From 4f0753e708c2e07f6e9bc1adfa73138e8ab0ee5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Kepplinger Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 11:10:53 +0100 Subject: security: replace FSF address with web source in license notices A few years ago the FSF moved and "59 Temple Place" is wrong. Having this still in our source files feels old and unmaintained. Let's take the license statement serious and not confuse users. As https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-howto.html suggests, we replace the postal address with "" in the security directory. Signed-off-by: Martin Kepplinger Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 3 +-- security/selinux/netlabel.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h index 75686d53df07..e77a5e307955 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h @@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ * the GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + * along with this program. If not, see . * */ diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index aaba6677ee2e..2c297b995b16 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ * the GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + * along with this program. If not, see . * */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From ef28df55ac27e1e5cd122e19fa311d886d47a756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 18:51:12 -0500 Subject: selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core() The syzbot/syzkaller automated tests found a problem in security_context_to_sid_core() during early boot (before we load the SELinux policy) where we could potentially feed context strings without NUL terminators into the strcmp() function. We already guard against this during normal operation (after the SELinux policy has been loaded) by making a copy of the context strings and explicitly adding a NUL terminator to the end. The patch extends this protection to the early boot case (no loaded policy) by moving the context copy earlier in security_context_to_sid_core(). Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Reviewed-By: William Roberts --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 ++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 33cfe5d3d6cb..d05496deb229 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1413,27 +1413,25 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, if (!scontext_len) return -EINVAL; + /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */ + scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags); + if (!scontext2) + return -ENOMEM; + if (!ss_initialized) { int i; for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { - if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) { + if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) { *sid = i; - return 0; + goto out; } } *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; - return 0; + goto out; } *sid = SECSID_NULL; - /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */ - scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags); - if (!scontext2) - return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len); - scontext2[scontext_len] = 0; - if (force) { /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */ rc = -ENOMEM; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4b14752ec4e0d87126e636384cf37c8dd9df157c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 17:17:43 -0500 Subject: selinux: skip bounded transition processing if the policy isn't loaded We can't do anything reasonable in security_bounded_transition() if we don't have a policy loaded, and in fact we could run into problems with some of the code inside expecting a policy. Fix these problems like we do many others in security/selinux/ss/services.c by checking to see if the policy is loaded (ss_initialized) and returning quickly if it isn't. Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Reviewed-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index d05496deb229..8900ea5cbabf 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -867,6 +867,9 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) int index; int rc; + if (!ss_initialized) + return 0; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); rc = -EINVAL; -- cgit v1.2.3