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser +#endif +}; + +/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from + * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */ +static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) +{ + int i; + + if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER + && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE + && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) + return -1; + if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) + return -1; + if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) + return -1; + + d->flags = s->flags; + d->action = s->action; + d->field_count = s->field_count; + for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) { + d->fields[i] = s->fields[i]; + d->values[i] = s->values[i]; + } + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i]; + return 0; +} + +/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from + * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and + * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ +static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) +{ + int i; + + if (a->flags != b->flags) + return 1; + + if (a->action != b->action) + return 1; + + if (a->field_count != b->field_count) + return 1; + + for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { + if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i] + || a->values[i] != b->values[i]) + return 1; + } + + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) + if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i]) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via + * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by + * audit_netlink_sem. */ +static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, + struct list_head *list) +{ + struct audit_entry *entry; + int i; + + /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only + * addition routine. */ + list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) { + if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) { + return -EEXIST; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) + return -EINVAL; + if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE ) + rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; + else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 ) + rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL; + rule->fields[i] &= (~AUDIT_NEGATE); + } + + if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) + return -ENOMEM; + if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) { + kfree(entry); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) { + entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; + list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); + } else { + list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); + kfree(e); +} + +/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via + * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by + * audit_netlink_sem. */ +static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, + struct list_head *list) +{ + struct audit_entry *e; + + /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only + * deletion routine. */ + list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { + if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { + list_del_rcu(&e->list); + call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); + return 0; + } + } + return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */ +} + +static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) +{ + int pid, seq; + int *dest = _dest; + struct audit_entry *entry; + int i; + + pid = dest[0]; + seq = dest[1]; + kfree(dest); + + down(&audit_netlink_sem); + + /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are + always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ + for (i=0; irule, sizeof(entry->rule)); + } + audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0); + + up(&audit_netlink_sem); + return 0; +} + +/** + * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type + * @type: audit message type + * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages + * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages + * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number + * @data: payload data + * @loginuid: loginuid of sender + */ +int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, + uid_t loginuid) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk; + int *dest; + int err = 0; + unsigned listnr; + + switch (type) { + case AUDIT_LIST: + /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill + * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for + * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to + * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl + * trying to _send_ the stuff */ + + dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dest) + return -ENOMEM; + dest[0] = pid; + dest[1] = seq; + + tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules"); + if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { + kfree(dest); + err = PTR_ERR(tsk); + } + break; + case AUDIT_ADD: + listnr = ((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; + switch(listnr) { + default: + return -EINVAL; + + case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: + case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE: +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL + case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY: + case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT: + case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK: +#endif + ; + } + err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); + if (!err) + audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, + "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); + break; + case AUDIT_DEL: + listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; + if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) + return -EINVAL; + + err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); + if (!err) + audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, + "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return err; +} + +int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right) +{ + switch (op) { + case AUDIT_EQUAL: + return (left == right); + case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL: + return (left != right); + case AUDIT_LESS_THAN: + return (left < right); + case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL: + return (left <= right); + case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN: + return (left > right); + case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL: + return (left >= right); + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} + + + +static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, + struct audit_rule *rule, + enum audit_state *state) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; + u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; + u32 value = rule->values[i]; + int result = 0; + + switch (field) { + case AUDIT_PID: + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, op, value); + break; + case AUDIT_UID: + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, op, value); + break; + case AUDIT_GID: + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, op, value); + break; + case AUDIT_LOGINUID: + result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, op, value); + break; + } + + if (!result) + return 0; + } + switch (rule->action) { + case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; + case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; + case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; + } + return 1; +} + +int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type) +{ + struct audit_entry *e; + enum audit_state state; + int ret = 1; + + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) { + if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) { + if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return ret; /* Audit by default */ +} + +int audit_filter_type(int type) +{ + struct audit_entry *e; + int result = 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE])) + goto unlock_and_return; + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE], + list) { + struct audit_rule *rule = &e->rule; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; + u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; + u32 value = rule->values[i]; + if ( field == AUDIT_MSGTYPE ) { + result = audit_comparator(type, op, value); + if (!result) + break; + } + } + if (result) + goto unlock_and_return; + } +unlock_and_return: + rcu_read_unlock(); + return result; +} + + diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 4ef14515da35..17719b303638 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -52,17 +52,15 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include #include +#include -/* 0 = no checking - 1 = put_count checking - 2 = verbose put_count checking -*/ -#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0 +#include "audit.h" + +extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[]; /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ extern int audit_enabled; @@ -76,29 +74,6 @@ extern int audit_enabled; * path_lookup. */ #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7 -/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using - a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by - the syscall filter. */ -enum audit_state { - AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context. - * No syscall-specific audit records can - * be generated. */ - AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, - * but don't necessarily fill it in at - * syscall entry time (i.e., filter - * instead). */ - AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, - * and always fill it in at syscall - * entry time. This makes a full - * syscall record available if some - * other part of the kernel decides it - * should be recorded. */ - AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context, - * always fill it in at syscall entry - * time, and always write out the audit - * record at syscall exit time. */ -}; - /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved * pointers at syscall exit time). @@ -183,264 +158,6 @@ struct audit_context { #endif }; - /* Public API */ -/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation - * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at - * syscall exit time. */ -static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { - LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]), - LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]), - LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), - LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), - LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), - LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]), -#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6 -#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser -#endif -}; - -struct audit_entry { - struct list_head list; - struct rcu_head rcu; - struct audit_rule rule; -}; - -extern int audit_pid; - -/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from - * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */ -static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) -{ - int i; - - if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER - && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE - && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) - return -1; - if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) - return -1; - if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) - return -1; - - d->flags = s->flags; - d->action = s->action; - d->field_count = s->field_count; - for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) { - d->fields[i] = s->fields[i]; - d->values[i] = s->values[i]; - } - for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i]; - return 0; -} - -/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from - * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and - * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ -static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) -{ - int i; - - if (a->flags != b->flags) - return 1; - - if (a->action != b->action) - return 1; - - if (a->field_count != b->field_count) - return 1; - - for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { - if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i] - || a->values[i] != b->values[i]) - return 1; - } - - for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) - if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i]) - return 1; - - return 0; -} - -/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via - * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by - * audit_netlink_sem. */ -static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, - struct list_head *list) -{ - struct audit_entry *entry; - int i; - - /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only - * addition routine. */ - list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) { - if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) { - return -EEXIST; - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) - return -EINVAL; - if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE ) - rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; - else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 ) - rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL; - rule->fields[i] &= (~AUDIT_NEGATE); - } - - if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) - return -ENOMEM; - if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) { - kfree(entry); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) { - entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; - list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); - } else { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); - } - - return 0; -} - -static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head) -{ - struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); - kfree(e); -} - -/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via - * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by - * audit_netlink_sem. */ -static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, - struct list_head *list) -{ - struct audit_entry *e; - - /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only - * deletion routine. */ - list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { - if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { - list_del_rcu(&e->list); - call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); - return 0; - } - } - return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */ -} - -static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) -{ - int pid, seq; - int *dest = _dest; - struct audit_entry *entry; - int i; - - pid = dest[0]; - seq = dest[1]; - kfree(dest); - - down(&audit_netlink_sem); - - /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are - always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ - for (i=0; irule, sizeof(entry->rule)); - } - audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0); - - up(&audit_netlink_sem); - return 0; -} - -/** - * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type - * @type: audit message type - * @pid: target pid for netlink audit messages - * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages - * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number - * @data: payload data - * @loginuid: loginuid of sender - */ -int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, - uid_t loginuid) -{ - struct task_struct *tsk; - int *dest; - int err = 0; - unsigned listnr; - - switch (type) { - case AUDIT_LIST: - /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill - * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for - * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to - * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl - * trying to _send_ the stuff */ - - dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!dest) - return -ENOMEM; - dest[0] = pid; - dest[1] = seq; - - tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules"); - if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { - kfree(dest); - err = PTR_ERR(tsk); - } - break; - case AUDIT_ADD: - listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; - if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) - return -EINVAL; - - err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); - if (!err) - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); - break; - case AUDIT_DEL: - listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; - if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) - return -EINVAL; - - err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); - if (!err) - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); - break; - default: - return -EINVAL; - } - - return err; -} - -static int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right) -{ - switch (op) { - case AUDIT_EQUAL: - return (left == right); - case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL: - return (left != right); - case AUDIT_LESS_THAN: - return (left < right); - case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL: - return (left <= right); - case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN: - return (left > right); - case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL: - return (left >= right); - default: - return -EINVAL; - } -} /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 * otherwise. */ @@ -613,95 +330,6 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; } -static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, - struct audit_rule *rule, - enum audit_state *state) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 value = rule->values[i]; - int result = 0; - - switch (field) { - case AUDIT_PID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, op, value); - break; - case AUDIT_UID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, op, value); - break; - case AUDIT_GID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, op, value); - break; - case AUDIT_LOGINUID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, op, value); - break; - } - - if (!result) - return 0; - } - switch (rule->action) { - case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; - case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; - case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; - } - return 1; -} - -int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type) -{ - struct audit_entry *e; - enum audit_state state; - int ret = 1; - - rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) { - if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) { - if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) - ret = 0; - break; - } - } - rcu_read_unlock(); - - return ret; /* Audit by default */ -} - -int audit_filter_type(int type) -{ - struct audit_entry *e; - int result = 0; - - rcu_read_lock(); - if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE])) - goto unlock_and_return; - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE], - list) { - struct audit_rule *rule = &e->rule; - int i; - for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 value = rule->values[i]; - if ( field == AUDIT_MSGTYPE ) { - result = audit_comparator(type, op, value); - if (!result) - break; - } - } - if (result) - goto unlock_and_return; - } -unlock_and_return: - rcu_read_unlock(); - return result; -} - - /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, int return_valid, -- cgit v1.2.3 From d884596f44ef5a0bcd8a66405dc04902aeaa6fc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2005 10:48:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 11 ++++------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 7f347c360876..a3a32752f973 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ -static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) +static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) { int i; @@ -107,19 +107,18 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only * addition routine. */ list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) { - if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) { + if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) return -EEXIST; - } } for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) return -EINVAL; - if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE ) + if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 ) rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL; - rule->fields[i] &= (~AUDIT_NEGATE); + rule->fields[i] &= ~AUDIT_NEGATE; } if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) @@ -374,5 +373,3 @@ unlock_and_return: rcu_read_unlock(); return result; } - - -- cgit v1.2.3 From af601e4623d0303bfafa54ec728b7ae8493a8e1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve Grubb Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2006 14:08:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] SE Linux audit events Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit system. Please Apply. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- include/linux/audit.h | 3 +++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 11 +++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 15 +++++++++------ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index fbc21d6267f3..8868c96ca8a2 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ #define AUDIT_AVC_PATH 1402 /* dentry, vfsmount pair from avc */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD 1403 /* Policy file load */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_STATUS 1404 /* Changed enforcing,permissive,off */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE 1405 /* Changes to booleans */ #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */ diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index b5fa02d17b1e..5eba6664eac0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -126,6 +127,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE); if (length) goto out; + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, + "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u", new_value, + selinux_enforcing, + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); selinux_enforcing = new_value; if (selinux_enforcing) avc_ss_reset(0); @@ -176,6 +181,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, length = selinux_disable(); if (length < 0) goto out; + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, + "selinux=0 auid=%u", + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); } length = count; @@ -261,6 +269,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, length = ret; else length = count; + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, + "policy loaded auid=%u", + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); out: up(&sel_sem); vfree(data); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 8a764928ff4b..d877cd16a813 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1758,19 +1758,22 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values) goto out; } - printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { "); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) { + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, + AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE, + "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u", + policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], + !!values[i], + policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state, + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); + } if (values[i]) { policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1; } else { policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0; } - if (i != 0) - printk(", "); - printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], - policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state); } - printk(" }\n"); for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 93315ed6dd12dacfc941f9eb8ca0293aadf99793 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amy Griffis Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 12:05:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer Updated patch to dynamically allocate audit rule fields in kernel's internal representation. Added unlikely() calls for testing memory allocation result. Amy Griffis wrote: [Wed Jan 11 2006, 02:02:31PM EST] > Modify audit's kernel-userspace interface to allow the specification > of string fields in audit rules. > > Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis Signed-off-by: Al Viro (cherry picked from 5ffc4a863f92351b720fe3e9c5cd647accff9e03 commit) --- include/linux/audit.h | 31 ++- kernel/audit.c | 19 +- kernel/audit.h | 23 ++- kernel/auditfilter.c | 467 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- kernel/auditsc.c | 50 +++-- security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 3 + 6 files changed, 448 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 8868c96ca8a2..8a3b98175c25 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -50,15 +50,18 @@ */ #define AUDIT_GET 1000 /* Get status */ #define AUDIT_SET 1001 /* Set status (enable/disable/auditd) */ -#define AUDIT_LIST 1002 /* List syscall filtering rules */ -#define AUDIT_ADD 1003 /* Add syscall filtering rule */ -#define AUDIT_DEL 1004 /* Delete syscall filtering rule */ +#define AUDIT_LIST 1002 /* List syscall rules -- deprecated */ +#define AUDIT_ADD 1003 /* Add syscall rule -- deprecated */ +#define AUDIT_DEL 1004 /* Delete syscall rule -- deprecated */ #define AUDIT_USER 1005 /* Message from userspace -- deprecated */ #define AUDIT_LOGIN 1006 /* Define the login id and information */ #define AUDIT_WATCH_INS 1007 /* Insert file/dir watch entry */ #define AUDIT_WATCH_REM 1008 /* Remove file/dir watch entry */ #define AUDIT_WATCH_LIST 1009 /* List all file/dir watches */ #define AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO 1010 /* Get info about sender of signal to auditd */ +#define AUDIT_ADD_RULE 1011 /* Add syscall filtering rule */ +#define AUDIT_DEL_RULE 1012 /* Delete syscall filtering rule */ +#define AUDIT_LIST_RULES 1013 /* List syscall filtering rules */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */ @@ -229,6 +232,26 @@ struct audit_status { __u32 backlog; /* messages waiting in queue */ }; +/* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string + * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and + * AUDIT_LIST_RULES requests. + */ +struct audit_rule_data { + __u32 flags; /* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */ + __u32 action; /* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */ + __u32 field_count; + __u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; + __u32 fields[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS]; + __u32 values[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS]; + __u32 fieldflags[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS]; + __u32 buflen; /* total length of string fields */ + char buf[0]; /* string fields buffer */ +}; + +/* audit_rule is supported to maintain backward compatibility with + * userspace. It supports integer fields only and corresponds to + * AUDIT_ADD, AUDIT_DEL and AUDIT_LIST requests. + */ struct audit_rule { /* for AUDIT_LIST, AUDIT_ADD, and AUDIT_DEL */ __u32 flags; /* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */ __u32 action; /* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */ @@ -338,7 +361,7 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type); extern int audit_filter_type(int type); extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, - void *data, uid_t loginuid); + void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid); #else #define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; }) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 07c5d2bdd38c..4eb97b62d7fa 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -361,9 +362,12 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type) switch (msg_type) { case AUDIT_GET: case AUDIT_LIST: + case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: case AUDIT_SET: case AUDIT_ADD: + case AUDIT_ADD_RULE: case AUDIT_DEL: + case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) err = -EPERM; @@ -470,12 +474,23 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) break; case AUDIT_ADD: case AUDIT_DEL: - if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(struct audit_rule)) + if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule)) return -EINVAL; /* fallthrough */ case AUDIT_LIST: err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, - uid, seq, data, loginuid); + uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh), + loginuid); + break; + case AUDIT_ADD_RULE: + case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: + if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data)) + return -EINVAL; + /* fallthrough */ + case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: + err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, + uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh), + loginuid); break; case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: sig_data.uid = audit_sig_uid; diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 7643e46daeb2..4b602cdcabef 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -52,10 +52,27 @@ enum audit_state { }; /* Rule lists */ +struct audit_field { + u32 type; + u32 val; + u32 op; +}; + +struct audit_krule { + int vers_ops; + u32 flags; + u32 listnr; + u32 action; + u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; + u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */ + u32 field_count; + struct audit_field *fields; +}; + struct audit_entry { - struct list_head list; - struct rcu_head rcu; - struct audit_rule rule; + struct list_head list; + struct rcu_head rcu; + struct audit_krule rule; }; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index a3a32752f973..686d514a3518 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -40,52 +40,279 @@ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { #endif }; -/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from - * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */ -static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s) +static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) { + kfree(e->rule.fields); + kfree(e); +} + +static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); + audit_free_rule(e); +} + +/* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space + * buffer. */ +static __attribute__((unused)) char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len) +{ + char *str; + + if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX + * defines the longest valid length. + */ + if (len > PATH_MAX) + return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); + + str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!str)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + memcpy(str, *bufp, len); + str[len] = 0; + *bufp += len; + *remain -= len; + + return str; +} + +/* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */ +static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule) +{ + unsigned listnr; + struct audit_entry *entry; + struct audit_field *fields; + int i, err; + + err = -EINVAL; + listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; + switch(listnr) { + default: + goto exit_err; + case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: + case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE: +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL + case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY: + case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT: + case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK: +#endif + ; + } + if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE && + rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) + goto exit_err; + if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) + goto exit_err; + + err = -ENOMEM; + entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!entry)) + goto exit_err; + fields = kmalloc(sizeof(*fields) * rule->field_count, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!fields)) { + kfree(entry); + goto exit_err; + } + + memset(&entry->rule, 0, sizeof(struct audit_krule)); + memset(fields, 0, sizeof(struct audit_field)); + + entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; + entry->rule.listnr = listnr; + entry->rule.action = rule->action; + entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count; + entry->rule.fields = fields; + + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) + entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i]; + + return entry; + +exit_err: + return ERR_PTR(err); +} + +/* Translate struct audit_rule to kernel's rule respresentation. + * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */ +static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule) +{ + struct audit_entry *entry; + int err = 0; int i; - if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER - && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE - && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) - return -1; - if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) - return -1; - if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) - return -1; - - d->flags = s->flags; - d->action = s->action; - d->field_count = s->field_count; - for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) { - d->fields[i] = s->fields[i]; - d->values[i] = s->values[i]; + entry = audit_to_entry_common(rule); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) + goto exit_nofree; + + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i]; + + if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto exit_free; + } + + f->op = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS); + f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS); + f->val = rule->values[i]; + + entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1; + if (f->op & AUDIT_NEGATE) + f->op |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; + else if (!(f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS)) + f->op |= AUDIT_EQUAL; + f->op &= ~AUDIT_NEGATE; } - for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i]; - return 0; + +exit_nofree: + return entry; + +exit_free: + audit_free_rule(entry); + return ERR_PTR(err); } -/* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from - * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and - * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */ -static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) +/* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */ +static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, + size_t datasz) { + int err = 0; + struct audit_entry *entry; + void *bufp; + /* size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); */ int i; - if (a->flags != b->flags) - return 1; + entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) + goto exit_nofree; - if (a->action != b->action) - return 1; + bufp = data->buf; + entry->rule.vers_ops = 2; + for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i]; + + err = -EINVAL; + if (!(data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) || + data->fieldflags[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS) + goto exit_free; + + f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; + f->type = data->fields[i]; + switch(f->type) { + /* call type-specific conversion routines here */ + default: + f->val = data->values[i]; + } + } + +exit_nofree: + return entry; + +exit_free: + audit_free_rule(entry); + return ERR_PTR(err); +} + +/* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */ +static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, char *str) +{ + size_t len = strlen(str); + + memcpy(*bufp, str, len); + *bufp += len; + + return len; +} + +/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule. + * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */ +static struct audit_rule *audit_krule_to_rule(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + struct audit_rule *rule; + int i; + + rule = kmalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!rule)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + memset(rule, 0, sizeof(*rule)); + + rule->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr; + rule->action = krule->action; + rule->field_count = krule->field_count; + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + rule->values[i] = krule->fields[i].val; + rule->fields[i] = krule->fields[i].type; + + if (krule->vers_ops == 1) { + if (krule->fields[i].op & AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL) + rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NEGATE; + } else { + rule->fields[i] |= krule->fields[i].op; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) rule->mask[i] = krule->mask[i]; + + return rule; +} - if (a->field_count != b->field_count) +/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */ +static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + struct audit_rule_data *data; + void *bufp; + int i; + + data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!data)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); + + data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr; + data->action = krule->action; + data->field_count = krule->field_count; + bufp = data->buf; + for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i]; + + data->fields[i] = f->type; + data->fieldflags[i] = f->op; + switch(f->type) { + /* call type-specific conversion routines here */ + default: + data->values[i] = f->val; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i]; + + return data; +} + +/* Compare two rules in kernel format. Considered success if rules + * don't match. */ +static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) +{ + int i; + + if (a->flags != b->flags || + a->listnr != b->listnr || + a->action != b->action || + a->field_count != b->field_count) return 1; for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { - if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i] - || a->values[i] != b->values[i]) + if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type || + a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op) return 1; + + switch(a->fields[i].type) { + /* call type-specific comparison routines here */ + default: + if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val) + return 1; + } } for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) @@ -95,41 +322,21 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b) return 0; } -/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via - * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by +/* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. Protected by * audit_netlink_sem. */ -static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, +static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, struct list_head *list) { - struct audit_entry *entry; - int i; + struct audit_entry *e; /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only * addition routine. */ - list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) { - if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) + list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { + if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) return -EEXIST; } - for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) - return -EINVAL; - if ( rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE) - rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; - else if ( (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS) == 0 ) - rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_EQUAL; - rule->fields[i] &= ~AUDIT_NEGATE; - } - - if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL))) - return -ENOMEM; - if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) { - kfree(entry); - return -EINVAL; - } - if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) { - entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); } else { list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); @@ -138,16 +345,9 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, return 0; } -static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head) -{ - struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); - kfree(e); -} - -/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via - * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by +/* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. Protected by * audit_netlink_sem. */ -static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, +static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, struct list_head *list) { struct audit_entry *e; @@ -155,16 +355,18 @@ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule, /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only * deletion routine. */ list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) { - if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) { + if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) { list_del_rcu(&e->list); - call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule); + call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu); return 0; } } return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */ } -static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) +/* List rules using struct audit_rule. Exists for backward + * compatibility with userspace. */ +static int audit_list(void *_dest) { int pid, seq; int *dest = _dest; @@ -180,9 +382,16 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ for (i=0; irule); + if (unlikely(!rule)) + break; audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1, - &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule)); + rule, sizeof(*rule)); + kfree(rule); + } } audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0); @@ -190,6 +399,40 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) return 0; } +/* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */ +static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) +{ + int pid, seq; + int *dest = _dest; + struct audit_entry *e; + int i; + + pid = dest[0]; + seq = dest[1]; + kfree(dest); + + down(&audit_netlink_sem); + + /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are + always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ + for (i=0; irule); + if (unlikely(!data)) + break; + audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 0, 1, + data, sizeof(*data)); + kfree(data); + } + } + audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0); + + up(&audit_netlink_sem); + return 0; +} + /** * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type * @type: audit message type @@ -197,18 +440,20 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest) * @uid: target uid for netlink audit messages * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number * @data: payload data + * @datasz: size of payload data * @loginuid: loginuid of sender */ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, - uid_t loginuid) + size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid) { struct task_struct *tsk; int *dest; - int err = 0; - unsigned listnr; + int err = 0; + struct audit_entry *entry; switch (type) { case AUDIT_LIST: + case AUDIT_LIST_RULES: /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to @@ -221,41 +466,48 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, dest[0] = pid; dest[1] = seq; - tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules"); + if (type == AUDIT_LIST) + tsk = kthread_run(audit_list, dest, "audit_list"); + else + tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, + "audit_list_rules"); if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { kfree(dest); err = PTR_ERR(tsk); } break; case AUDIT_ADD: - listnr = ((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; - switch(listnr) { - default: - return -EINVAL; - - case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: - case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE: -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL - case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY: - case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT: - case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK: -#endif - ; - } - err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); + case AUDIT_ADD_RULE: + if (type == AUDIT_ADD) + entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data); + else + entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) + return PTR_ERR(entry); + + err = audit_add_rule(entry, + &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]); if (!err) audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); + else + audit_free_rule(entry); break; case AUDIT_DEL: - listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; - if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS) - return -EINVAL; - - err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]); + case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: + if (type == AUDIT_DEL) + entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data); + else + entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz); + if (IS_ERR(entry)) + return PTR_ERR(entry); + + err = audit_del_rule(entry, + &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]); if (!err) audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); + audit_free_rule(entry); break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -287,29 +539,27 @@ int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right) static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, - struct audit_rule *rule, + struct audit_krule *rule, enum audit_state *state) { int i; for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 value = rule->values[i]; + struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; int result = 0; - switch (field) { + switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_UID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_GID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(cb->loginuid, f->op, f->val); break; } @@ -354,14 +604,11 @@ int audit_filter_type(int type) list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE], list) { - struct audit_rule *rule = &e->rule; int i; - for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 value = rule->values[i]; - if ( field == AUDIT_MSGTYPE ) { - result = audit_comparator(type, op, value); + for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; + if (f->type == AUDIT_MSGTYPE) { + result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val); if (!result) break; } diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 17719b303638..ba0878854777 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -162,70 +162,68 @@ struct audit_context { /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 * otherwise. */ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct audit_rule *rule, + struct audit_krule *rule, struct audit_context *ctx, enum audit_state *state) { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 op = rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; - u32 value = rule->values[i]; + struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; int result = 0; - switch (field) { + switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_UID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_EUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FSUID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_GID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_EGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_FSGID: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_PERS: - result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_ARCH: if (ctx) - result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_EXIT: if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) - result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_SUCCESS: if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { - if (value) - result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); + if (f->val) + result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); else - result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); } break; case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) { + if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } @@ -235,7 +233,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), op, value)) { + if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } @@ -245,8 +243,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_INODE: if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, op, value) || - audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, op, value)) { + if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) || + audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } @@ -256,14 +254,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_LOGINUID: result = 0; if (ctx) - result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, op, value); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_ARG0: case AUDIT_ARG1: case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: if (ctx) - result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0], op, value); + result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); break; } diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index d7c0e912c5f3..73158244cf8c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = { AUDIT_LIST, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV }, { AUDIT_ADD, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { AUDIT_DEL, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { AUDIT_LIST_RULES, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV }, + { AUDIT_ADD_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { AUDIT_DEL_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY }, { AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5d3301088f7e412992d9e61cc3604cbdff3090ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve Grubb Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2006 09:48:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] add/remove rule update Hi, The following patch adds a little more information to the add/remove rule message emitted by the kernel. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 16 +++++++++------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 8a3b98175c25..d760430c8de3 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ struct audit_rule_data { __u32 flags; /* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */ __u32 action; /* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */ __u32 field_count; - __u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; + __u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; /* syscall(s) affected */ __u32 fields[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS]; __u32 values[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS]; __u32 fieldflags[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS]; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 686d514a3518..35f8fa82bb8b 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -487,10 +487,11 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]); - if (!err) - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid); - else + audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, + "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d\n", + loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err); + + if (err) audit_free_rule(entry); break; case AUDIT_DEL: @@ -504,9 +505,10 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, err = audit_del_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]); - if (!err) - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid); + audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, + "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d\n", + loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err); + audit_free_rule(entry); break; default: -- cgit v1.2.3 From a6c043a887a9db32a545539426ddfc8cc2c28f8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve Grubb Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2006 14:07:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records Hi, >From the RBAC specs: FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide the set of authorized RBAC administrators with the capability to read the following audit information from the audit records: (e) The User Session Identifier or Terminal Type A patch adding the tty for all syscalls is included in this email. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index ba0878854777..d3d499272d13 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "audit.h" @@ -573,6 +574,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) int i; struct audit_buffer *ab; struct audit_aux_data *aux; + const char *tty; ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL); if (!ab) @@ -585,11 +587,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", context->return_code); + if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name) + tty = current->signal->tty->name; + else + tty = "(none)"; audit_log_format(ab, " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" - " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u", + " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s", context->argv[0], context->argv[1], context->argv[2], @@ -600,7 +606,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) context->uid, context->gid, context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, - context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid); + context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty); audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask); audit_log_end(ab); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5bdb98868062c1b14025883049551af343233187 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steve Grubb Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2005 08:39:35 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] promiscuous mode Hi, When a network interface goes into promiscuous mode, its an important security issue. The attached patch is intended to capture that action and send an event to the audit system. The patch carves out a new block of numbers for kernel detected anomalies. These are events that may indicate suspicious activity. Other examples of potential kernel anomalies would be: exceeding disk quota, rlimit violations, changes to syscall entry table. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- include/linux/audit.h | 7 ++++++- net/core/dev.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index d760430c8de3..1c47c59058c1 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ * 1400 - 1499 SE Linux use * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events - * 1700 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events) + * 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records + * 1800 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events) * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy) * 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel) * 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records @@ -90,6 +91,10 @@ #define AUDIT_MAC_STATUS 1404 /* Changed enforcing,permissive,off */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE 1405 /* Changes to booleans */ +#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700 +#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799 +#define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS 1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */ + #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */ /* Rule flags */ diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 2afb0de95329..e9f84a66ce81 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ #include #endif /* CONFIG_NET_RADIO */ #include +#include /* * The list of packet types we will receive (as opposed to discard) @@ -2120,6 +2121,12 @@ void dev_set_promiscuity(struct net_device *dev, int inc) printk(KERN_INFO "device %s %s promiscuous mode\n", dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) ? "entered" : "left"); + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, + AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS, + "dev=%s prom=%d old_prom=%d auid=%u", + dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC), + (old_flags & IFF_PROMISC), + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d9d9ec6e2c45b22282cd36cf92fcb23d504350a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dustin Kirkland Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 13:40:01 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] Fix audit operators Darrel Goeddel initiated a discussion on IRC regarding the possibility of audit_comparator() returning -EINVAL signaling an invalid operator. It is possible when creating the rule to assure that the operator is one of the 6 sane values. Here's a snip from include/linux/audit.h Note that 0 (nonsense) and 7 (all operators) are not valid values for an operator. ... /* These are the supported operators. * 4 2 1 * = > < * ------- * 0 0 0 0 nonsense * 0 0 1 1 < * 0 1 0 2 > * 0 1 1 3 != * 1 0 0 4 = * 1 0 1 5 <= * 1 1 0 6 >= * 1 1 1 7 all operators */ ... Furthermore, prior to adding these extended operators, flagging the AUDIT_NEGATE bit implied !=, and otherwise == was assumed. The following code forces the operator to be != if the AUDIT_NEGATE bit was flipped on. And if no operator was specified, == is assumed. The only invalid condition is if the AUDIT_NEGATE bit is off and all of the AUDIT_EQUAL, AUDIT_LESS_THAN, and AUDIT_GREATER_THAN bits are on--clearly a nonsensical operator. Now that this is handled at rule insertion time, the default -EINVAL return of audit_comparator() is eliminated such that the function can only return 1 or 0. If this is acceptable, let's get this applied to the current tree. :-Dustin -- Signed-off-by: Al Viro (cherry picked from 9bf0a8e137040f87d1b563336d4194e38fb2ba1a commit) --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 35f8fa82bb8b..b85fd8cce11f 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -160,11 +160,17 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule) f->val = rule->values[i]; entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1; + + /* Support for legacy operators where + * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */ if (f->op & AUDIT_NEGATE) - f->op |= AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; - else if (!(f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS)) - f->op |= AUDIT_EQUAL; - f->op &= ~AUDIT_NEGATE; + f->op = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL; + else if (!f->op) + f->op = AUDIT_EQUAL; + else if (f->op == AUDIT_OPERATORS) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto exit_free; + } } exit_nofree: @@ -533,9 +539,9 @@ int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right) return (left > right); case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL: return (left >= right); - default: - return -EINVAL; } + BUG(); + return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4023e020807ea249ae83f0d1d851b4c7cf0afd8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 23:51:39 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking Simplify audit_free()'s locking: no need to lock a task that we are tearing down. [the extra locking also caused false positives in the lock validator] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index d3d499272d13..b613ec89e99c 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -704,10 +704,14 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct audit_context *context; - task_lock(tsk); + /* + * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free() + * then the task has no external references anymore, and + * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses + * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq + * contexts as well, via RCU.) + */ context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); - task_unlock(tsk); - if (likely(!context)) return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5a0bbce58bb25bd756f7ec437319d6ed2201a18b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2006 23:51:38 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem Semaphore to mutex conversion. The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated automatically via a script as well. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 6 +++--- kernel/audit.h | 3 ++- kernel/auditfilter.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 4eb97b62d7fa..6a44e0a7707d 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(audit_backlog_wait); /* The netlink socket is only to be read by 1 CPU, which lets us assume * that list additions and deletions never happen simultaneously in * auditsc.c */ -DECLARE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_sem); +DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_mutex); /* AUDIT_BUFSIZ is the size of the temporary buffer used for formatting * audit records. Since printk uses a 1024 byte buffer, this buffer @@ -538,14 +538,14 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sock *sk, int length) struct sk_buff *skb; unsigned int qlen; - down(&audit_netlink_sem); + mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex); for (qlen = skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_receive_queue); qlen; qlen--) { skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue); audit_receive_skb(skb); kfree_skb(skb); } - up(&audit_netlink_sem); + mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex); } diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 4b602cdcabef..bc5392076e2b 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA */ +#include #include #include @@ -84,4 +85,4 @@ extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, void *payload, int size); extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); extern void audit_panic(const char *message); -extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem; +extern struct mutex audit_netlink_mutex; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index b85fd8cce11f..d3a8539f3a83 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) } /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. Protected by - * audit_netlink_sem. */ + * audit_netlink_mutex. */ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, struct list_head *list) { @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, } /* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. Protected by - * audit_netlink_sem. */ + * audit_netlink_mutex. */ static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, struct list_head *list) { @@ -383,10 +383,10 @@ static int audit_list(void *_dest) seq = dest[1]; kfree(dest); - down(&audit_netlink_sem); + mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex); /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are - always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ + always called with audit_netlink_mutex held. */ for (i=0; i Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2006 00:33:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hi, This is a trivial patch that enables the possibility of using some auditing functions within loadable kernel modules (ie. inside a Linux Security Module). _ Make the audit_log_start, audit_log_end, audit_format and audit_log interfaces available to Loadable Kernel Modules, thus making possible the usage of the audit framework inside LSMs, etc. Signed-off-by: > Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 6a44e0a7707d..c9345d3e8ada 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -994,3 +994,8 @@ void audit_log(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type, audit_log_end(ab); } } + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_start); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_end); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_format); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 71e1c784b24a026a490b3de01541fc5ee14ebc09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amy Griffis Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2006 22:40:05 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path Make audit_init() failure path handle situations where the audit_panic() action is not AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC (default is AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK). Other uses of audit_sock are not reached unless audit's netlink message handler is properly registered. Bug noticed by Peter Staubach. Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- kernel/audit.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index c9345d3e8ada..04fe2e301b61 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -558,8 +558,9 @@ static int __init audit_init(void) THIS_MODULE); if (!audit_sock) audit_panic("cannot initialize netlink socket"); + else + audit_sock->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; - audit_sock->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_queue); audit_initialized = 1; audit_enabled = audit_default; -- cgit v1.2.3