// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks * * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI * Copyright © 2021-2022 Microsoft Corporation * Copyright © 2022 Günther Noack * Copyright © 2023-2024 Google LLC */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "common.h" #include "cred.h" #include "fs.h" #include "limits.h" #include "object.h" #include "ruleset.h" #include "setup.h" /* Underlying object management */ static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object) __releases(object->lock) { struct inode *const inode = object->underobj; struct super_block *sb; if (!inode) { spin_unlock(&object->lock); return; } /* * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference * to the underlying inode. */ object->underobj = NULL; /* * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted, * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput(). */ sb = inode->i_sb; atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); spin_unlock(&object->lock); /* * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. It is therefore * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. */ rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); /* * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object(). */ iput(inode); if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)) wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); } static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = { .release = release_inode }; /* IOCTL helpers */ /** * is_masked_device_ioctl - Determine whether an IOCTL command is always * permitted with Landlock for device files. These commands can not be * restricted on device files by enforcing a Landlock policy. * * @cmd: The IOCTL command that is supposed to be run. * * By default, any IOCTL on a device file requires the * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right. However, we blanket-permit some * commands, if: * * 1. The command is implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl(), * not in f_ops->unlocked_ioctl() or f_ops->compat_ioctl(). * * 2. The command is harmless when invoked on devices. * * We also permit commands that do not make sense for devices, but where the * do_vfs_ioctl() implementation returns a more conventional error code. * * Any new IOCTL commands that are implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl() * should be considered for inclusion here. * * Returns: true if the IOCTL @cmd can not be restricted with Landlock for * device files. */ static __attribute_const__ bool is_masked_device_ioctl(const unsigned int cmd) { switch (cmd) { /* * FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC manipulate the FD's * close-on-exec and the file's buffered-IO and async flags. These * operations are also available through fcntl(2), and are * unconditionally permitted in Landlock. */ case FIOCLEX: case FIONCLEX: case FIONBIO: case FIOASYNC: /* * FIOQSIZE queries the size of a regular file, directory, or link. * * We still permit it, because it always returns -ENOTTY for * other file types. */ case FIOQSIZE: /* * FIFREEZE and FITHAW freeze and thaw the file system which the * given file belongs to. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN. * * These commands operate on the file system's superblock rather * than on the file itself. The same operations can also be * done through any other file or directory on the same file * system, so it is safe to permit these. */ case FIFREEZE: case FITHAW: /* * FS_IOC_FIEMAP queries information about the allocation of * blocks within a file. * * This IOCTL command only makes sense for regular files and is * not implemented by devices. It is harmless to permit. */ case FS_IOC_FIEMAP: /* * FIGETBSZ queries the file system's block size for a file or * directory. * * This command operates on the file system's superblock rather * than on the file itself. The same operation can also be done * through any other file or directory on the same file system, * so it is safe to permit it. */ case FIGETBSZ: /* * FICLONE, FICLONERANGE and FIDEDUPERANGE make files share * their underlying storage ("reflink") between source and * destination FDs, on file systems which support that. * * These IOCTL commands only apply to regular files * and are harmless to permit for device files. */ case FICLONE: case FICLONERANGE: case FIDEDUPERANGE: /* * FS_IOC_GETFSUUID and FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH both operate on * the file system superblock, not on the specific file, so * these operations are available through any other file on the * same file system as well. */ case FS_IOC_GETFSUUID: case FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH: return true; /* * FIONREAD, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS, FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and * FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR are forwarded to device implementations. */ /* * file_ioctl() commands (FIBMAP, FS_IOC_RESVSP, FS_IOC_RESVSP64, * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64 and FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE) are * forwarded to device implementations, so not permitted. */ /* Other commands are guarded by the access right. */ default: return false; } } /* * is_masked_device_ioctl_compat - same as the helper above, but checking the * "compat" IOCTL commands. * * The IOCTL commands with special handling in compat-mode should behave the * same as their non-compat counterparts. */ static __attribute_const__ bool is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(const unsigned int cmd) { switch (cmd) { /* FICLONE is permitted, same as in the non-compat variant. */ case FICLONE: return true; #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) /* * FS_IOC_RESVSP_32, FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32, * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32: not blanket-permitted, * for consistency with their non-compat variants. */ case FS_IOC_RESVSP_32: case FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32: case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32: case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32: case FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32: #endif /* * FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS are forwarded to their device * implementations. */ case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS: case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS: return false; default: return is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd); } } /* Ruleset management */ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode) { struct landlock_object *object, *new_object; struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode); rcu_read_lock(); retry: object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object); if (object) { if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) { rcu_read_unlock(); return object; } /* * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going * away. Wait for release_inode(), then retry. */ spin_lock(&object->lock); spin_unlock(&object->lock); goto retry; } rcu_read_unlock(); /* * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without * holding any locks). */ new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode); if (IS_ERR(new_object)) return new_object; /* * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or * hook_sb_delete(). */ spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) { /* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */ spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); kfree(new_object); rcu_read_lock(); goto retry; } /* * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the * related object. */ ihold(inode); rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object); spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); return new_object; } /* All access rights that can be tied to files. */ /* clang-format off */ #define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV) /* clang-format on */ /* * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd(). */ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, const struct path *const path, access_mask_t access_rights) { int err; struct landlock_id id = { .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE, }; /* Files only get access rights that make sense. */ if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) && (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) != ACCESS_FILE) return -EINVAL; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1)) return -EINVAL; /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0); id.key.object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)); if (IS_ERR(id.key.object)) return PTR_ERR(id.key.object); mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights); mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); /* * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule() * increments the refcount for the new object if needed. */ landlock_put_object(id.key.object); return err; } /* Access-control management */ /* * The lifetime of the returned rule is tied to @domain. * * Returns NULL if no rule is found or if @dentry is negative. */ static const struct landlock_rule * find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const struct dentry *const dentry) { const struct landlock_rule *rule; const struct inode *inode; struct landlock_id id = { .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE, }; /* Ignores nonexistent leafs. */ if (d_is_negative(dentry)) return NULL; inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); rcu_read_lock(); id.key.object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object); rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id); rcu_read_unlock(); return rule; } /* * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g. * sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through * /proc//fd/ */ static bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry) { return (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || (d_is_positive(dentry) && unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))); } static access_mask_t get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain) { access_mask_t access_dom = 0; size_t layer_level; for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++) access_dom |= landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level); return access_dom; } static access_mask_t get_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain) { /* Handles all initially denied by default access rights. */ return get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(domain) | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED; } static const struct landlock_ruleset * get_fs_domain(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain) { if (!domain || !get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(domain)) return NULL; return domain; } static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_fs_domain(void) { return get_fs_domain(landlock_get_current_domain()); } /* * Check that a destination file hierarchy has more restrictions than a source * file hierarchy. This is only used for link and rename actions. * * @layer_masks_child2: Optional child masks. */ static bool no_more_access( const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_parent1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_child1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], const bool child1_is_directory, const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_parent2)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_child2)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], const bool child2_is_directory) { unsigned long access_bit; for (access_bit = 0; access_bit < ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent2); access_bit++) { /* Ignores accesses that only make sense for directories. */ const bool is_file_access = !!(BIT_ULL(access_bit) & ACCESS_FILE); if (child1_is_directory || is_file_access) { /* * Checks if the destination restrictions are a * superset of the source ones (i.e. inherited access * rights without child exceptions): * restrictions(parent2) >= restrictions(child1) */ if ((((*layer_masks_parent1)[access_bit] & (*layer_masks_child1)[access_bit]) | (*layer_masks_parent2)[access_bit]) != (*layer_masks_parent2)[access_bit]) return false; } if (!layer_masks_child2) continue; if (child2_is_directory || is_file_access) { /* * Checks inverted restrictions for RENAME_EXCHANGE: * restrictions(parent1) >= restrictions(child2) */ if ((((*layer_masks_parent2)[access_bit] & (*layer_masks_child2)[access_bit]) | (*layer_masks_parent1)[access_bit]) != (*layer_masks_parent1)[access_bit]) return false; } } return true; } #define NMA_TRUE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, no_more_access(__VA_ARGS__)) #define NMA_FALSE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, no_more_access(__VA_ARGS__)) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST static void test_no_more_access(struct kunit *const test) { const layer_mask_t rx0[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0), [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)] = BIT_ULL(0), }; const layer_mask_t mx0[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0), [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG)] = BIT_ULL(0), }; const layer_mask_t x0[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0), }; const layer_mask_t x1[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(1), }; const layer_mask_t x01[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0) | BIT_ULL(1), }; const layer_mask_t allows_all[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {}; /* Checks without restriction. */ NMA_TRUE(&x0, &allows_all, false, &allows_all, NULL, false); NMA_TRUE(&allows_all, &x0, false, &allows_all, NULL, false); NMA_FALSE(&x0, &x0, false, &allows_all, NULL, false); /* * Checks that we can only refer a file if no more access could be * inherited. */ NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x0, false, &rx0, NULL, false); NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, NULL, false); NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, NULL, false); NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x1, NULL, false); /* Checks allowed referring with different nested domains. */ NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x1, false, &x0, NULL, false); NMA_TRUE(&x1, &x0, false, &x0, NULL, false); NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x01, false, &x0, NULL, false); NMA_TRUE(&x0, &x01, false, &rx0, NULL, false); NMA_TRUE(&x01, &x0, false, &x0, NULL, false); NMA_TRUE(&x01, &x0, false, &rx0, NULL, false); NMA_FALSE(&x01, &x01, false, &x0, NULL, false); /* Checks that file access rights are also enforced for a directory. */ NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, true, &x0, NULL, false); /* Checks that directory access rights don't impact file referring... */ NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, NULL, false); /* ...but only directory referring. */ NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, NULL, false); /* Checks directory exchange. */ NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &mx0, &mx0, true); NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &mx0, &x0, true); NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, &mx0, true); NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x0, &x0, true); NMA_FALSE(&mx0, &mx0, true, &x1, &x1, true); /* Checks file exchange with directory access rights... */ NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &mx0, &mx0, false); NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &mx0, &x0, false); NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, &mx0, false); NMA_TRUE(&mx0, &mx0, false, &x0, &x0, false); /* ...and with file access rights. */ NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, &rx0, false); NMA_TRUE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &rx0, &x0, false); NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, &rx0, false); NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x0, &x0, false); NMA_FALSE(&rx0, &rx0, false, &x1, &x1, false); /* * Allowing the following requests should not be a security risk * because domain 0 denies execute access, and domain 1 is always * nested with domain 0. However, adding an exception for this case * would mean to check all nested domains to make sure none can get * more privileges (e.g. processes only sandboxed by domain 0). * Moreover, this behavior (i.e. composition of N domains) could then * be inconsistent compared to domain 1's ruleset alone (e.g. it might * be denied to link/rename with domain 1's ruleset, whereas it would * be allowed if nested on top of domain 0). Another drawback would be * to create a cover channel that could enable sandboxed processes to * infer most of the filesystem restrictions from their domain. To * make it simple, efficient, safe, and more consistent, this case is * always denied. */ NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, NULL, false); NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &rx0, NULL, false); NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, NULL, false); NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &rx0, NULL, false); /* Checks the same case of exclusive domains with a file... */ NMA_TRUE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, NULL, false); NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, &x0, false); NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x01, &x01, false); NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, &x0, false); /* ...and with a directory. */ NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, false, &x0, &x0, true); NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, &x0, false); NMA_FALSE(&x1, &x1, true, &x0, &x0, true); } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */ #undef NMA_TRUE #undef NMA_FALSE /* * Removes @layer_masks accesses that are not requested. * * Returns true if the request is allowed, false otherwise. */ static bool scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request, layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS]) { const unsigned long access_req = access_request; unsigned long access_bit; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!layer_masks)) return true; for_each_clear_bit(access_bit, &access_req, ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) (*layer_masks)[access_bit] = 0; return !memchr_inv(layer_masks, 0, sizeof(*layer_masks)); } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST static void test_scope_to_request_with_exec_none(struct kunit *const test) { /* Allows everything. */ layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {}; /* Checks and scopes with execute. */ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, scope_to_request(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, &layer_masks)); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)]); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)]); } static void test_scope_to_request_with_exec_some(struct kunit *const test) { /* Denies execute and write. */ layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0), [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = BIT_ULL(1), }; /* Checks and scopes with execute. */ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, scope_to_request(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, &layer_masks)); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, BIT_ULL(0), layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)]); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)]); } static void test_scope_to_request_without_access(struct kunit *const test) { /* Denies execute and write. */ layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0), [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = BIT_ULL(1), }; /* Checks and scopes without access request. */ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, scope_to_request(0, &layer_masks)); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)]); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0, layer_masks[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)]); } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */ /* * Returns true if there is at least one access right different than * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER. */ static bool is_eacces(const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], const access_mask_t access_request) { unsigned long access_bit; /* LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER alone must return -EXDEV. */ const unsigned long access_check = access_request & ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; if (!layer_masks) return false; for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_check, ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) { if ((*layer_masks)[access_bit]) return true; } return false; } #define IE_TRUE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, is_eacces(__VA_ARGS__)) #define IE_FALSE(...) KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, is_eacces(__VA_ARGS__)) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST static void test_is_eacces_with_none(struct kunit *const test) { const layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {}; IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, 0); IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER); IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE); IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE); } static void test_is_eacces_with_refer(struct kunit *const test) { const layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)] = BIT_ULL(0), }; IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, 0); IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER); IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE); IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE); } static void test_is_eacces_with_write(struct kunit *const test) { const layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = { [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE)] = BIT_ULL(0), }; IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, 0); IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER); IE_FALSE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE); IE_TRUE(&layer_masks, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE); } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */ #undef IE_TRUE #undef IE_FALSE /** * is_access_to_paths_allowed - Check accesses for requests with a common path * * @domain: Domain to check against. * @path: File hierarchy to walk through. * @access_request_parent1: Accesses to check, once @layer_masks_parent1 is * equal to @layer_masks_parent2 (if any). This is tied to the unique * requested path for most actions, or the source in case of a refer action * (i.e. rename or link), or the source and destination in case of * RENAME_EXCHANGE. * @layer_masks_parent1: Pointer to a matrix of layer masks per access * masks, identifying the layers that forbid a specific access. Bits from * this matrix can be unset according to the @path walk. An empty matrix * means that @domain allows all possible Landlock accesses (i.e. not only * those identified by @access_request_parent1). This matrix can * initially refer to domain layer masks and, when the accesses for the * destination and source are the same, to requested layer masks. * @dentry_child1: Dentry to the initial child of the parent1 path. This * pointer must be NULL for non-refer actions (i.e. not link nor rename). * @access_request_parent2: Similar to @access_request_parent1 but for a * request involving a source and a destination. This refers to the * destination, except in case of RENAME_EXCHANGE where it also refers to * the source. Must be set to 0 when using a simple path request. * @layer_masks_parent2: Similar to @layer_masks_parent1 but for a refer * action. This must be NULL otherwise. * @dentry_child2: Dentry to the initial child of the parent2 path. This * pointer is only set for RENAME_EXCHANGE actions and must be NULL * otherwise. * * This helper first checks that the destination has a superset of restrictions * compared to the source (if any) for a common path. Because of * RENAME_EXCHANGE actions, source and destinations may be swapped. It then * checks that the collected accesses and the remaining ones are enough to * allow the request. * * Returns: * - true if the access request is granted; * - false otherwise. */ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed( const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const struct path *const path, const access_mask_t access_request_parent1, layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_parent1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], const struct dentry *const dentry_child1, const access_mask_t access_request_parent2, layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_parent2)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], const struct dentry *const dentry_child2) { bool allowed_parent1 = false, allowed_parent2 = false, is_dom_check, child1_is_directory = true, child2_is_directory = true; struct path walker_path; access_mask_t access_masked_parent1, access_masked_parent2; layer_mask_t _layer_masks_child1[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], _layer_masks_child2[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS]; layer_mask_t(*layer_masks_child1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = NULL, (*layer_masks_child2)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = NULL; if (!access_request_parent1 && !access_request_parent2) return true; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path)) return true; if (is_nouser_or_private(path->dentry)) return true; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1 || !layer_masks_parent1)) return false; if (unlikely(layer_masks_parent2)) { if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dentry_child1)) return false; /* * For a double request, first check for potential privilege * escalation by looking at domain handled accesses (which are * a superset of the meaningful requested accesses). */ access_masked_parent1 = access_masked_parent2 = get_handled_fs_accesses(domain); is_dom_check = true; } else { if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry_child1 || dentry_child2)) return false; /* For a simple request, only check for requested accesses. */ access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1; access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2; is_dom_check = false; } if (unlikely(dentry_child1)) { landlock_unmask_layers( find_rule(domain, dentry_child1), landlock_init_layer_masks( domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS, &_layer_masks_child1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE), &_layer_masks_child1, ARRAY_SIZE(_layer_masks_child1)); layer_masks_child1 = &_layer_masks_child1; child1_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child1); } if (unlikely(dentry_child2)) { landlock_unmask_layers( find_rule(domain, dentry_child2), landlock_init_layer_masks( domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS, &_layer_masks_child2, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE), &_layer_masks_child2, ARRAY_SIZE(_layer_masks_child2)); layer_masks_child2 = &_layer_masks_child2; child2_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child2); } walker_path = *path; path_get(&walker_path); /* * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant * restriction. */ while (true) { struct dentry *parent_dentry; const struct landlock_rule *rule; /* * If at least all accesses allowed on the destination are * already allowed on the source, respectively if there is at * least as much as restrictions on the destination than on the * source, then we can safely refer files from the source to * the destination without risking a privilege escalation. * This also applies in the case of RENAME_EXCHANGE, which * implies checks on both direction. This is crucial for * standalone multilayered security policies. Furthermore, * this helps avoid policy writers to shoot themselves in the * foot. */ if (unlikely(is_dom_check && no_more_access( layer_masks_parent1, layer_masks_child1, child1_is_directory, layer_masks_parent2, layer_masks_child2, child2_is_directory))) { allowed_parent1 = scope_to_request( access_request_parent1, layer_masks_parent1); allowed_parent2 = scope_to_request( access_request_parent2, layer_masks_parent2); /* Stops when all accesses are granted. */ if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2) break; /* * Now, downgrades the remaining checks from domain * handled accesses to requested accesses. */ is_dom_check = false; access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1; access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2; } rule = find_rule(domain, walker_path.dentry); allowed_parent1 = landlock_unmask_layers( rule, access_masked_parent1, layer_masks_parent1, ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent1)); allowed_parent2 = landlock_unmask_layers( rule, access_masked_parent2, layer_masks_parent2, ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent2)); /* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */ if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2) break; jump_up: if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) { if (follow_up(&walker_path)) { /* Ignores hidden mount points. */ goto jump_up; } else { /* * Stops at the real root. Denies access * because not all layers have granted access. */ break; } } if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) { /* * Stops at disconnected root directories. Only allows * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is * reachable through /proc//ns/). */ allowed_parent1 = allowed_parent2 = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL); break; } parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry); dput(walker_path.dentry); walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry; } path_put(&walker_path); return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2; } static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const struct path *const path, access_mask_t access_request) { layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {}; access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks( domain, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE); if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(domain, path, access_request, &layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) return 0; return -EACCES; } static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path, const access_mask_t access_request) { const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain(); if (!dom) return 0; return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request); } static access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode) { switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFLNK: return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM; case 0: /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */ case S_IFREG: return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG; case S_IFDIR: return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR; case S_IFCHR: return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR; case S_IFBLK: return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK; case S_IFIFO: return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO; case S_IFSOCK: return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK; default: WARN_ON_ONCE(1); return 0; } } static access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry) { if (d_is_negative(dentry)) return 0; return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR : LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE; } /** * collect_domain_accesses - Walk through a file path and collect accesses * * @domain: Domain to check against. * @mnt_root: Last directory to check. * @dir: Directory to start the walk from. * @layer_masks_dom: Where to store the collected accesses. * * This helper is useful to begin a path walk from the @dir directory to a * @mnt_root directory used as a mount point. This mount point is the common * ancestor between the source and the destination of a renamed and linked * file. While walking from @dir to @mnt_root, we record all the domain's * allowed accesses in @layer_masks_dom. * * This is similar to is_access_to_paths_allowed() but much simpler because it * only handles walking on the same mount point and only checks one set of * accesses. * * Returns: * - true if all the domain access rights are allowed for @dir; * - false if the walk reached @mnt_root. */ static bool collect_domain_accesses( const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const struct dentry *const mnt_root, struct dentry *dir, layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_dom)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS]) { unsigned long access_dom; bool ret = false; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !mnt_root || !dir || !layer_masks_dom)) return true; if (is_nouser_or_private(dir)) return true; access_dom = landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS, layer_masks_dom, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE); dget(dir); while (true) { struct dentry *parent_dentry; /* Gets all layers allowing all domain accesses. */ if (landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dir), access_dom, layer_masks_dom, ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_dom))) { /* * Stops when all handled accesses are allowed by at * least one rule in each layer. */ ret = true; break; } /* We should not reach a root other than @mnt_root. */ if (dir == mnt_root || WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ROOT(dir))) break; parent_dentry = dget_parent(dir); dput(dir); dir = parent_dentry; } dput(dir); return ret; } /** * current_check_refer_path - Check if a rename or link action is allowed * * @old_dentry: File or directory requested to be moved or linked. * @new_dir: Destination parent directory. * @new_dentry: Destination file or directory. * @removable: Sets to true if it is a rename operation. * @exchange: Sets to true if it is a rename operation with RENAME_EXCHANGE. * * Because of its unprivileged constraints, Landlock relies on file hierarchies * (and not only inodes) to tie access rights to files. Being able to link or * rename a file hierarchy brings some challenges. Indeed, moving or linking a * file (i.e. creating a new reference to an inode) can have an impact on the * actions allowed for a set of files if it would change its parent directory * (i.e. reparenting). * * To avoid trivial access right bypasses, Landlock first checks if the file or * directory requested to be moved would gain new access rights inherited from * its new hierarchy. Before returning any error, Landlock then checks that * the parent source hierarchy and the destination hierarchy would allow the * link or rename action. If it is not the case, an error with EACCES is * returned to inform user space that there is no way to remove or create the * requested source file type. If it should be allowed but the new inherited * access rights would be greater than the source access rights, then the * kernel returns an error with EXDEV. Prioritizing EACCES over EXDEV enables * user space to abort the whole operation if there is no way to do it, or to * manually copy the source to the destination if this remains allowed, e.g. * because file creation is allowed on the destination directory but not direct * linking. * * To achieve this goal, the kernel needs to compare two file hierarchies: the * one identifying the source file or directory (including itself), and the * destination one. This can be seen as a multilayer partial ordering problem. * The kernel walks through these paths and collects in a matrix the access * rights that are denied per layer. These matrices are then compared to see * if the destination one has more (or the same) restrictions as the source * one. If this is the case, the requested action will not return EXDEV, which * doesn't mean the action is allowed. The parent hierarchy of the source * (i.e. parent directory), and the destination hierarchy must also be checked * to verify that they explicitly allow such action (i.e. referencing, * creation and potentially removal rights). The kernel implementation is then * required to rely on potentially four matrices of access rights: one for the * source file or directory (i.e. the child), a potentially other one for the * other source/destination (in case of RENAME_EXCHANGE), one for the source * parent hierarchy and a last one for the destination hierarchy. These * ephemeral matrices take some space on the stack, which limits the number of * layers to a deemed reasonable number: 16. * * Returns: * - 0 if access is allowed; * - -EXDEV if @old_dentry would inherit new access rights from @new_dir; * - -EACCES if file removal or creation is denied. */ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry, const struct path *const new_dir, struct dentry *const new_dentry, const bool removable, const bool exchange) { const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain(); bool allow_parent1, allow_parent2; access_mask_t access_request_parent1, access_request_parent2; struct path mnt_dir; struct dentry *old_parent; layer_mask_t layer_masks_parent1[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {}, layer_masks_parent2[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {}; if (!dom) return 0; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1)) return -EACCES; if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) return -ENOENT; if (exchange) { if (unlikely(d_is_negative(new_dentry))) return -ENOENT; access_request_parent1 = get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode); } else { access_request_parent1 = 0; } access_request_parent2 = get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode); if (removable) { access_request_parent1 |= maybe_remove(old_dentry); access_request_parent2 |= maybe_remove(new_dentry); } /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ if (old_dentry->d_parent == new_dir->dentry) { /* * The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right is not required * for same-directory referer (i.e. no reparenting). */ access_request_parent1 = landlock_init_layer_masks( dom, access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE); if (is_access_to_paths_allowed( dom, new_dir, access_request_parent1, &layer_masks_parent1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) return 0; return -EACCES; } access_request_parent1 |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; access_request_parent2 |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; /* Saves the common mount point. */ mnt_dir.mnt = new_dir->mnt; mnt_dir.dentry = new_dir->mnt->mnt_root; /* * old_dentry may be the root of the common mount point and * !IS_ROOT(old_dentry) at the same time (e.g. with open_tree() and * OPEN_TREE_CLONE). We do not need to call dget(old_parent) because * we keep a reference to old_dentry. */ old_parent = (old_dentry == mnt_dir.dentry) ? old_dentry : old_dentry->d_parent; /* new_dir->dentry is equal to new_dentry->d_parent */ allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(dom, mnt_dir.dentry, old_parent, &layer_masks_parent1); allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses( dom, mnt_dir.dentry, new_dir->dentry, &layer_masks_parent2); if (allow_parent1 && allow_parent2) return 0; /* * To be able to compare source and destination domain access rights, * take into account the @old_dentry access rights aggregated with its * parent access rights. This will be useful to compare with the * destination parent access rights. */ if (is_access_to_paths_allowed( dom, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1, &layer_masks_parent1, old_dentry, access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent2, exchange ? new_dentry : NULL)) return 0; /* * This prioritizes EACCES over EXDEV for all actions, including * renames with RENAME_EXCHANGE. */ if (likely(is_eacces(&layer_masks_parent1, access_request_parent1) || is_eacces(&layer_masks_parent2, access_request_parent2))) return -EACCES; /* * Gracefully forbids reparenting if the destination directory * hierarchy is not a superset of restrictions of the source directory * hierarchy, or if LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is not allowed by the * source or the destination. */ return -EXDEV; } /* Inode hooks */ static void hook_inode_free_security_rcu(void *inode_security) { struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec; /* * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete(). */ inode_sec = inode_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode; WARN_ON_ONCE(inode_sec->object); } /* Super-block hooks */ /* * Release the inodes used in a security policy. * * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes() */ static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) { struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL; if (!landlock_initialized) return; spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) { struct landlock_object *object; /* Only handles referenced inodes. */ if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) continue; /* * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g. * from get_inode_object()). */ spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); /* * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE to protect against a race * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object. Also * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object. */ if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } rcu_read_lock(); object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object); if (!object) { rcu_read_unlock(); spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } /* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */ __iget(inode); spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); /* * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we * will just wait for it to finish. */ spin_lock(&object->lock); if (object->underobj == inode) { object->underobj = NULL; spin_unlock(&object->lock); rcu_read_unlock(); /* * Because object->underobj was not NULL, * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee * that it is safe to reset * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. */ rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); /* * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop * walk. Therefore the following call to iput() will * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at * least two references to it. */ iput(inode); } else { spin_unlock(&object->lock); rcu_read_unlock(); } if (prev_inode) { /* * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference * that we just set in this loop walk. Therefore we * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't * disappear from under us until the next loop walk. */ spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); /* * We can now actually put the inode reference from the * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore. */ iput(prev_inode); cond_resched(); spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); } prev_inode = inode; } spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); /* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */ if (prev_inode) iput(prev_inode); /* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */ wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs, !atomic_long_read(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)); } /* * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files * not previously allowed. * * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked * processes. Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide * access-control security policy. * * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process. Indeed, we could * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point. * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically * inherit these new constraints. Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons, * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag). */ static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name, const struct path *const path, const char *const type, const unsigned long flags, void *const data) { if (!get_current_fs_domain()) return 0; return -EPERM; } static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path, const struct path *const to_path) { if (!get_current_fs_domain()) return 0; return -EPERM; } /* * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden. */ static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags) { if (!get_current_fs_domain()) return 0; return -EPERM; } static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts) { if (!get_current_fs_domain()) return 0; return -EPERM; } /* * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace. It must * then be forbidden for a landlocked process. * * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root * directory of the current process. Moreover, it can be used to restrict the * view of the filesystem. */ static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path, const struct path *const new_path) { if (!get_current_fs_domain()) return 0; return -EPERM; } /* Path hooks */ static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry, const struct path *const new_dir, struct dentry *const new_dentry) { return current_check_refer_path(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, false, false); } static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir, struct dentry *const old_dentry, const struct path *const new_dir, struct dentry *const new_dentry, const unsigned int flags) { /* old_dir refers to old_dentry->d_parent and new_dir->mnt */ return current_check_refer_path(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry, true, !!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE)); } static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir, struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode) { return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR); } static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir, struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode, const unsigned int dev) { const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain(); if (!dom) return 0; return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode)); } static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir, struct dentry *const dentry, const char *const old_name) { return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM); } static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir, struct dentry *const dentry) { return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE); } static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir, struct dentry *const dentry) { return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR); } static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path) { return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE); } /* File hooks */ /** * get_required_file_open_access - Get access needed to open a file * * @file: File being opened. * * Returns the access rights that are required for opening the given file, * depending on the file type and open mode. */ static access_mask_t get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file) { access_mask_t access = 0; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { /* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */ if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE; } if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE; /* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */ if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE; return access; } static int hook_file_alloc_security(struct file *const file) { /* * Grants all access rights, even if most of them are not checked later * on. It is more consistent. * * Notably, file descriptors for regular files can also be acquired * without going through the file_open hook, for example when using * memfd_create(2). */ landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS; return 0; } static bool is_device(const struct file *const file) { const struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); return S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode); } static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file) { layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {}; access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access, optional_access; const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_fs_domain(landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain); if (!dom) return 0; /* * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_required_file_open_access() * may return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock * evolution. */ open_access_request = get_required_file_open_access(file); /* * We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so * that we can later authorize operations on opened files. */ optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; if (is_device(file)) optional_access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV; full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access; if (is_access_to_paths_allowed( dom, &file->f_path, landlock_init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE), &layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) { allowed_access = full_access_request; } else { unsigned long access_bit; const unsigned long access_req = full_access_request; /* * Calculate the actual allowed access rights from layer_masks. * Add each access right to allowed_access which has not been * vetoed by any layer. */ allowed_access = 0; for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req, ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)) { if (!layer_masks[access_bit]) allowed_access |= BIT_ULL(access_bit); } } /* * For operations on already opened files (i.e. ftruncate()), it is the * access rights at the time of open() which decide whether the * operation is permitted. Therefore, we record the relevant subset of * file access rights in the opened struct file. */ landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access; if ((open_access_request & allowed_access) == open_access_request) return 0; return -EACCES; } static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file) { /* * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write * and execute operations. * * Note: For checks done based on the file's Landlock allowed access, we * enforce them independently of whether the current thread is in a * Landlock domain, so that open files passed between independent * processes retain their behaviour. */ if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) return 0; return -EACCES; } static int hook_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access; /* * It is the access rights at the time of opening the file which * determine whether IOCTL can be used on the opened file later. * * The access right is attached to the opened file in hook_file_open(). */ if (allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV) return 0; if (!is_device(file)) return 0; if (is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd)) return 0; return -EACCES; } static int hook_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access; /* * It is the access rights at the time of opening the file which * determine whether IOCTL can be used on the opened file later. * * The access right is attached to the opened file in hook_file_open(). */ if (allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV) return 0; if (!is_device(file)) return 0; if (is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(cmd)) return 0; return -EACCES; } static void hook_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom, *prev_dom; /* * Lock already held by __f_setown(), see commit 26f204380a3c ("fs: Fix * file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies"). */ lockdep_assert_held(&file_f_owner(file)->lock); new_dom = landlock_get_current_domain(); landlock_get_ruleset(new_dom); prev_dom = landlock_file(file)->fown_domain; landlock_file(file)->fown_domain = new_dom; /* Called in an RCU read-side critical section. */ landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(prev_dom); } static void hook_file_free_security(struct file *file) { landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(landlock_file(file)->fown_domain); } static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security_rcu, hook_inode_free_security_rcu), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, hook_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, hook_file_ioctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, hook_file_ioctl_compat), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, hook_file_set_fowner), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, hook_file_free_security), }; __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void) { security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), &landlock_lsmid); } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST /* clang-format off */ static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = { KUNIT_CASE(test_no_more_access), KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_with_exec_none), KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_with_exec_some), KUNIT_CASE(test_scope_to_request_without_access), KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_none), KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_refer), KUNIT_CASE(test_is_eacces_with_write), {} }; /* clang-format on */ static struct kunit_suite test_suite = { .name = "landlock_fs", .test_cases = test_cases, }; kunit_test_suite(test_suite); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */