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-rw-r--r--config/Config-kernel.in23
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/config/Config-kernel.in b/config/Config-kernel.in
index 2243e3e5bc..902e211ea1 100644
--- a/config/Config-kernel.in
+++ b/config/Config-kernel.in
@@ -114,6 +114,16 @@ config KERNEL_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
Enabling this option on architectures that support unaligned
accesses may produce a lot of false positives.
+config KERNEL_UBSAN_BOUNDS
+ bool "Perform array index bounds checking"
+ depends on KERNEL_UBSAN
+ help
+ This option enables detection of directly indexed out of bounds array
+ accesses, where the array size is known at compile time. Note that
+ this does not protect array overflows via bad calls to the
+ {str,mem}*cpy() family of functions (that is addressed by
+ FORTIFY_SOURCE).
+
config KERNEL_UBSAN_NULL
bool "Enable checking of null pointers"
depends on KERNEL_UBSAN
@@ -121,6 +131,19 @@ config KERNEL_UBSAN_NULL
This option enables detection of memory accesses via a
null pointer.
+config KERNEL_UBSAN_TRAP
+ bool "On Sanitizer warnings, abort the running kernel code"
+ depends on KERNEL_UBSAN
+ help
+ Building kernels with Sanitizer features enabled tends to grow the
+ kernel size by around 5%, due to adding all the debugging text on
+ failure paths. To avoid this, Sanitizer instrumentation can just
+ issue a trap. This reduces the kernel size overhead but turns all
+ warnings (including potentially harmless conditions) into full
+ exceptions that abort the running kernel code (regardless of context,
+ locks held, etc), which may destabilize the system. For some system
+ builders this is an acceptable trade-off.
+
config KERNEL_KASAN
bool "Compile the kernel with KASan: runtime memory debugger"
select KERNEL_SLUB_DEBUG