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authorJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>2021-03-02 09:51:42 +0100
committerDavid Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>2021-03-02 10:54:38 +0100
commit1265dbafcdce30c6e6db914b70f2824851c0e0b7 (patch)
treea3bcc3e91b9128eb858437bad2863dbc5ec15af1
parentd54072587146dd0db9bb52b513234d944edabda3 (diff)
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kernel-5.10: backport chacha non block size optimizations
These make a big difference when doing WireGuard with small armv7 routers, and the 5.4 backport already has it. Suggested-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy <ilya.lipnitskiy@gmail.com> Cc: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net> Cc: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
-rw-r--r--target/linux/generic/backport-5.10/071-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch272
-rw-r--r--target/linux/generic/backport-5.10/072-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-add-missing-counter-increment.patch38
2 files changed, 310 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.10/071-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.10/071-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b1f46e9af8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.10/071-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-optimize-for-non-block-size-m.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+From 03662fcd41f4b764857f17b95f9a2a63c24bddd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 17:28:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] crypto: arm/chacha-neon - optimize for non-block size
+ multiples
+
+commit 86cd97ec4b943af35562a74688bc4e909b32c3d1 upstream.
+
+The current NEON based ChaCha implementation for ARM is optimized for
+multiples of 4x the ChaCha block size (64 bytes). This makes sense for
+block encryption, but given that ChaCha is also often used in the
+context of networking, it makes sense to consider arbitrary length
+inputs as well.
+
+For example, WireGuard typically uses 1420 byte packets, and performing
+ChaCha encryption involves 5 invocations of chacha_4block_xor_neon()
+and 3 invocations of chacha_block_xor_neon(), where the last one also
+involves a memcpy() using a buffer on the stack to process the final
+chunk of 1420 % 64 == 12 bytes.
+
+Let's optimize for this case as well, by letting chacha_4block_xor_neon()
+deal with any input size between 64 and 256 bytes, using NEON permutation
+instructions and overlapping loads and stores. This way, the 140 byte
+tail of a 1420 byte input buffer can simply be processed in one go.
+
+This results in the following performance improvements for 1420 byte
+blocks, without significant impact on power-of-2 input sizes. (Note
+that Raspberry Pi is widely used in combination with a 32-bit kernel,
+even though the core is 64-bit capable)
+
+ Cortex-A8 (BeagleBone) : 7%
+ Cortex-A15 (Calxeda Midway) : 21%
+ Cortex-A53 (Raspberry Pi 3) : 3%
+ Cortex-A72 (Raspberry Pi 4) : 19%
+
+Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+---
+ arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 34 +++++------
+ arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
++++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
+ asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ int nrounds);
+ asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_neon(const u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+- int nrounds);
++ int nrounds, unsigned int nbytes);
+ asmlinkage void hchacha_block_arm(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
+ asmlinkage void hchacha_block_neon(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds);
+
+@@ -42,24 +42,24 @@ static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8
+ {
+ u8 buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+- while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) {
+- chacha_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds);
+- bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
+- src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
+- dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4;
+- state[12] += 4;
+- }
+- while (bytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+- chacha_block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds);
+- bytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+- src += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+- dst += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+- state[12]++;
++ while (bytes > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
++ unsigned int l = min(bytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4U);
++
++ chacha_4block_xor_neon(state, dst, src, nrounds, l);
++ bytes -= l;
++ src += l;
++ dst += l;
++ state[12] += DIV_ROUND_UP(l, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+ if (bytes) {
+- memcpy(buf, src, bytes);
+- chacha_block_xor_neon(state, buf, buf, nrounds);
+- memcpy(dst, buf, bytes);
++ const u8 *s = src;
++ u8 *d = dst;
++
++ if (bytes != CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)
++ s = d = memcpy(buf, src, bytes);
++ chacha_block_xor_neon(state, d, s, nrounds);
++ if (d != dst)
++ memcpy(dst, buf, bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S
++++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-neon-core.S
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
+ */
+
+ #include <linux/linkage.h>
++#include <asm/cache.h>
+
+ .text
+ .fpu neon
+@@ -205,7 +206,7 @@ ENDPROC(hchacha_block_neon)
+
+ .align 5
+ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
+- push {r4-r5}
++ push {r4, lr}
+ mov r4, sp // preserve the stack pointer
+ sub ip, sp, #0x20 // allocate a 32 byte buffer
+ bic ip, ip, #0x1f // aligned to 32 bytes
+@@ -229,10 +230,10 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
+ vld1.32 {q0-q1}, [r0]
+ vld1.32 {q2-q3}, [ip]
+
+- adr r5, .Lctrinc
++ adr lr, .Lctrinc
+ vdup.32 q15, d7[1]
+ vdup.32 q14, d7[0]
+- vld1.32 {q4}, [r5, :128]
++ vld1.32 {q4}, [lr, :128]
+ vdup.32 q13, d6[1]
+ vdup.32 q12, d6[0]
+ vdup.32 q11, d5[1]
+@@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
+
+ // Re-interleave the words in the first two rows of each block (x0..7).
+ // Also add the counter values 0-3 to x12[0-3].
+- vld1.32 {q8}, [r5, :128] // load counter values 0-3
++ vld1.32 {q8}, [lr, :128] // load counter values 0-3
+ vzip.32 q0, q1 // => (0 1 0 1) (0 1 0 1)
+ vzip.32 q2, q3 // => (2 3 2 3) (2 3 2 3)
+ vzip.32 q4, q5 // => (4 5 4 5) (4 5 4 5)
+@@ -493,6 +494,8 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
+
+ // Re-interleave the words in the last two rows of each block (x8..15).
+ vld1.32 {q8-q9}, [sp, :256]
++ mov sp, r4 // restore original stack pointer
++ ldr r4, [r4, #8] // load number of bytes
+ vzip.32 q12, q13 // => (12 13 12 13) (12 13 12 13)
+ vzip.32 q14, q15 // => (14 15 14 15) (14 15 14 15)
+ vzip.32 q8, q9 // => (8 9 8 9) (8 9 8 9)
+@@ -520,41 +523,121 @@ ENTRY(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
+ // XOR the rest of the data with the keystream
+
+ vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
++ subs r4, r4, #96
+ veor q0, q0, q8
+ veor q1, q1, q12
++ ble .Lle96
+ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
+
+ vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
++ subs r4, r4, #32
+ veor q0, q0, q2
+ veor q1, q1, q6
++ ble .Lle128
+ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
+
+ vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
++ subs r4, r4, #32
+ veor q0, q0, q10
+ veor q1, q1, q14
++ ble .Lle160
+ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
+
+ vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
++ subs r4, r4, #32
+ veor q0, q0, q4
+ veor q1, q1, q5
++ ble .Lle192
+ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
+
+ vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
++ subs r4, r4, #32
+ veor q0, q0, q9
+ veor q1, q1, q13
++ ble .Lle224
+ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
+
+ vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]!
++ subs r4, r4, #32
+ veor q0, q0, q3
+ veor q1, q1, q7
++ blt .Llt256
++.Lout:
+ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]!
+
+ vld1.8 {q0-q1}, [r2]
+- mov sp, r4 // restore original stack pointer
+ veor q0, q0, q11
+ veor q1, q1, q15
+ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]
+
+- pop {r4-r5}
+- bx lr
++ pop {r4, pc}
++
++.Lle192:
++ vmov q4, q9
++ vmov q5, q13
++
++.Lle160:
++ // nothing to do
++
++.Lfinalblock:
++ // Process the final block if processing less than 4 full blocks.
++ // Entered with 32 bytes of ChaCha cipher stream in q4-q5, and the
++ // previous 32 byte output block that still needs to be written at
++ // [r1] in q0-q1.
++ beq .Lfullblock
++
++.Lpartialblock:
++ adr lr, .Lpermute + 32
++ add r2, r2, r4
++ add lr, lr, r4
++ add r4, r4, r1
++
++ vld1.8 {q2-q3}, [lr]
++ vld1.8 {q6-q7}, [r2]
++
++ add r4, r4, #32
++
++ vtbl.8 d4, {q4-q5}, d4
++ vtbl.8 d5, {q4-q5}, d5
++ vtbl.8 d6, {q4-q5}, d6
++ vtbl.8 d7, {q4-q5}, d7
++
++ veor q6, q6, q2
++ veor q7, q7, q3
++
++ vst1.8 {q6-q7}, [r4] // overlapping stores
++ vst1.8 {q0-q1}, [r1]
++ pop {r4, pc}
++
++.Lfullblock:
++ vmov q11, q4
++ vmov q15, q5
++ b .Lout
++.Lle96:
++ vmov q4, q2
++ vmov q5, q6
++ b .Lfinalblock
++.Lle128:
++ vmov q4, q10
++ vmov q5, q14
++ b .Lfinalblock
++.Lle224:
++ vmov q4, q3
++ vmov q5, q7
++ b .Lfinalblock
++.Llt256:
++ vmov q4, q11
++ vmov q5, q15
++ b .Lpartialblock
+ ENDPROC(chacha_4block_xor_neon)
++
++ .align L1_CACHE_SHIFT
++.Lpermute:
++ .byte 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07
++ .byte 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
++ .byte 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17
++ .byte 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f
++ .byte 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07
++ .byte 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
++ .byte 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17
++ .byte 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f
diff --git a/target/linux/generic/backport-5.10/072-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-add-missing-counter-increment.patch b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.10/072-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-add-missing-counter-increment.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e4d2041e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/linux/generic/backport-5.10/072-crypto-arm-chacha-neon-add-missing-counter-increment.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 7f63462faf9eab69132bea9abd48c2c05a93145b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
+Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2020 15:39:29 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] crypto: arm/chacha-neon - add missing counter increment
+
+commit fd16931a2f518a32753920ff20895e5cf04c8ff1 upstream.
+
+Commit 86cd97ec4b943af3 ("crypto: arm/chacha-neon - optimize for non-block
+size multiples") refactored the chacha block handling in the glue code in
+a way that may result in the counter increment to be omitted when calling
+chacha_block_xor_neon() to process a full block. This violates the skcipher
+API, which requires that the output IV is suitable for handling more input
+as long as the preceding input has been presented in round multiples of the
+block size. Also, the same code is exposed via the chacha library interface
+whose callers may actually rely on this increment to occur even for final
+blocks that are smaller than the chacha block size.
+
+So increment the counter after calling chacha_block_xor_neon().
+
+Fixes: 86cd97ec4b943af3 ("crypto: arm/chacha-neon - optimize for non-block size multiples")
+Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+---
+ arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
++++ b/arch/arm/crypto/chacha-glue.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void chacha_doneon(u32 *state, u8
+ chacha_block_xor_neon(state, d, s, nrounds);
+ if (d != dst)
+ memcpy(dst, buf, bytes);
++ state[12]++;
+ }
+ }
+